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This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  Britain	  and	  transatlantic	  slavery	  in	  the	  
post-­‐emancipation	  period.	  Following	  West	  Indian	  emancipation	  various	  types	  of	  
British	  capitalists	  continued	  to	  profit	  from	  both	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  slave-­‐ownership.	  
These	  economic	  connections	  had	  to	  be	  rationalised	  within	  a	  Britain	  politically	  and	  
ideologically	  committed	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  British	  government,	  
abolitionists,	  and	  capitalists	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery,	  namely	  the	  
question	  of	  whether	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  operate	  morally	  in	  an	  Atlantic	  economy	  built	  
upon	  chattel	  slavery.	  I	  explore	  a	  number	  of	  controversies	  relating	  to	  both	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  debates	  
must	  be	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  a	  longer	  tradition	  of	  slavery	  apologism	  that	  stretched	  
back	  to	  the	  struggles	  over	  slave	  trade	  abolition	  and	  West	  Indian	  emancipation.	  In	  doing	  
so	  I	  complicate	  our	  understanding	  of	  Britain	  as	  anti-­‐slavery	  nation.	  
Debates	  over	  British	  involvement	  of	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  blended	  economic	  and	  
moral	  arguments.	  As	  such	  my	  thesis	  stresses	  the	  historically	  contingent	  nature	  of	  
appeals	  to	  economic	  rationality,	  a	  key	  strategy	  of	  British	  capitalists	  justifying	  profiting	  
from	  slavery.	  By	  examining	  business	  records,	  private	  correspondence,	  and	  government	  
papers	  I	  establish	  the	  material	  basis	  of	  British	  involvement	  with	  transatlantic	  slavery.	  I	  
also	  analyse	  debates	  that	  took	  place	  in	  newspapers,	  journals,	  and	  parliament	  to	  explore	  
the	  arguments	  advanced	  about	  Britain,	  commerce,	  and	  slavery.	  I	  demonstrate	  how	  
British	  capitalists	  justified	  profiting	  from	  transatlantic	  slavery	  through	  a	  construction	  
of	  Britons	  as	  more	  civilized	  than	  foreign	  slave	  owners,	  slave	  traders,	  and	  enslaved	  
people.	  That	  this	  imagined	  geography	  provided	  a	  solution	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  
speaks	  to	  the	  heterogeneous	  nature	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  ideology	  in	  Victorian	  Britain.
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Introduction:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Capital	  
In	  June	  of	  1840	  abolitionists	  from	  around	  the	  globe	  crowded	  into	  London’s	  
Freemason’s	  Hall	  to	  attend	  the	  first	  General	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention.	  This	  was	  a	  grand	  
occasion	  with	  even	  grander	  aims.	  In	  the	  opening	  address	  Thomas	  Clarkson,	  the	  81-­‐
year-­‐old	  veteran	  of	  British	  abolitionism,	  laid	  down	  the	  gauntlet	  to	  his	  audience:	  ‘My	  
dear	  friends	  you	  have	  a	  most	  difficult	  task	  to	  perform;	  it	  is	  neither	  more	  or	  less	  the	  
extirpation	  of	  slavery	  from	  the	  whole	  world.’1	  Implicit	  in	  this	  call	  to	  arms	  were	  two	  
assertions;	  that	  slavery	  had,	  mostly,	  been	  overcome	  in	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  that	  this	  
success	  should	  be	  exported	  to	  the	  wider	  world.	  British	  abolitionists	  having	  seen	  the	  
Anglo-­‐American	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  abolished	  and	  West	  Indian	  slaves	  
emancipated	  looked	  out	  on	  a	  world	  still	  dominated	  by	  slavery.	  Yet,	  some	  like	  the	  Irish	  
abolitionist	  Richard	  Allen	  also	  looked	  inwards.	  Warning	  against	  triumphalism	  Allen	  
told	  the	  Convention	  ‘I	  have	  long	  been	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  while	  we	  were	  speaking	  
strongly	  against	  those	  abroad	  who	  are	  connected	  with	  slavery,	  we,	  ourselves,	  as	  a	  
nation,	  were	  not	  entirely	  clear	  of	  the	  guilt.’2	  The	  Irishman	  feared	  that	  many	  British	  
subjects	  remained	  heavily	  involved	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  and	  proposed	  a	  committee	  
investigate	  the	  following:	  
1. Whether	  manacles	  for	  slaves	  are	  manufactured	  in	  this	  country?	  
2. Whether	  large	  quantities	  of	  inferior	  fire-­‐arms	  are	  also	  manufactured	  in	  
Great	  Britain,	  to	  be	  sold	  to	  the	  Africans	  for	  their	  slave	  wars?	  
3. Whether	  cotton	  goods	  of	  a	  particular	  fabric	  and	  to	  a	  large	  amount	  are	  
manufactured	  in	  this	  country,	  and	  solely	  intended	  for	  being	  used	  in	  
barter	  for	  African	  slaves?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  BFASS,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  General	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention,	  called	  by	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  
British	  and	  Foreign	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Society,	  and	  Held	  in	  London,	  from	  Friday,	  June	  12th,	  to	  Tuesday,	  
June	  23rd,	  1840	  (London:	  1841),	  p.	  
3.[https://archive.org/stream/oates71027137#page/n3/mode/2up,	  accessed	  5	  July	  2017]	  
(Italics	  in	  original)	  
2	  Ibid,	  p.	  265.	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4. 	  Whether	  persons	  in	  England	  hold	  shares	  in	  Brazilian	  and	  other	  mines	  
which	  are	  worked	  by	  slaves?	  
5. Whether	  any	  British	  Joint	  Stock	  Banks	  have	  branch	  establishments	  in	  
countries	  in	  which	  the	  slave-­‐trade	  prevails?	  
6. What	  are	  the	  quantities	  of	  gunpowder	  exported	  from	  any	  port	  or	  ports	  
in	  Great	  Britain	  to	  Africa	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  respectively?3	  
Allen’s	  questions	  spoke	  not	  only	  to	  fears	  about	  the	  complicity	  of	  Britons	  in	  the	  multi-­‐
national	  system	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  British	  commercial	  
activity	  in	  the	  early	  Victorian	  period.	  The	  first	  four	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
had	  been	  a	  period	  of	  economic	  innovation	  and	  ascendancy.	  British	  bankers,	  
manufacturers,	  merchants,	  and	  shareholders	  had	  inserted	  themselves	  into	  the	  
economies	  of	  the	  Americas	  and	  Africa.	  This	  process	  had	  corresponded	  with	  the	  
dismantling	  of	  slavery	  within	  the	  British	  Empire	  from	  the	  Abolition	  Act	  of	  1807	  
onwards,	  but	  now	  there	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  tension	  between	  commercial	  expansion	  and	  
moral	  progress.	  Allen’s	  speech	  was	  met	  with	  still	  more	  examples	  of	  British	  wrongdoing	  
from	  the	  crowd.	  London	  was	  said	  to	  be	  home	  to	  ‘sleeping	  partners	  in	  the	  mercantile	  
houses	  of	  Cuba;	  and	  these	  traitors	  to	  humanity	  are	  the	  main	  pillars	  of	  slavery	  and	  the	  
slave-­‐trade’.	  This	  was	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  abolitionists	  who	  hoped	  that	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐
slavery	  example	  might	  inspire	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  to	  follow	  suit.	  If	  Britain	  were	  to	  be	  
an	  anti-­‐slavery	  beacon	  then,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Joseph	  Sturge,	  ‘it	  must	  be	  one	  great	  object	  
of	  this	  Convention	  to	  drag	  out	  these	  atrocities	  to	  public	  light.’4	  According	  to	  John	  H.	  
Hinton	  the	  solution	  was	  simple;	  those	  whose	  capital	  supported	  slavery	  should	  be	  
exposed	  and	  ‘ought	  to	  be	  exhibited	  to	  universal	  execration.’5	  In	  theory	  publicity	  and	  
infamy	  would	  force	  British	  capitalists	  to	  abandon	  involvement	  in	  slavery,	  cleansing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Ibid,	  p.	  265.	  




commerce	  and	  maintaining	  the	  nation’s	  reputation.	  This	  thesis	  explains	  why	  such	  
condemnation	  failed	  to	  materialise	  and	  how	  the	  practices	  revealed	  on	  the	  Convention	  
floor	  were	  reconciled	  in	  a	  Britain	  politically	  and	  culturally	  opposed	  to	  slavery.	  	  	  
Victorian	  Britain	  has	  been	  described	  as	  an	  ‘anti-­‐slavery	  nation’.	  This	  term	  was	  coined	  
by	  Richard	  Huzzey	  as	  a	  means	  of	  capturing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  
played	  an	  important	  role	  within	  British	  political	  culture	  in	  the	  decades	  after	  
emancipation.6	  Within	  such	  a	  context	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  links	  to	  slavery	  identified	  at	  
the	  1840	  Convention	  to	  have	  sparked	  controversy,	  soul-­‐searching,	  or	  government	  
intervention.	  This	  was	  far	  from	  the	  case	  as	  no	  popular	  movement	  or	  sustained	  political	  
inquiry	  into	  British	  complicity	  with	  slavery	  ever	  emerged.	  Few	  attempts	  have	  been	  
made	  to	  understand	  this	  absence	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  rank	  hypocrisy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  British	  government	  and	  its	  subjects.7	  I	  contend	  that	  such	  a	  conclusion	  misread	  the	  
questions	  raised	  by	  the	  1840	  convention.	  Richard	  Allen’s	  revelations	  addressed	  a	  
tension	  and	  betrayed	  the	  contradictions	  in	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  its	  
economic	  relationship	  with	  the	  wider	  world.	  In	  addressing	  this	  tension	  I	  make	  a	  
contribution	  to	  longstanding	  historical	  attempts	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  relationship	  
between	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  capitalism.	  I	  do	  so	  by	  proposing	  that	  attempts	  to	  expose	  
British	  complicity	  with	  slavery	  by	  abolitionists	  such	  as	  Richard	  Allen	  were	  just	  one	  of	  
many	  solutions	  to	  what	  I	  term	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
The	  problem	  of	  slavery,	  as	  conceptualised	  across	  a	  series	  of	  landmark	  works	  by	  David	  
Brion	  Davis,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  contradictions	  embodied	  in	  ‘converting	  humans	  
into	  totally	  compliant,	  submissive	  chattel	  property.’8	  Within	  the	  British	  Empire	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  slavery,	  and	  post	  slavery	  ‘apprenticeship’,	  all	  provided	  solutions	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  R.	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning:	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  and	  Empire	  in	  Victorian	  Britain	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  2012),	  p.	  5-­‐20.	  
7	  	  M.	  Sherwood,	  After	  Abolition:	  Britain	  and	  the	  Slave	  Trade	  since	  1807	  (London:	  IB	  Tauris,	  2007).	  
8	  D.	  B.	  Davis,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Slavery	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Emancipation	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  2014),	  p.	  13,	  
see	  also	  D.	  B.	  Davis,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Slavery	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Revolution,	  1770-­‐1823	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  1975,	  pp.	  39-­‐41.	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this	  problem	  by	  defining	  slavery	  as	  a	  morally	  and	  legally	  indefensible.	  However,	  in	  
Victorian	  Britain	  new	  questions	  emerged.	  How	  might	  this	  repudiation	  of	  slavery	  within	  
the	  Empire	  square	  with	  the	  continued	  intercourse	  with	  slave	  systems	  throughout	  the	  
wider	  world?	  	  How	  was	  the	  involvement	  of	  British	  subjects	  with	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  
trade	  reconciled	  with	  cultural	  and	  political	  opposition	  to	  human	  bondage?	  Rather	  than	  
confronting	  the	  problem	  of	  slavery,	  various	  abolitionists,	  capitalists,	  and	  government	  
officials	  attempted	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  Britain’s	  position	  in	  the	  world	  and	  faced	  instead	  
the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  These	  groups	  approached	  the	  problem	  from	  different	  
perspectives.	  Abolitionists	  attempted	  to	  cleanse	  British	  commerce	  of	  its	  troubling	  
connections.	  Capitalists	  asserted	  they	  were	  conducting	  their	  business	  morally.	  The	  
British	  state	  sought	  to	  reconcile	  an	  explicitly	  anti-­‐slavery	  foreign	  policy	  with	  a	  
commitment	  to	  commercial	  expansion.	  
	  This	  chapter	  sets	  out	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  thesis,	  providing	  a	  number	  of	  key	  definitions.	  
Next,	  I	  survey	  the	  relatively	  small	  and	  fragmentary	  historical	  work	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	  
British	  complicity	  with	  slavery,	  which	  was	  often	  the	  result	  of	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
commercial	  expansion.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  establish	  the	  need	  for	  more	  work	  on	  how	  British	  
profiting	  from	  slavery	  was	  rationalised	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period.	  I	  set	  out	  how	  
this	  thesis	  will	  expand	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  slavery,	  anti-­‐
slavery,	  and	  Victorian	  capitalism.	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  Victorian	  Britain	  where	  
opposition	  to	  slavery	  was	  widely	  expressed,	  but	  partial	  in	  focus	  and	  indecisively	  
practiced.	  	  	  
Definitions	  and	  Boundaries	  
To	  understand	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  the	  age	  of	  capital	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  set	  out	  a	  few	  
key	  definitions.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  “anti-­‐slavery”	  and	  
9	  
	  
“abolitionism”	  or	  “abolitionist.”9	  Those	  latter	  terms	  are	  reserved	  for	  individuals	  and	  
groups	  who	  actively	  campaigned	  for	  the	  end	  of	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade	  or	  as	  Turley	  
has	  termed	  them	  ‘the	  active	  minority	  –	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  reformers.’10	  Here	  ‘abolitionist’	  
most	  often	  refers	  to	  members	  of	  the	  British	  and	  Foreign	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Society	  (BFASS),	  
or	  one	  of	  the	  many	  provincial	  societies	  in	  Britain	  that	  actively	  campaigned	  or	  lobbied	  
the	  government	  to	  take	  action	  against	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade.	  	  
The	  term	  ‘anti-­‐slavery’	  is	  more	  slippery	  but	  might	  be	  best	  understood	  as	  broad-­‐based	  
opposition	  to	  slavery.	  As	  Linda	  Colley	  argues	  this	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  was	  central	  to	  
ideas	  of	  British	  patriotism,	  especially	  after	  1838.11	  Within	  this	  broad	  opposition	  to	  
human	  bondage	  lay	  countless	  different	  interpretations	  of	  why	  slavery	  was	  wrong,	  how	  
it	  should	  be	  ended,	  and	  when	  it	  should	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  Richard	  Huzzey	  defines	  anti-­‐
slavery	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “ideology,”	  drawing	  on	  Michael	  Freeden’s	  use	  of	  the	  concept,	  
meaning	  ‘the	  family	  of	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  wrongfulness	  of	  slavery.’12	  This	  definition	  
usefully	  captures	  the	  numerous	  and	  often	  contradictory	  ways	  in	  which	  opposition	  to	  
slavery	  could	  be	  expressed	  and	  practiced.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  as	  “ideology”	  is	  central	  to	  
Huzzey’s	  depiction	  of	  Britain	  as	  ‘anti-­‐slavery	  nation’	  and	  it	  is	  a	  definition	  maintained	  
here	  with	  minor	  qualifications.	  	  
The	  depth	  of	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  felt	  by	  any	  individual	  actor	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  for	  
sure,	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  some,	  particularly	  former	  West	  Indian	  slave-­‐owners,	  invoked	  
anti-­‐slavery	  cynically.	  This	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  Britons	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  
system	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery	  made	  appeals	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  The	  fact	  that	  links	  to	  slave	  
traders	  and	  even	  slave-­‐ownership	  could	  be	  defended	  arguably	  stretches	  the	  concept	  of	  
anti-­‐slavery	  “ideology”	  to	  breaking	  point.	  However,	  after	  1838	  only	  the	  most	  maverick	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This	  distinction	  echoes	  that	  of	  David	  Brion	  Davis	  in	  The	  Problem	  of	  Slavery	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  
Revolution,	  pp.	  21-­‐22	  and	  extended	  discussion	  in	  R.	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  pp.	  5-­‐20.	  
10	  D.	  Turley,	  The	  Culture	  of	  English	  Anti-­‐Slavery,	  1780-­‐1860	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1991),	  p.	  2.	  
11	  L.	  Colley,	  Britons:	  Forging	  the	  Nation,	  1707-­‐1837	  (London:	  Pimlico,	  2003),	  pp.	  354-­‐355.	  
12	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  p.8;	  M.	  Freeden,	  ‘Ideology	  and	  Political	  Theory’,	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Ideologies,	  11	  (2006),	  pp.	  3-­‐22.	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of	  individuals	  would	  publicly	  defend	  slavery	  in	  the	  abstract.	  Even	  critics	  of	  
emancipation	  such	  as	  Thomas	  Carlyle	  stopped	  short	  of	  calling	  for	  the	  return	  of	  
slavery.13	  Recognition	  of	  this	  fact	  also	  requires	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  for	  the	  
majority	  of	  Victorians	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  far	  from	  synonymous	  with	  a	  belief	  in	  racial	  
equality.	  Rather,	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  often	  rested	  upon	  the	  understanding	  that	  people	  
of	  African	  descent	  were	  less	  civilized	  than	  white	  Britons.	  In	  fact,	  Douglas	  Lorimer	  has	  
argued	  the	  abolitionist	  campaign	  against	  slavery	  ‘intensifi[ed]’	  a	  particularly	  
hierarchical	  ‘race	  consciousnesses	  among	  Victorians’.14	  Later	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  
suggest	  that	  looking	  back	  to	  pre-­‐emancipation	  apologies	  for	  slavery	  might	  deepen	  our	  
understanding	  of	  how	  profiting	  from	  slavery	  could	  be	  rationalised	  as	  consistent	  with	  a	  
professed	  opposition	  to	  slavery.	  	  Ultimately,	  I	  utilise	  Huzzey’s	  definition	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  
as	  heterogeneous	  and	  diverse,	  whilst	  placing	  my	  own	  work	  alongside	  recent	  research	  
on	  the	  legacies	  of	  slavery	  in	  Britain.	  
Although	  anti-­‐slavery	  can	  refer	  to	  an	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  in	  the	  widest	  sense,	  the	  
problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  conceptualised	  within	  this	  thesis	  is	  limited	  to	  discussion	  of	  
British	  complicity	  with	  transatlantic	  slavery.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  to	  encapsulate	  both	  the	  
transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  and	  chattel	  slavery	  as	  practiced	  in	  the	  Americas	  and	  
Caribbean.	  This	  perspective	  of	  course	  excludes	  slavery	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐
continent.	  Indian	  and	  African	  slavery	  lived	  on	  past	  the	  Emancipation	  Act	  of	  1833	  and	  
this	  would	  generate	  controversy	  in	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  However,	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  
Indian	  and	  African	  slaveries,	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  British	  Empire,	  will	  explain	  
why	  they	  mostly	  fall	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  study.	  
After	  1833	  there	  were	  still	  a	  large	  number	  of	  slaves	  within	  the	  areas	  of	  India	  under	  
British	  rule,	  at	  this	  point	  still	  administered	  by	  the	  East	  India	  Company.	  Debates	  over	  
the	  Emancipation	  Act	  coincided	  with	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  Company’s	  charter	  sparking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  pp.	  85-­‐9.	  
14	  D.	  Lorimer,	  Colour,	  Class	  and	  the	  Victorians:	  English	  Attitudes	  to	  the	  Negro	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐
Nineteenth	  Century	  (Leicester:	  Leicester	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.	  69.	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debate	  over	  the	  question	  of	  slavery	  in	  India	  itself.	  However,	  Indian	  slavery	  in	  both	  form	  
and	  extent	  was	  poorly	  understood.	  Slavery	  in	  India	  was	  a	  diverse	  heterogeneous	  
institution	  that	  did	  not	  quite	  fit	  with	  the	  common	  British	  understanding	  of	  racialised,	  
chattel	  slavery	  as	  practiced	  in	  the	  Caribbean.15	  An	  1838	  Law	  Commission	  investigating	  
Company	  rule	  in	  India	  highlighted	  at	  least	  sixteen	  paths	  into	  slavery,	  including	  the	  
practice	  of	  selling	  one’s	  self	  into	  bondage.	  Rather	  than	  being	  grounded	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  
property	  rights	  and	  absolute	  ownership	  the	  variegated	  slavery	  practices	  of	  India	  were	  
bound	  up	  in	  Islamic	  and	  Hindu	  law	  as	  well	  the	  caste	  system.	  Indian	  society	  was	  ‘an	  
intricate	  system	  of	  reciprocal	  rights	  and	  obligations’	  of	  which	  slavery	  was	  just	  one	  and	  
East	  India	  Company	  rule	  depended	  on	  the	  military	  support	  of	  an	  Indian	  elite	  
committed	  to	  maintaining	  these	  hierarchies.16	  Contemporary	  estimates	  placed	  
numbers	  at	  anywhere	  between	  1	  and	  16	  million	  individuals	  held	  in	  bondage	  and	  this	  
lack	  of	  clarity	  over	  numbers	  compounded	  attempts	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  problem.17	  
Howard	  Temperley	  has	  traced	  how	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  Company	  officials,	  and	  a	  
government-­‐appointed	  Law	  Commission	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  compensated	  
emancipation	  would	  prove	  too	  complex,	  disruptive,	  and	  costly	  to	  enforce	  in	  British-­‐
ruled	  India.	  Rather	  a	  policy	  of	  ‘delegalization’	  was	  pursued	  forbidding	  British	  courts	  
from	  recognising	  slavery	  rather	  than	  actively	  freeing	  slaves.	  These	  reforms	  undertaken	  
in	  1843	  ultimately	  saw	  much	  of	  Indian	  slavery	  redefined	  as	  debt	  bondage.18	  
Slavery	  within	  Africa	  would	  pose	  persistent	  and	  shifting	  questions	  as	  Britain’s	  colonial	  
presence	  in	  the	  continent	  developed	  from	  the	  1830s	  onwards.	  At	  the	  point	  of	  West	  
Indian	  emancipation	  British	  possessions	  in	  Africa	  amounted	  to	  the	  formal	  colonies	  of	  
the	  Cape	  of	  Good	  Hope	  and	  Sierra	  Leone,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  trading	  forts	  dotted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  M.	  Finn,	  ‘Slaves	  Out	  of	  Context:	  Domestic	  Slavery	  and	  the	  Anglo-­‐Indian	  Family,	  c.	  1780-­‐1830’,	  
Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Historical	  Society,	  19	  (2009),	  pp.	  181-­‐203.	  Also	  see	  I.	  Chatterjee,	  
Gender,	  Slavery,	  and	  Law	  in	  Colonial	  India	  (New	  Delhi,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  
16	  H.	  Temperley,	  ‘The	  Delegalization	  of	  Slavery	  in	  British	  India’,	  Slavery	  &	  Abolition,	  21:2,	  pp.	  
167-­‐189,	  pp.	  177-­‐9.	  	  
17	  Ibid,	  pp.	  176-­‐177.	  
18	  Ibid,	  pp.	  183-­‐186.	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along	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  and	  Gambia	  River.	  Within	  these	  formal	  possessions	  a	  West	  Indian-­‐
style	  emancipation,	  or	  what	  Suzanne	  Miers	  calls	  the	  ‘colonial	  model’	  was	  theoretically	  
enforced.19	  However,	  as	  Britain	  began	  to	  increase	  its	  formal	  African	  possessions,	  
beginning	  with	  the	  annexation	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  in	  1874,	  a	  policy	  of	  Indian	  style	  
delegalization	  was	  adopted.	  As	  in	  India	  this	  was	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  forms	  of	  
bondage	  and	  coerced	  labour	  within	  African	  society,	  which	  were	  poorly	  understood	  by	  
European	  observers.20	  Colonial	  official	  also	  believed	  that	  wholescale	  emancipations	  
would	  prove	  disruptive.	  Hardening	  of	  colonial	  rule	  from	  the	  1880s	  onwards	  would	  see	  
slavery	  dealt	  with	  via	  a	  ‘veritable	  hodge-­‐podge	  of	  pragmatic	  solutions	  worked	  out	  by	  
each	  administration’.21	  	  
Ultimately,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  Britons	  slavery	  in	  Africa	  and	  India	  
was	  a	  relationship	  between	  indigenous	  groups	  in	  which	  the	  British	  themselves	  were	  
not	  complicit.	  Many	  British	  subjects	  did	  own	  slaves	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  inventories	  
and	  wills	  of	  East	  India	  Company	  officials.	  However,	  as	  Margot	  Finn	  has	  noted	  
parliamentary	  records	  generated	  from	  the	  1780s	  onwards	  saw	  Indian	  slaves	  
rhetorically	  repositioned	  as	  servants,	  reflecting	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  were	  
domestic	  slaves	  forming	  part	  of	  the	  household.22	  Similarly,	  the	  early	  1840s	  would	  see	  
brief	  controversy	  over	  the	  ownership	  of	  slaves	  by	  some	  British	  officials	  in	  West	  Africa.	  
The	  1833	  Emancipation	  Act	  would	  only	  be	  promulgated	  there	  in	  the	  1840s	  and	  an	  
1843	  Act	  banning	  pawning,	  a	  form	  of	  debt	  bondage,	  was	  generally	  ignored	  by	  officials	  
who	  operated	  beyond	  Colonial	  Office	  supervision.23	  Despite	  these	  realities	  both	  Africa	  
and	  India	  were	  perceived	  as	  potential	  arenas	  for	  free	  labour	  unlike	  the	  United	  States,	  
Brazil,	  or	  Cuba.	  For	  many	  Victorians	  there	  was	  what	  Seymour	  Drescher	  has	  called	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  S.	  Miers,	  ‘Slavery	  to	  Freedom	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa:	  Expectations	  and	  Reality’,	  Slavery	  &	  
Abolition,	  21:2	  (2000),	  237-­‐64,	  p.	  238.	  	  
20	  P.	  E.	  Lovejoy,	  Transformations	  in	  Slavery:	  A	  History	  of	  Slavery	  in	  Africa	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1983).	  	  
21	  Miers,	  ‘Slavery	  to	  Freedom’,	  pp.	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22	  Finn,	  ‘Slaves	  Out	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  Context’,	  pp.	  197-­‐198.	  
23	  G.	  E.	  Metcalfe,	  MacLean	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast:	  The	  Life	  and	  Times	  of	  George	  Maclean,	  1801	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  1847	  
(London:	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  University	  Press,	  1962),	  pp.	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‘categorical	  bifurcation’	  of	  two	  types	  of	  labour:	  slave	  and	  free.24	  The	  category	  of	  free	  
labour	  could	  include	  the	  “delegalized”	  slaveries	  of	  India	  and	  Africa	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
coerced	  labour	  of	  indentured	  Indian	  and	  Chinese	  workers	  in	  the	  Caribbean,	  although	  
all	  these	  systems	  might	  be	  indistinguishable	  in	  practice	  from	  transatlantic	  slavery.25	  
Discussions	  of	  Indian	  and	  African	  slavery	  then	  fall	  outside	  my	  concern,	  as	  British	  
subjects	  were	  not	  perceived	  as	  actively	  maintaining	  these	  slave	  systems.	  Rather,	  
policies	  such	  as	  delegalization	  and	  ignorance	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owning	  strengthened	  
belief	  in	  the	  British	  Empire	  as	  a	  slave	  free	  zone.	  Being	  anti-­‐slavery	  never	  demanded	  an	  
abandonment	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  coerced	  labour;	  the	  question	  it	  posed	  was	  whether	  it	  was	  
possible	  to	  operate	  morally	  in	  within	  an	  Atlantic	  economy	  built	  upon	  chattel	  slavery.	  
The	  idea	  of	  Britain	  as	  geographically	  isolated	  from	  slavery	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  
concept	  of	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  nation.	  Both	  David	  Brion	  Davis	  and	  Seymour	  Drescher	  have	  
argued	  Britain	  was	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  site	  of	  freedom	  geographically	  isolated	  and	  
distinct	  from	  slavery	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.26	  As	  Christopher	  Brown	  has	  
demonstrated	  such	  a	  vision	  of	  Britain	  could	  only	  emerge	  after	  the	  American	  Revolution	  
transformed	  the	  question	  of	  slavery	  into	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Empire.27	  
Following	  emancipation	  this	  freedom	  from	  slavery	  was	  then	  extended	  across	  the	  
British	  Empire.	  The	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  how	  this	  perception	  of	  Britain	  could	  
be	  maintained	  alongside	  commercial	  links	  to	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  system.	  The	  
borders	  of	  empire	  limited	  the	  majority	  of	  Britons’	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  sustained	  
the	  image	  of	  Britain	  as	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  nation.	  This	  is	  what	  Richard	  Huzzey,	  
repurposing	  a	  term	  first	  articulated	  by	  Felix	  Driver,	  has	  termed	  the	  ‘moral	  geography’	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  S.	  Drescher,	  The	  Mighty	  Experiment:	  Free	  Labour	  versus	  Slavery	  in	  British	  Emancipation	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  31-­‐2.	  
25For	  Chinese	  indentured	  labour	  C.	  Bischof,	  ‘Chinese	  Labourers,	  Free	  Blacks,	  and	  Social	  
Engineering	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Emancipation	  British	  West	  Indies’,	  Past	  &	  Present,	  231:1	  (2016),	  pp.	  
129-­‐168.	  
26	  D.	  B.	  Davis,	  Slavery	  and	  Human	  Progress	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  p.	  81;	  S.	  
Drescher,	  Capitalism	  and	  Antislavery:	  British	  Mobilization	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  
(Basingstoke:	  Macmillan,	  1986),	  p.	  17.	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  C.	  L.	  Brown,	  Moral	  Capital:	  Foundations	  of	  British	  Abolitionism	  (Chapel	  Hill,	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University	  Press,	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of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  my	  thesis	  as	  a	  whole	  hinges	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  British	  
empire	  as	  somewhere	  free	  from	  the	  taint	  of	  slavery.28	  	  
By	  the	  1840s	  the	  division	  between	  “freedom”	  and	  “slavery,”	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  world	  at	  
least,	  was	  roughly	  understood	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  This	  
relationship	  is	  analogous	  to	  what	  Catherine	  Hall	  has	  identified	  as	  the	  Victorian	  
understanding	  of	  ‘the	  gap	  between	  metropole	  and	  colony:	  civilization	  here,	  
barbarism/savagery	  there.’29	  Britain’s	  claims	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  were	  rooted	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  its	  subjects	  and	  government	  were	  uniquely	  opposed	  to	  slave	  labour	  and	  the	  slave	  
trade.	  Such	  a	  belief	  underwrote	  a	  British	  sense	  of	  moral	  and	  civilizational	  superiority	  
that	  shaped	  perceptions	  of	  Cuba,	  Brazil,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  more	  as	  places	  that	  
could	  be	  condemned,	  ignored,	  or	  transformed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  involvement	  with	  
transatlantic	  slavery.	  This	  was	  an	  ‘imagined	  geography’	  that	  culturally	  separated	  
Britain	  and	  its	  Empire	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.30	  However,	  as	  with	  the	  gap	  between	  
metropole	  and	  colony	  the	  division	  between	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  various	  slave	  
societies	  was	  ‘a	  slippery	  one,	  constantly	  being	  reworked.’31	  This	  reworking	  of	  the	  
division	  between	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain	  and	  transatlantic	  slavery	  had	  to	  take	  account	  of	  
the	  ability	  of	  capital	  to	  transcend	  borders	  of	  all	  kinds.	  This	  raises	  another	  definitional	  
question,	  that	  of	  capitalism	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
thesis.	  
That	  capitalism	  has	  some	  relation	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  has	  been	  accepted	  since	  Eric	  Williams	  
explicitly	  linked	  the	  two	  concepts	  in	  his	  1944	  work	  Capitalism	  &	  Slavery.32	  For	  
Williams,	  working	  in	  a	  Marxist	  tradition,	  market	  capitalism	  was	  associated	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  R.	  Huzzey,	  ‘The	  Moral	  Geography	  of	  British	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Responsibilities’,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  
Royal	  Historical	  Society,	  22	  (2012),	  pp.	  111-­‐139;	  F.	  Driver,	  ‘Moral	  Geographies:	  Social	  Sciences	  
and	  the	  Urban	  Environment	  in	  Mid-­‐Nineteenth	  Century	  England’,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  
British	  Geographers,	  13:3	  (1998),	  pp.	  275-­‐287.	  
29	  C.	  Hall,	  Civilising	  Subjects:	  Metropole	  and	  Colony	  in	  the	  English	  Imagination,	  1830-­‐1867	  
(Oxford:	  Polity	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  10.	  
30	  E.	  Said,	  Orientalism	  (London:	  Penguin,	  2003),	  p.	  74,	  Said,	  Culture	  &	  Imperialism	  (London:	  
Vintage	  Books,	  1994),	  p.	  69.	  
31	  Hall,	  Civilising	  Subjects,	  p.	  10.	  
32	  E.	  Williams,	  Capitalism	  &	  Slavery	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1944).	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emergence	  of	  wage	  labour	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  economy	  around	  free	  market	  
and	  free	  trade	  principles.	  Market	  capitalism	  was	  defined	  in	  relief	  to	  mercantilism,	  
monopoly	  and	  reliance	  on	  unfree	  labour	  and	  in	  particular	  slavery.	  Here	  slavery,	  and	  the	  
slave	  trade,	  within	  the	  British	  Empire	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  accumulation	  of	  
capital	  during	  Britain’s	  transition	  to	  an	  industrialised,	  capitalist	  economy.33	  For	  
Williams,	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  transition,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  
interpretation	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  More	  recently,	  Sven	  Beckert	  
has	  depicted	  capitalism	  as	  a	  global	  network,	  which	  integrated	  the	  industrial	  capitalism	  
of	  Europe	  with	  ‘war	  capitalism’;	  a	  system	  of	  violent	  exploitation	  of	  land	  and	  labour	  in	  
the	  Americas	  in	  which	  slavery	  played	  a	  key	  part.34	  What	  is	  key	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  how	  for	  
both	  Williams	  and	  Beckert	  capitalism	  has	  a	  clear	  geographic	  aspect.	  Capital	  moves	  
across	  borders,	  often	  as	  credit,	  is	  invested	  and	  generates	  profit	  before	  it	  travels	  back	  
across	  borders	  to	  be	  reinvested.	  As	  Williams	  put	  it	  by	  1832	  ‘British	  capital	  …	  was	  
thinking	  in	  world	  terms.’35	  This	  spatialized	  understanding	  of	  capitalism	  corresponds	  to	  
the	  social	  scientist	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein’s	  ‘world	  systems	  theory’,	  which	  
conceptualises	  capitalism	  as	  essentially	  transnational	  in	  nature.36	  For	  both	  Williams	  
and	  Beckert	  capitalism	  includes	  a	  connection	  between,	  to	  use	  Wallerstein’s	  terms,	  a	  
core	  and	  periphery.	  For	  both	  authors	  the	  division	  between	  core	  and	  periphery	  was	  also	  
that	  between	  slavery	  and	  freedom.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  capitalism	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  
part	  as	  the	  flow	  of	  capital,	  and	  the	  technologies	  that	  allowed	  this,	  between	  Britain	  and	  
various	  slave	  societies.	  How	  were	  these	  capital	  flows	  reconciled	  with	  Britain’s	  self-­‐
image	  of	  isolation	  from	  transatlantic	  slavery?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ibid,	  pp.	  105-­‐106,	  pp.	  126-­‐153.	  
34	  S.	  Beckert,	  Empire	  of	  Cotton:	  A	  New	  History	  of	  Global	  Capitalism	  (London:	  Allen	  Lane,	  2014),	  p.	  
30.	  
35	  Williams,	  Capitalism	  &	  Slavery,	  p.	  131.	  
36	  I.	  Wallerstein,	  The	  Capitalist	  World	  Economy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1979),	  
pp.	  119-­‐131;	  Daniel	  Rood’s	  excellent	  review	  essay	  makes	  explicit	  Beckert’s	  intellectual	  debt	  to	  
Wallerstein	  as	  well	  as	  identifying	  the	  importance	  of	  geography	  in	  other	  recent	  histories	  of	  
capitalism.	  D.	  Rood,	  ‘Beckert	  is	  Liverpool,	  Baptist	  is	  New	  Orleans:	  Geography	  Returns	  to	  the	  
History	  of	  Capitalism’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Early	  Republic,	  36:1	  (2016),	  pp.	  151-­‐167.	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The	  above	  discussion	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  can	  be	  best	  
understood,	  to	  borrow	  David	  Lambert’s	  phrase,	  as	  a	  ‘problem	  of	  geography’.37	  Within	  
this	  thesis	  spatial	  metaphors	  are	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  capturing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
Victorians	  thought	  about	  both	  specific	  geographic	  locations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relationships	  
between	  different	  sites.	  Here	  “space”	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  physical	  plane	  upon	  
which	  human	  interactions	  occur	  ‘which,	  like	  time,	  produces	  the	  basic	  co-­‐ordinates	  of	  
human	  life.’38	  However,	  space	  is	  not	  only	  the	  physical	  location	  where	  events	  occur	  as	  
different	  spaces,	  places,	  or	  sites	  have	  meanings	  projected	  onto	  them	  through	  the	  way	  
they	  are	  discussed	  and	  through	  the	  actions	  performed	  within	  them.	  For	  example,	  
Britain	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  space	  of	  freedom,	  whilst	  Brazil	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  slave	  
space.	  Britain	  and	  Brazil	  were	  also	  of	  course	  distinct	  geographic	  units,	  separated	  not	  
only	  by	  political	  borders	  but	  also	  by	  the	  physical	  barrier	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean.	  They	  can	  
be	  considered	  both	  as	  spaces	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  or	  as	  sites	  with	  space	  between	  them.	  
This	  dual	  meaning	  of	  space	  helps	  to	  capture	  the	  interplay	  of	  imaginative	  and	  physical	  
geographies	  that	  underpinned	  discussion	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐emancipation	  relationship	  to	  
slavery.	  This	  thesis,	  then,	  both	  narrates	  events	  that	  took	  place	  within	  a	  specific	  
geographic	  context	  and	  provides	  analysis	  on	  how	  this	  space	  was	  conceptualised	  by	  
historical	  actors.	  
Recognising	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  geography	  also	  requires	  
further	  elaboration	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  imagined	  and	  physical	  geographies.	  
The	  term	  imaginative	  geographies	  refers	  to	  the	  different	  ways	  Victorians	  conceived	  of	  
the	  world	  in	  spatialised	  terms	  and	  how	  various	  cultural	  and	  ideological	  meanings	  were	  
projected	  onto	  the	  relationship	  between	  distinct	  geographic	  units.	  The	  key	  imagined	  
geographies	  for	  this	  thesis	  are	  firstly,	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  perceived	  division	  between	  
the	  British	  Empire	  as	  a	  space	  of	  freedom	  and	  other	  societies	  as	  sites	  of	  slavery.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  D.	  Lambert,	  White	  Creole	  Culture,	  Politics	  and	  Identity	  during	  the	  Age	  of	  Abolition	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  pp.	  10-­‐11	  
38	  T.	  Cresswell,	  Place:	  A	  Short	  Introduction	  (Oxford:	  Wiley	  Blackwell,	  2015).	  P.	  16.	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Secondly,	  Huzzey’s	  suggested	  moral	  geography	  which	  saw	  responsibility	  for	  policing	  
slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade	  limited	  to	  actions	  which	  fell	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  
British	  Empire,	  or	  upon	  the	  high	  seas	  were	  the	  British	  navy	  held	  sway.	  I	  am	  interested	  
in	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  imagined	  geographies	  and	  the	  material	  connections	  
between	  Britain	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  which	  are	  key	  to	  my	  definition	  of	  capitalism.	  
These	  material	  connections	  also	  make	  clear	  that	  both	  imagined	  and	  physical	  
geographies	  were	  not	  static	  rather	  they	  were	  constructed	  and	  challenged	  through	  the	  
movement	  of	  British	  capital,	  goods,	  and	  people	  throughout	  the	  Atlantic	  world.	  By	  
addressing	  the	  spatial	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  I	  also	  pay	  attention	  to	  
both	  how	  things	  physically	  moved	  throughout	  the	  Atlantic	  world;	  how	  these	  
movements	  were	  represented	  within	  the	  British	  metropole;	  and	  how	  these	  different	  
mobilities	  facilitated	  the	  transmission	  of	  ideas	  about	  the	  economy	  and	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
Different	  visions	  of	  Britain’s	  economic	  relationship	  with	  slave	  societies	  existed	  and	  
competed.	  Richard	  Allen	  and	  Joseph	  Sturge	  envisioned	  a	  world	  economy	  where	  British	  
commerce	  was	  not	  entangled	  with	  slavery;	  though	  this	  vision	  was	  never	  achieved	  
British	  involvement	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  inevitable.	  
Reconciling	  capitalism	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  rested	  on	  particular	  constructions	  of	  African	  
consumers,	  the	  Brazilian	  labour	  market,	  or	  the	  Cuban	  economy.	  Here	  the	  economic	  
geographies	  of	  Williams,	  Beckert,	  and	  Wallerstein	  intersect	  with	  the	  imagined	  
geography	  of	  Hall	  and	  Said.	  Recognising	  this	  cultural	  aspect	  of	  capitalism	  also	  allows	  
for	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  British	  state	  in	  facilitating	  the	  global	  reach	  of	  British	  
capital.	  Material	  connections	  were	  predicated	  upon	  imagined	  geographies	  but,	  as	  will	  
be	  discussed	  in	  my	  methodology,	  physical	  geographies	  also	  structured	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  Britons	  acquired	  knowledge	  about	  other	  societies.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  controversies	  
over	  involvement	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  often	  turned	  on	  whether	  certain	  economic	  
practices	  should	  be	  regulated	  or	  prohibited.	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Within	  this	  thesis	  capitalism	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  are	  understood	  as	  spatial	  phenomena	  
describing	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  world.	  Understanding	  
how	  these	  two	  geographies	  were	  reconciled	  requires	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  ideology,	  ideas,	  and	  political	  economy.	  Frank	  Trentmann	  has	  
convincingly	  argued	  that	  economic	  interests	  are	  ‘not	  pre-­‐social	  but	  are	  embedded	  in	  
society	  and	  culture’.39	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  
Britain’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  wider	  world	  rested	  on	  a	  number	  of	  cultural,	  or	  to	  
borrow	  Trentmann’s	  term,	  ‘moral-­‐political’	  representations.	  These	  included	  conflicting	  
representations	  of	  different	  Atlantic	  world	  spaces,	  but	  also	  different	  representations	  of	  
the	  various	  types	  of	  economic	  activity	  British	  capitalists	  engaged	  in.	  In	  picking	  apart	  
how	  these	  representations	  were	  contested	  and	  constructed	  I	  propose	  a	  cultural	  
approach	  to	  economic	  history	  that	  will	  be	  laid	  out	  within	  my	  methodology.	  
Finally,	  the	  chronological	  span	  of	  this	  thesis	  stretches	  roughly	  from	  the	  1820s	  to	  the	  
end	  of	  slavery	  in	  Brazil	  in	  1888.	  I	  borrow	  Eric	  Hobsbawm’s	  periodisation	  of	  the	  Age	  of	  
Capital	  and	  expand	  it	  to	  include	  both	  the	  Latin	  American	  speculation	  boom	  of	  the	  
1820s	  and	  the	  final	  years	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery.	  Whilst	  Hobsbawm	  dates	  the	  term	  
capitalism	  to	  around	  1849	  the	  concept	  of	  “capital”	  as	  something	  that	  might	  be	  
expended	  in,	  or	  accumulated	  by,	  involvement	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  was	  understood	  
at	  an	  earlier	  date.40	  As	  the	  Scottish	  abolitionist	  David	  Turnbull	  told	  the	  1840	  
Convention	  ‘the	  terms	  “coward”	  and	  “capitalist”	  were	  never	  more	  truly	  convertible	  
than	  in	  the	  person	  of	  the	  trafficker	  in	  slaves.’41	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  I	  analyse	  take	  place	  in	  the	  1840s,	  the	  early	  part	  of	  
which	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  peak	  of	  anti-­‐slavery’s	  prowess.42	  These	  years	  then	  
provide	  an	  effective	  vantage	  point	  from	  which	  to	  observe	  how	  British	  involvement	  with	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  F.	  Trentmann,	  'Political	  Culture	  and	  Political	  Economy:	  Interest,	  Ideology	  and	  Free	  Trade',	  
Review	  of	  International	  Political	  Economy,	  5:2	  (1998),	  pp.	  217-­‐251,	  p.	  234.	  
40	  E.	  Hobsbawm,	  The	  Age	  of	  Capital,	  1848	  –	  1875	  (London:	  Weidenfield	  &	  Nicholson,	  1997),	  p.	  1.	  
41	  BFASS,	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  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention,	  p.	  523.	  
42	  H.	  Temperley,	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  Antislavery,	  1833-­‐1870	  (London:	  Longman,	  1972),	  p.	  166.	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slavery	  could	  be	  rationalised	  and	  justified.	  Connections	  to	  West	  African	  slavers,	  Cuban	  
plantations,	  and	  Brazilian	  mines	  all	  predated	  emancipation	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  would	  
stretch	  well	  into	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  Whilst	  individual	  chapters	  might	  focus	  on	  
a	  single	  select	  committee,	  parliamentary	  act	  or	  even	  company	  general	  meeting	  these	  
events	  are	  always	  positioned	  within	  Britain’s	  political	  and	  economic	  landscape.	  This	  is	  
done	  not	  only	  through	  an	  awareness	  of	  how	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  a	  concept	  developed	  before	  
and	  after-­‐emancipation,	  but	  also	  by	  highlighting	  continuities	  in	  slavery	  apologism.	  	  
Literature	  and	  Structure	  
Anti-­‐slavery	  ideology	  functioned	  through	  the	  shared	  belief	  that	  Britain	  and	  its	  imperial	  
possessions	  were,	  and	  should	  remain,	  free	  from	  slavery.	  However,	  the	  demarcation	  
between	  the	  slave	  world	  and	  free	  world	  was	  not	  so	  neat.	  After	  emancipation	  British	  
subjects	  dealt	  with	  slave	  traders,	  financed	  slave	  plantations,	  and	  owned	  slaves	  
themselves.	  This	  was	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  period	  of	  commercial	  expansion	  that	  saw	  
British	  capital	  extended	  further	  across	  borders,	  including	  crucially	  the	  one	  between	  
freedom	  and	  slavery.	  The	  consumption	  of	  slave-­‐grown	  sugar	  and	  cotton	  could	  be	  
rationalised	  as	  a	  transitory	  problem	  whilst	  slavery	  died	  out	  across	  the	  world,	  but	  in	  
many	  cases	  British	  subjects	  were	  actively	  involved	  with	  slavery.	  The	  historiographical	  
consensus	  is	  that	  these	  instances	  of	  British	  involvement	  in	  slavery	  provoked	  little	  
concern,	  though	  there	  has	  been	  little	  discussion	  of	  why	  that	  was	  the	  case.	  Here	  I	  
provide	  a	  brief	  survey	  of	  British	  complicity	  and	  profiting	  from	  slavery	  in	  the	  post-­‐
emancipation	  period.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  historical	  consensus	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  controversy	  over	  
these	  cases	  has	  understated	  the	  way	  British	  banks,	  company	  directors,	  and	  merchants	  
actively	  worked	  to	  rationalise	  their	  links	  to	  slavery.	  
From	  a	  historiographical	  perspective	  the	  two	  most	  controversial	  aspects	  of	  Britain’s	  
post-­‐emancipation	  relationship	  to	  slavery	  related	  to	  the	  import	  of	  slave-­‐grown	  sugar	  
and	  cotton.	  In	  both	  cases	  Britons	  not	  only	  consumed	  the	  goods	  produced	  by	  slave	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labour,	  but	  also	  invested	  in	  slave	  economies	  particularly	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  
credit	  by	  British	  merchants.	  Historians	  have	  struggled	  to	  reconcile	  this	  fact	  with	  
Britain’s	  professed	  anti-­‐slavery	  variously	  reading	  it	  as	  evidence	  of	  capitalist	  self-­‐
interest	  or	  humanitarian	  decline.	  In	  my	  first	  chapter	  I	  review	  the	  literature	  on	  sugar,	  
cotton,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  and	  argue	  that	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  Britons	  these	  
connections	  were	  not	  viewed	  as	  at	  odds	  with	  an	  opposition	  to	  slavery.	  Rather	  anti-­‐
slavery	  was	  pluralist	  in	  nature	  and	  the	  internal	  slave	  systems	  of	  the	  Americas	  were	  
seen	  as	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  British	  government.	  Whilst	  abolitionists	  did	  criticise	  
the	  import	  of	  Brazilian	  sugar	  or	  American	  cotton	  they	  rarely	  did	  so	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  complicity	  with	  slavery.	  Neither	  sugar	  nor	  cotton	  imports	  were	  among	  
the	  forms	  of	  British	  capital	  supporting	  slavery	  exposed	  at	  the	  1840	  Convention.	  I	  will	  
suggest	  that	  the	  merchants	  and	  industrialists	  involved	  in	  the	  sugar	  and	  cotton	  trade	  
were	  somewhat	  insulated	  from	  criticism	  as	  the	  ownership	  of	  slaves	  took	  place	  
overseas.	  This	  thesis	  is	  more	  concerned	  with	  those	  instances	  in	  which	  Britons	  owned	  
slaves	  or	  participated	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  from	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  empire,	  disrupting	  
the	  moral	  and	  political	  geographies	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
Broadly	  speaking	  there	  were	  two	  ways	  that	  British	  commerce	  contributed	  to	  
transatlantic	  slavery	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period.	  Firstly,	  there	  was	  the	  impetus	  
British	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  provided	  to	  the	  slave	  trade,	  not	  only	  through	  
importing	  the	  produce	  of	  slave	  labour,	  but	  also	  by	  providing	  credit	  in	  various	  forms	  to	  
slave	  traders.	  Secondly,	  following	  emancipation	  British	  subjects	  continued	  to	  own	  
slaves	  abroad	  a	  practice	  that	  was	  technically	  rendered	  illegal	  by	  the	  1843	  Act	  for	  the	  
More	  Effectual	  Suppression	  of	  the	  Slave	  Trade.	  This	  brief	  review,	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  thesis,	  will	  mirror	  the	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  movement	  by	  concerning	  itself	  with	  the	  
slave	  trade	  first,	  and	  slave	  ownership	  second.	  
British	  involvement	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  was	  the	  issue	  that	  came	  closest	  to	  
disrupting	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  self-­‐image.	  In	  ports	  such	  as	  Rio	  or	  Havana	  British	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merchants,	  often	  acting	  as	  consuls,	  held	  partnerships	  in	  slave	  trading	  firms.	  Whilst	  on	  
the	  West	  African	  coast	  British	  merchants	  stood	  accused	  of	  supplying	  slave	  traders	  and	  
were	  consequently	  investigated	  in	  an	  1842	  parliamentary	  select	  committee.	  This	  latter	  
controversy	  has	  traditionally	  been	  of	  greater	  interest	  to	  historians	  of	  British	  
involvement	  in	  Africa.43	  However,	  British	  involvement	  in	  financing	  and	  supplying	  the	  
slave	  trade	  has	  received	  scant	  attention	  from	  historians	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  David	  Eltis	  has	  
argued	  that	  the	  British	  government,	  and	  particularly	  Palmerston,	  did	  try	  to	  address	  
these	  issues	  but	  the	  ‘process	  of	  squeezing	  British	  capital	  out	  of	  the	  trade	  was	  
protracted	  and	  largely	  unsuccessful.’44	  Both	  Huzzey	  and	  Eltis	  identify	  widespread	  
British	  faith	  in	  the	  moral	  and	  civilizing	  power	  of	  commerce	  as	  key	  in	  negating	  criticism	  
of	  British	  merchants.45	  I	  complicate	  this	  narrative	  by	  exploring	  how	  controversy	  over	  
British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  far	  from	  inevitable	  by	  picking	  apart	  the	  idea	  
of	  legitimate	  commerce.	  	  
My	  second	  chapter	  explores	  how	  the	  export	  of	  British	  manufactured	  goods	  to	  West	  
Africa	  came	  to	  be	  viewed	  by	  abolitionists,	  government	  officials,	  and	  naval	  officers	  as	  
supporting	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  export	  of	  British	  manufactures	  to	  West	  Africa	  has	  been	  
identified	  by	  scholars	  such	  as	  Joseph	  Inikori,	  Sven	  Beckert,	  and	  Eric	  Williams	  as	  a	  key	  
part	  of	  Britain’s	  Atlantic	  economy	  though	  there	  has	  been	  little	  investigation	  of	  the	  
moral	  questions	  this	  raised	  after	  slave	  trade	  abolition.46	  Drawing	  on	  human	  geography,	  
particularly	  the	  study	  of	  mobility,	  I	  argue	  that	  after	  1838	  the	  movements	  of	  slave	  
traders,	  naval,	  and	  British	  mercantile	  interests	  converged	  on	  the	  western	  coast	  of	  
Africa.	  It	  was	  within	  this	  context	  that	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  fell	  within	  Britain’s	  moral	  
geography.	  My	  third	  chapter	  explores	  how	  British	  merchants	  in	  Cuba,	  Brazil,	  and	  West	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  Empire	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  pp.	  36-­‐37.	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Africa	  were	  able	  to	  rationalise	  these	  links	  to	  slave	  traders.	  This	  requires	  paying	  greater	  
attention	  to	  the	  defences	  offered	  by	  the	  British	  mercantile	  community	  than	  previous	  
historians.	  Merchants	  successfully	  portrayed	  themselves	  as	  legitimate	  traders	  whilst	  
limiting	  their	  own	  personal	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  at	  each	  stage.	  Such	  an	  
interpretation	  moves	  past	  unhelpful	  binaries	  of	  identifying	  either	  the	  West	  African	  
merchants	  or	  their	  abolitionist	  critics	  in	  Britain	  as	  the	  true	  standard	  bearers	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery.47	  Ultimately,	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  British	  government	  came	  to	  an	  uneasy	  
compromise	  with	  merchants	  whilst	  remaining	  sensitive	  to	  accusations	  of	  complicity	  
with	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
West	  Indian	  emancipation	  was	  far	  from	  the	  end	  of	  British	  slave-­‐ownership,	  but	  there	  
has	  been	  relatively	  little	  historical	  attention	  to	  this	  fact.	  Louise	  Guenther	  and	  David	  
Murray	  have	  discussed	  slave-­‐ownership	  among	  the	  British	  merchant	  community	  in	  the	  
Brazilian	  port	  of	  Bahia	  and	  British	  officials	  in	  Cuba	  respectively.48	  However,	  post-­‐
emancipation	  slave-­‐ownership,	  and	  the	  metropolitan	  response,	  has	  mostly	  been	  
studied	  through	  histories	  of	  British-­‐owned	  mining	  companies	  as	  these	  entities	  
generated	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  controversy.	  Huzzey	  has	  used	  these	  companies,	  and	  
the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  controversy	  they	  generated,	  to	  argue	  that	  ‘apathy	  and	  inaction’	  
characterised	  the	  British	  response	  to	  slave-­‐ownership.49	  A	  similar	  interpretation	  has	  
been	  offered	  by	  Howard	  Temperley	  and	  Chris	  Evans	  both	  of	  whom	  have	  cast	  the	  
aforementioned	  1843	  Act	  as	  a	  ‘dead	  letter’.50	  This	  reading	  highlights	  the	  reluctance	  of	  
the	  British	  government	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  other	  states.	  However,	  as	  
I	  demonstrate	  in	  my	  fourth	  chapter	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  of	  various	  kinds	  played	  an	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active	  role	  in	  protesting	  and	  neutering	  the	  1843	  Act.	  I	  particularly	  point	  to	  the	  protests	  
of	  banking	  and	  commercial	  interests	  that	  have	  been	  largely	  ignored	  by	  previous	  
historiography.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  1843	  Act	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  read	  as	  
legitimising	  certain	  forms	  of	  slave-­‐ownership,	  including	  sugar	  plantations	  in	  Surinam	  
and	  the	  Danish	  West	  Indies.	  
Works	  on	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  that	  have	  looked	  beyond	  the	  1843	  Act	  have	  
generally	  focused	  on	  the	  histories	  of	  individual	  companies.	  Most	  prominent	  have	  been	  
works	  on	  the	  St.	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company,	  which	  have	  explored	  how	  British	  
slave-­‐ownership	  functioned	  overseas.51	  These	  works	  demonstrate	  that	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  continued	  to	  thrive	  into	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  generally	  credit	  
British	  anti-­‐slavery	  with	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  management	  of	  the	  workforce.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  
here	  often	  appears	  as	  a	  fuzzy	  concept	  and	  can	  generally	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  frequent	  
attacks	  on	  slave-­‐owning	  mining	  companies	  in	  the	  BFASS’s	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter.	  Given	  
the	  ebbing	  popular	  influence	  of	  the	  BFASS	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1840s,	  I	  look	  beyond	  
abolitionist	  societies	  for	  evidence	  of	  anti-­‐slavery’s	  influence	  on	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  
and	  find	  it	  at	  work	  in	  the	  companies	  themselves.52	  My	  fifth	  chapter	  foregrounds	  the	  fact	  
that	  these	  companies	  were	  joint-­‐stock	  ventures	  and	  reveals	  that	  contests	  over	  
company	  management	  and	  directorial	  accountability	  became	  suffused	  with	  the	  
language	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Matt	  Childs	  has	  shown	  that	  during	  the	  1870s	  British	  
government	  and	  abolitionists	  would	  be	  drawn	  into	  condemnation	  of	  the	  St.	  John	  d’El	  
Rey’s	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  the	  nascent	  Brazilian	  anti-­‐slavery	  movement.53	  However,	  for	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much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  it	  was	  the	  financial	  press	  and	  company	  general	  
meetings	  where	  expressions	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  could	  be	  found.	  
Methodology	  	  
David	  Brion	  Davis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘sobering	  knowledge	  [of	  complicity	  with	  slavery]	  
did	  nothing	  to	  tarnish	  Britain’s	  self-­‐image	  as	  the	  benevolent	  champion	  of	  universal	  
emancipation.’54	  This	  is	  an	  astute	  comment	  and	  is	  largely	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  
historiography	  laid	  out	  above.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  indicated,	  more	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  
done	  to	  reveal	  how	  this	  self-­‐image	  was	  contested	  and	  constructed.	  One	  way	  is	  to	  look	  
beyond	  the	  sites	  where	  historians	  have	  usually	  identified	  anti-­‐slavery	  rhetoric.	  Whilst	  
abolitionist	  societies,	  parliament,	  and	  then	  Foreign	  and	  Colonial	  Offices	  all	  have	  a	  role	  
to	  play	  in	  this	  story	  so	  do	  chambers	  of	  commerce,	  company	  general	  meetings,	  and	  the	  
financial	  press.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  set	  out	  the	  conceptual	  frameworks	  that	  have	  informed	  
my	  reading	  of	  these	  sources.	  I	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  how	  information	  and	  
knowledge	  about	  different	  slave	  societies	  was	  transmitted	  to	  Britain.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  
engage	  with	  how	  concerns	  about	  trust	  and	  reputation	  structured	  economic	  activity,	  
and	  argument,	  in	  Victorian	  Britain.	  My	  analysis	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery,	  then,	  
forms	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  what	  can	  be	  called	  British	  economic	  culture.	  I	  
also	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility	  as	  a	  means	  of	  understanding	  both	  the	  role	  of	  
imagined	  and	  physical	  space	  economic	  culture.	  Finally,	  I	  also	  consider	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain	  was	  not	  solely	  the	  creation	  of	  slavery’s	  opponents,	  but	  also	  
those	  who	  offered	  apologies	  for	  various	  forms	  of	  human	  property.	  	  
Frank	  Trentmann	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘[m]aterial	  circumstances	  and	  structures	  […]	  require	  
language	  and	  communication	  to	  be	  shaped	  into	  meaningful	  interest	  by	  
contemporaries’.55	  Understanding	  the	  debates	  over	  connections	  between	  British	  
subjects	  and	  transatlantic	  slavery	  therefore	  requires	  both	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  used	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to	  represent	  these	  material	  connections	  and	  an	  engagement	  with	  how	  information	  
about	  economic	  activity	  in	  slave	  societies	  was	  communicated	  to	  Britain.	  These	  
concerns	  are	  central	  to	  my	  conceptualisation	  of	  economic	  culture,	  a	  term	  which	  within	  
this	  thesis	  encapsulates	  two	  interrelated	  aspects	  of	  the	  Victorian	  economy.	  Firstly,	  it	  
captures	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  
terms	  of	  how	  ‘ideas	  and	  practices	  shaping	  collective	  identity	  and	  power	  relations.’56	  
Secondly,	  it	  describes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  historical	  actors	  ‘negotiate[d]	  the	  meanings	  of	  
economic	  relationships	  through	  daily	  experience	  and	  behaviour.’57	  These	  two	  aspects	  
are	  constitutive	  of	  one	  another	  as	  government	  policy	  towards	  the	  economy	  was	  
informed	  by	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  different	  economic	  relationships	  were	  represented	  and	  
laws	  and	  regulations	  helped	  determine	  which	  forms	  of	  economic	  activity	  were	  feasible	  
or	  acceptable	  within	  Victorian	  Britain.	  Ideas,	  practices,	  and	  representations	  helped	  
determine	  both	  whether	  certain	  forms	  of	  economic	  activity	  sparked	  controversy,	  and	  
which	  activities	  could	  be	  defended.	  Below	  I	  establish	  my	  approach	  to	  reconstructing	  
Britain’s	  economic	  culture.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  set	  out	  a	  number	  of	  ideas	  relating	  to	  economic	  
knowledge,	  trust,	  reputation,	  and	  moralities	  that	  informed	  my	  reading	  of	  primary	  
sources.	  These	  concepts	  are	  vital	  to	  understanding	  how	  certain	  types	  of	  economic	  
activity	  were	  communicated	  to,	  and	  established	  as	  acceptable	  within,	  a	  Britain	  
ideologically	  opposed	  to	  slavery.	  	  	  
When	  the	  committee	  tasked	  with	  investigating	  Richard	  Allen’s	  motion	  reported	  back	  to	  
the	  Convention	  they	  were	  convinced	  that	  ‘British	  hands	  and	  British	  capital	  are	  yet	  
employed	  in	  forging	  the	  instruments	  and	  nourishing	  the	  sinews	  of	  [transatlantic	  
slavery].’58	  Yet	  the	  evidence	  relating	  to	  the	  six	  different	  ways	  British	  capital	  was	  
employed	  in	  slavery	  was	  of	  a	  very	  mixed	  character.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  committee	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  F.	  Trentmann,	  M.	  Daunton,	  ‘Worlds	  of	  Political	  Economy:	  Knowledge,	  Practices	  and	  
Contestation’,	  in	  F.	  Trentmann,	  M.	  Daunton	  (eds)	  Worlds	  of	  Political	  Economy:	  Knowledge	  and	  
Power	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  and	  Twentieth	  Centuries	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2004),	  p.	  3.	  
57	  M.	  Daunton,	  ‘The	  Future	  Direction	  of	  British	  History:	  Thinking	  about	  Economic	  Cultures’,	  
History	  Workshop	  Journal,	  72	  (2011),	  222-­‐239,	  p.	  223.	  
58	  BFASS,	  General	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention,	  p.	  518.	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produced	  hard	  evidence,	  for	  example	  the	  number	  of	  slaves	  owned	  by	  mining	  
companies	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  was	  ‘no	  less	  than	  3225’.’59	  Other	  evidence	  was	  far	  more	  
anecdotal,	  such	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  collars	  for	  slaves	  were	  ‘manufactured	  [in	  
Birmingham]	  but	  with	  a	  small	  measure	  of	  concealment.’	  For	  the	  abolitionists	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  British	  capital	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  less	  important	  than	  the	  
‘revolting	  and	  melancholy	  fact’	  that	  there	  was	  any	  involvement	  at	  all.60	  Similarly,	  this	  
thesis	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  quantify	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Britons	  profited	  from	  slavery,	  
for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  finding	  accurate	  statistical	  material,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  West	  African	  trade.61	  The	  second	  problem	  is	  a	  definitional	  
one,	  specifically	  identifying	  what	  exactly	  counted	  as	  complicity	  with	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
The	  1840	  Convention	  identified	  at	  least	  six	  examples	  of	  British	  capital	  supporting	  
slavery.	  This	  could	  surely	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  consumption	  of	  slave-­‐grown	  cotton	  
and	  sugar,	  or	  the	  sale	  of	  sugar-­‐boiling	  equipment	  to	  Cuban	  plantations.	  Differing	  
definitions	  have	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  
economy	  to	  British	  industrialisation.62	  However,	  as	  my	  main-­‐body	  chapters	  make	  clear,	  
what	  counted	  as	  complicity	  with	  slavery	  was	  very	  much	  up	  for	  debate.	  To	  a	  modern	  
observer	  British	  complicity	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  is	  easy	  to	  identify,	  but	  I	  intend	  to	  
unpick	  how	  the	  boundaries	  of	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable	  economic	  involvement	  in	  
slavery	  were	  negotiated	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period	  itself.	  
My	  focus	  on	  the	  definitional	  question	  raises	  its	  own	  issues	  given	  that	  many	  examples	  of	  
Britons	  profiting	  from	  slavery	  failed	  to	  provoke	  controversy.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  is	  
the	  manufacture	  of	  manacles	  and	  chains	  for	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade.	  William	  Allen,	  
at	  the	  1840	  Convention,	  argued	  that	  the	  practice	  was	  prevalent	  in	  both	  Birmingham	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Ibid.	  
60	  Ibid.	  
61	  M.	  Lynn,	  ‘The	  Profitability	  of	  the	  Early	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Palm	  Oil	  Trade’,	  African	  Economic	  
History,	  20	  (1992),	  pp.	  77-­‐97.	  
62	  See	  J.	  E.	  Inikori,	  ‛Slavery	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  Industrial	  Capitalism	  in	  England,’	  Journal	  of	  
Interdisciplinary	  History,	  17	  (1987),	  pp.	  771-­‐793;	  D.	  Eltis	  and	  S.	  L.	  Engerman,	  ‛The	  Importance	  of	  
Slavery	  and	  the	  Slave	  Trade	  to	  Industrialisation	  in	  Britain,’	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  History,	  60	  
(2000),	  pp.	  123-­‐144.	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and	  Glasgow,	  however	  it	  did	  not	  become	  a	  point	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  agitation.63	  Chains	  and	  
shackles	  are	  amongst	  the	  most	  visceral	  images	  slavery	  and	  were	  constantly	  used	  by	  
abolitionists	  to	  stress	  the	  oppressive	  and	  violent	  nature	  of	  human	  bondage.	  Yet,	  outside	  
of	  the	  1840	  Convention	  little	  controversy	  emerged.	  American	  abolitionists	  looking	  to	  
convince	  British	  audiences	  that	  they	  had	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  oppose	  Southern	  slavery	  
would	  occasionally	  point	  to	  the	  manufacture	  of	  chains.	  James	  W.	  C.	  Pennington,	  a	  
former	  slave,	  rattled	  a	  British-­‐made	  chain	  whilst	  lecturing	  in	  Newcastle.	  A	  decade	  later	  
Henry	  Highland	  Garnet,	  another	  black	  abolitionist,	  whilst	  promoting	  the	  Free	  Produce	  
Movement	  told	  an	  audience	  in	  Carlisle	  that	  “England	  wove	  the	  fabrics	  that	  were	  
exchanged	  for	  the	  captive	  Africans	  and	  forged	  his	  chains.”64	  British-­‐made	  chains	  might	  
prove	  a	  useful	  prop	  in	  scandalising	  the	  audience	  within	  a	  provincial	  lecture	  hall,	  but	  
this	  outrage	  did	  not	  translate	  to	  action.	  Explaining	  a	  lack	  of	  controversy	  is	  a	  difficult	  
task	  and	  rather	  than	  relying	  upon	  counter-­‐factual	  speculation,	  I	  look	  to	  the	  few	  
occasions	  where	  the	  entanglement	  of	  British	  capital	  with	  slavery	  provoked	  open	  
debate.	  
For	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  role	  of	  British	  capital	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  to	  take	  place	  
abolitionists,	  government	  officials,	  and	  other	  critics	  had	  to	  have	  some	  access	  to	  
information	  about	  the	  Atlantic	  economy.	  As	  the	  1840	  Convention	  demonstrates	  
abolitionists	  possessed	  varying	  degrees	  of	  information	  about	  the	  deployment	  of	  British	  
capital	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery.	  This	  was	  partially	  a	  result	  of	  physical	  geography	  
because	  as	  previously	  noted	  slavery	  and	  slave	  trading	  took	  place	  elsewhere.	  Therefore,	  
I	  consider	  the	  historical	  contingencies	  that	  determined	  both	  the	  creation	  and	  
dissemination	  of	  sources.	  Such	  a	  consideration	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  
understanding	  why	  certain	  instances	  of	  British	  complicity	  with	  slavery	  remained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  BFASS,	  General	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention,	  p.	  266.	  
64	  Quoted	  in	  R.	  J.	  M.	  Blackett,	  Building	  an	  Antislavery	  Wall:	  Black	  Americans	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  
Abolitionist	  Movement,	  1830-­‐1860	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  University	  of	  Louisiana	  Press,	  1983),	  p.	  13;	  ff.	  
18,	  Newcastle	  Chronicle,	  21	  Mar	  1840,	  p.	  120-­‐1,	  ff.2,	  The	  Carlisle	  Journal,	  22	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uncontroversial.	  For	  example,	  Baring	  Brothers,	  a	  London	  based	  bank,	  acquired	  slaves	  
in	  Cuba	  and	  St.	  Croix	  through	  the	  mortgaging	  of	  plantations.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  
correspondence	  discussing	  these	  plantations	  and	  their	  enslaved	  workforce	  within	  the	  
Barings	  archive.	  However,	  Barings	  never	  attracted	  wider	  condemnation,	  as	  these	  
letters	  were	  private	  communications	  between	  the	  bank’s	  directors	  and	  its	  employees.	  
Public	  companies	  however,	  such	  as	  mining	  ventures	  in	  Brazil,	  had	  to	  explain	  their	  
expenditure	  on	  slave	  labour	  through	  the	  publication	  of	  accounts	  and	  annual	  reports,	  
which	  provided	  the	  evidential	  basis	  for	  abolitionist	  critiques.	  Similarly,	  as	  
demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  two,	  parliamentary	  debate	  over	  British	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  
trade	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  material	  changes	  in	  slave	  trading	  necessitated	  by	  
British	  naval	  suppression.	  Physical	  geographies	  and	  practical	  concerns	  in	  many	  ways	  
determined	  the	  degree	  of	  information	  available	  about	  the	  Atlantic	  economy.	  However,	  
as	  the	  case	  of	  case	  of	  British-­‐made	  manacles	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  awareness	  of	  a	  
material	  fact	  does	  not	  necessitate	  knowledge	  of	  its	  immorality.	  Bearing	  this	  in	  mind	  it	  
is	  important	  to	  establish	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  “knowledge”	  within	  this	  thesis.	  
Knowledge	  here	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  inherently	  rooted	  in	  social	  relationships;	  it	  is	  
understood	  as	  providing	  the	  link	  between	  the	  observation	  of	  material	  circumstances	  
and	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  historical	  actors.65	  Defining	  knowledge	  in	  this	  manner	  
explains	  why	  abolitionist	  hopes	  of	  ending	  British	  involvement	  in	  slavery	  through	  
publicity	  alone	  were	  ill	  founded.	  The	  material	  fact	  of	  slave-­‐owning	  by	  British	  mining	  
companies,	  for	  example,	  only	  became	  objectionable	  if	  it	  was	  “known”	  to	  be	  morally	  
wrong	  and	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  imagine	  an	  alternative	  ways	  of	  operating	  in	  Brazil.	  
Debates	  over	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  then	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  contests	  over	  how	  
to	  interpret	  the	  information	  that	  British	  capital	  was	  deployed	  in	  slave	  societies.	  
Defining	  knowledge	  in	  this	  manner	  also	  rejects	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  refusal	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  This	  definition	  of	  knowledge	  draws	  on	  the	  history	  of	  science,	  specifically	  S.	  Shapin,	  A	  Social	  
History	  of	  Truth:	  Civility	  and	  Science	  in	  Seventeenth-­‐Century	  England	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	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individuals,	  corporations,	  or	  the	  state	  to	  end	  involvement	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  
resulted	  from	  a	  simple	  recognition	  of	  economic	  circumstances.	  Rather,	  I	  follow	  Frank	  
Trentmann’s	  argument	  that	  economic	  ‘[r]ationality	  stands	  for	  what	  social	  actors	  find	  
plausible	  and	  meaningful	  at	  a	  historical	  moment	  rather	  than	  for	  what	  might	  be	  
theoretically	  “true”’.66	  	  	  Britons	  needed	  information	  about	  the	  Atlantic	  economy	  for	  
debates	  over	  anti-­‐slavery,	  morality,	  and	  rationality	  to	  take	  place,	  but	  these	  debates	  
were	  ultimately	  an	  epistemological	  struggle	  over	  ‘what	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  about	  
slavery	  were	  trustworthy’.67	  .	  	  
Within	  this	  thesis,	  then,	  I	  explore	  how	  knowledge	  about	  slavery,	  the	  Atlantic	  economy,	  
and	  British	  capital	  was	  constructed	  and	  contested	  across	  a	  number	  of	  different	  texts.	  
These	  include	  parliamentary	  debates,	  official	  correspondence,	  the	  press,	  and	  the	  
private	  correspondence	  of	  both	  companies	  and	  individuals.	  I	  am	  particularly	  interested	  
in	  the	  justifications	  and	  apologies	  offered	  for	  involvement	  in	  slavery	  within	  these	  texts.	  
Rather	  than	  defending	  slavery	  as	  moral,	  an	  unacceptable	  line	  of	  argument	  within	  anti-­‐
slavery	  Britain,	  these	  apologies	  made	  claims	  about	  the	  economies	  of	  slave	  societies	  and	  
the	  futility	  of	  government	  regulation.	  Steven	  Shapin	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘the	  identification	  
of	  trustworthy	  agents	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  any	  body	  of	  knowledge’68	  My	  
methodology	  then	  must	  also	  contend	  with	  both	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  British	  economic	  
culture,	  and	  how	  individuals	  established	  their	  trustworthiness.	  
Any	  individual	  or	  group	  hoping	  to	  establish	  the	  reliability	  of	  their	  account	  of	  Britain’s	  
economic	  relationship	  to	  slavery	  also	  had	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  trustworthiness.	  
“Trust”	  was	  also	  vital	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  economic	  relationships	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  
century.	  Within	  British	  economic	  culture	  trust	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  reciprocal	  
relationship	  between	  two	  or	  more	  historical	  actors	  that	  is	  established	  over	  time	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  Trentmann,	  ‘Political	  Culture	  and	  Political	  Economy’,	  p.	  226.	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  D.	  Lambert,	  ‘Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Other	  Sites	  in	  the	  War	  of	  Representation	  over	  Slavery’,	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Workshop	  Journal,	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  (2007),	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  103-­‐132,	  p.	  104.	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  Shapin,	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  Social	  History	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through	  the	  experience	  of	  exchange.69	  If	  someone	  was	  trusted,	  then,	  they	  could	  both	  be	  
expected	  to	  honour	  agreements	  and	  also	  provide	  reliable	  and	  accurate	  information.	  
Within	  this	  thesis	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  how	  interlocutors	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  
trustworthy	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  slave	  societies	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  However,	  I	  
am	  also	  interested	  in	  unpicking	  how	  the	  various	  trust	  relationships	  through	  which	  
Atlantic	  capitalism	  functioned	  were	  represented	  in	  the	  metropole.	  For	  example,	  British	  
merchants	  in	  West	  Africa	  were	  involved	  in	  economic	  relationships	  with	  individuals	  
involved	  in	  the	  slave	  trade;	  these	  mercantile	  relationships	  functioned	  through	  process-­‐
based	  trust.	  However,	  this	  trust	  relationship	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  undermine	  an	  
individual’s	  position	  as	  an	  objective	  observer	  of	  the	  role	  of	  British	  capital	  in	  the	  slave	  
trade.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  fact	  lie	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  processes	  that	  built	  
up	  trust	  and	  another	  key	  facet	  of	  the	  Victorian	  economy,	  that	  of	  “reputation”.	  
	  “Reputation”	  can	  be	  understood,	  in	  part,	  as	  the	  public	  expression	  of	  “trust.”	  The	  
reputation	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  company	  was	  the	  means	  by	  which	  they	  might	  gain	  access	  
to	  reciprocal	  relationships,	  built	  upon	  trust,	  such	  as	  credit	  or	  governmental	  guarantee	  
of	  property	  rights.	  During	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  reputation	  was	  more	  often	  expressed	  
in	  terms	  of	  “character”	  which,	  as	  Margot	  Finn	  has	  argued,	  was	  ‘clearly	  understood	  to	  
constitute	  an	  essential	  form	  of	  social	  capital’.70	  This	  designation	  of	  reputation	  as	  social	  
capital	  reflects	  how	  a	  good	  reputation	  was	  essential	  to	  both	  relationships	  between	  
economic	  actors	  and	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  market.	  Discussion	  of	  reputation	  
or	  character	  within	  this	  thesis	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  cultural	  means	  through	  which	  
individuals	  and	  corporate	  bodies	  built	  up,	  and,	  maintained,	  this	  social	  capital.	  
Ultimately,	  I	  see	  reputation	  or	  character	  as	  the	  means	  by	  which	  joint-­‐stock	  companies,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  My	  discussion	  of	  Trust	  here	  is	  heavily	  indebted	  to	  Sherlynne	  Haggerty’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  
the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  business	  culture	  of	  eighteenth-­‐century	  Atlantic	  merchants,	  Haggerty	  
identifies	  various	  different	  forms	  of	  trust	  including	  processed-­‐based	  trusts,	  	  guarantee	  by	  
institutions	  (assurance)	  and	  a	  merchant’s	  trust	  in	  the	  State	  as	  guarantor	  of	  property	  
(Confidence)	  see	  S.	  Haggerty,	  ‘Merely	  for	  Money?’	  Business	  Culture	  in	  the	  British	  Atlantic,	  1780	  –	  
1815	  (Liverpool:	  Liverpool	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  pp.	  66	  –	  96.	  
70	  M.	  Finn,	  The	  Character	  of	  Credit:	  Personal	  Debt	  in	  English	  Culture,	  1740-­‐1914	  (Cambridge,	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  p.	  20.	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merchants,	  or	  even	  abolitionists	  achieved	  legitimacy	  both	  as	  economic	  actors,	  but	  also	  
as	  reliable	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  Atlantic	  world.71	  	  
This	  thesis	  pays	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  reputations	  as	  opponents	  of	  
slavery,	  savvy	  businessmen,	  or	  honest	  company	  directors	  were	  crafted	  not	  only	  
through	  actions,	  but	  how	  those	  actions	  were	  represented	  textually.	  As	  Haggerty	  has	  
noted	  an	  individual’s	  reputation	  often	  rested	  on	  the	  company	  they	  kept	  or	  
communities	  they	  were	  members	  of.72	  For	  example,	  my	  third	  chapter	  explores	  how	  
merchants	  utilised	  a	  number	  of	  different	  mediums,	  including	  the	  press,	  select	  
committees,	  and	  correspondence	  with	  government	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  links	  
to	  slavery	  that	  might	  damage	  their	  reputation.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  corporate	  bodies,	  most	  
notably	  joint-­‐stock	  companies,	  had	  to	  craft	  a	  reputation	  as	  reliable	  and	  this	  often	  rested	  
on	  the	  individual	  character	  of	  their	  directors.73	  However,	  as	  my	  fifth	  chapter	  
demonstrates,	  there	  were	  also	  a	  number	  of	  texts	  whose	  primary	  concern	  was	  the	  
construction	  or	  mediation	  of	  these	  companies	  reputation.	  Specifically,	  company	  annual	  
reports	  and	  the	  nascent	  financial	  press	  where	  companies	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  
sound	  investments.74	  These	  chapters	  bear	  out	  my	  distinction	  between	  trust	  and	  
reputation,	  as	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  economic	  actors	  operating	  within	  trust	  
relationships	  might	  reveal	  information	  that	  would	  harm	  their	  reputation	  if	  expressed	  
in	  a	  public	  forum.	  Reputation,	  especially	  when	  expressed	  as	  character,	  could	  be	  
adjudged	  both	  by	  a	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  the	  company	  people	  kept	  and	  was	  also	  of	  a	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  For	  a	  discussion	  of	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  importance	  of	  reputation	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  corporate	  bodies	  see	  T.	  L.	  
Alborn,	  Conceiving	  Companies:	  Joint-­‐Stock	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  (London:	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  Haggerty,	  Merely	  for	  Money,	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  121–125.	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  University	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  Press,	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  about	  Finance	  in	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  in	  Victorian	  England:	  Disclosure	  and	  Secrecy	  in	  
the	  Culture	  of	  investment’,	  Victorian	  Studies,	  45:1	  (2002),	  pp.	  17-­‐41;	  J.	  Taylor,	  Privacy,	  Publicity,	  
and	  Reputation:	  How	  the	  Press	  Regulated	  the	  Market	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  England’,	  Business	  
History	  Review,	  87:4	  (2013),	  pp.	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person’s	  behaviour.75	  This	  observation	  raises	  another	  vital	  aspect	  of	  economic	  culture	  
as	  conceptualised	  in	  this	  thesis;	  the	  relationship	  between	  ideas	  of	  morality	  and	  
economy.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  morality	  and	  the	  economy,	  as	  conceptualised	  in	  this	  thesis,	  
differs	  from	  E.	  P.	  Thompson’s	  interpretation	  of	  a	  moral,	  communal	  economy	  
superseded	  by	  a	  market	  driven	  economy.76	  Instead	  morality	  is	  treated	  as	  a	  non-­‐
normative	  concept	  and	  I	  pay	  attention	  to	  how	  different	  interlocutors	  attempted	  to	  
moralise	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  British	  economy.	  I	  work	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  
various	  types	  of	  economic	  activity	  could	  be	  represented	  as	  either	  morally	  acceptable	  or	  
morally	  unacceptable	  for	  Britons	  to	  engage	  in.	  Immoral	  acts	  might	  not	  necessarily	  be	  
illegal,	  but	  forms	  of	  economic	  activity	  that	  were	  perfectly	  legal	  were	  often	  subject	  to	  
severe	  moral	  critique,	  which	  could	  constrain	  the	  options	  available	  to	  historical	  actors.	  
Take	  for	  example	  the	  critique	  of	  individuals	  who	  speculated	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  shares	  as	  
gamblers,	  or	  the	  web	  of	  familial	  obligations	  that	  structured	  inheritance.77	  In	  the	  most	  
extreme	  examples	  the	  British	  state	  could	  outlaw	  certain	  types	  of	  commercial	  activity	  or	  
property	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  immorality.	  The	  abolition	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  the	  
emancipation	  of	  1833	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  evidence	  of	  this	  fact	  and	  all	  Atlantic	  
commerce	  in	  this	  period	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  legislation.	  This	  thesis	  then	  
pays	  attention	  to	  contests	  over	  the	  morality	  of	  whole	  branches	  of	  commerce,	  
particularly	  in	  chapters	  two	  and	  three,	  as	  well	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  day	  to	  day	  life	  of	  
capitalists	  was	  shaped	  by	  moral	  expectations.	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  Thought	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  Britain	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	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  Family	  Fortunes:	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  and	  Women	  of	  the	  
English	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  (London:	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  R.	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  Morris,	  Men,	  
Women,	  and	  Property	  in	  England,	  1780-­‐1870	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009).	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Taking	  this	  non-­‐normative	  approach	  to	  questions	  of	  morality	  also	  opens	  up	  new	  
possibilities	  when	  engaging	  with	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Victorian	  interlocutors.	  Rather	  than	  
focusing	  simply	  on	  the	  explicitly	  moral	  arguments	  of	  abolitionists	  regarding	  slavery’s	  
sinfulness	  it	  allows	  a	  closer	  inspection	  of	  arguments	  that,	  at	  first,	  appear	  amoral	  in	  
nature.	  The	  apologies	  for	  links	  to	  transatlantic	  slavery	  offered	  in	  company	  reports,	  
correspondence	  with	  the	  government,	  or	  through	  the	  press	  often	  maintained	  a	  sense	  
that	  connections	  to	  slavery	  were	  an	  unfortunate	  but	  unavoidable	  feature	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  
economy.	  However,	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  these	  sources	  reveals	  how	  such	  claims	  and	  
appeals	  to	  economic	  rationality	  rested	  on	  a	  number	  of	  cultural	  assumptions	  grounded	  
in	  Victorian	  thinking	  about	  race,	  civilization	  and	  various	  other	  factors.	  The	  role	  of	  
morality	  in	  the	  Victorian	  economy,	  then,	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  public	  
reputation	  of	  individual	  economic	  actors,	  corporations,	  and	  even	  whole	  branches	  of	  
commerce.	  The	  British	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  presented	  the	  various	  capitalists	  
discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  with	  a	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  maintain	  both	  legality	  and	  moral	  
acceptability	  of	  their	  businesses.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  few,	  if	  
any,	  interlocutors	  in	  this	  debate	  be	  they	  slave-­‐owner,	  West	  Africa	  merchant,	  or	  
metropolitan	  abolitionist	  were	  critical	  of	  capitalism	  as	  a	  whole.	  Rather,	  critical	  voices	  
hope	  to	  render	  transatlantic	  commerce	  as	  moral	  as	  possible,	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  
questions	  asked	  about	  empire	  by	  humanitarian	  reformers	  in	  the	  same	  period.78	  	  
What	  happened	  to	  British	  ideas	  about	  knowledge,	  reputation,	  and	  morality	  when	  
applied	  to	  commercial	  activity	  happening	  outside	  of	  metropolitan	  Britain	  or	  its	  empire?	  
Did	  these	  ideas	  travel,	  and	  if	  not	  why	  not?	  These	  questions	  are	  essential	  to	  
understanding	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  they	  reinforce	  the	  essentially	  spatial	  
character	  of	  the	  debates	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  competing	  knowledge	  claims	  
about	  slave	  societies	  and	  the	  role	  of	  British	  investment	  in	  them	  helped	  construct	  the	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  Lester,	  Imperial	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  Identities	  in	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  Africa	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imaginative	  geography	  of	  Atlantic	  world	  capitalism.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  physical	  space	  
placed	  constraints	  on	  what	  information	  could	  be	  gleaned	  about	  slavery	  in	  Brazil	  or	  the	  
West	  African	  slave	  trade.	  The	  interrelationship	  of	  these	  imagined	  and	  physical	  
geographies	  can	  be	  most	  clearly	  conceptualised	  through	  what	  cultural	  geographer	  Tim	  
Creswell	  calls	  the	  ‘politics	  of	  mobility’.79	  This	  phrase	  captures	  how	  the	  physical	  
movement	  of	  goods,	  capital,	  and	  people	  is	  both	  productive	  of	  and	  produced	  by	  cultural,	  
social,	  or	  ideological	  processes.	  This	  theme	  is	  most	  explicitly	  explored	  in	  chapter	  three,	  
but	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  I	  maintain	  a	  focus	  on	  how	  Britons	  represented	  other	  
societies	  and	  how	  this	  facilitated	  the	  deployment	  of	  capital	  within	  them.	  Ultimately,	  
rather	  than	  threatening	  the	  imagined	  geography	  of	  British	  isolation	  from	  slavery	  these	  
mobilities	  reinforced	  ideas	  of	  Africa,	  the	  Americas,	  and	  Caribbean	  as	  both	  culturally	  
different	  and	  physically	  distant	  from	  Britain.	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  concerns	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  understanding	  how	  profiting	  from	  slavery	  was	  
justified	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period.	  If	  the	  setting	  was	  novel	  the	  problem	  was	  an	  
older	  one.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐eighteenth	  century	  various	  groups	  of	  Britons	  had	  been	  
justifying,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  involvement	  with	  slavery.	  This	  body	  of	  thought	  has	  
generally	  been	  termed	  pro-­‐slavery,	  in	  part	  because	  it	  has	  generally	  been	  studied	  by	  
anti-­‐slavery	  historians	  as	  the	  defensive	  and	  reactionary	  response	  of	  slave-­‐owners	  and	  
traders	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  abolitionism.80	  Recently	  historians	  have	  begun	  to	  take	  a	  more	  
sustained	  look	  at	  British	  justifications	  for	  slavery	  and	  the	  gradations	  of	  begrudging	  
support,	  apology,	  and	  vehement	  defence	  that	  were	  voiced.	  Paula	  Dumas	  has	  
demonstrated	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  diverse	  ‘culture	  of	  proslavery’	  in	  Britain,	  defining	  
‘proslavery’	  as	  the	  ‘arguments	  and	  individuals	  who	  promoted	  the	  institution	  of	  slavery,	  
as	  beneficial	  for	  them,	  the	  colonies,	  and	  Britain’s	  national	  interest	  in	  a	  public	  manner.’81	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  T.	  Cresswell,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Politics	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  &	  Space,	  
28:1	  (2010),	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80	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  an	  example	  see	  Davis,	  Age	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  Revolution,	  pp.	  39-­‐82.	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  P.	  E.	  Dumas,	  Proslavery	  Britain:	  Fighting	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Works	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Dumas	  understandably	  take	  West	  Indian	  emancipation	  as	  their	  
end	  point.	  Yet,	  placing	  the	  defences,	  apologies,	  and	  justifications	  offered	  after	  
emancipation	  within	  a	  longer	  tradition	  of	  British	  pro-­‐slavery	  offers	  a	  chance	  to	  identify	  
both	  continuities	  and	  ruptures.	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  most	  fruitful	  work	  on	  pro-­‐slavery	  has	  focused	  on	  its	  function	  in	  identity	  
formation.	  As	  David	  Lambert	  and	  Christer	  Petley	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  the	  cases	  
of	  Barbados	  and	  Jamaica	  respectively,	  defending	  slavery	  amounted	  to	  defending	  a	  way	  
of	  life.82	  Defenders	  of	  slavery	  in	  both	  colonies	  argued	  that	  they	  ‘were	  part	  of	  an	  
extended	  British	  nation	  and	  presented	  abolitionism	  as	  a	  potentially	  revolutionary	  force	  
that	  would	  cause	  the	  whole	  system	  to	  collapse.’83	  Such	  a	  position	  stressed	  the	  economic	  
benefits	  brought	  by	  the	  West	  Indian	  colonies	  and	  attempted	  to	  position	  West	  Indians	  
as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  white	  British	  culture	  defined	  against	  black	  slave	  labourers.	  Elsewhere,	  as	  
Michael	  Taylor	  has	  argued,	  defences	  of	  slavery	  ‘were	  integral	  to	  imperial	  economic	  
thought	  in	  the	  1820s	  and	  1830s.’	  84	  Works	  that	  have	  been	  held	  up	  as	  examples	  of	  
conservative	  political	  economy	  were	  first	  and	  foremost	  attempts	  to	  stave	  off	  
emancipation.	  Srividhya	  Swaminthan	  has	  argued	  that	  defenders	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  also	  
stressed	  that	  they	  were	  ‘loyal	  citizen[s]	  of	  empire’	  and	  that	  such	  claims,	  alongside	  
abolitionist	  rhetoric,	  contributed	  to	  shaping	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  Britishness.85	  Whilst	  the	  
owners	  of	  slave-­‐worked	  mines	  or	  Surinamese	  plantations,	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  four	  
and	  five,	  would	  not	  defend	  slavery	  in	  the	  abstract	  they	  echoed	  many	  earlier	  attempts	  to	  
prolong	  slavery	  in	  the	  British	  Empire.	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  Journal,	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  pp.	  973-­‐995,	  p.	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85	  S.	  Swaminathan,	  Debating	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  Trade:	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Extending	  a	  history	  of	  pro-­‐slavery,	  or	  slavery	  apologism	  at	  least,	  after	  1833	  also	  places	  
my	  work	  within	  the	  developing	  field	  of	  studies	  of	  legacies	  of	  British	  slave-­‐ownership.86	  
Nicholas	  Draper	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  compensation	  awarded	  to	  slave-­‐owners	  
was	  something	  actively	  campaigned	  for	  and	  won	  by	  Britons	  who	  had	  invested	  large	  
sums	  of	  capital	  in	  human	  property.87	  British	  emancipation	  can	  in	  many	  ways	  be	  
considered	  as	  a	  compromise	  between	  slave-­‐owners	  and	  their	  opponents.88	  This	  
particular	  legacy	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  exploring	  British	  complicity	  with	  
slavery	  after	  emancipation.	  Work	  on	  these	  legacies	  has	  mostly	  been	  interested	  in	  
tracing	  how	  the	  profits	  generated	  by	  slavery	  and	  the	  compensation	  process	  were	  
reinvested	  in	  the	  British	  economy.89	  However,	  Catherine	  Hall	  has	  explored	  the	  ‘writing	  
strategies	  of	  the	  slave-­‐owners	  and	  their	  descendants	  as	  they	  grappled	  with	  a	  world	  of	  
otherness	  in	  which	  chattel	  slavery	  was	  no	  longer	  acceptable.’90	  Hall	  argues	  that	  former	  
slave-­‐owners	  sought	  to	  maintain	  the	  racial	  hierarchies	  of	  slavery	  in	  a	  post-­‐
emancipation	  world,	  demonstrating	  that	  much	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  slavery	  apology	  could	  
live	  on.	  We	  might	  add	  company	  reports	  and	  financial	  journalism	  to	  the	  novels	  and	  
travel	  writing,	  which	  Hall	  identifies	  as	  bearing	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  slavery’s	  racial	  and	  
social	  hierarchies.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  of	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  which	  address	  
how	  slave-­‐ownership	  was	  actively	  legitimised	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  carrying	  what	  Hall	  
has	  called	  the	  ‘war	  of	  representation’	  of	  slavery	  into	  new	  arena.91	  In	  Victorian	  Britain	  
the	  contest	  was	  not	  over	  slavery’s	  morality	  but	  its	  relationship	  to	  property	  and	  
commerce.	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The	  continuities	  of	  slavery	  apologism	  highlighted	  above	  also	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  race	  as	  a	  social	  construct	  within	  this	  thesis.	  Whilst	  white	  hostility	  towards	  black	  
skinned	  individuals	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  earliest	  contact	  between	  Europeans	  and	  
Africans	  historians	  have	  been	  near	  unanimous	  in	  identifying	  a	  hardening	  of	  explicitly	  
racist	  attitudes	  within	  Britain	  in	  the	  years	  after	  emancipation.92	  According	  to	  Douglas	  
Lorimer,	  among	  others,	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  saw	  the	  emergence	  of	  scientific	  
racism	  within	  Britain	  alongside	  an	  older	  tradition	  of	  ethnocentric	  thought	  grounded	  in	  
a	  belief	  in	  English	  moral	  and	  civilizational	  superiority.93	  It	  was	  this	  latter	  strand	  of	  
thinking	  that	  blurred	  understandings	  of	  civilization	  and	  race	  that	  characterised	  debates	  
over	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Both	  sides	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  emancipation	  were	  
convinced	  that	  Britain	  stood	  at	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  civilization	  and	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  
came	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  this	  belief.94	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  when	  British	  capitalists	  
discussed	  race	  they	  maintained	  the	  association	  of	  Black	  people,	  whether	  African,	  Afro-­‐
Caribbean,	  or	  Afro-­‐Brazilian,	  with	  manual	  labour,	  a	  perspective	  that	  was	  at	  home	  with	  
the	  hierarchical	  understanding	  of	  British	  society.95	  Such	  rhetoric	  was	  much	  more	  
prominent	  than	  explicitly	  scientific	  racism	  or	  the	  biblical	  arguments	  that	  had	  been	  
prevalent	  prior	  to	  West	  Indian	  emancipation.96	  However,	  in	  many	  cases	  British	  
capitalists	  sought	  to	  avoid	  a	  discussion	  of	  enslaved	  people	  at	  all	  preferring	  to	  advance	  
economic	  arguments,	  where	  moral,	  racial,	  and	  civilizational	  claims	  were	  more	  implicit.	  	  
A	  key	  justification	  for	  slavery	  both	  before	  and	  after	  emancipation	  was	  the	  stress	  placed	  
by	  slave-­‐owners,	  slave	  traders,	  and	  other	  defenders	  of	  the	  system	  on	  property	  rights.	  
The	  primacy	  of	  property	  rights	  and	  sanctity	  of	  contract	  relate	  to	  another	  key	  question	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raised	  by	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery:	  how	  did	  involvement	  with	  slavery	  map	  onto	  a	  
highly	  moralised	  British	  economy?	  G.	  R.	  Searle	  argued	  that	  in	  Victorian	  economic	  
culture	  slavery	  came	  to	  be	  a	  red	  line	  in	  terms	  of	  unacceptable	  economic	  activity	  as	  
‘“legitimate	  trade”	  was	  incompatible	  with	  transactions	  that	  in	  any	  way	  resulted,	  
directly	  or	  indirectly,	  in	  the	  buying	  and	  selling	  of	  bodies.’97	  However,	  as	  discussed	  
below	  the	  definition	  of	  legitimate	  trade	  could	  include	  a	  myriad	  of	  different	  links	  to	  
slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade.	  This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  understand	  how	  profiting	  from	  slavery	  
could	  be	  reconciled	  within	  a	  Victorian	  economy	  where	  credit	  relations,	  business	  
partnerships,	  and	  joint-­‐stock	  investments	  were	  constantly	  moralised.98	  	  
Debates	  over	  the	  moral	  consequences	  of	  commercial	  activity,	  whether	  positive	  or	  
negative,	  were	  a	  constant	  in	  Victorian	  public	  discourse.	  For	  example,	  Boyd	  Hilton	  has	  
argued	  that	  until	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  Britons,	  particularly	  Evangelicals,	  
struggled,	  but	  ultimately	  succeeded	  in	  reconciling	  the	  profit-­‐motive	  with	  Christian	  
other-­‐worldliness.99	  Considering	  this	  moral	  and	  cultural	  aspect	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  
century	  economy	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  Frank	  Trentmann’s	  contention	  that	  concepts	  such	  
as	  economic	  rationality	  are	  culturally	  constructed	  and	  historically	  contingent.100	  
Apologies	  for	  connections	  to	  slavery	  rested	  upon	  the	  suggestion	  that	  they	  were	  the	  
inevitable	  result	  of	  amoral	  market	  relations.	  Rather	  than	  taking	  this	  assertion	  at	  face	  
value	  I	  examine	  how	  those	  invested	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  attempted	  to	  represent	  
their	  economic	  activity	  as	  existing	  outside	  of	  questions	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  slavery.	  
Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  appeals	  to	  economic	  rationality	  were	  consistently	  combined	  with	  
explicitly	  moral	  and	  civilizational	  arguments.	  Here	  the	  question	  of	  imagined	  
geographies	  re-­‐enter	  the	  question	  as	  British	  economic	  activity	  in	  Brazil,	  West	  Africa,	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and	  Cuba	  was	  consistently	  represented	  in	  terms	  of	  extending	  the	  civilizing	  influence	  of	  
commerce.	  These	  arguments	  rested	  both	  on	  the	  belief,	  as	  established	  above,	  that	  
Britain	  was	  free	  from	  the	  taint	  of	  slavery	  and	  superior	  in	  terms	  of	  civilization	  to	  the	  
various	  slave	  societies	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  World.	  As	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  emancipation	  
‘[p]olitically	  and	  ideologically	  motivated	  comparisons	  between	  different	  worldly	  sites’	  
were	  made	  to	  justify,	  or	  critique,	  British	  involvement	  in	  slavery.101	  These	  comparisons	  
of	  different	  worldly	  sites,	  and	  the	  people	  within	  them,	  also	  indicates	  the	  how	  different	  
types	  of	  human	  variation	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  debates	  over	  slavery	  and	  British	  
capitalism.	  As	  Sadiah	  Qureshi	  has	  argued	  Victorians	  often	  held	  ‘twinned	  notions	  of	  
diachronic	  human	  variation	  and	  developmental	  civilization	  [that]	  remained	  both	  
powerful	  and	  relevant	  to	  discussions	  of	  human	  history	  and	  national	  difference.’102	  
From	  this	  perspective	  enslaved	  Africans,	  Brazilian	  slave-­‐owners,	  or	  Dutch	  colonial	  
officials	  could	  all	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  lagging	  behind	  Britain	  in	  terms	  of	  morals	  and	  
civilization.	  The	  claims	  made	  by	  abolitionists,	  government	  officials,	  and	  capitalists	  
contributed	  to	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  outside	  the	  British	  
Empire.	  As	  I	  shall	  demonstrate	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  spaces	  outside	  the	  British	  Empire	  
were	  represented	  as	  inappropriate	  arenas	  for	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiment.	  
Conclusion	  
In	  conclusion,	  post-­‐emancipation	  Britain	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  reconciling	  its	  
opposition	  to	  slavery	  with	  numerous	  commercial	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  economies	  of	  the	  
Americas.	  Whilst	  Richard	  Allen	  argued	  that	  Britain	  must	  ‘root	  out	  all	  participation	  in	  
[slavery]’	  the	  question	  of	  what	  counted	  as	  participation	  was	  very	  much	  up	  for	  
debate.103	  British	  subjects	  dealt	  with	  slave	  traders	  and	  bought	  or	  sold	  slaves	  long	  after	  
it	  had	  become	  morally,	  and	  sometimes	  legally,	  unacceptable.	  Many	  did	  so	  from	  within	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the	  boundaries	  of	  empire,	  a	  fact	  that	  would	  appear	  to	  disrupt	  the	  moral	  geography	  of	  
anti-­‐slavery.	  To	  understand	  how	  this	  involvement	  with	  transatlantic	  slavery	  could	  be	  
rationalised	  with	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  legacies	  of	  
slavery	  apologism	  after	  emancipation	  as	  well	  as	  Victorian	  economic	  culture.	  As	  I	  will	  
demonstrate	  potentially	  troubling	  entanglements	  with	  slavery	  were	  consistently	  




Chapter	  I:	  Slavery’s	  Products	  and	  The	  Problem	  of	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  	  
The	  landscape	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  the	  years	  following	  West	  Indian	  emancipation	  
was	  hotly	  contested	  terrain.	  Diverse	  interpretations	  of	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities	  
of	  both	  individual	  Britons	  and	  the	  British	  state	  were	  advanced	  and	  competed	  with	  one	  
another.	  This	  chapter	  deals	  with	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  that	  have	  
previously	  received	  the	  most	  attention	  from	  historians.	  Firstly,	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  
historiographical	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  role	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  politics	  in	  the	  struggle	  
between	  free	  trade	  and	  protectionism.	  These	  debates	  have	  been	  central	  to	  
historiographical	  attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  capitalism	  and	  
British	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Between	  1841	  and	  1853	  the	  British	  government	  slashed	  
prohibitive	  duties	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  slave-­‐produced	  goods.	  Sugar,	  however,	  was	  the	  only	  
commodity	  to	  provoke	  genuinely	  fierce	  parliamentary	  debate;	  a	  fact	  bound	  up	  in	  the	  
legacy	  of	  British	  emancipation	  and	  commitment	  to	  slave	  trade	  suppression.	  I	  briefly	  
examine	  the	  muted	  debate	  over	  slave-­‐mined	  copper	  ore	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  not	  all	  of	  
slavery’s	  products	  received	  equal	  attention.	  Next,	  I	  explore	  British	  attitudes	  towards	  
American	  slavery	  including	  the	  ambivalent	  response	  to	  the	  American	  Civil	  War.	  The	  
sugar	  duties	  and	  American	  slavery	  dominated	  the	  attention	  of	  both	  early	  Victorians	  
and	  later	  historians.	  By	  surveying	  both	  the	  historiographical	  and	  contemporary	  
debates	  I	  demonstrate	  the	  benefits	  of	  stressing	  the	  pluralism	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  when	  
attempting	  to	  understand	  Britain’s	  post-­‐emancipation	  relationship	  to	  slavery.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  complicate	  Richard	  Huzzey’s	  argument	  that	  British	  responsibility	  for	  
slavery	  was	  limited	  by	  the	  political	  boundaries	  of	  empire	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  
various	  moral	  geographies	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  were	  the	  result	  of	  shifting	  understandings	  of	  
who	  shouldered	  the	  burden	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  Previous	  attempts	  to	  understand	  
the	  geographic	  stretch	  of	  humanitarian	  concern	  or	  moral	  responsibility	  have	  focused	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on	  the	  connections	  fostered	  by	  market	  capitalism	  or	  the	  British	  Empire.1	  I	  reframe	  the	  
question	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  differing	  conceptions	  of	  who	  should	  be	  the	  primary	  
moral	  actor.	  The	  sugar	  duties	  debate	  was	  principally	  concerned	  with	  the	  state	  as	  
economic	  regulator	  and	  moral	  arbiter,	  whilst	  debates	  over	  slave-­‐grown	  cotton	  placed	  
the	  moral	  burden	  on	  individual	  consumers.	  Attempts	  to	  moralise	  manufacturers	  or	  
merchants	  were	  rare	  and	  often	  explicitly	  linked	  to	  economic	  self-­‐interest.	  This	  chapter,	  
then,	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  intersection	  of	  imagined	  geographies	  and	  political	  economy.	  I	  
argue	  that	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  Brazil,	  Cuba,	  or	  the	  United	  States	  was	  never	  
understood	  in	  purely	  economic	  terms.	  Rather,	  abolitionists	  offered	  differing	  
representations	  of	  free	  labour	  and	  slave	  labour	  economies	  that	  framed	  the	  debate	  over	  
whether	  it	  was	  practical	  for	  Britons	  to	  reject	  slave	  produced	  goods.	  Ultimately,	  I	  
demonstrate	  that	  Britain’s	  self-­‐image	  as	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  anti-­‐slavery	  survived	  debates	  
over	  free	  trade,	  cotton,	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  War.	  I	  suggest	  these	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  
contests	  over	  who	  should	  provide	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery;	  the	  state,	  
consumers,	  or	  capitalists.	  	  
The	  Problem	  of	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  and	  Free	  Trade	  
Reconciling	  Britain’s	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  with	  its	  commercial	  relationship	  to	  the	  
wider	  world	  has	  been	  as	  problematic	  for	  historians	  as	  it	  was	  for	  the	  Victorians,	  if	  not	  
more	  so.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  truer	  than	  in	  the	  historiography	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  the	  sugar	  
duties.	  A	  recent	  survey	  of	  historical	  literature	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  slavery,	  
anti-­‐slavery,	  and	  free	  trade	  has	  aptly	  described	  the	  British	  debate	  as	  a	  ‘quagmire’.2	  In	  
this	  section	  I	  map	  the	  various	  strands	  of	  historical	  debate	  that	  have	  stemmed	  from	  Eric	  
Williams’s	  argument	  that	  repeal	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  was	  evidence	  that	  ‘the	  weakness	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Huzzey,	  ‘Moral	  Geography’,	  pp.	  138-­‐139;	  T.	  L.	  Haskell,	  ‘Capitalism	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  
Humanitarian	  Sensibility,	  Part	  1’,	  Capitalism	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Humanitarian	  Sensibility,	  Part	  2’,	  
in	  T.	  Bender	  (ed.),	  The	  Antislavery	  debate:	  Capitalism	  and	  Abolitionism	  as	  a	  Problem	  in	  Historical	  
Interpretation	  (Berkley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1992);	  D.	  Lambert,	  A.	  Lester,	  
‘Geographies	  of	  Colonial	  Philanthropy’,	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography,	  38:3	  (2004),	  pp.	  320-­‐341.	  
2	  M-­‐W.	  Palen,	  ‘Free	  Trade	  Ideology	  and	  Transatlantic	  Abolitionism:	  A	  Historiography’,	  Journal	  of	  
the	  History	  of	  Economic	  Thought,	  37:2	  (2015),	  pp.	  291-­‐304,	  p.	  293.	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the	  West	  Indian	  system	  was	  less	  that	  it	  was	  immoral	  than	  that	  it	  was	  unprofitable.’3	  
Williams’s	  depiction	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  capitalist	  self-­‐interest	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  
other	  interpretations	  that	  have	  cast	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  free	  trade	  as	  oppositional	  forces,	  
or	  the	  free	  trade	  movement	  as	  the	  successor	  to	  a	  declining	  abolitionism.	  I	  navigate	  
these	  historiographical	  debates	  and	  situate	  my	  own	  work	  among	  more	  recent	  attempts	  
to	  understand	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  playing	  a	  complex	  role	  in	  Victorian	  politics,	  as	  arguments	  
both	  for	  and	  against	  foreign	  sugar	  were	  expressed	  through	  a	  language	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  I	  
will	  argue	  that	  for	  many	  contemporary	  commentators,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  questions	  
posed	  by	  free	  trade	  in	  slave	  produce	  was	  conceptualising	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  
limited	  by	  geography.	  I	  complement	  this	  historiographical	  survey	  with	  an	  account	  of	  
the	  more	  muted	  contemporary	  debate	  over	  slave-­‐mined	  copper	  ore,	  which	  bore	  
similarities	  to	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debate	  but	  failed	  to	  spark	  national	  controversy.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  sugar	  duties	  was	  one	  over	  the	  role	  the	  British	  state	  
should	  play	  in	  opposing	  slavery.	  
Before	  delving	  into	  the	  historiographical	  debate	  over	  the	  sugar	  duties	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
establish	  the	  timeline	  of	  repeal.	  Until	  the	  1830s	  the	  British	  government	  operated	  a	  
protectionist	  tariff	  system	  charging	  prohibitively	  high	  duties	  on	  the	  import	  of	  foreign	  
produce	  compared	  to	  those	  from	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  empire.	  From	  1830	  slave-­‐
produced	  West	  Indian	  and	  Mauritian	  sugar	  was	  charged	  24s	  per	  hundredweight	  
(Cwt.)4	  However,	  when	  in	  1841	  Lord	  Melbourne’s	  Whig	  government	  introduced	  a	  
budget	  which	  ‘intended	  to	  reduce	  the	  duties	  on	  all	  foreign	  sugars	  from	  63s	  to	  36s	  per	  
hundredweight	  slavery	  had	  ended	  in	  the	  British	  Caribbean.’5	  This	  reduction	  would	  
have	  maintained	  a	  12s	  difference	  between	  foreign	  and	  colonial	  sugar,	  but	  sparked	  
fierce	  opposition	  and	  the	  government	  was	  defeated	  by	  an	  amendment	  couched	  in	  anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  E.	  Williams,	  ‘Laissez	  Faire,	  Sugar	  and	  Slavery’,	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly,	  58:1	  (1943),	  pp.	  67-­‐
85,	  p.	  67.	  
4	  C.	  D.	  Rice,	  ‘”Humanity	  Sold	  for	  Sugar!”	  The	  British	  Abolitionist	  Response	  to	  Free	  Trade	  in	  Slave-­‐
Grown	  Sugar’,	  Historical	  Journal,	  13:3	  (1970),	  pp.	  402-­‐418,	  p.	  409.	  
5	  Temperley,	  British	  Antislavery,	  pp.	  145-­‐6.	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slavery	  terms.6	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  1840s	  would	  see	  a	  progressive	  shift	  towards	  free	  trade	  
with	  the	  lowering	  of	  both	  foreign	  and	  colonial	  duties	  by	  10s	  in	  1844.	  Following	  the	  fall	  
of	  Peel’s	  administration	  after	  Corn	  Law	  repeal	  in	  1846	  Lord	  John	  Russell’s	  government	  
passed	  a	  bill	  setting	  out	  the	  gradual	  lowering	  of	  duties	  on	  all	  sugar,	  with	  the	  duties	  
eventually	  equalizing	  in	  1854	  after	  some	  opposition	  from	  the	  Lords	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
1840s.7	  This	  gradual	  march	  towards	  free	  trade	  in	  sugar	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  
reduction	  in	  tariffs	  on	  a	  number	  of	  other	  products	  of	  slave	  labour	  and	  must	  always	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  platform	  of	  free	  trade.	  However,	  it	  was	  sugar	  that	  
excited	  the	  most	  comment,	  both	  at	  the	  time	  and	  amongst	  subsequent	  historians.	  
For	  many	  historians	  interested	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  free	  trade	  and	  slavery	  the	  
contest	  over	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  is	  the	  final	  chapter	  in	  the	  story	  of	  British	  
abolitionism.	  In	  Capitalism	  &	  Slavery	  Eric	  Williams	  argued	  that	  slavery	  was	  vital	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  and	  that	  the	  demands	  of	  this	  capitalist	  system	  were	  
ultimately	  responsible	  for	  emancipation.8	  Within	  this	  context	  sugar	  duty	  repeal	  was	  the	  
final	  step	  in	  dismantling	  the	  old	  monopoly	  of	  the	  West	  Indies	  and	  emancipation	  was	  a	  
consequence	  of	  a	  self-­‐interested	  transition	  to	  market	  capitalism.	  That	  sugar	  duty	  repeal	  
was	  a	  foundational	  moment	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  more	  laissez-­‐faire	  economy	  is	  
inarguable.	  Repeal	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  campaign	  against	  import	  tariffs	  centred	  on	  
the	  Corn	  Laws	  that	  gripped	  British	  politics	  from	  the	  1830s	  onwards.	  This	  was	  a	  shift	  in	  
British	  political	  economy	  that	  by	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  established	  free	  trade,	  
small	  government	  expenditure,	  and	  free	  markets	  as	  articles	  of	  faith.9	  Both	  Williams’s	  
overall	  framework	  and	  specific	  analysis	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  question	  have	  been	  
challenged.	  Seymour	  Drescher	  has	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  abolition	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  
was	  in	  fact	  an	  economically	  disastrous	  policy	  and	  understood	  as	  such,	  rather	  than	  one	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  Ibid,	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  145-­‐50,	  Hansard,	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7	  Rice,	  “Humanity	  Sold”,	  p.	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  Williams,	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motivated	  by	  self-­‐interest.10	  However,	  Williams’s	  scepticism	  of	  the	  motivations	  for	  anti-­‐
slavery	  and	  attempts	  to	  understand	  its	  relationship	  to	  emergent	  capitalism	  has	  been	  
maintained.	  Determining	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  this	  relationship	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
problems	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  historiography.	  
If,	  for	  Williams,	  sugar	  duty	  repeal	  exposed	  the	  fact	  that	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  had	  cloaked	  
self-­‐interest,	  others	  interpreted	  it	  as	  evidence	  of	  declining	  humanitarianism.	  C.	  Duncan	  
Rice,	  argued	  that	  abolitionists	  had	  in	  fact	  opposed	  reform	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties.	  For	  Rice,	  
the	  protests	  of	  the	  BFASS	  and	  a	  plethora	  of	  provincial	  anti-­‐slavery	  societies	  proved	  that	  
opponents	  of	  slavery	  raised	  a	  serious	  moral	  objection	  to	  admission	  of	  slave-­‐grown	  
sugar.	  Key	  to	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Rice	  and	  Williams	  was	  who	  was	  taken	  as	  
representative	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  opinion.	  Rice	  argued	  that	  Williams	  had	  been	  too	  
credulous	  of	  Richard	  Cobden’s	  claims	  that	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  movement	  had	  been	  
subsumed	  into	  the	  campaign	  against	  the	  Corn	  Laws.11	  Identifying	  the	  legitimate	  
standard	  bearers	  of	  abolitionism	  has	  long	  been	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  among	  historians.	  
For	  David	  Brion	  Davis,	  British	  abolitionism	  was	  the	  preserve	  of	  an	  ascendant	  middle	  
class	  for	  whom	  anti-­‐slavery	  ‘reflected	  the	  needs	  and	  values	  of	  the	  emerging	  capitalist	  
order.’12	  Drescher’s	  abolitionists	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  were	  the	  Methodist	  working	  classes	  
expressing	  opposition	  to	  shifts	  in	  the	  labour	  market.13	  However,	  the	  debates	  over	  sugar	  
duty	  repeal	  belie	  attempts	  to	  identify	  a	  single	  strand	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  thought,	  as	  
demonstrated	  by	  those	  works	  whose	  primary	  focus	  is	  anti-­‐slavery	  after	  emancipation.	  
For	  historians	  who	  look	  well	  beyond	  1833,	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debates	  are	  often	  
represented	  as	  the	  peak	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiment	  rather	  than	  the	  final	  chapter.	  
Howard	  Temperley,	  in	  a	  study	  of	  abolitionist	  societies	  after	  emancipation,	  takes	  the	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  University	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  Press,	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defeat	  of	  Melbourne’s	  government	  in	  1841	  as	  a	  high	  point	  of	  organised	  anti-­‐slavery’s	  
influence.	  However,	  he	  also	  notes	  that	  throughout	  the	  1840s	  the	  abolitionist	  movement	  
was	  riven	  with	  divergent	  opinions.	  Even	  the	  BFASS	  who	  were	  the	  most	  prominent	  
abolitionist	  opponents	  of	  sugar	  duty	  reduction	  witnessed	  a	  number	  of	  splits.	  Following	  
the	  proposed	  reduction	  of	  1841	  George	  Bennett,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  BFASS’s	  governing	  
committee,	  broke	  cover	  in	  asserting	  his	  support	  for	  free	  trade	  and	  the	  end	  of	  monopoly	  
in	  the	  press.14	  Temperley	  has	  identified	  BFASS’s	  failed	  campaign	  against	  the	  sugar	  
duties	  as	  a	  key	  point	  from	  which	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  society,	  and	  abolitionist	  
groups	  in	  general,	  began	  to	  decline.15	  David	  Turley,	  like	  Temperley,	  has	  argued	  that	  
diversity	  of	  opinion	  among	  abolitionists	  was	  symptomatic	  of	  decline,	  particularly	  as	  
they	  lost	  the	  West	  India	  interest	  as	  a	  coherent	  opposition	  to	  define	  themselves	  
against.16	  Opponents	  of	  sugar	  duty	  appeal	  found	  themselves	  up	  against	  fellow	  
abolitionists	  and	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Anti-­‐Corn	  Law	  League,	  who	  as	  Simon	  Morgan	  has	  
argued,	  actively	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  the	  moral	  successors	  to	  the	  campaign	  against	  
slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade.17	  Such	  interpretations	  move	  past	  viewing	  repeal	  of	  the	  
sugar	  duties	  as	  the	  result	  capitalist	  self-­‐interest	  or	  sincere	  abolitionists	  thwarted	  by	  
parliament.	  However,	  they	  ultimately	  conform	  to	  a	  decline	  narrative	  of	  
humanitarianism	  by	  binding	  the	  fate	  of	  anti-­‐slavery’s	  influence	  to	  the	  waning	  
abolitionist	  societies.	  By	  looking	  beyond	  these	  societies	  recent	  historiography	  
demonstrates	  the	  complexity	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  belief	  and	  action	  in	  Victorian	  Britain.	  
Moving	  beyond	  the	  fractious	  debates	  within	  anti-­‐slavery	  societies,	  Huzzey	  has	  argued	  
that	  ‘[b]oth	  sides	  of	  the	  sugar	  contest	  claimed	  to	  be	  authentic	  standard-­‐bearers	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery	  and	  prosperity.’18	  Framing	  the	  debate	  over	  slavery	  and	  free	  trade	  in	  such	  a	  
manner	  recognises	  that	  both	  opponents	  and	  advocates	  of	  repeal	  might	  appeal	  to	  anti-­‐
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  Temperley,	  British	  Antislavery,	  pp.	  145-­‐146.	  
15	  Ibid,	  p.	  166.	  
16	  Turley,	  The	  Culture	  of	  English	  Antislavery,	  pp.	  79-­‐80.	  
17	  S.	  Morgan,	  ‘The	  Anti-­‐Corn	  Law	  League	  and	  British	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  in	  Transatlantic	  Perspective,	  
1838-­‐1846’,	  The	  Historical	  Journal,	  52:1	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  pp.	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  98.	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slavery	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  However,	  this	  simple	  binary	  of	  for	  and	  against	  free	  
trade	  itself	  has	  to	  be	  questioned.	  The	  sugar	  duty	  debate	  must	  be	  placed	  in	  its	  proper	  
context,	  specifically	  that	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  politics	  of	  the	  1840s,	  which	  were	  plagued	  
by	  division	  on	  economic,	  religious,	  and	  social	  policy.	  Different	  wings	  of	  the	  Whig	  and	  
Tory	  parties	  could,	  and	  did,	  work	  together	  or	  come	  apart	  on	  a	  bill-­‐by-­‐bill	  basis.19	  Free-­‐
trade	  zealots	  were	  generally	  drawn	  from	  two	  separate	  intellectual	  streams,	  the	  secular	  
utilitarian	  approach	  and	  the	  evangelical,	  which	  converged	  over	  a	  belief	  in	  removing	  
“unnatural”	  government	  impositions	  that	  disrupted	  either	  the	  “natural”	  function	  of	  the	  
market	  or	  providence.20	  Anna	  Gambles	  has	  argued	  for	  protectionism	  as	  ‘alternative	  
fiscal	  politics	  for	  a	  propertied	  polity’	  that	  sought	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  
urban/rural	  or	  industrial/agrarian	  interests.21	  As	  Michael	  Taylor	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  
imperial	  aspect	  of	  the	  Conservative	  political	  economy	  had	  actually	  been	  an	  expression	  
of	  the	  economic	  defence	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period;	  the	  West	  India	  
interest	  remained	  ardent	  protectionists	  as	  they	  now	  feared	  competition	  with	  slave	  
sugar.22	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  the	  thorny	  issue	  of	  slavery	  further	  complicated	  
this	  muddled	  picture	  as	  those	  who	  were	  neither	  ardent	  free	  traders	  nor	  protectionists	  
came	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  debate	  that	  touched	  upon	  British	  anti-­‐slavery,	  the	  economy,	  and	  
social	  cohesion.	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debate,	  and	  broader	  arguments	  over	  free	  trade,	  
cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  what	  Thomas	  Carlyle	  termed	  the	  “Condition	  of	  England”	  
question	  as	  the	  British	  government	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  collapse	  in	  living	  standards	  in	  the	  
1830s	  and	  40s.23	  Industrialisation	  and	  mechanisation	  had	  produced	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
social	  upheaval	  and	  economic	  uncertainty.	  This	  context,	  alongside	  stripping	  back	  of	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  32-­‐33.	  	  
21	  A.	  Gambles,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Politics	  of	  Protection:	  Conservatism	  and	  the	  Corn	  Laws,	  1830-­‐52’,	  
English	  Historical	  Review,	  113(453),	  pp.	  928-­‐952,	  p.	  935.	  
22	  Taylor,	  ‘Conservative	  Political	  Economy’,	  pp.	  973-­‐995,	  p.	  994.	  
23	  R.	  Huzzey,	  ‘Free	  Trade,	  Free	  Labour,	  and	  Slave	  Sugar	  in	  Victorian	  Britain’,	  The	  Historical	  
Journal,	  53:2	  (2010),	  pp.	  359-­‐79,	  pp.	  364-­‐366;	  Hilton,	  Mad.	  Bad,	  Dangerous,	  pp.	  573-­‐588.	  
48	  
	  
state	  responsibility	  for	  unemployment	  through	  the	  1834	  New	  Poor	  Law,	  contributed	  to	  
periodic	  social	  protest	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  
period	  that	  Chartists	  began	  their	  agitation	  for	  working	  class	  political	  rights,	  combining	  
political	  campaigning,	  petitioning,	  and	  monster	  meetings.	  Whilst	  historians	  have	  
disagreed	  over	  whether	  the	  movement’s	  aims	  were	  essentially	  political	  or	  socio-­‐
economic	  in	  nature,	  Chartism	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  protest	  clearly	  warranted	  some	  
government	  response,	  either	  through	  reform	  or	  repression.24	  Whilst	  Corn	  Law	  Repeal	  
might	  be	  debated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  free	  trade	  on	  wages,	  sugar	  was	  increasingly	  
viewed	  as	  a	  necessity	  rather	  than	  a	  luxury	  product.25	  Benjamin	  Disraeli	  summed	  up	  the	  
confused	  nature	  of	  the	  sugar	  question	  when	  he	  stated	  “all	  considerations	  mingle	  in	  it;	  
not	  merely	  commercial,	  but	  imperial,	  philanthropic,	  religious;	  confounding	  and	  
crossing	  each	  other.”26	  To	  begin	  to	  navigate	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  sugar	  question	  then	  it	  
is	  imperative	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  came	  to	  be	  particularly	  offensive	  compared	  to	  other	  
products	  of	  slave	  labour.	  
Sugar’s	  peculiarly	  offensive	  status	  has	  been	  invoked	  as	  evidence	  of	  abolitionist	  
insincerity	  by	  both	  contemporary	  commentators	  and	  historians.	  A	  poem	  in	  Punch	  
describing	  the	  ‘very	  well-­‐spread	  table’	  of	  the	  ‘Anti-­‐Slavery	  Hannibal’	  is	  illustrative	  of	  
this	  fact.	  Within	  this	  sketch,	  Hannibal	  protested	  that	  he	  would	  not	  ‘Help	  Brazil	  of	  her	  
sugar	  to	  rid!’	  as	  ‘WILBERFORCE,	  CLARKSON,	  forbid!’	  These	  protests	  are	  juxtaposed	  
with	  Hannibal	  sipping	  slave-­‐grown	  coffee,	  wearing	  slave-­‐grown	  cotton,	  brandishing	  a	  
slave-­‐mined	  copper	  coin.27	  Historians	  from	  Williams	  to	  Davis	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  lack	  
of	  anti-­‐slavery	  protest	  over	  American	  cotton	  as	  the	  prime	  example	  that	  abolitionists	  
were	  at	  best	  blinkered	  and	  at	  worst	  self-­‐interested.28	  Similarly,	  Sidney	  Mintz	  has	  
pointed	  to	  the	  sugar	  duty	  debates	  as	  a	  ‘parliamentary	  high-­‐water	  mark	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Hilton,	  Mad	  Bad	  Dangerous,	  pp.	  612-­‐622,	  	  
25	  Gambles,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Politics’,	  p.	  938;	  S.	  W.	  Mintz,	  Sweetness	  and	  Power:	  The	  Place	  of	  Sugar	  
in	  Modern	  History,	  (London:	  Penguin,	  1986),	  p.	  164.	  
26	  Quoted	  in	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  p.	  99.	  
27	  ‘The	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Hannibal’,	  Punch,	  22	  Aug	  1846.	  
28	  Williams,	  ‘Laissez	  Faire,	  Sugar	  and	  Slavery’,	  pp.	  75-­‐79,	  Davis,	  Age	  of	  Emancipation,	  p.	  285.	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disingenuousness.’29	  This	  critique	  might	  be	  fairly	  applied	  to	  members	  of	  the	  West	  India	  
interest,	  formerly	  staunch	  defenders	  of	  British	  slavery,	  who	  sought	  to	  maintain	  
protection	  of	  their	  sugar	  production.	  However,	  the	  BFASS	  explicitly	  looked	  to	  distance	  
themselves	  from	  protectionist	  voices	  like	  Viscount	  Sandon.30	  Rather	  than	  being	  
dismissed	  out	  of	  hand,	  the	  argument	  for	  sugar	  as	  a	  special	  case	  should	  be	  taken	  
seriously.	  To	  do	  so	  one	  must	  consider	  how	  the	  commodity	  was	  seen	  to	  relate	  to	  two	  
key	  issues:	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  West	  India	  Emancipation.	  
Sugar’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  question	  was	  tied	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  since	  abolition	  
in	  1807	  Britain	  had	  become	  increasingly	  committed	  to	  policing	  the	  transatlantic	  trade	  
in	  slaves.	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  had	  first	  been	  expressed	  as	  condemnation	  and	  then	  
agitation	  against	  the	  slave	  trade,	  a	  decision	  Davis	  describes	  as	  ‘tactical’	  but	  possessing	  
‘profound	  ideological	  meaning.’31	  Whilst	  there	  was	  often	  a	  slippage	  between	  
condemnations	  of	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade	  the	  latter	  was	  generally	  represented	  as	  
the	  greater	  evil.	  In	  fact	  moral	  condemnation	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  became	  near	  universal	  in	  
Atlantic	  World	  diplomacy	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  Wars	  onwards,	  even	  as	  many	  
nations	  remained	  illicitly	  involved.32	  By	  the	  1840s	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  stood	  as	  the	  last	  
remaining	  new	  world	  destinations	  for	  African	  slaves,	  they	  were	  also	  home	  to	  
burgeoning	  sugar	  economies	  with	  the	  latter	  in	  particular	  undergoing	  a	  ‘revolution’	  in	  
sugar	  production.33	  Removing	  the	  sugar	  duties	  then	  would	  give	  impetus	  to	  the	  slave	  
trade	  in	  a	  way	  that	  increased	  consumption	  of	  cotton,	  tobacco,	  or	  coffee	  would	  not.	  Lord	  
Brougham	  in	  defending	  a	  call	  to	  exclude	  slave	  sugar	  from	  Britain	  noted	  that	  a	  reduction	  
in	  the	  duties	  charged	  on	  foreign	  copper	  ores,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  mined	  by	  Cuban	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  Temperley,	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  pp.	  151-­‐152.	  
31	  Davis,	  Age	  of	  Revolution,	  p.	  417.	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  M.	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  ‘Keeping	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  International	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  of	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  F.	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  Knight,	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  University	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  Press,	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slaves,	  had	  ‘only	  found	  employment	  for	  one	  additional	  vessel'	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.34	  
Fighting	  against	  sugar	  duty	  repeal	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  meaningful	  continuation	  of	  the	  
fight	  against	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
There	  were	  numerous	  means	  of	  opposing	  the	  slave	  trade	  some	  antithetical	  to	  free	  
trade,	  others	  that	  chimed	  with	  it.	  Since	  the	  abolition	  of	  1807	  the	  British	  government	  
had	  become	  committed	  to	  the	  naval	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  via	  a	  squadron	  
deployed	  off	  the	  West	  Coast	  of	  Africa.	  From	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  War	  suppression	  
had	  also	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Britain’s	  foreign	  diplomacy.	  Suppression	  was	  pursued	  
through	  bi-­‐lateral	  treaties	  allowing	  the	  search	  of	  foreign	  vessels	  and	  making	  slave	  
trade	  abolition	  a	  condition	  when	  recognising	  newly	  independent	  states.35	  Admission	  of	  
slave	  sugar	  might	  appear	  to	  undermine	  Britain’s	  claims	  to	  moral	  prestige	  that	  rested	  in	  
part	  on	  commitment	  to	  suppression.	  This	  was	  certainly	  the	  point	  argued	  by	  ardent	  
defender	  of	  suppression	  Robert	  Harry	  Inglis,	  an	  Anglican	  Tory,	  during	  an	  1846	  
debate.36	  However,	  support	  for	  suppression	  was	  far	  from	  a	  guarantee	  of	  a	  protectionist	  
outlook.	  Palmerston,	  who	  as	  foreign	  secretary	  was	  particularly	  belligerent	  in	  his	  
pursuit	  of	  naval	  suppression,	  became	  a	  supporter	  of	  repeal	  and	  professed	  to	  see	  no	  
contradiction	  between	  the	  policies.37	  Even	  more	  counter-­‐intuitively	  the	  BFASS,	  the	  
most	  stringent	  opponents	  of	  repeal	  among	  abolitionists,	  were	  opposed	  to	  naval	  
suppression	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  pacifism	  of	  their	  Quaker	  leadership.38	  The	  various	  
positions	  taken	  on	  free	  trade	  in	  sugar	  related	  to	  differing	  expectations	  of	  the	  British	  
state’s	  responsibility	  for	  the	  slave	  trade.	  For	  Palmerston	  this	  responsibility	  ended	  with	  
the	  navy,	  for	  others	  repeal	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  gave	  tacit	  sanction,	  and	  impetus,	  to	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  Huzzey	  connects	  the	  campaign	  against	  the	  sugar	  duties	  to	  later	  efforts	  to	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  Hansard,	  27	  July	  1846,	  3rd	  series	  vol.	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35	  Eltis,	  Economic	  Growth,	  pp.	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  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  p.	  103.	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  Temperley,	  British	  Antislavery,	  p.	  76.	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end	  naval	  suppression,	  both	  of	  which	  causes	  were	  championed	  by	  radical	  liberal	  
William	  Hutt.39	  However,	  Hutt	  was	  not	  critical	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  of	  itself	  and	  to	  
understand	  his	  position	  and	  that	  of	  many	  other	  free	  trade	  acolytes	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
understand	  how	  the	  sugar	  question	  related	  to	  emancipation.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  sugar	  question	  and	  emancipation	  is	  captured	  by	  a	  clause	  
within	  the	  BFASS	  constitution	  calling	  for	  the	  ‘the	  adoption	  of	  fiscal	  regulations	  in	  
favour	  of	  free	  labour.’40	  The	  society	  believed	  it	  was	  the	  British	  government’s	  
responsibility	  to	  ensure	  measures	  were	  taken	  to	  favour	  free	  labour	  over	  slave	  labour.	  
The	  free	  labourers	  in	  this	  case	  were	  of	  course	  the	  former	  slaves	  of	  the	  West	  Indies	  and	  
Mauritius.	  The	  BFASS’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  government’s	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  free	  
labour	  reflected	  the	  campaign	  Sturge	  had	  spearheaded	  against	  West	  Indian	  
apprenticeship.	  Sturge	  and	  other	  ‘moral	  radicals’	  had	  sought	  to	  influence	  policy	  
through	  the	  exertion	  of	  pressure	  from	  without	  on	  government,	  stressing	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  state	  rather	  than	  the	  individual.41	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  for	  
the	  BFASS	  sugar	  was	  merely	  the	  exception	  to	  a	  general	  preference	  for	  free	  trade,	  there	  
was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  overlap	  in	  membership	  of	  the	  BFASS	  and	  ACLL.42	  Sugar’s	  
exceptional	  status	  lay	  in	  a	  more	  ‘holistic’	  view	  of	  emancipation	  which	  required	  the	  
British	  state	  to	  help	  manage	  the	  transition	  to	  free	  labour,	  a	  belief	  that	  was	  tied	  up	  in	  the	  
missionary	  work	  of	  men	  like	  Sturge	  and	  William	  Morgan	  who	  looked	  to	  transform	  West	  
Indian	  society	  as	  a	  whole.43	  Whilst	  Hall	  has	  characterised	  this	  missionary	  attitude	  as	  
patronising	  in	  its	  conceptualisation	  of	  Africans	  it	  did	  at	  least	  recognise	  responsibility	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  British	  state	  towards	  former	  slaves,	  as	  opposed	  to	  figures	  like	  
Thomas	  Macaulay	  who	  argued	  that	  any	  obligation	  had	  been	  terminated	  with	  the	  end	  of	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slavery.44	  The	  resonance	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debate	  then	  came	  in	  part	  from	  how	  
different	  groups	  conceptualised	  a	  world	  economy	  where	  free	  labour	  competed	  with	  
slave	  labour	  and	  what	  role	  the	  state	  should	  play.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  for	  some	  free-­‐trade	  
zealots	  state	  protection	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  anathema	  to	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  cause.	  	  
The	  awkward	  post-­‐emancipation	  alliance	  of	  BFASS,	  the	  West	  India	  interest,	  and	  other	  
protectionists	  must	  be	  considered	  alongside	  an	  earlier	  tradition	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  that	  
had	  seen	  free	  trade	  and	  free	  labour	  as	  complimentary.	  Figures	  such	  as	  James	  Cropper	  
campaigned	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  sugar	  duties	  in	  the	  1820s	  and	  also	  promoted	  
expanded	  sugar	  production	  in	  India.45	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  1820s	  tariffs	  protected	  
West	  Indian	  slave-­‐owners,	  whilst	  penalising	  supposedly	  free	  labour	  sugar	  from	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  Empire.	  By	  the	  late	  1830s	  Cropper	  and	  free	  traders	  such	  as	  Richard	  
Cobden	  and	  John	  Bright	  were	  arguing	  that	  government	  protection	  of	  the	  West	  Indies	  
prevented	  a	  fair	  contest	  between	  free	  and	  slave	  labour.	  John	  Scoble	  of	  the	  BFASS	  
described	  this	  position	  as	  ‘sophistry’	  an	  interpretation	  echoed	  by	  some	  historians;	  
however	  there	  seems	  little	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  sincerity	  of	  the	  likes	  of	  Cobden	  and	  
Cropper.46	  As	  Huzzey	  has	  argued	  free-­‐trade	  abolitionism	  was	  simply	  representative	  of	  
a	  political	  economy	  that	  envisioned	  a	  minimalist	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  the	  campaign	  
against	  slavery	  and	  everything	  else.47	  Such	  a	  perspective	  rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  
slavery	  in	  Cuba	  or	  Brazil	  would	  eventually	  come	  to	  an	  end,	  and	  that	  open	  competition	  
with	  free	  labour	  could	  hasten	  this	  process.	  	  
The	  various	  different	  perspectives	  aired	  during	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debate	  boiled	  down	  to	  
a	  single	  question:	  what	  were	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  British	  state?	  This	  
was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  abolitionist	  movement’s	  success	  in	  framing	  slavery	  as	  a	  national	  
sin,	  something	  which	  the	  British	  people	  as	  a	  whole	  represented	  by	  their	  government	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were	  responsible	  for.48	  There	  were	  numerous	  strands	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  thought	  
competing	  and	  combining	  with	  each	  other	  including	  hard-­‐line	  protectionists,	  free	  trade	  
apostles,	  and	  those	  who	  saw	  sugar	  as	  exceptional.	  Others	  such	  as	  Thomas	  Fowell	  
Buxton	  saw	  the	  free	  trade	  question	  as	  somewhat	  irrelevant,	  instead	  pressuring	  the	  
state	  into	  supporting	  an	  expedition	  up	  the	  Niger	  River	  intended	  to	  tackle	  the	  slave	  
trade	  at	  its	  source.49	  These	  were	  not	  disagreements	  over	  the	  morality	  of	  slavery,	  but	  
how	  the	  problem	  should	  be	  tackled.	  Importantly,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  no	  one	  single	  
solution	  won	  out.	  The	  British	  government	  both	  established	  free	  trade	  in	  sugar	  and	  
remained	  committed	  to	  naval	  suppression.50	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  
geography’	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  a	  sense	  of	  slavery	  as	  a	  national	  question	  that	  the	  British	  
state	  had	  some	  responsibility	  to	  address.	  The	  broad	  consensus	  reached	  was	  that	  this	  
responsibility	  ended	  at	  Britain’s	  borders.	  	  
Acknowledging	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  British	  state	  in	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debate	  requires	  a	  
reassessment	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  anti-­‐slavery	  politicised	  consumption.	  Certainly	  
consumption	  of	  slave-­‐produced	  sugar	  had	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  campaign	  against	  both	  
the	  slave	  trade	  and	  Caribbean	  slavery.	  Elizabeth	  Heyrick’s	  call	  to	  boycott	  sugar	  was	  key	  
in	  putting	  immediatism,	  rather	  than	  a	  gradual	  end	  to	  slavery,	  on	  the	  agenda	  in	  the	  
1820s.	  As	  Clare	  Midgely	  notes,	  sugar	  boycotts	  challenged	  the	  male	  leadership	  of	  the	  
abolitionist	  movement	  and	  added	  to	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  government.51	  Charlotte	  
Sussman	  has	  argued	  that	  awareness	  of	  sugar’s	  slave	  origins	  was	  promoted	  through	  
language	  that	  associated	  sugar	  itself	  with	  revulsion	  and	  disgust	  and	  drawn	  explicit	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through	  lines	  to	  twentieth	  century	  boycott	  movements.52	  However,	  this	  interpretation	  
requires	  some	  qualification	  as	  prior	  to	  emancipation,	  boycotts	  of	  slave	  grown	  sugar	  
happened	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  empire	  and	  a	  protectionist	  system.	  Refusal	  to	  consume	  
sugar	  was	  aimed	  at	  harming	  the	  revenues	  of	  both	  slave-­‐owners	  and	  the	  government	  
who	  sanctioned	  them.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  foreign	  sugars	  individual	  boycott	  only	  
became	  prominent	  after	  the	  failure	  to	  prevent	  repeal	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties,	  with	  
Temperley	  casting	  it	  as	  a	  ‘last	  resort’	  for	  the	  likes	  of	  BFASS.53	  Whilst	  some	  consumers	  
were	  inspired	  to	  abstain	  from	  slave-­‐produced	  goods	  this	  individualised	  approach	  was	  
secondary	  to	  debates	  over	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  state.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  
section,	  individual	  abstention	  and	  a	  more	  expansive	  sense	  of	  moral	  geography	  was	  
more	  characteristic	  of	  debates	  over	  American	  slavery.	  
The	  majority	  of	  British	  complicity	  with	  the	  slave	  trade	  escaped	  wider	  comment	  or	  
condemnation,	  as	  such	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  sugar’s	  particular	  resonance	  through	  a	  
comparison	  to	  another	  commodity:	  copper	  ore.	  As	  demonstrated	  above,	  many	  Britons	  
believed	  the	  government	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  end	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  British	  free	  
labourers	  were	  being	  thrown	  into	  direct	  contest	  with	  slave	  labour.	  This	  was	  of	  course	  
also	  true	  of	  copper	  ore	  imported	  from	  Cuba.	  Britain’s	  copper	  industry	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  
century	  had	  two	  distinct	  strands;	  copper	  mining	  and	  copper	  smelting.	  The	  former	  saw	  
the	  raw	  material	  of	  copper	  ore	  extracted	  from	  mines	  the	  majority	  of	  which	  were	  
located	  in	  Cornwall,	  which	  held	  a	  near	  monopoly	  on	  British	  copper	  mining	  up	  until	  
1850.54	  Smelting	  was	  centred	  on	  Swansea,	  where	  an	  ample	  supply	  of	  coal,	  favourable	  
geographic	  location,	  and	  the	  innovative	  ‘Welsh	  process’	  of	  mixing	  copper	  ores	  allowed	  
for	  the	  production	  of	  particularly	  pure	  base	  metal.55	  The	  success	  of	  Swansea	  smelting	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and	  Cornish	  mining	  had	  been	  linked	  but	  a	  series	  of	  tariff	  reforms	  in	  the	  1820s	  saw	  
British	  ports	  opened	  to	  foreign	  ores	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  The	  1827	  Customs	  Act	  is	  credited	  
by	  Edmund	  Newell	  as	  ‘opening	  the	  door	  for	  foreign	  ore	  to	  enter	  Britain’	  by	  exempting	  
ore	  imported	  in	  bond,	  meaning	  to	  be	  re-­‐exported	  rather	  than	  sold	  in	  Britain,	  from	  
import	  duties.56	  However,	  this	  exemption	  on	  foreign	  ores	  imported	  in	  bond	  would	  be	  
removed	  in	  1842	  as	  Peel	  reduced	  the	  duties	  on	  copper	  ore,	  unwrought	  copper,	  and	  
pure	  copper.	  Different	  grades	  of	  copper	  ore	  were	  also	  subject	  to	  different	  duties	  but	  in	  
1848	  these	  duties	  were	  reduced	  to	  1s	  per	  ton	  of	  ore,	  having	  been	  as	  high	  as	  £6	  6s	  0d	  for	  
ore	  with	  less	  than	  20%	  copper	  content	  previously.57	  The	  British	  market	  would	  only	  be	  
fully	  opened	  to	  foreign	  ores	  in	  1848,	  and	  the	  duties	  would	  be	  swept	  away	  alongside	  
those	  on	  sugar	  in	  1853.	  Arguably,	  the	  British	  state’s	  increasing	  sanction	  of	  the	  import	  
of	  slave-­‐mined	  copper	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  a	  cause	  which	  abolitionists	  could	  
rally	  round.	  However,	  abolitionist	  comment	  on	  the	  copper	  duties	  question	  was	  muted.	  
The	  majority	  of	  abolitionist	  comment	  on	  copper	  ore	  actually	  related	  to	  the	  question	  of	  
British	  ownership	  of	  Cuban	  copper	  mines,	  such	  as	  the	  Royal	  Copper	  Mines	  of	  El	  Cobre,	  
first	  promoted	  in	  1835.58	  Discussion	  of	  the	  import	  of	  slave	  copper	  barley	  registered	  
among	  abolitionists	  at	  the	  1840	  convention;	  though	  Joseph	  Price,	  a	  Welsh	  delegate,	  
who	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  copper	  ore	  was	  re-­‐exported.59	  In	  parliament	  
the	  majority	  of	  comment	  on	  copper	  came	  from	  free	  traders	  that	  adverted	  to	  the	  
admission	  of	  copper	  as	  evidence	  of	  protectionist	  hypocrisy	  on	  the	  slavery	  issue.	  Lord	  
John	  Russell	  was	  typical	  when	  he	  attacked	  Peel	  over	  a	  reduction	  in	  copper	  duties	  but	  
not	  in	  that	  of	  sugar	  noting	  that	  the	  ‘two	  cases	  were	  exactly	  analogous.’	  60	  If	  anything	  
copper	  mining	  was	  worse	  as	  ‘slaves	  [were]	  subjected	  to	  the	  hardest	  and	  most	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oppressive	  kind	  of	  labour’.61	  Copper	  was	  for	  the	  most	  part	  a	  way	  to	  needle	  opponents	  
of	  reducing	  the	  sugar	  duties	  and	  prominent	  anti-­‐slavery	  voices	  in	  parliament	  had	  little	  
to	  say	  on	  the	  issue.	  
If	  the	  question	  of	  copper	  duties	  did	  little	  to	  move	  Parliament	  or	  Exeter	  Hall	  in	  Cornwall	  
itself	  they	  proved	  far	  more	  controversial.	  When	  Sir	  Richard	  Hussey	  Vivian,	  MP	  for	  East	  
Cornwall,	  defended	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  Sugar	  Duties	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  ‘it	  is	  in	  fact,	  
splitting	  hairs,	  to	  say	  that	  you	  will	  not	  import	  sugar	  from	  Brazil,	  whilst	  you	  import	  …	  
copper	  ore	  from	  Cuba’	  he	  was	  airing	  a	  common	  argument.62	  However	  an	  editorial	  in	  
the	  Cornwall	  Royal	  Gazette	  took	  aim	  at	  Hussey	  Vivian’s	  support	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  
duties	  on	  foreign	  ores	  views	  linking	  them	  to	  pecuniary	  interest	  and	  noting	  that	  ‘Sir	  
Hussey	  it	  would	  seem,	  prefers	  the	  cheap	  …	  Copper	  Ore,	  in	  despite	  of	  his	  early	  hatred	  for	  
slavery.’63	  Vivian	  was	  an	  inactive	  partner	  in	  a	  firm	  of	  copper	  manufacturers,	  Vivian	  and	  
Sons,	  who	  imported	  ores	  from	  Cuba.64	  Protests	  over	  the	  import	  of	  slave	  copper	  were	  
provincial	  in	  nature	  emanating	  from	  Cornish	  mining	  interests.	  The	  Royal	  Cornwall	  
Gazette’s	  attack	  on	  Sir	  Hussey	  Vivian	  also	  poured	  scorn	  on	  William	  Huskisson,	  architect	  
of	  the	  1820s	  reforms	  and	  at	  this	  point	  deceased	  for	  over	  a	  decade,	  claiming	  that	  
‘Cornwall	  has	  seen	  all	  her	  interests	  either	  injured	  or	  jeopardised	  by	  the	  Free	  trade	  
system,	  which	  the	  government	  has	  long	  secretly	  encouraged’.65	  As	  early	  as	  1830	  
Cornish	  mining	  interests	  had	  protested	  to	  parliament	  about	  the	  admission	  of	  foreign	  
ores.66	  This	  predated	  the	  first	  shipment	  of	  Cuban	  ore,	  which	  landed	  in	  Swansea	  in	  1831	  
and	  yielded	  double	  the	  amount	  of	  metallic	  copper	  expected	  from	  Cornish	  ores.67	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  copper	  ore	  then,	  it	  appears	  anti-­‐slavery	  had	  become	  grafted	  onto	  an	  older	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conflict,	  as	  Cornish	  mining	  interests	  found	  a	  new	  weapon	  in	  what	  they	  viewed	  as	  a	  
struggle	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  competition	  
Complicity	  with	  slavery	  prompted	  the	  widest	  debate	  when	  it	  intersected	  with	  other	  
questions	  perceived	  to	  be	  of	  national	  importance.	  However,	  the	  case	  of	  copper	  ore	  
demonstrates	  that	  even	  small-­‐scale	  disputes	  were	  inflected	  with	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Similarly,	  
the	  most	  provincial	  of	  concerns	  could	  produce	  expansive	  moral	  geographies	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Joseph	  Treffry	  who	  in	  protesting	  copper	  duty	  reduction	  stated	  that	  Cuban	  ships	  
brought	  copper	  ore	  to	  Britain’s	  shores	  and	  in	  return	  received	  ‘goods,	  perhaps,	  they	  can	  
barter	  on	  the	  Coast	  of	  Africa	  for	  the	  very	  Slaves	  required	  in	  working	  the	  Foreign	  Mines	  
even	  to	  the	  starvation	  of	  the	  British	  Miner	  at	  home!’	  68	  Treffry	  tied	  together	  British	  
ownership	  of	  Cuban	  mines,	  slave	  mining	  of	  coppers,	  and	  the	  re-­‐export	  of	  copper	  made	  
goods	  into	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  the	  British	  state	  was	  certainly	  
limited	  by	  its	  borders	  but	  individuals	  were	  often	  more	  expansive	  in	  their	  
conceptualisation	  of	  responsibility	  for	  slavery.	  Treffry	  in	  many	  ways	  mapped	  out	  a	  
supply	  chain	  of	  slavery	  in	  which	  British	  capital	  intervened	  at	  many	  stages.	  Such	  an	  
expansive	  moral	  geography	  might	  be	  interpreted	  at	  first	  glance	  as	  support	  for	  Thomas	  
Haskell’s	  argument	  that	  involvement	  in	  transnational	  markets	  expanded	  humanitarian	  
horizons.69	  Treffy’s	  concerns	  however	  were	  more	  parochial;	  as	  owner	  of	  Fowey	  
Consols,	  the	  second	  largest	  copper	  mine	  in	  Cornwall,	  his	  livelihood	  was	  directly	  
threatened	  by	  free	  trade.70	  Whilst	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  if	  Treffry’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  
declarations	  were	  genuine	  he	  clearly	  recognised	  the	  political	  utility	  of	  framing	  the	  
debate	  between	  free	  trade	  and	  protection	  in	  such	  terms.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  would	  also	  be	  
invoked	  by	  an	  1842	  petition	  to	  Queen	  Victoria	  by	  ‘Cornish	  miners’,	  which	  protested	  at	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mining	  ventures	  overseas.71	  The	  protectionist	  local	  press	  portrayed	  free	  trade	  in	  ore	  as	  
a	  contest	  between	  Cornish	  miners	  and	  Cuban	  slaves,	  though	  by	  the	  late	  1840s	  free	  
labour	  mining	  in	  Australia	  and	  Chile	  appeared	  to	  pose	  as	  great	  a	  threat.72	  Self-­‐interest	  
and	  fears	  for	  the	  local	  economy	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  expansive	  moral	  geography,	  but	  
ultimately	  the	  burden	  still	  fell	  upon	  the	  state	  to	  take	  action.	  
The	  question	  of	  free	  trade	  versus	  protection	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  question	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  state	  and	  market,	  rather	  it	  was	  a	  debate	  suffused	  with	  moral	  
concerns	  frequently	  expressed	  in	  spatial	  terms.	  The	  relationship	  between	  free	  trade	  
and	  anti-­‐slavery	  is	  best	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  role	  the	  British	  state	  
should	  play	  in	  opposing	  the	  slave	  trade.	  This	  was	  the	  question	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
struggle	  over	  the	  sugar	  duties.	  For	  the	  opponents	  of	  repeal	  the	  British	  state	  was	  
variously	  responsible	  for	  ending	  of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  protecting	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
newly	  free	  Caribbean	  population,	  or	  the	  profit	  margins	  of	  their	  former	  masters.	  
Proponents	  of	  free	  trade	  were	  made	  up	  both	  of	  those	  who	  had	  faith	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  free	  
labour	  to	  outperform	  slave	  labour,	  and	  those	  like	  Thomas	  Macaulay	  who	  believed	  that	  
the	  British	  state’s	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  ended	  with	  its	  diplomatic	  and	  naval	  efforts	  
against	  the	  transatlantic	  trade.	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  slave	  societies	  of	  Brazil	  and	  
Cuba	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  both	  economic	  competitor	  and	  providing	  a	  moral	  example.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  sugar	  these	  debates	  were	  further	  muddled	  by	  domestic	  concerns	  over	  
public	  order,	  which	  elevated	  the	  sugar	  question	  to	  a	  debate	  of	  national	  importance.	  At	  
the	  state	  level,	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  always	  likely	  to	  be	  limited	  by	  political	  boundaries	  and	  
the	  parliamentary	  consensus	  was	  that	  British	  responsibility	  ended	  with	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  suppression.	  Whilst	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  state	  were	  
hotly	  debated	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  sugar	  duties	  British	  capital	  and	  consumers	  were	  
rarely	  moralised	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  debate	  over	  American	  slavery	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Cornwall	  Royal	  Gazette,	  29	  Apr	  1842.	  
72	  Ibid;	  Cornwall	  Royal	  Gazette,	  28	  May	  1841.	  
59	  
	  
put	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  individuals,	  but	  was	  similarly	  
characterised	  by	  the	  pluralism	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
The	  Problem	  of	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
British	  opinion	  on	  American	  slavery	  has	  long	  been	  a	  point	  of	  debate	  for	  historians.	  The	  
United	  States	  was	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  concern	  within	  Britain,	  not	  least	  due	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  abolitionists,	  many	  of	  them	  fugitive	  or	  former	  slaves,	  traversed	  the	  
Atlantic	  to	  rally	  support.	  However,	  this	  journey	  was	  also	  made	  by	  millions	  of	  bales	  of	  
slave-­‐grown	  cotton,	  a	  thread	  that	  bound	  British	  industry	  to	  a	  reviled	  system	  of	  
oppression.	  This	  apparent	  contradiction	  came	  to	  a	  head	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  
American	  Civil	  War.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  survey	  the	  historiography	  of	  British	  attitudes	  
towards	  American	  slavery.	  I	  argue	  that	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  Britons	  had	  
myriad	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  American	  slavery,	  ranging	  from	  transatlantic	  
cooperation	  to	  pragmatic	  justification.	  However,	  British	  comment	  on	  America	  was	  
united	  in	  its	  condemnation	  of	  slavery	  in	  principle,	  a	  fact	  that	  belies	  attempts	  to	  paint	  
particular	  classes,	  cities,	  or	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  adherents	  to	  the	  Confederate	  or	  
Union	  cause.	  Whilst	  the	  economic	  links	  between	  Britain	  and	  American	  slavery	  were	  a	  
point	  of	  contestation	  reliance	  upon	  slave-­‐grown	  cotton	  was	  ultimately	  reconciled	  with	  
British	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
As	  with	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  free	  trade	  in	  sugar	  it	  is	  best	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  
problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  trade	  with	  the	  United	  States	  as	  operating	  on	  a	  number	  of	  
different	  levels.	  In	  fact,	  one	  might	  conceptualise	  of	  two	  contradictory	  forms	  of	  
transatlantic	  co-­‐operation	  in	  relation	  to	  American	  slavery.	  Firstly,	  Lancashire	  mill	  
owners	  and	  Southern	  plantation	  owners	  were	  bound	  together	  in	  a	  web	  of	  connections	  
centred	  on	  the	  credit	  relations	  of	  Liverpool	  merchants,	  a	  transatlantic	  collaboration	  
that,	  as	  Sven	  Beckert	  has	  demonstrated,	  allowed	  both	  American	  slavery	  and	  British	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industry	  to	  thrive.73	  At	  the	  same	  time	  historians	  have	  stressed	  the	  essentially	  
transnational	  character	  of	  American	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  activists,	  authors,	  and	  former	  
slaves	  criss-­‐crossed	  the	  Atlantic	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  constructing	  an	  imagined	  geography	  
that	  isolated	  American	  slave-­‐owners	  behind	  a	  ‘moral	  cordon’.74	  Finally,	  at	  the	  state	  
level	  America’s	  internal	  slave	  system	  lay	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  British	  government	  
intervention.	  The	  United	  States	  could	  be	  viewed	  from	  multiple	  perspectives;	  both	  as	  a	  
market	  for	  exports	  and	  potential	  rival,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  consistent	  stumbling	  block	  to	  
suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Slavery	  in	  the	  American	  South	  fell	  outside	  the	  moral	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  British	  state,	  but	  large	  numbers	  of	  British	  subjects	  were	  connected	  
in	  some	  way	  to	  the	  American	  slave	  system.	  A	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  Anglo-­‐
American	  relations	  reveals	  how	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  transatlantic	  co-­‐operation	  could	  
coexist.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  during	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  both	  Union	  and	  
Confederacy	  had	  to	  take	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  into	  account	  as	  they	  competed	  for	  popular,	  
diplomatic,	  and	  economic	  support.	  
From	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  the	  
economies	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  were	  tied	  to	  one	  another	  by	  slave-­‐grown	  
cotton.	  Recent	  work	  has	  focused	  on	  how	  cotton	  bound	  together	  European	  wage	  labour	  
and	  the	  Southern	  plantation	  system.75	  American	  cotton	  first	  arrived	  on	  British	  shores	  
in	  1795	  at	  a	  point	  when	  a	  series	  of	  technological	  innovations	  had	  allowed	  Lancashire	  
based	  manufacturers	  to	  compete	  with	  Indian	  textile	  production	  for	  the	  first	  time.76	  
Beckert	  argues	  that	  these	  innovations	  were	  the	  result	  of	  imperial	  networks	  specifically	  
focusing	  on	  the	  figure	  of	  Samuel	  Greg,	  whose	  links	  to	  the	  West	  Indies	  provided	  a	  source	  
of	  both	  cotton	  and	  credit.77	  However,	  it	  was	  connections	  with	  the	  slave	  society	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  that	  would	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  British	  market.	  Grown	  and	  picked	  by	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  Beckert,	  Empire	  of	  Cotton,	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  Blackett,	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  Wall,	  pp.	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75	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  well	  as	  Beckert,	  see	  G.	  Riello,	  Cotton:	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  that	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  World	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	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  Press,	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slave	  labourers	  in	  the	  American	  South,	  cotton	  was	  then	  shipped	  to	  Liverpool	  where	  it	  
moved	  through	  the	  hands	  of	  several	  different	  merchants	  and	  brokers	  before	  making	  its	  
way	  into	  Lancashire’s	  textile	  factories.	  For	  Beckert	  Liverpool	  merchants	  were	  the	  key	  
figures	  whose	  ‘genius’	  lay	  in	  the	  ‘ability	  to	  combine	  ingredients	  often	  considered	  
antagonistic:	  wage	  labor	  and	  slavery,	  industrialization	  and	  deindustrialization,	  free	  
trade	  and	  empire,	  violence	  and	  contract’.78	  	  
From	  Beckert’s	  perspective	  the	  expansion	  of	  Southern	  slavery	  emerges	  as	  an	  Anglo-­‐
American	  joint	  venture	  built	  upon	  the	  credit	  provided	  by	  Liverpool	  merchants,	  both	  to	  
Lancashire	  manufacturers	  and	  Southern	  slave-­‐owners.	  The	  interdependence	  of	  British	  
industry	  and	  American	  slavery	  was	  acknowledged	  by	  contemporaries.	  Addressing	  the	  
1840	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention	  the	  New	  York	  abolitionist	  Harry	  Brewster	  Stanton	  noted	  
‘[a]s	  cotton	  rises	  or	  falls	  in	  Liverpool,	  so	  it	  not	  only	  the	  money	  market,	  but	  the	  slavery	  
of	  America.’79	  Recognition	  of	  this	  fact	  arguably	  placed	  some	  burden	  on	  Britons	  to	  take	  
action,	  but	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  the	  burden	  of	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  was	  generally	  seen	  to	  
lie	  with	  the	  consumer	  rather	  than	  the	  state.	  The	  dominance	  of	  American	  cotton	  would	  
only	  be	  decisively	  ended	  through	  political	  decisions	  and	  the	  military	  exigencies	  of	  the	  
American	  Civil	  War.	  Egyptian	  and	  Brazilian	  cotton	  production	  boomed	  during	  the	  war	  
years	  and	  more	  global	  cotton	  production	  characterised	  by	  debt	  bondage	  would	  emerge	  
in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.80	  The	  importance	  of	  slave	  grown	  cotton	  to	  British	  
industry	  cannot	  be	  disputed,	  but	  as	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  it	  did	  not	  preclude	  anti-­‐slavery	  
condemnation	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  
Whilst	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  sugar	  duties	  had	  revolved	  around	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  
responsibilities	  of	  the	  British	  state	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  with	  American	  cotton.	  Slavery	  
within	  the	  United	  States	  lay	  beyond	  the	  political	  reach	  of	  a	  British	  state	  reticent	  to	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79	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interfere	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  other,	  as	  they	  saw	  it,	  “civilized”	  states.81	  
Furthermore,	  America	  had	  outlawed	  participation	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  in	  
1808.	  Unlike	  sugar	  the	  import	  of	  slave-­‐grown	  cotton	  could	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  in	  conflict	  
with	  Britain’s	  legal	  and	  naval	  efforts	  against	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Whilst	  there	  was	  a	  thriving	  
trade	  in	  enslaved	  people	  within	  the	  United	  States	  this	  was	  again	  conceptualised	  as	  
internal	  matter	  in	  which	  the	  British	  state	  had	  little	  right	  to	  intervene.82	  Again,	  unlike	  
the	  cases	  of	  sugar	  or	  copper,	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  British	  market	  by	  American	  cotton	  
also	  meant	  that	  the	  question	  of	  protectionism	  versus	  free	  trade	  was	  not	  an	  issue.	  
American	  slaves	  were	  not	  generally	  perceived	  as	  being	  in	  direct	  competition	  with	  
British	  subjects.	  Rather	  as	  the	  economist	  John	  T.	  Danson	  stated	  in	  1857	  “as	  far	  as	  yet	  
appears	  [cotton]	  must	  continue	  to	  be	  grown,	  chiefly	  by	  slave-­‐labour.”83	  Whilst	  not	  all	  
observers	  were	  so	  fatalistic	  there	  was	  little	  sense	  that	  the	  British	  government	  could	  
actively	  effect	  American	  slavery.	  The	  majority	  of	  British	  subjects	  saw	  American	  slavery	  
as	  lying	  outside	  both	  their	  personal	  moral	  geographies	  and	  that	  of	  the	  government.84	  
Similarly,	  American	  abolitionists	  were	  for	  the	  most	  part	  patriots	  and	  proud	  democrats	  
who	  would	  have	  scorned	  internal	  interference	  from	  a	  foreign	  government.85	  A	  
discussion	  of	  American	  abolitionist	  activity	  in	  Britain	  reveals	  that	  they	  generally	  hoped	  
to	  gain	  the	  support	  of	  institutions	  and	  individuals	  rather	  than	  the	  state.	  
The	  United	  States	  dominated	  the	  attention	  of	  both	  organised	  and	  popular	  anti-­‐slavery	  
in	  the	  years	  between	  the	  end	  of	  apprenticeship	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  War.	  In	  the	  
antebellum	  period	  American	  abolitionists	  of	  all	  stripes	  came	  to	  Britain	  intent	  on	  
proselytising	  for	  their	  particular	  approach	  to	  ending	  the	  peculiar	  institution.	  Whilst	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there	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  disagreement	  among	  abolitionists	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  
a	  sense	  of	  co-­‐operation	  was	  more	  successfully	  forged	  here	  than	  in	  any	  other	  
transnational	  context.86	  David	  Turley	  notes	  that	  Anglo-­‐American	  collaboration	  amongst	  
abolitionists	  was	  at	  its	  peak	  in	  the	  1830s	  and	  1840s	  and	  that	  it	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  
movement	  of	  middle	  class	  internationalism.87	  As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  nature	  of	  
Anglo-­‐American	  anti-­‐slavery	  rarely	  required	  serious	  investigation	  of	  British	  complicity	  
in	  American	  slavery.	  	  
American	  abolitionism	  was	  as	  fragmented	  as	  its	  British	  counterpart	  with	  anti-­‐slavery	  
societies	  divided	  both	  territorially	  and	  tactically	  in	  the	  American	  North.	  The	  biggest	  
rupture	  was	  between	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  secure	  emancipation	  via	  political	  means	  and	  
the	  more	  radical	  wing	  who	  rejected	  the	  American	  constitution	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  
Northern	  states	  should	  secede	  from	  the	  Union.88	  	  	  The	  1840	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention	  
transferred	  these	  conflicts	  transferred	  to	  London	  and	  highlighted	  the	  fragmented	  
nature	  of	  both	  British	  and	  American	  anti-­‐slavery.	  The	  Convention	  is	  famed	  for	  a	  
dispute	  over	  the	  refusal	  to	  allow	  female	  representatives	  among	  the	  Garissonian	  
delegation	  to	  take	  seats	  on	  the	  Convention	  floor,	  reflecting	  the	  practice	  of	  distinct	  
British	  anti-­‐slavery	  societies	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  The	  fallout	  of	  this	  event	  would	  see	  
British	  abolitionists	  choose	  sides	  between	  William	  Garrison’s	  Antislavery	  Society	  and	  
Lewis	  Tappan’s	  American	  and	  Foreign	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Society.	  According	  to	  both	  Turley	  
and	  Temperley	  endorsing	  either	  side	  appeared	  to	  rest	  upon	  personal	  preference	  for	  
George	  Thompson,	  allied	  to	  the	  former,	  or	  Joseph	  Sturge,	  friend	  of	  the	  latter.	  89	  For	  all	  
the	  conflict	  within	  the	  abolitionist	  movement	  both	  groups	  had	  broadly	  the	  same	  aim	  in	  
their	  campaigning	  in	  Britain;	  namely	  to	  publicise	  the	  horrors	  of	  American	  slavery.	  
Whether	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  British	  public	  understood,	  or	  cared	  about,	  the	  finer	  points	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  Netherlands	  in	  M.	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  Little	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  Anti-­‐Slavery	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  Movement	  in	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  &	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  (2015),	  pp.	  123-­‐160.	  
87	  Turley,	  The	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  of	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  Anti-­‐Slavery,	  pp.	  196-­‐197.	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  pp.	  210-­‐211;	  Turley,	  The	  Culture	  of	  English	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of	  difference	  between	  American	  abolitionists	  is	  more	  doubtful,	  as	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  
by	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  black	  Americans	  in	  transatlantic	  abolitionism.	  	  
Black	  Americans,	  many	  of	  them	  former	  slaves,	  were	  vitally	  important	  in	  disseminating	  
information	  about	  American	  slavery.	  In	  the	  two	  decades	  before	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  
hundreds	  of	  black	  Americans	  crossed	  the	  Atlantic.	  Whilst	  individuals	  such	  as	  Frederick	  
Douglass,	  William	  Wells	  Brown,	  or	  William	  and	  Ellen	  Craft	  were	  often	  sponsored	  by	  
specific	  abolitionist	  groups	  they	  generally	  succeeded	  in	  providing	  a	  united	  front	  in	  
their	  condemnation	  of	  American	  slavery,	  providing	  what	  Richard	  Blackett	  has	  called	  a	  
‘third	  way’	  in	  transatlantic	  anti-­‐slavery.90	  Black	  Americans	  worked	  across	  ideological	  
boundaries	  to	  both	  inform	  British	  audiences	  of	  the	  horrors	  of	  American	  slavery	  and,	  
more	  crucially,	  to	  transmit	  a	  message	  of	  moral	  condemnation	  back	  across	  the	  Atlantic.	  
Whilst	  black	  Americans	  gave	  talks	  almost	  everywhere	  in	  Britain	  it	  was	  the	  American	  
audience	  that	  was	  key.	  They	  hoped	  to	  project	  an	  image	  of	  a	  world	  where,	  as	  Douglass	  
put	  it,	  the	  American	  slave-­‐owner	  could	  not	  travel	  without	  being	  “looked	  down	  upon	  as	  
a	  man-­‐stealing,	  cradle-­‐robbing,	  and	  women-­‐stripping	  monster,	  and	  he	  might	  see	  
reproof	  and	  detestation	  on	  every	  hand.”91	  For	  black	  Americans	  the	  positive	  reception	  
received	  in	  Britain	  was	  a	  means	  of	  piercing	  American	  claims	  to	  moral	  superiority,	  as	  
were	  the	  annual	  celebrations	  of	  Caribbean	  emancipation	  held	  within	  the	  United	  States	  
in	  opposition	  to	  Independence	  Day.92	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiment	  was	  perceived	  to	  
have	  rhetorical	  value,	  though	  small	  financial	  and	  fundraising	  contributions	  were	  also	  
made	  to	  the	  cause.93	  However,	  American	  abolitionists	  did	  engage	  in	  some	  campaigns	  
where	  British	  subjects	  could	  take	  a	  more	  active	  role.	  
The	  desire	  of	  American	  abolitionists	  to	  isolate	  slave-­‐owners	  found	  particular	  
expression	  in	  campaigns	  against	  spiritual	  rather	  than	  economic	  ties	  with	  slave-­‐owners.	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The	  desire	  to	  morally	  isolate	  American	  slave-­‐owners	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  ‘Send	  Back	  
the	  Money’	  campaign,	  which	  saw	  abolitionists	  rail	  against	  the	  Scottish	  Free	  Church’s	  
receipt	  of	  donations	  from	  Southern	  slave-­‐owners.94	  This	  controversy	  is	  known	  for	  the	  
prominent	  role	  played	  Garrisonians,	  though	  as	  Turley	  notes	  the	  Glasgow	  Emancipation	  
Society	  distributed	  pamphlets	  on	  the	  controversy	  written	  by	  Lewis	  Tappan.95	  ‘Send	  
Back	  the	  Money’	  was	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  effort	  to	  encourage	  religious	  condemnation	  of	  
slave-­‐owners.	  The	  1840s	  saw	  attempts	  to	  foster	  international	  collaboration	  between	  
Evangelical	  churches	  through	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Alliance	  in	  London	  in	  
1846.	  The	  Alliance’s	  proposed	  admission	  of	  slave-­‐owning	  Southern	  churches	  was	  
protested	  by	  a	  ‘monster	  gathering’	  organised	  by	  the	  Garrisonian	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  League.96	  
Similarly,	  Irish	  abolitionists	  would	  encourage	  a	  rejection	  of	  famine	  relief	  raised	  by	  
Southern	  churches	  in	  the	  late	  1840s.97	  The	  logic	  behind	  such	  moves	  was	  that	  religious	  
fellowship	  and	  acceptance	  of	  charity	  gave	  moral	  sanction	  to	  slave-­‐owners.	  As	  such	  
whilst	  Britons	  were	  pressured	  to	  renounce	  ties	  to	  American	  slavery	  it	  was	  an	  audience	  
of	  slave-­‐owners	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  that	  remained	  of	  greater	  concern	  to	  
abolitionists.	  
Both	  the	  “Send	  the	  Money	  Back”	  and	  Evangelical	  Alliance	  campaigns	  failed	  in	  their	  
attempts	  to	  force	  repudiation	  of	  American	  slave-­‐owners.	  Leaders	  of	  the	  Free	  Church	  
such	  as	  Thomas	  Chalmers	  and	  William	  Candlish	  argued	  that	  the	  Church	  could	  not	  
interfere	  with	  a	  “civil	  and	  political	  institution”;	  these	  letters	  were	  circulated	  in	  the	  
American	  South	  and	  undermined	  the	  attempts	  at	  moral	  suasion	  anticipated	  by	  
abolitionists.98	  The	  focus	  on	  moral	  suasion	  among	  transatlantic	  abolitionists,	  may	  well	  
explain	  why	  Britons	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  chastised	  for	  their	  religious	  than	  economic	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links	  to	  slave-­‐owners.	  Ultimately,	  inciting	  moral	  revulsion	  for	  slavery	  was	  not	  enough	  
to	  bring	  about	  action.	  The	  Free	  Church	  maintained	  that	  whilst	  it	  ‘zealously	  deplored’	  
American	  slavery	  that	  did	  not	  warrant	  returning	  the	  money,	  still	  less	  breaking	  ties	  with	  
American	  churches.’99	  The	  assertion	  that	  slavery	  was	  wrong	  but	  that	  it	  had	  little	  to	  do	  
with	  religious	  fellowship	  in	  many	  ways	  mirrors	  the	  various	  defences	  offered	  for	  
commercial	  involvement	  with	  slavery	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
When	  American	  abolitionists	  and	  their	  British	  supporters	  adverted	  to	  the	  economic	  
role	  Britons	  played	  in	  maintaining	  Southern	  slavery	  they	  hoped	  to	  promote	  alternative	  
economies.	  The	  most	  prominent	  of	  these	  was	  the	  Free	  Produce	  Movement,	  which	  
urged	  British	  consumers	  and	  producers	  to	  shun	  American	  cotton	  in	  favour	  of	  free	  
labour	  alternatives.	  Henry	  Highland	  Garnet,	  a	  former	  slave	  and	  key	  proponent	  of	  the	  
movement,	  addressed	  audiences	  across	  Britain	  and	  explicitly	  linked	  cotton	  
consumption	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  political	  power	  among	  slave-­‐owners.100	  Work	  on	  the	  
Free	  Produce	  Movement	  has	  generally	  focused	  on	  the	  prominent	  role	  of	  Quakerism	  in	  
facilitating	  the	  transatlantic	  collaboration	  involved.101	  Joseph	  Sturge,	  Elihu	  Burritt,	  and	  
Anna	  and	  George	  Richardson	  were	  among	  the	  prominent	  Quakers	  who	  promoted	  the	  
cause,	  but	  in	  material	  terms	  very	  little	  free	  labour	  cotton	  was	  procured.	  At	  the	  
movement’s	  peak	  only	  a	  few	  hundred	  bales	  of	  free	  labour	  cotton	  were	  imported	  each	  
year	  compared	  to	  the	  two	  million	  from	  the	  American	  South.102	  Despite	  the	  Free	  
Produce	  Movement’s	  lack	  of	  success,	  the	  logic	  behind	  boycott	  and	  abstention	  of	  
American	  cotton	  deserves	  further	  consideration	  as	  it	  indicates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	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responsibility	  for	  American	  slavery	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  individual,	  and	  specifically	  the	  
consumer.	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  aspects	  of	  the	  Free	  Produce	  Movement	  was	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  
consumer	  rather	  than	  producers,	  or	  the	  capital	  that	  backed	  them,	  as	  the	  target	  of	  
moralising.	  The	  Free	  Produce	  Movement	  was	  as	  much	  about	  personal	  culpability	  as	  
attempting	  to	  provide	  a	  genuine	  alternative	  to	  slave	  labour.	  Anna	  Richardson,	  in	  a	  
pamphlet	  promoting	  free	  produce,	  explicitly	  stated	  was	  a	  “self-­‐cleansing	  measure	  from	  
voluntary	  participation	  in	  the	  crime	  of	  slavery.”103	  Whilst	  Henry	  Highland	  Garnet	  
envisioned	  that	  the	  movement	  through	  public	  opinion	  influence	  ‘all	  the	  great	  firms	  who	  
supplied	  the	  country’	  the	  practical	  aspects	  of	  the	  Free	  Produce	  Movement	  were	  very	  
limited.104	  The	  movement	  contracted	  with	  a	  couple	  of	  Nottingham	  and	  Manchester	  
textile	  firms	  to	  produce	  goods	  using	  cotton	  from	  free	  labour	  producers	  in	  both	  America	  
and	  India,	  but	  most	  activities	  focused	  on	  propaganda	  through	  pamphleteering	  and	  the	  
publication	  of	  a	  journal	  The	  Non-­‐Slaveholder.105	  However,	  it	  was	  the	  practical	  
difficulties	  of	  acquiring	  free-­‐labour	  cotton	  that	  proved	  a	  frequent	  point	  of	  criticism.	  
Richard	  Cobden	  whilst	  attending	  a	  breakfast	  with	  Free	  Produce	  advocates	  Joseph	  
Sturge	  and	  Harriet	  Beecher	  Stowe	  stressed	  that	  ‘you	  cannot	  distinguish	  the	  free-­‐grown	  
cotton	  product;	  you	  will	  be	  overwhelmed	  by	  counterfeits.’106	  A	  focus	  on	  the	  consumer	  
rather	  than	  the	  role	  of	  the	  British	  state	  or	  industrialists	  suggests	  that	  the	  Free	  Produce	  
Movement	  was	  more	  about	  individual	  culpability	  than	  earlier	  boycotts	  that	  had	  
moralised	  government	  policy	  on	  slave	  produced	  goods.	  Individuals	  were	  clearly	  
capable	  of	  developing	  expansive	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  
consumption	  habits,	  particularly	  when	  they	  were	  engaged	  in	  transnational	  networks	  
such	  as	  those	  fostered	  by	  Quakerism.	  However,	  the	  Free	  Produce	  Movement	  is	  a	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testament	  of	  the	  inability	  to	  extend	  this	  sense	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  outside	  of	  a	  
relatively	  small	  group	  within	  Britain	  itself.	  Ultimately,	  as	  Louis	  Billington	  concluded	  the	  
movement	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  ‘part	  of	  that	  wider	  Anglo-­‐American	  reform	  movement	  
which	  believed	  in	  the	  utility	  of	  moral	  absolutes’.107	  	  
Not	  all	  attempts	  to	  find	  alternatives	  to	  slave-­‐grown	  cotton	  focused	  solely	  on	  the	  
consumer.	  There	  were	  numerous	  antebellum	  projects	  that	  sought	  to	  find	  new	  arenas	  of	  
cotton	  production,	  particularly	  in	  India	  and	  Africa.	  For	  example	  the	  British	  India	  
Society	  (BIS)	  whose	  platform	  ‘explicitly	  link[ed]	  a	  series	  of	  geographically	  distinct	  
interests:	  Indian	  reform,	  the	  abolition	  of	  American	  slavery	  and	  British	  prosperity.’108	  
Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  abstention	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BIS,	  including	  George	  
Thompson,	  argued	  that	  British	  commercial	  expansion	  could	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  anti-­‐
slavery.	  Advocates	  of	  Free	  Trade	  claimed	  that	  the	  fates	  of	  American	  slaves,	  India’s	  poor,	  
and	  the	  British	  working-­‐class	  were	  intertwined,	  arguing	  that	  Corn	  Law	  repeal	  would	  
see	  more	  bread	  and	  less	  cotton	  imported	  from	  the	  US	  with	  India	  taking	  up	  the	  slack.109	  
Whilst	  these	  interests	  could	  coalesce	  in	  theory	  the	  practice	  proved	  more	  dubious.	  The	  
East	  India	  Company	  attempted	  to	  expand	  cotton	  production	  by	  hiring	  American	  
plantation	  overseers	  in	  a	  bold,	  and	  ultimately	  doomed,	  attempt	  at	  transferring	  
expertise.110	  Christopher	  Florio	  argues	  that	  ‘seemingly	  everyone	  viewed	  the	  overseers’	  
endeavour	  as	  an	  antislavery	  effort,	  because	  Indian	  cotton,	  by	  definition	  was	  not	  slave-­‐
grown	  American	  cotton.’111	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  American	  overseers	  tried,	  
and	  failed,	  to	  implement	  the	  violent	  form	  of	  labour	  management	  found	  on	  a	  Southern	  
plantation.	  Clearly,	  anti-­‐slavery	  could	  produce	  a	  moral	  geography	  that	  was	  at	  once	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expansive	  in	  scope,	  but	  blinkered	  in	  its	  acceptance	  of	  a	  strict	  divide	  between	  free	  and	  
enslaved	  labour.	  The	  utility	  of	  professed	  anti-­‐slavery	  intentions	  to	  justify	  all	  manner	  of	  
abuses	  will	  be	  considered	  at	  length	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  	  
A	  focus	  on	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  BIS	  allows	  us	  to	  collapse	  the	  binary	  between	  moral	  
reformers	  and	  hard-­‐nosed	  business	  interests.	  This	  can	  be	  pushed	  further	  by	  
considering	  how	  anti-­‐slavery	  shaped	  the	  economic	  decisions	  made	  by	  those	  interested	  
in	  the	  cotton	  economy.	  Beckert	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  in	  motivating	  
British	  manufacturers	  to	  consider	  Indian	  and	  Egyptian	  cotton	  production	  was	  concerns	  
over	  the	  perceived	  instability	  of	  slavery.	  Whilst	  Beckert	  credits	  ‘forward-­‐looking	  
manufacturers’	  in	  the	  Manchester	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  for	  lobbying	  the	  government	  
for	  a	  free	  labour	  alternative,	  there	  is	  little	  sense	  of	  how	  this	  idea	  of	  slavery	  as	  untenable	  
in	  the	  long-­‐term	  was	  developed.112	  Jay	  Sexton	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  commercial	  and	  
moral	  concerns	  muddled	  when	  it	  came	  to	  financial	  dealings	  with	  the	  US.	  A	  reticence	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  British	  financiers	  to	  extend	  credit	  to	  Southern	  states	  is	  attributed	  not	  only	  to	  
their	  land	  speculation	  that	  led	  to	  an	  1837	  financial	  crisis,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  morally	  
deleterious	  effects	  of	  slave-­‐owning.113	  This	  concern	  over	  the	  long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  slave	  
economies	  can	  only	  be	  properly	  understood	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  much	  of	  the	  
broader	  discussion	  of	  American	  slavery	  emanated	  from	  abolitionists	  and	  that	  Britain’s	  
anti-­‐slavery	  culture	  helped	  shape	  attitudes	  towards	  America’s	  slave	  economy.	  	  
Rather	  than	  assessing	  the	  practical	  effects	  of	  campaigns	  such	  as	  the	  Free	  Produce	  
Movement	  or	  the	  BIS’s	  plans	  for	  India	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  how	  successfully	  a	  
particular	  image	  of	  American	  slavery	  was	  conveyed	  to	  a	  British	  audience.	  The	  wild	  
success	  of	  Harriet	  Beecher	  Stowe’s	  novel	  Uncle	  Tom’s	  Cabin,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  many	  
imitators,	  meant	  a	  negative	  depiction	  of	  Southern	  slavery,	  which	  already	  existed	  within	  
British	  society,	  was	  further	  strengthened	  and	  conveyed	  to	  vast	  swathes	  of	  the	  British	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public.114	  Similarly,	  Black	  abolitionists	  succeeded	  in	  presenting	  themselves	  as	  ‘the	  bona	  
fide	  representatives	  of	  millions	  of	  oppressed	  human	  beings	  whom	  they	  successfully	  
portrayed	  as	  the	  pariahs	  of	  American	  society.’115	  Such	  representations	  of	  slavery	  
arguably	  succeeded	  in	  transmitting	  the	  American	  ‘anti-­‐slavery	  impulse’	  across	  the	  
Atlantic.116	  However,	  whilst	  the	  majority	  of	  Britons	  might	  be	  convinced	  of	  American	  
slavery’s	  immorality	  this	  did	  not	  translate	  to	  a	  unified	  response.	  
Many	  Britons	  viewed	  American	  slavery	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  British	  emancipation.	  
Reviews	  of	  Uncle	  Tom’s	  Cabin	  in	  the	  conservative	  press	  condemned	  what	  they	  
perceived	  as	  a	  rash	  call	  for	  immediate	  emancipation.117	  Chapter	  four	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  
discuss	  the	  legacy	  of	  Britain’s	  gradualist	  approach	  to	  emancipation	  in	  dealing	  with	  
British	  slave-­‐owners,	  but	  it	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  dictating	  attitudes	  towards	  
slavery	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Richard	  Blackett	  has	  also	  argued	  that	  anti-­‐black	  racism	  
had	  become	  more	  prevalent	  among	  Britons	  by	  the	  1850s.118	  However,	  it	  might	  be	  fairer	  
to	  argue	  that	  crude	  racial	  thinking	  and	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  had	  rarely	  been	  mutually	  
exclusive	  in	  Britain.	  Ryan	  Hanley	  has	  recently	  demonstrated	  evidence	  of	  working	  class	  
racism	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1820s.119	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debates	  British	  
attitudes	  towards	  American	  slavery	  are	  probably	  best	  conceptualised	  as	  unified	  in	  
condemnation,	  but	  plural	  in	  their	  response.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  by	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  
American	  Civil	  War	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Southern	  slavery	  
was	  far	  from	  straightforward.	  The	  antebellum	  period	  had	  seen	  thousands	  of	  Britons	  
become	  economically	  dependent	  on	  the	  cotton	  economy,	  though	  doubts	  over	  the	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  slave-­‐system	  had	  crept	  into	  the	  minds	  of	  some	  industrialists.	  At	  the	  
same	  time	  abolitionists	  and	  the	  popularity	  of	  Uncle	  Tom’s	  Cabin	  had	  fixed	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  pp.	  27-­‐28.	  
115	  Blackett,	  Antislavery	  Wall,	  p.	  195.	  
116	  J.	  L.	  Huston,	  ‘The	  Experiential	  Basis	  of	  the	  Northern	  Antislavery	  Impulse’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Southern	  History,	  56:4	  (1990),	  pp.	  609-­‐640,	  p.	  615.	  
117	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  p.	  25.	  
118	  Blackett,	  Antislavery	  Wall,	  p.	  159.	  
119	  R.	  Hanley,	  ‘Slavery	  and	  the	  Birth	  of	  Working-­‐Class	  Racism	  in	  England,	  1814-­‐1833’,	  
Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Historical	  Society,	  26	  (2016),	  pp.	  103-­‐123.	  
71	  
	  
overwhelmingly	  negative	  view	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  Britons.	  
Secession	  would	  bring	  these	  various	  strands	  together	  as	  Union	  and	  Confederacy	  
competed	  for	  diplomatic,	  economic,	  and	  popular	  support	  in	  Britain.	  Here	  the	  issue	  of	  
slavery	  would	  be	  key	  and	  British	  condemnation	  of	  the	  South’s	  peculiar	  institution,	  
publicly	  at	  least,	  remained	  consistent	  throughout.	  However,	  this	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  
did	  not	  translate	  simply	  into	  full-­‐fledged	  support	  for	  the	  North,	  a	  fact	  that	  can	  be	  
explained	  by	  once	  again	  recognising	  the	  diversity	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  opinion	  within	  Britain.	  
The	  historiography	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  has	  generally	  focused	  on	  
identifying	  support	  for	  either	  side	  within	  specific	  classes	  or	  geographic	  regions.	  
Scholarship	  has	  been	  divided	  into	  a	  ‘traditional’	  interpretation	  and	  a	  ‘revisionist’	  
critique,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  laid	  particular	  stress	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  working	  
classes	  towards	  the	  conflict.	  The	  traditional	  position,	  as	  first	  expressed	  by	  E.	  D.	  Adams	  
and	  later	  restated	  by	  Philip	  Foner,	  held	  that	  the	  ‘British	  aristocracy,	  the	  upper-­‐middle	  
class	  and	  political	  conservatives	  were	  solidly	  pro-­‐South,	  the	  lower-­‐middle	  and	  working	  
classes	  were	  firmly	  pro-­‐North.’120	  The	  revisionist	  position,	  most	  clearly	  articulated	  by	  
Mary	  Ellison,	  challenged	  this	  view	  by	  arguing	  that	  economic	  factors	  and	  scepticism	  of	  
Northern	  imperialism	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  fostering	  Confederate	  support	  amongst	  
Lancashire’s	  working	  classes.121	  More	  recent	  works	  by	  Duncan	  Campbell	  and	  Richard	  
Blackett	  have	  further	  complicated	  this	  revisionist	  trend,	  but	  have	  offered	  differing	  
conclusions	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  public	  opinion.	  Campbell	  argues	  that	  ‘most	  English	  
observers,	  irrespective	  of	  class,	  wished	  to	  remain	  neutral	  in	  the	  struggle	  and	  distrusted	  
(and	  even	  disliked)	  both	  sides.’122	  Blackett	  meanwhile	  sought	  to	  interrogate	  Ellison’s	  
contentions	  about	  Lancashire	  cotton	  workers	  as	  well	  as	  applying	  it	  to	  other	  areas	  
within	  Britain,	  ultimately	  concluding	  that	  ‘political	  creed’	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  in	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determining	  opinions	  on	  the	  conflict.123	  Blackett’s	  investigation	  of	  membership	  lists	  
from	  Pro-­‐Union	  or	  Confederate	  societies	  does	  suggest	  a	  class	  or	  religious	  element	  did	  
help	  determine	  individual	  support.124	  Whilst	  issues	  can	  be	  taken	  with	  Campbell’s	  
definition	  of	  public	  opinion	  his	  analysis	  does	  appear	  to	  capture	  the	  British	  state’s	  
official	  position	  towards	  the	  war,	  in	  which	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  only	  one	  factor.125	  
The	  British	  government’s	  official	  position	  on	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  was	  one	  of	  
neutrality,	  though	  recognition	  of	  the	  Confederacy	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  was	  
considered.	  Specifically,	  in	  1862	  the	  Palmerston	  administration	  considered	  joining	  
France	  in	  an	  offer	  of	  mediation,	  which	  following	  early	  Confederate	  military	  victories	  
would	  have	  almost	  certainly	  resulted	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  right	  to	  secede.126	  The	  late	  
1830s	  debate	  over	  Texan	  independence	  can	  help	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  such	  a	  position	  
might	  be	  reconciled	  with	  an	  official	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Both	  British	  and	  
American	  abolitionists	  had	  campaigned	  for	  the	  British	  government	  to	  make	  
emancipation	  a	  condition	  of	  recognising	  secession	  from	  Mexico.	  Amongst	  those	  
abolitionists	  linked	  to	  the	  BFASS	  there	  was	  hope	  that	  Texas	  might	  operate	  like	  Canada	  
as	  a	  safe	  haven	  for	  runaway	  slaves	  and	  a	  pamphlet	  by	  John	  Scoble	  argued	  that	  
emancipation	  should	  be	  a	  condition	  of	  British	  recognition.127	  However,	  as	  discussed	  
above	  the	  British	  government’s	  main	  anti-­‐slavery	  priority	  was	  suppression	  of	  the	  
transatlantic	  slave	  trade,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Texas	  to	  fend	  of	  annexation	  to	  the	  United	  
States.	  As	  such,	  a	  slave	  trade	  suppression	  treaty	  was	  the	  price	  of	  recognition	  as	  granted	  
in	  1840.	  Ironically,	  Texan	  slave-­‐owners	  exploited	  calls	  for	  emancipation	  from	  
abolitionists	  through	  misrepresenting	  the	  threat	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  imperialism	  to	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secure	  annexation	  to	  the	  United	  States.128	  The	  same	  logic	  applied	  to	  the	  British	  
government’s	  attitude	  towards	  the	  American	  Civil	  War,	  whilst	  an	  independent	  
Confederacy	  would	  maintain	  slavery	  its	  government	  was	  happy	  to	  commit	  to	  outlawing	  
the	  slave	  trade.	  	  
Serious	  consideration	  of	  Confederate	  recognition	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  fraught	  
diplomatic	  relationship	  between	  the	  Union	  and	  the	  British	  government.	  The	  idea	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  government	  should	  be	  considered	  opponents	  of	  slavery	  seemed	  an	  
odd	  proposition	  to	  a	  British	  government	  who	  had	  butted	  heads	  with	  numerous	  
administrations	  over	  issues	  relating	  to	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  right	  of	  British	  
naval	  ships	  to	  search	  American	  vessels	  suspected	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  had	  
been	  bitterly	  contested	  as	  had	  Britain’s	  free	  soil	  policy	  in	  the	  West	  Indies	  and	  Canada,	  
as	  well	  as	  fears	  that	  an	  expansionist	  US	  might	  set	  its	  sights	  on	  annexing	  the	  latter.129	  
American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  antebellum	  period	  had	  been	  dominated	  by	  Southern	  
slave	  apologists	  such	  as	  Duff	  Green,	  President	  John	  Tyler’s	  unofficial	  emissary	  to	  
Britain.130	  Whilst	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  Republican	  government	  represented	  a	  shift	  away	  
from	  this	  foreign	  policy,	  many	  Britons	  remained	  deeply	  sceptical	  of	  the	  Union’s	  
position	  on	  slavery	  and	  of	  Abraham	  Lincoln,	  who	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  unimpressive	  
figure.131	  Scepticism	  about	  the	  United	  States’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  credentials	  was	  
compounded	  by	  early	  actions	  during	  the	  war	  where	  a	  cash	  starved	  federal	  government	  
‘dramatically	  increased	  customs	  duties’	  through	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Morrill	  Tariff.132	  
This	  protectionist	  measure	  sat	  ill	  with	  a	  British	  government	  committed	  to	  the	  
promotion	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  relations	  deteriorated	  further	  when	  Union	  officers	  
boarded	  a	  British	  ship,	  The	  Trent,	  arresting	  Confederate	  commissioners	  James	  Mason	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and	  John	  Slidell.	  The	  ‘Trent	  affair’	  almost	  led	  to	  open	  hostilities	  between	  the	  Union	  and	  
Britain,	  with	  war	  only	  averted	  following	  the	  release	  of	  Mason	  and	  Slidell	  alongside	  a	  
begrudging	  apology	  from	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  Seward.133	  The	  British	  government	  
viewed	  both	  Union	  and	  Confederacy	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  suspicion.	  British	  commitment	  
to	  anti-­‐slavery	  did	  not	  necessitate	  alliance	  with	  either	  side.	  However,	  diplomatic	  
thinking	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  bubble	  and	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  way	  in	  which	  both	  
sides	  attempted	  to	  cultivate	  wider	  support	  in	  Britain,	  a	  process	  in	  which	  British	  
attitudes	  toward	  slavery	  played	  a	  key	  role.	  
Throughout	  the	  Civil	  War,	  both	  Union	  and	  Confederacy	  jockeyed	  for	  support	  within	  
Britain.	  The	  ‘public	  diplomacy’,	  as	  Don	  Doyle	  terms	  it,	  of	  Union	  and	  Confederacy	  
operated	  at	  different	  levels	  as	  both	  sides	  hired	  journalists,	  lobbied	  politicians	  and	  
relied	  upon	  sympathetic	  Britons	  to	  promote	  their	  cause.134	  In	  this	  case,	  British	  anti-­‐
slavery	  was	  a	  problem	  that	  both	  North	  and	  South	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  in	  different	  
ways.	  In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  war	  advocates	  of	  the	  Union,	  including	  John	  Bright,	  had	  to	  
explain	  the	  reticence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Lincoln	  administration	  to	  frame	  the	  war	  as	  one	  
for	  emancipation.135	  Blackett	  notes	  the	  difficulty	  of	  making	  such	  a	  case	  in	  light	  of	  years	  
of	  Garrisonians	  arguing	  for	  Northern	  disunion	  with	  abolitionists	  such	  as	  James	  
Haughton	  asking	  why,	  if	  Southerners	  wanted	  to	  secede,	  not	  let	  them?136	  Also	  whilst	  
Union	  supporters	  may	  have	  viewed	  the	  United	  States	  as	  ‘an	  imperfect	  but	  viable	  model	  
of	  society	  based	  on	  universal	  principles	  of	  natural	  rights’	  many	  Britons	  were	  more	  
inclined	  to	  view	  democratic	  projects	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  scepticism.137	  If,	  as	  Lawrence	  
Goldman	  has	  argued,	  the	  Union	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  a	  British	  public	  who	  ‘were	  
essentially	  ill-­‐informed	  and	  ignorant	  of	  American	  affairs’	  they	  also	  had	  to	  convince	  a	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public	  who	  were	  sceptical	  of	  war	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  anti-­‐slavery	  ends.138	  Even	  
Lincoln’s	  emancipation	  proclamation	  was	  viewed	  in	  some	  quarters	  as	  a	  cynical	  move	  
since	  a	  gradualist	  model	  of	  emancipation	  was	  favoured	  by	  many	  Britons	  and	  the	  
violence	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  appeared	  at	  odds	  with	  this.139	  Ultimately,	  for	  the	  Union	  the	  
problem	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  only	  reconciled	  when	  the	  tide	  on	  the	  battlefield	  had	  
turned	  decisively	  in	  their	  favour.	  When,	  in	  1867,	  Lord	  John	  Russell	  praised	  the	  shared	  
heritage	  and,	  now,	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  he	  elided	  the	  
difficulties	  the	  Union	  had	  faced	  in	  positioning	  itself	  as	  an	  authentic	  standard	  bearer	  of	  
anti-­‐slavery.140	  	  
British	  anti-­‐slavery	  provided	  a	  different	  set	  of	  problems	  for	  Southern	  public	  diplomacy.	  
For	  some	  advocates	  of	  the	  Confederacy	  slavery	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  should	  be	  played	  
down	  at	  all	  costs.	  Some	  Southerners	  depicted	  the	  conflict	  a	  war	  for	  self-­‐determination	  
between	  an	  agrarian	  South	  and	  an	  imperialistic,	  industrial	  North.141	  Liverpool	  
merchant	  James	  Spence	  wrote	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  for	  The	  Times	  and	  a	  book,	  The	  
American	  Union,	  which	  argued	  for	  the	  South	  as	  Britain’s	  natural	  ally.142	  Certainly	  some	  
British	  subjects,	  such	  as	  the	  geologist	  Charles	  Lyell	  who	  travelled	  to	  the	  Southern	  
states,	  were	  convinced	  by	  the	  suggestion	  that	  an	  independent	  Confederacy	  would	  
emancipate	  its	  slaves.143	  However,	  the	  South	  did	  not	  speak	  with	  one	  voice	  and	  other	  
Confederate	  agents	  set	  about	  offering	  an	  intellectual	  defence	  of	  slavery.	  Swiss-­‐born	  
journalist	  Henry	  Hotze	  published	  a	  weekly	  journal,	  The	  Index,	  propagandising	  on	  behalf	  
of	  the	  South.	  Hotze	  was	  also	  among	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  London	  Anthropological	  Society	  
whose	  work	  provided	  the	  intellectual	  grounding	  for	  scientific	  racism	  and	  arguments	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for	  a	  biological	  lack	  incapacity	  for	  “civilization”	  among	  black	  people.144	  Both	  
approaches	  recognised	  that	  slavery	  was	  a	  diplomatic	  weakness	  for	  the	  Confederacy	  
that	  either	  had	  to	  be	  quashed	  or	  rationalised	  when	  appealing	  to	  the	  British	  public.	  	  
Whilst	  both	  Union	  and	  Confederacy	  had	  to	  negotiate	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiments	  
Civil	  War	  diplomacy	  was	  also	  based	  on	  the	  need	  for	  commercial	  and	  financial	  support.	  
Jay	  Sexton	  in	  Debtor	  Diplomacy	  has	  stressed	  how	  both	  Union	  and	  Confederacy	  required	  
foreign	  finance	  for	  the	  war	  effort,	  and	  that	  the	  South	  in	  particular	  conflated	  financial	  
and	  political	  recognition.145	  The	  perceived	  instability	  of	  slave	  economies	  was	  cited	  by	  
British	  bankers	  as	  reason	  to	  avoid	  investment	  in	  the	  South,	  a	  belief	  that	  continued	  into	  
the	  war	  as	  the	  Confederacy	  struggled	  to	  attract	  support	  from	  the	  City	  of	  London.	  Anti-­‐
slavery	  shaped	  what	  Britons	  knew	  about	  the	  Southern	  slave	  system	  and	  this	  clearly	  
had	  some	  influence	  in	  shaping	  economic	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Confederacy.	  In	  the	  
early	  years	  of	  the	  war	  the	  Confederate	  government	  had	  hoped	  to	  strong	  arm	  Britain	  
into	  recognition	  through	  withholding	  cotton.	  The	  miserable	  failure	  of	  Confederate	  
attempts	  to	  win	  support	  via	  withholding	  cotton	  exports	  saw	  a	  shift	  to	  seeking	  finance	  
for	  a	  large	  government	  loan	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  cotton	  bonds.	  The	  Erlanger	  loan	  failed	  
to	  attract	  widespread	  support	  for	  the	  Confederacy,	  with	  many	  shares	  purchased	  by	  
Southerners	  in	  Britain	  looking	  for	  repayment	  on	  existing	  debts.146	  The	  Confederacy	  had	  
much	  greater	  success	  in	  procuring	  arms	  and	  more	  controversially	  building	  ships	  in	  
Britain.147	  However,	  economic	  ties	  and	  sympathy	  should	  not	  be	  conflated	  with	  support	  
for	  slavery.	  As	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  Southern	  diplomacy,	  slavery	  was	  a	  topic	  best	  
avoided	  even	  when	  working	  with	  those	  who	  stood	  to	  profit	  through	  collaboration	  with	  
the	  Confederacy.	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Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  United	  States	  operated	  on	  different	  levels.	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  British	  government	  American	  slavery,	  and	  the	  internal	  
slave	  trade	  lay	  outside	  of	  its	  moral	  geography	  and	  legislative	  reach.	  This	  was	  a	  
perspective	  shared	  by	  American	  abolitionists	  who	  did	  not	  want	  foreign	  intervention,	  
but	  saw	  the	  British	  government’s	  role	  as	  limited	  to	  maintaining	  the	  free	  soil	  status	  of	  
the	  West	  Indies	  and	  Canada.	  Britain	  could	  help	  geographically	  isolate	  American	  slave-­‐
owners,	  and	  this	  became	  a	  particular	  concern	  when	  recognition	  of	  both	  Texan	  and	  later	  
Confederate	  independence	  was	  being	  considered.	  The	  Free	  Produce	  Movement	  sought	  
to	  place	  the	  onus	  on	  British	  consumers	  as	  the	  means	  of	  removing	  economic	  and	  moral	  
sanction	  for	  slavery.	  Other	  projects	  like	  that	  of	  the	  BIS	  looked	  to	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  
supply	  chain	  for	  a	  solution,	  where	  the	  emergence	  of	  free	  labour	  might	  bring	  prosperity	  
to	  the	  British	  and	  emancipation	  to	  America.	  Each	  approach	  expressed	  a	  different	  moral	  
geography,	  what	  they	  shared	  was	  both	  a	  condemnation	  of	  slavery	  and	  a	  belief	  that	  its	  
endpoint	  lay	  somewhere	  in	  the	  future.	  That	  this	  future	  end	  of	  slavery	  might	  
conceivably	  be	  within	  an	  independent	  Confederate	  states	  of	  course	  appears	  odd	  to	  a	  
modern-­‐day	  observer,	  but	  as	  Davis	  has	  argued	  ‘antislavery	  ideology	  held	  that	  the	  
gradual	  eradication	  of	  coerced	  labour	  was	  synonymous	  with	  the	  material	  and	  moral	  
progress	  of	  humanity	  as	  a	  whole.’148	  Such	  a	  belief	  underpinned	  the	  variety	  of	  British	  
positions	  on	  the	  American	  Civil	  War,	  and	  could	  also	  justify	  reliance	  on	  American	  cotton	  
as	  a	  temporary	  measure.	  The	  Union’s	  triumph	  in	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  would	  solve	  
any	  lingering	  conflicts	  as	  American	  slavery	  ended	  and	  the	  deep	  scepticism	  towards	  
Northern	  motives	  was	  quickly	  forgotten.	  
Conclusion	  
British	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  
heterogeneous.	  Britons	  were	  united	  in	  their	  public	  condemnation	  of	  slavery,	  but	  as	  the	  
above	  discussion	  has	  demonstrated	  there	  was	  great	  variety	  in	  terms	  of	  practical	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responses.	  Ultimately,	  some	  Britons	  could	  reconcile	  consuming	  the	  products	  of	  slave	  
labour	  or	  even	  supporting	  the	  Confederacy.	  Historians	  have	  generally	  viewed	  this	  a	  
contradiction	  that	  can	  be	  best	  explained	  through	  narratives	  of	  British	  hypocrisy,	  
advancing	  racism,	  or	  declining	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiment.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  taking	  
account	  of	  differing	  political	  economies	  and	  moral	  geographies	  within	  British	  anti-­‐
slavery	  provides	  a	  better	  solution	  to	  this	  problem.	  Richard	  Huzzey	  has	  argued	  that	  
British	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  characterised	  by	  two	  distinct	  moral	  geographies;	  those	  who	  
believed	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  was	  limited	  by	  political	  boundaries	  and	  those	  who	  
believed	  Britons	  were	  bore	  some	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  
Empire.	  However,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  two	  moral	  geographies	  must	  
also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  shared	  assumption	  after	  1838	  that	  British	  subjects	  were	  no	  
longer	  directly	  involved	  in	  slavery	  or	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
As	  I	  have	  shown,	  debates	  over	  slave	  sugar	  or	  copper	  ore	  ultimately	  revolved	  around	  
the	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  state.	  British	  consumers	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  
bear	  the	  moral	  burden	  in	  discussions	  over	  the	  United	  States	  where	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  
rejection	  of	  slave	  cotton	  would	  form	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  attempt	  to	  morally	  isolate	  
American	  slave-­‐owners.	  In	  both	  cases	  anti-­‐slavery	  concerns	  and	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  
abolitionists	  helped	  constitute	  the	  knowledge	  base	  upon	  which	  economic	  decisions	  
were	  made.	  This	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘economic	  ideas	  will	  only	  be	  adopted	  when	  […]	  
connected	  to	  a	  language	  through	  which	  the	  economy	  and	  economic	  behaviour	  is	  
understood.’149	  Debates	  over	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibility	  contributed	  to	  a	  broader	  
conceptualisation	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  economy	  that	  was	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  geography	  
and	  space.	  Whilst	  the	  British	  government	  or	  an	  individual	  consumer	  might	  be	  
conceptualised	  as	  contributing	  to	  transatlantic	  slavery	  through	  moral	  sanction	  or	  the	  
abstract	  process	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  British	  subjects	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  actively	  
involved	  in	  either	  the	  slave	  trade	  or	  slave	  ownership.	  Both	  understandings	  of	  Britain’s	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  ‘Worlds	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  Political	  Economy’,	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moral	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  positioned	  both	  slave-­‐owner	  and	  slave	  trader	  outside	  
the	  borders	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  Both	  moral	  geographies	  then	  fail	  to	  take	  account	  of	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  British	  capital	  crossed	  this	  boundary	  between	  slavery	  and	  freedom.	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  develop	  this	  geographic	  understanding	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  by	  
giving	  serious	  consideration	  to	  controversies	  that	  threatened	  the	  assumption	  that	  
Britain	  was	  isolated	  from	  slavery.	  The	  sugar	  debates	  of	  the	  1840s	  and	  the	  American	  
Civil	  War	  saw	  British	  subjects	  insulated	  from	  critique	  by	  an	  understanding	  that	  the	  
perpetrators	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery	  were	  in	  fact	  American,	  Brazilian,	  or	  Cuban.	  It	  was	  
only	  when	  British	  capital	  was	  identified	  with	  upholding	  slavery	  that	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐




Chapter	  II:	  Manufacturing	  Outrage:	  Mobility,	  Morality	  and	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  
In	  the	  spring	  of	  1838	  a	  young	  William	  Gladstone	  stepped	  forward	  and,	  in	  defending	  the	  
practice	  of	  apprenticeship,	  outlined	  a	  vision	  of	  how	  Britain	  remained	  entangled	  with	  
slavery	  throughout	  the	  world.	  ‘I	  am	  credibly	  informed	  that	  50,000	  human	  beings	  were	  
brought	  last	  year	  to	  a	  single	  port	  of	  South	  America’	  the	  future	  Prime	  Minister	  told	  the	  
House	  of	  Commons.	  Surely,	  argued	  Gladstone,	  it	  was	  this	  inhuman	  traffic	  that	  deserved	  
the	  attention	  of	  parliament,	  how	  could	  it	  be	  possible	  that	  the	  slave	  trade	  still	  thrived?	  
Gladstone	  believed	  he	  had	  the	  answer:	  
I	  ask	  are	  not	  the	  manufacturers	  of	  this	  country	  they	  who	  supply	  the	  means	  
of	  supporting	  this	  monstrous	  traffic?	  The	  British	  manufacturer	  sends	  his	  
goods	  in	  ships	  to	  the	  Brazils,	  and	  receives	  for	  them	  cotton,	  the	  produce	  of	  
slave	  labour.	  But	  a	  portion	  of	  those	  goods	  are	  made	  for	  an	  ulterior	  purpose;	  
they	  are	  adapted	  to	  the	  African	  market;	  they	  are	  reshipped	  from	  the	  Brazils	  
to	  the	  coast	  of	  Africa,	  and	  there	  exchanged	  for	  the	  human	  ware	  that	  passes	  
from	  Brazil	  to	  Africa.1	  
William	  Gladstone	  was	  of	  course	  the	  son	  of	  John	  Gladstone	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  
former	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  the	  British	  Caribbean.	  As	  such,	  his	  horror	  at	  the	  role	  British	  
manufacturers	  and	  merchants	  played	  in	  servicing	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  likely	  self-­‐
interested	  and	  one	  of	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  arguments	  deployed	  in	  his	  ‘long	  and	  wearisome’	  
defence	  of	  apprenticeship.2	  However,	  Gladstone’s	  speech	  represented	  both	  an	  
expansive	  view	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  a	  surprising	  awareness	  of	  Britain’s	  
continued	  connections	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  charge	  levelled	  against	  British	  
manufacturers	  and	  merchants	  was	  incidental	  to	  the	  apprenticeship	  debate	  and	  failed	  to	  
cause	  a	  stir	  at	  the	  time.	  However,	  within	  a	  few	  years	  the	  issue	  would	  be	  raised	  by	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  Mar	  1841,	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Richard	  Allen	  at	  the	  1840	  Convention.	  These	  calls	  for	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  British	  
manufactures	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  came	  at	  the	  same	  moment	  that	  the	  
Colonial	  Office	  were	  preparing	  an	  inquiry,	  and	  potential	  legal	  action,	  over	  the	  
commercial	  links	  between	  British	  merchants	  and	  slave	  traders	  on	  the	  West	  African	  
coast.3	  Throughout	  the	  next	  few	  years	  the	  role	  of	  British	  manufactures	  in	  the	  
transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  provoked	  parliamentary	  committees,	  legal	  cases,	  and	  at	  times	  
frantic	  private	  correspondence.	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  these	  debates	  
emerged	  and	  the	  difficult	  questions	  they	  raised	  about	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Britain	  
should	  restrict	  the	  movement	  of	  its	  own	  subjects.	  
As	  Christopher	  Brown	  noted	  in	  his	  masterful	  study	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  British	  
abolitionism	  ‘[i]t	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  notice	  an	  injustice	  and	  something	  else	  to	  act.’4	  This	  
observation	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  British	  manufactures	  in	  the	  slave	  
trade,	  as	  the	  immorality	  of	  the	  practice	  was	  very	  much	  up	  for	  debate.	  This	  belied	  the	  
rhetoric	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  campaigners	  such	  as	  Richard	  Allen	  who	  spoke	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
broad	  responsibility	  when	  he	  claimed	  ‘we,	  ourselves,	  as	  a	  nation,	  [are]	  not	  entirely	  
clear	  of	  the	  guilt.’5	  Michael	  E.	  Woods	  has	  recently	  demonstrated	  how	  abolitionists	  
attempted	  to	  synthesize	  an	  outraged	  consensus	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  universal	  sense	  of	  
indignation.6	  However	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  it	  was	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  consensus	  
existed.	  Other	  leading	  abolitionists,	  notably	  Thomas	  Fowell	  Buxton,	  had	  long	  been	  
aware	  of	  the	  role	  British	  manufactures	  played	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  appeared	  to	  view	  
it	  as	  unproblematic.	  Clearly,	  the	  subject	  of	  British	  manufactures	  had	  to	  acquire	  political	  
resonance	  to	  spark	  wider	  outrage.	  This	  resonance	  came	  about	  through	  a	  combination	  
of	  different	  factors	  including	  shifts	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery,	  governmental	  
commitment	  to	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  the	  material	  reality	  of	  British	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  to	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  Stephen,	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  Brown,	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  BFASS,	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  Convention,	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  ‘A	  Theory	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commerce	  with	  slave	  traders.	  In	  tying	  together	  these	  various	  strands	  I	  will	  utilise	  the	  
geographer’s	  concept	  of	  mobility,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  flow,	  or	  movement,	  of	  British	  goods	  into	  
the	  hands	  of	  slave	  traders	  that	  ultimately	  proved	  so	  offensive	  to	  metropolitan	  
commentators.	  	  
Mobility	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  ‘a	  fragile	  entanglement	  of	  physical	  movement,	  
representations	  and	  practices.’7	  It	  is	  an	  increasingly	  popular	  analytic	  category	  amongst	  
social	  scientists,	  human	  geographers,	  and	  more	  recently	  historians	  who	  have	  examined	  
the	  ‘politics	  of	  mobility’.8	  Tim	  Cresswell,	  a	  cultural	  geographer,	  defined	  the	  ‘politics	  of	  
mobility’	  as	  the	  way	  movements,	  or	  mobilities,	  are	  both	  productive	  of,	  and	  produced	  
by,	  social	  processes.9	  It	  was	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  to	  Brazil,	  
Cuba	  and	  West	  Africa	  that	  allowed	  there	  to	  be	  outrage	  at	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  As	  we	  
shall	  see	  those	  who	  commented	  on	  this	  practice	  often	  mapped	  out	  a	  geography	  that	  
was	  constituted	  by	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  between	  these	  different	  sites.	  Whilst	  these	  
representations	  were	  often	  divorced	  from	  the	  brute	  reality	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  
goods	  they	  resulted	  in	  legislation,	  and	  other	  measures,	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  effect	  
the	  mobility	  of	  manufactured	  goods	  once	  they	  left	  British	  ports.	  A	  mobilities	  
framework	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  encapsulate	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  factors;	  legal,	  political	  
and	  material	  that	  led	  to	  the	  export	  of	  British	  manufactures	  generating	  controversy.	  	  
When	  Gladstone	  invoked	  the	  spectre	  of	  British	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  it	  was	  
intended	  as	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  primary	  controversy	  of	  the	  apprenticeship	  system.	  
Somewhat	  fittingly,	  once	  apprenticeship	  had	  ended	  increasing	  attention	  would	  be	  paid	  
to	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  as	  anti-­‐slavery	  
campaigners	  fixed	  their	  attention	  to	  slavery	  outside	  the	  British	  Empire.	  This	  chapter	  
will	  explore	  how	  the	  movement	  of	  manufactured	  goods	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  gained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Ibid,	  p.	  18.	  
8	  For	  an	  example	  of	  mobility	  utilised	  in	  a	  historical	  context,	  albeit	  in	  a	  very	  different	  manner,	  see	  
the	  June	  2014	  special	  issue	  of	  Mobilities	  which	  includes	  several	  contributions	  from	  historical	  
geographers.	  
9	  Cresswell,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Politics	  of	  Mobility’,	  p.	  21.	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enough	  political	  resonance	  to	  provoke	  wider	  controversy	  in	  the	  early	  1840s.	  Firstly,	  I	  
will	  sketch	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  perceived	  in	  the	  late	  1830s	  
to	  around	  1840.	  This	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  was	  growing	  concern	  over	  Britain’s	  
commercial	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade,	  however	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  concern	  was	  almost	  
entirely	  on	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil.	  Next,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  reality	  of	  supplying	  the	  
slave	  trade	  and	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  naval	  suppression	  saw	  attention	  switch	  to	  
West	  Africa	  following	  the	  seizure	  of	  a	  Spanish	  vessel	  the	  Dos	  Amigos.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  
explore	  how	  metropolitan	  figures	  hoped	  to	  tackle	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  by	  
restricting	  the	  mobility	  of	  British	  manufactures	  and	  the	  merchants	  who	  conveyed	  
them.	  This	  included	  establishing	  ideas	  of	  appropriate	  and	  inappropriate	  mobilities.	  In	  
doing	  so	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  flow	  of	  goods	  out	  of	  Britain,	  and	  into	  areas	  
associated	  with	  the	  slave	  trade,	  could	  provoke	  outrage	  and	  raise	  questions	  over	  
Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  wider	  world.	  This	  chapter	  demonstrates	  the	  entanglement	  
of	  physical	  and	  imagined	  geographies	  as	  government	  officials	  and	  merchants	  debated	  
where	  exactly	  British	  capital	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  flow.	  I	  explore	  how	  material	  changes	  
briefly	  allowed	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  critique	  of	  British	  commerce	  to	  emerge.	  Commercial	  
links	  to	  slave	  traders	  were	  not	  inherently	  problematic,	  rather	  this	  chapter	  explains	  
how	  converging	  mobilities	  transformed	  West	  African	  commerce	  into	  a	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery.	  
Travelling	  Narratives	  of	  the	  Slave	  Trade	  
William	  Gladstone’s	  ability	  to	  clearly	  map	  out	  the	  chain	  along	  which	  British-­‐made	  
goods	  moved,	  from	  Britain,	  to	  Latin	  America	  and	  finally	  to	  Africa,	  demonstrates	  that	  at	  
least	  some	  people	  were	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  role	  that	  British	  business	  played	  in	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  Despite	  this	  awareness	  it	  would	  only	  be	  at	  the	  1840	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  
Convention	  that	  abolitionists	  would	  openly	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  British	  manufactures	  
and	  the	  slave	  trade.	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  metropolitan	  debate	  and	  discussion	  on	  
the	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  how	  the	  geographic	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understanding	  of	  the	  problem	  shifted	  in	  the	  late	  1830s.	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  David	  Turnbull’s	  
Travels	  in	  the	  West	  a	  key	  text	  that	  addressed	  the	  role	  of	  British	  manufactures	  in	  the	  
slave	  trade,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Thomas	  Buxton’s	  The	  African	  Slave	  Trade	  and	  Its	  Remedy.	  As	  I	  
will	  demonstrate	  these	  works	  offered	  differing	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  ending	  the	  
transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  but	  shared	  a	  geographic	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  British	  
manufactures	  in	  the	  trade.	  This	  was	  a	  geography	  that	  was	  centred	  on	  the	  movement	  of	  
British	  goods	  through	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil.	  I	  explore	  how	  these	  texts	  represented	  the	  role	  
of	  British	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  and	  how	  their	  authors	  hoped	  to	  influence	  
policy	  through	  the	  circulation	  of	  their	  works.	  As	  such	  I	  consider	  not	  only	  how	  Turnbull	  
and	  Buxton	  represented	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures,	  but	  also	  how	  their	  own	  
texts	  circulated	  paying	  heed	  to	  Miles	  Ogborn’s	  call	  to	  consider	  how	  ‘writing	  travels’.10	  
Approaching	  these	  texts	  in	  this	  way	  provides	  further	  evidence	  of	  how	  culture	  shaped	  
economic	  knowledge	  within	  Victorian	  Britain	  as	  both	  Turnbull	  and	  Buxton	  blended	  
anti-­‐slavery	  and	  political	  economy	  in	  their	  discussions	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
David	  Turnbull’s	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  key	  work	  in	  disseminating	  
information	  about	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade.	  As	  its	  
title	  suggests	  Turnbull’s	  work	  is	  a	  travel	  narrative	  based	  upon	  the	  Scottish	  author’s	  
visit	  to	  Cuba	  and	  Porto	  Rico	  in	  the	  late	  1830s.11	  Within	  the	  work	  Turnbull	  discussed	  the	  
myriad	  connections	  between	  Britons	  and	  the	  slave	  trade	  in	  Cuba	  including	  British	  
ownership	  of	  slave-­‐worked	  copper	  mines	  (discussed	  in	  chapter	  four)	  as	  well	  as	  
financing	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  He	  ultimately	  concluded	  that	  ‘[e]very	  shilling	  of	  English	  
capital	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  island	  …	  serves	  to	  fetter	  some	  poor	  negro	  in	  the	  interior	  of	  
Africa.’12	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  role	  of	  British	  manufactures	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  Turnbull	  
quoted	  US	  Consul	  Nicholas	  Trist	  and	  noted	  that	  ‘British	  fabrics	  made	  expressly	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  M.	  Ogborn,	  ‘Writing	  Travels:	  Power,	  Knowledge	  and	  Ritual	  on	  the	  English	  East	  India	  
Company’s	  Early	  Voyages’,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers,	  27	  (2),	  pp.	  155-­‐
171,	  p.	  156.	  
11	  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	  p.	  134.	  
12	  D.	  Turnbull,	  Travels	  in	  the	  West:	  Cuba;	  with	  Notices	  of	  Porto	  Rico	  and	  the	  Slave	  Trade	  (London:	  
Longman,	  Orme,	  Brown,	  Green	  and	  Longmans,	  1840),	  p.	  133.	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coast	  of	  Africa	  …	  of	  British	  manufacture	  [are]	  annually	  exported	  to	  this	  island’.	  It	  is	  
worth	  noting	  that	  Trist’s	  critiques	  of	  Britain	  were	  likely	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  deflect	  
attention	  from	  his	  own	  role	  in	  the	  slave	  trade,	  which	  eventually	  saw	  him	  stripped	  of	  his	  
consulship.13	  However,	  Turnbull	  believed	  Trist’s	  claims	  and	  in	  repeating	  them	  he	  
outlined,	  as	  Gladstone	  had	  done,	  a	  geography	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  where	  British	  
manufactures	  and	  capital	  flowed	  through	  key	  sites	  such	  as	  Havana	  before	  travelling	  to	  
Africa.	  	  	  
	  Turnbull’s	  concern	  for	  highlighting	  British	  complicity	  was	  grounded	  in	  his	  proposed	  
solution	  for	  ending	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade.	  Turnbull	  believed	  that	  Cuban	  and	  
Brazilian	  demand	  for	  slaves	  had	  to	  be	  curbed	  and	  that	  this	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  
increasing	  the	  powers	  of	  Mixed	  Commission	  Courts,	  bi-­‐national	  courts	  that	  judged	  
whether	  a	  seized	  ship	  was	  guilty	  of	  slaving,	  in	  those	  countries.14	  A	  focus	  on	  the	  demand	  
side	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  also	  required	  a	  hostility	  towards	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  and	  
manufactures	  by	  British	  subjects	  that	  facilitated	  this	  demand.	  Within	  Travels	  in	  the	  
West	  Turnbull	  foregrounded	  the	  issue	  of	  British	  complicity	  and	  wrote	  at	  length	  about	  
the	  variety	  of	  ways	  British	  capital	  supported	  the	  slave	  trade.	  For	  example	  the	  preface	  
discussed	  how:	  	  
[M]any	  of	  our	  manufacturers	  and	  merchants	  are	  accused,	  not	  altogether	  
without	  cause,	  of	  reaping	  a	  disgraceful	  profit	  from	  the	  fabrication	  and	  sale	  
of	  articles	  of	  exchange,	  exclusively	  employed	  in	  this	  trade	  in	  human	  flesh.15	  
The	  Scotsman	  hoped	  to	  embarrass	  readers	  into	  action	  and	  viewed	  commercial	  links	  to	  
the	  slave	  trade	  as	  ‘grievous	  blots	  on	  the	  national	  escutcheon’.16	  	  This	  concern	  for	  the	  
national	  character	  had	  long	  been	  a	  part	  of	  abolitionist	  rhetoric	  representing	  slavery	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Turnbull,	  Travels	  in	  the	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  Turnbull,	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  p.	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a	  national	  and	  individual	  sin.17	  Turnbull	  argued	  anyone	  who	  exported	  cotton	  fabrics	  or	  
shackles	  to	  Cuba	  knew	  full	  well	  that	  they	  were	  making	  their	  way	  into	  the	  slave	  trade.18	  
However,	  this	  was	  far	  from	  a	  guarantee	  of	  wider	  outrage,	  or	  action	  and	  we	  must	  
consider	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  information	  about	  British	  complicity	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  
were	  disseminated.	  
Whilst	  this	  chapter	  is	  not	  primarily	  interested	  in	  reader	  reception	  it	  is	  worth	  
considering	  briefly	  whether	  readers	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  geography	  of	  supplying	  the	  
slave	  trade	  laid	  out	  by	  Turnbull.	  British	  complicity	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  certainly	  made	  an	  
impression	  on	  reviewers	  of	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  with	  The	  Monthly	  Review	  noting	  that	  
such	  revelations	  were	  ’startling	  charges’	  that	  they	  hoped	  would	  ‘arrest	  the	  attention	  of	  
the	  British	  public’.19	  Reviews	  in	  periodicals	  and	  newspapers	  should	  not	  simply	  be	  read	  
as	  reception	  of	  texts,	  they	  also	  played	  a	  part	  in	  their	  dissemination	  as	  quotations	  in	  
reviews	  helped	  expose	  texts	  to	  a	  wider	  readership.20	  Even	  The	  Times,	  a	  publication	  
often	  critical	  of	  the	  abolitionists,	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘British	  capitalists,	  
under	  the	  cloak	  of	  a	  foreign	  partnership,	  still	  assist	  in	  the	  trade.’21	  This	  favourable	  
review	  was	  likely	  secured	  through	  connections	  fostered	  during	  Turnbull’s	  tenure	  as	  
the	  paper’s	  European	  correspondent	  a	  fact	  that	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  
networks	  in	  the	  dissemination	  of	  works	  like	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  to	  a	  literate	  
metropolitan	  audience.22	  However,	  as	  Brown	  has	  argued	  there	  is	  a	  ‘chasm	  between	  
moral	  opinion	  and	  moral	  action’.23	  Simply	  knowing	  about	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  
slave	  trade	  did	  not	  necessitate	  action,	  but	  as	  a	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  circulation	  of	  
Travels	  reveals	  Turnbull	  took	  practical	  steps	  to	  ensure	  his	  work	  made	  an	  impact.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Turley,	  The	  Culture	  of	  English	  Anti-­‐Slavery,	  pp.	  18-­‐21.	  	  
18	  Turnbull,	  Travels	  in	  the	  West,	  p.	  441.	  
19	  The	  Monthly	  Review,	  1	  Apr	  1840.	  
20	  P.	  E.	  Dumas,	  ‘The	  Edinburgh	  Review,	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  Quarterly	  Review,	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  the	  Contributions	  of	  the	  
Periodical	  to	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  Slavery	  Debates’,	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  &	  Abolition,	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  (2017),	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  561.	  
21	  The	  Times,	  21	  February	  1840.	  
22	  M.	  Llorca-­‐Jaña,	  ‘Turnbull,	  David	  (1793?-­‐1851)’,	  ODNB	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2009).	  [http://www.oxforddnb.com.liverpool.idm.oclc.org/view/article/98426,	  accessed	  12	  
Sep	  2017]	  
23	  Brown,	  Moral	  Capital,	  p.	  2.	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When	  David	  Turnbull	  wrote	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  he	  clearly	  envisioned	  that	  it	  would	  find	  
an	  audience	  of	  abolitionists	  and	  government	  officials.	  The	  book	  was	  dedicated	  to	  the	  
Earl	  of	  Clarendon	  who	  had	  negotiated	  the	  1835	  Anglo-­‐Spanish	  slave	  trade	  treaty,	  a	  
piece	  of	  legislation	  Turnbull	  believed	  to	  be	  key	  in	  tackling	  the	  slave	  trade.24	  However,	  
Turnbull	  went	  further	  than	  simply	  addressing	  his	  intended	  audience	  in	  text	  he	  also	  
used	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  to	  forge	  connections	  with	  abolitionists	  and	  government	  
officials.	  As	  David	  Murray	  notes	  Turnbull	  sent	  a	  physical	  copy	  of	  Travels	  to	  Foreign	  
Secretary	  Lord	  Palmerston	  in	  1840,	  followed	  by	  a	  letter	  detailing	  his	  plan	  to	  amend	  the	  
1835	  treaty.25	  Here	  Travels	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  material	  object	  that	  allowed	  
Turnbull	  access	  to	  what	  Turley	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘insider	  status’,	  in	  that	  he	  became	  a	  
respected	  expert	  and	  had	  a	  direct	  line	  to	  influential	  members	  of	  government.26	  The	  
favourable	  review	  in	  The	  Times	  also	  attracted	  the	  attention	  the	  BFASS	  who	  supported	  
Turnbull	  in	  his	  lobbying	  of	  the	  government.27	  The	  circulation	  of	  Travels	  is	  proof	  of	  how	  
forms	  of	  writing	  gain	  meaning	  through	  ‘the	  people,	  objects	  and	  practices	  that	  are	  
required	  to	  make	  them	  work.’28	  Turnbull’s	  letters	  and	  favourable	  reviews	  succeeded	  in	  
bringing	  his	  work	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  audience	  he	  had	  envisioned.	  
Travels	  in	  the	  West	  helped	  to	  publicise	  British	  contribution	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  
construct	  a	  geography	  focused	  on	  movement	  through	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil.	  The	  publication	  
of	  this	  work	  in	  1840	  spoke	  to	  the	  shifting	  focus	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  
period.	  As	  Howard	  Temperley	  has	  argued	  it	  was	  at	  this	  point	  that	  British	  campaigners	  
turned	  their	  attention	  to	  tackling	  slavery	  in	  the	  wider	  world.29	  Joseph	  Sturge	  and	  the	  
BFASS	  were	  committed	  to	  moral	  suasion	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  activity	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  Travels	  in	  the	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  p.	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  Commerce,	  p.	  134.	  
25	  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	  pp.	  135-­‐136;	  D.	  Turnbull	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  Palmerston,	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Foreign	  Office	  Papers,	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  Trade,	  1807-­‐1975,	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28	  Ogborn,	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  p.	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  British	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abroad	  and	  moral	  purity	  at	  home.30	  David	  Turnbull	  aligned	  himself	  with	  this	  group	  of	  
abolitionists	  and	  the	  focus	  on	  British	  manufactures	  in	  Cuba	  at	  the	  1840	  convention	  
surely	  owed	  much	  to	  the	  Scotsman’s	  presence.31	  Turnbull’s	  work	  had	  provided	  
evidence	  that	  Britain	  had	  failed	  to	  extricate	  itself	  from	  the	  global	  system	  of	  slavery.	  
Travels	  in	  the	  West	  and	  the	  1840	  convention	  were	  attempts	  to	  stoke	  the	  fires	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery	  outrage	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  these	  facts;	  a	  strategy	  consistent	  with	  earlier	  
abolitionist	  attempts	  to	  cultivate	  indignation	  or	  offence.32	  However,	  as	  I	  shall	  
demonstrate,	  not	  all	  abolitionists	  interpreted	  the	  supply	  of	  British	  manufactures	  to	  
slave	  traders	  as	  cause	  for	  moral	  outrage.	  	  
Travels	  in	  the	  West	  was	  not	  the	  only	  1840	  work	  to	  reference	  the	  role	  of	  British	  
manufactures	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  as	  the	  issue	  was	  also	  broached	  in	  Thomas	  
Fowell	  Buxton’s	  The	  African	  Slave	  Trade	  and	  Its	  Remedy.	  The	  last	  in	  a	  series	  of	  works	  
produced	  by	  the	  veteran	  abolitionist	  following	  the	  end	  of	  West	  Indian	  slavery,	  The	  
African	  Slave	  Trade	  and	  its	  Remedy	  contained	  Buxton’s	  own	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  
transatlantic	  slavery.33	  These	  pamphlets	  and	  books	  alongside	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  
African	  Civilization	  Society	  were	  used	  by	  Buxton	  to	  promote	  his	  proposed	  expedition	  
up	  the	  Niger	  River	  to	  encourage	  legitimate	  trade	  with	  groups	  in	  the	  African	  interior.	  34	  
Buxton’s	  plan	  was	  to	  cut	  off	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  by	  ‘experimentally	  
convinc[ing]’	  Africans	  to	  engage	  in	  legitimate	  commerce.35	  The	  substance	  of	  Buxton’s	  
plans	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  but	  at	  this	  point	  it	  is	  worth	  
considering	  how	  Buxton’s	  works	  were	  produced	  and	  how	  this	  influenced	  the	  
representation	  of	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid,	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32	  Woods,	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Unlike	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  Buxton’s	  various	  works	  were	  not	  travel	  narratives.	  Instead	  
they	  can	  be	  considered	  akin	  to	  the	  political	  economic	  works	  of	  Harriet	  Martineau,	  
which	  combined	  information	  gleaned	  from	  government	  blue	  books	  and	  informants	  
with	  an	  attempt	  to	  apply	  economic	  theory	  to	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  world.36	  Whilst	  
neither	  Thomas	  Buxton,	  nor	  his	  daughters	  and	  nieces	  who	  did	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  
research	  and	  writing,	  personally	  travelled	  to	  Africa	  or	  the	  Americas	  works	  on	  the	  slave	  
trade	  drew	  on	  the	  expertise	  of	  individuals	  interested	  in	  African	  commerce	  as	  well	  as	  
geographers	  such	  as	  James	  MacQueen.37	  Specifically,	  Buxton’s	  estimate	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  
the	  illegal	  slave	  trade,	  which	  he	  put	  at	  upwards	  of	  150,000	  per	  annum,	  was	  reached	  
through	  ‘much	  communication	  with	  African	  merchants,	  engaged	  in	  legitimate	  trade’.	  38	  
Buxton	  had	  ascertained	  that	  goods	  manufactured	  in	  Manchester	  were	  frequently	  used	  
to	  purchase	  slaves	  and	  were	  ‘altogether	  unsuitable	  for	  any	  other	  market	  save	  that	  
traffic	  alone.’39	  He	  used	  estimates	  of	  how	  many	  of	  these	  goods	  were	  exported	  each	  year	  
as	  a	  basis	  for	  calculating	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  illegal	  slave	  trade.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter	  among	  Buxton’s	  informants	  were	  several	  merchants	  who	  would	  be	  accused	  of	  
dealing	  with	  slave	  traders.	  Buxton	  himself	  passed	  little	  comment	  on	  the	  morality	  of	  this	  
practice,	  relegating	  discussion	  to	  the	  footnotes	  as	  it	  simply	  informed	  his	  metrics	  in	  
determining	  the	  price	  of	  slaves	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  trade.40	  Clearly,	  condemnation	  
was	  far	  from	  a	  universal	  response	  to	  awareness	  of	  British	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
In	  fact,	  the	  information	  that	  British	  manufactures	  were	  used	  for	  slave	  trading	  could	  
mean	  very	  different	  things	  to	  different	  people.	  
Whilst	  Buxton	  did	  not	  condemn	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  with	  British	  
manufactures	  he	  did	  give	  the	  issue	  wider	  publicity.	  The	  African	  Slave	  Trade	  specifically	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discussed	  the	  export	  of	  British	  manufactures	  to	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba	  drawing	  on	  the	  
published	  papers	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Office.41	  Buxton’s	  lack	  of	  concern	  was	  likely	  the	  result	  
of	  believing	  that	  slavery	  had	  to	  be	  tackled	  at	  the	  supply	  end	  in	  West	  Africa,	  whereas	  
Britons	  contributed	  to	  demand.	  This	  of	  course	  differed	  from	  Turnbull’s	  perspective	  and	  
supporters	  of	  Buxton’s	  Niger	  scheme	  openly	  critiqued	  Turnbull	  in	  the	  periodical	  
press.42	  Despite	  their	  differences	  both	  Buxton	  and	  Turnbull	  helped	  construct	  a	  
geography	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  that	  was	  built	  around	  the	  mobility	  of	  goods	  
through	  Latin	  America.	  However,	  proponents	  of	  Buxton’s	  perspective	  did	  at	  times	  
publicise	  the	  role	  of	  Britons	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  George	  Stephen,	  an	  abolitionist	  hired	  by	  
Buxton	  to	  promote	  the	  Niger	  expedition,	  expressed	  incredulity	  that	  nothing	  had	  been	  
done	  about	  British	  goods	  being	  sent	  to	  Latin	  America	  at	  a	  meeting	  in	  Reading	  in	  1840.	  
The	  always-­‐belligerent	  Stephen	  bemoaned	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  parliamentary	  enquiry	  and	  
concluded	  by	  reminding	  his	  audience	  that	  ‘every	  two	  minutes	  those	  who	  heard	  him	  
hesitated	  to	  join	  the	  cause	  they	  were	  passively	  parties	  to	  the	  enslavement	  or	  murder	  of	  
three	  of	  their	  fellow	  creatures.'43	  Stephen	  was	  clearly	  much	  more	  disturbed	  by	  the	  
supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  than	  Buxton	  and	  appears	  to	  have	  viewed	  the	  matter	  in	  a	  
similar	  light	  to	  Turnbull.	  For	  both,	  British	  involvement	  was	  a	  disgrace	  that	  needed	  to	  
be	  addressed;	  however	  it	  could	  also	  serve	  to	  inspire	  renewed	  fervour	  for	  anti-­‐slavery	  
action.	  Stephen	  clearly	  hoped	  that	  feelings	  of	  complicity	  would	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  
Niger	  expedition,	  whilst	  Turnbull	  aimed	  to	  garner	  publicity	  for	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  and	  
the	  suggestions	  it	  contained	  for	  tackling	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
For	  action	  to	  take	  place	  against	  British	  subjects	  involved	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  there	  
needed	  to	  be	  sustained	  political	  interest	  in	  the	  issue.	  Political	  support	  and	  publicity	  
were	  vital	  to	  prompting	  action	  against	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  by	  British	  
subjects.	  David	  Turley	  has	  explored	  how	  abolitionists	  relied	  on	  a	  mixture	  of	  ‘influence’	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  pp.	  178-­‐179.	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and	  ‘agitation’	  to	  bring	  about	  political	  action.	  Agitation	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  
propaganda	  efforts,	  which	  looked	  to	  grab	  government	  attention	  for	  a	  cause.44	  In	  
Turnbull’s	  case	  this	  strategy	  worked;	  as	  discussed	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  attracted	  the	  
interest	  of	  Palmerston	  and	  the	  Scotsman	  was	  able	  to	  parlay	  this	  into	  being	  appointed	  
consul	  to	  Havana.45	  Palmerston’s	  official	  correspondence	  had	  been	  included	  in	  
Buxton’s	  The	  African	  Slave	  Trade,	  in	  which	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  explicitly	  asked	  for	  
more	  information	  about	  British	  manufactures	  in	  Brazil.46	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case	  it	  would	  
appear	  that	  the	  stage	  should	  have	  been	  set	  for	  more	  serious	  political	  action	  over	  the	  
role	  of	  British	  manufactures	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Publications	  such	  as	  Travels	  in	  the	  West	  
and	  The	  African	  Slave	  Trade	  had	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  and	  Turnbull’s	  
appointment	  appeared	  to	  indicate	  a	  willingness	  to	  act.	  To	  ascertain	  why	  government	  
action	  went	  no	  further	  it	  will	  first	  be	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  attitude	  towards	  
supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  within	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  itself.	  
The	  Foreign	  Office’s	  slave	  trade	  department	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  ‘bureaucratic	  
lynch-­‐pin’	  of	  the	  British	  campaign	  against	  transatlantic	  slavery.47	  It	  was	  to	  this	  office	  
that	  reports	  of	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  were	  directed	  and	  they	  were	  met	  
with	  great	  interest.	  David	  Eltis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  was	  ‘baffled’	  by	  
British	  involvement	  in	  supplying	  or	  ‘aiding	  and	  abetting’	  the	  slave	  trade.48	  This	  
bafflement	  related	  to	  exactly	  how	  it	  could	  stop	  these	  instances	  of	  British	  goods	  and	  
capital	  making	  their	  way	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  slave	  traders.	  However,	  there	  clearly	  was	  a	  
will	  to	  tackle	  these	  issues	  particularly	  during	  the	  1830s	  when	  Palmerston	  held	  the	  
position	  of	  foreign	  secretary.	  Palmerston’s	  commitment	  to	  suppression	  lay	  in	  a	  
combination	  of	  electoral	  politics	  and	  principal.	  The	  future	  prime	  minister	  had	  suffered	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electoral	  embarrassment	  early	  in	  his	  career	  when	  his	  anti-­‐slavery	  credentials	  had	  been	  
questioned,	  and	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  political	  value	  of	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐slavery	  position.49	  
For	  Palmerston,	  Britain’s	  moral	  example	  was	  also	  of	  great	  practical	  importance	  for	  
suppression.	  This	  is	  unsurprising,	  as	  Matthew	  Mason	  has	  noted,	  nations	  jockeyed	  for	  
prestige	  through	  trumpeting	  their	  commitment	  to	  abolition	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	  century.	  Foreign	  powers	  were	  also	  quick	  to	  leap	  on	  any	  suggestion	  of	  
British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  duplicity	  and	  use	  this	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  
undermine	  the	  negotiation	  of	  anti-­‐slave	  trade	  treaties.	  50	  	  
Palmerston	  was	  not	  the	  only	  politician	  interested	  in	  protecting	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  
position.	  For	  example	  Lord	  Glenelg,	  Colonial	  Secretary	  from	  1835	  to	  1839,	  wrote	  to	  
Palmerston	  about	  British	  commission	  houses	  ‘deeply	  engaged’	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  In	  the	  
letter	  he	  argued	  that	  prosecuting	  those	  involved	  would	  lead	  to	  ‘very	  beneficial	  results	  if	  
some	  of	  the	  most	  conspicuous	  of	  them	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  punishment.’51	  This	  desire	  
to	  bring	  the	  most	  egregious	  offenders	  to	  justice	  speaks	  to	  the	  importance	  placed	  on	  
making	  an	  example	  of	  those	  who	  threatened	  to	  damage	  British	  claims	  to	  moral	  
superiority.	  Clearly	  there	  was	  both	  an	  awareness	  of	  British	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  
and	  a	  willingness	  within	  government	  to	  take	  action.	  It	  is	  also	  evident	  that	  the	  supplying	  
of	  the	  slave	  trade	  with	  British	  manufactures	  was	  for	  the	  most	  part	  understood	  in	  terms	  
of	  British	  goods	  moving	  through	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba.	  This	  was	  down	  in	  part	  to	  the	  
assiduous	  reporting	  from	  officials	  in	  those	  countries,	  which	  would	  only	  increase	  with	  
Turnbull’s	  appointment	  to	  the	  Havannah	  consulate.	  Given	  these	  conditions	  it	  is	  
perhaps	  surprising	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  little	  attempt	  at	  intervening	  in	  the	  
affairs	  of	  the	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  involved	  in	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
This	  inaction	  equated	  less	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  desire	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government	  than	  a	  want	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of	  means.	  The	  goods	  being	  exported	  to	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  were	  perfectly	  legal	  in	  nature	  
and	  British	  officials	  in	  these	  countries	  lacked	  the	  ability	  to	  interfere	  with	  regular	  trade.	  
Whilst	  Thomas	  Buxton	  had	  claimed	  that	  the	  facts	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  were	  
‘notorious	  to	  commercial	  men’	  it	  was	  only	  with	  his	  work	  and	  David	  Turnbull’s	  Travels	  
in	  the	  West	  that	  the	  issue	  would	  gain	  wider	  attention.52	  At	  the	  same	  time	  relevant	  
members	  of	  the	  Whig	  government	  were	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  British	  
involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  how	  it	  undermined	  Britain’s	  moral	  standing.	  This	  
mirrored	  the	  concerns	  aired	  at	  the	  1840	  World	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention,	  which	  further	  
publicised	  the	  issue.	  However,	  both	  the	  political	  and	  popular	  understandings	  of	  
supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  focused	  specifically	  on	  the	  flow	  of	  goods	  through	  Latin	  
America.	  Whilst	  large	  amounts	  of	  British	  goods	  were	  undoubtedly	  sent	  to	  Brazil	  and	  
Cuba	  before	  being	  re-­‐exported	  for	  use	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  it	  was	  a	  practice	  that	  the	  
British	  government	  had	  little	  power	  to	  prevent.	  What	  clearly	  existed	  was	  a	  political	  will	  
to	  address	  the	  issue	  in	  some	  way.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  British	  attention	  shifted	  to	  Western	  
Africa	  that	  a	  full-­‐blown	  investigation	  could	  take	  place.	  To	  understand	  how	  this	  
happened	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  practical	  realities	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  how	  
this	  related	  to	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  naval	  suppression.	  
Material	  Mobilities	  of	  Suppression	  and	  the	  Slave	  Trade	  
In	  the	  spring	  of	  1842	  a	  parliamentary	  select	  committee	  was	  tasked	  with	  investigating	  
accusations	  that	  British	  merchants	  operating	  on	  the	  western	  coast	  of	  Africa	  were	  guilty	  
of	  supplying	  goods	  that	  were	  vital	  to	  the	  prosecution	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  On	  April	  19th	  
John	  G.	  Nicholls,	  secretary	  to	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  Committee,	  a	  group	  of	  London	  merchants	  
who	  represented	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  British	  owned	  forts	  that	  dotted	  the	  coast	  of	  what	  is	  
now	  called	  Ghana,	  laid	  out	  the	  means	  by	  which	  British	  goods	  made	  their	  way	  into	  the	  
hands	  of	  slave	  traders:	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[V]essels	  now	  proceed	  from	  the	  Havannah	  with	  nothing	  whatever	  but	  
dollars	  and	  doubloons;	  and	  those	  vessels	  arrive	  on	  the	  windward	  coast	  of	  
Africa,	  where	  they	  commence	  their	  trade.	  The	  natives	  sell	  those	  slavers	  
goods	  bought	  from	  British	  ships	  for	  their	  dollars	  and	  doubloons;	  probably,	  
there	  follows	  a	  British	  ship,	  and	  with	  those	  dollars	  he	  goes	  on	  board	  a	  
British	  ship,	  and	  purchases	  a	  quantity	  of	  goods,	  and	  in	  that	  way	  the	  thing	  
goes	  on,	  and	  thus	  the	  slave	  trade	  is	  supplied,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  it	  is	  
prevented;	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  whole	  British	  navy	  could	  do	  it.53	  
Nicholls’s	  statement	  deserves	  some	  scrutiny.	  Whilst	  by	  1842	  it	  had	  been	  a	  long	  time	  
since	  he	  had	  personally	  tarried	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  he	  remained	  heavily	  involved	  
with	  trade	  there.	  Likely	  wanting	  to	  shield	  British	  merchants	  from	  criticism,	  he	  clearly	  
painted	  West	  Africans	  as	  providing	  the	  link	  to	  slave	  traders	  portraying	  the	  British	  role	  
as	  merely	  selling	  their	  wares	  to	  the	  local	  population.	  Whilst	  Nicholls’s	  testimony	  did	  
depict	  one	  way	  British	  goods	  made	  their	  way	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  slave	  traders	  there	  were	  
in	  fact	  numerous	  channels.	  However,	  despite	  the	  elision	  of	  the	  direct	  links	  between	  
British	  merchants	  and	  slave	  traders	  Nicholls	  does	  provide	  a	  useful	  illustration	  of	  the	  
various	  actors	  and	  processes	  involved	  in	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Mobility	  was	  key	  
to	  Nicholls’s	  testimony.	  British	  goods	  clearly	  moved	  along	  what	  modern	  observers	  
would	  recognise	  as	  a	  supply	  chain;	  from	  the	  decks	  of	  British	  merchant	  vessels,	  into	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  slave	  trader	  via	  a	  West	  African	  middleman.	  	  In	  the	  other	  direction	  flowed	  
specie	  and	  doubloons,	  which	  would	  make	  their	  way	  back	  to	  merchant	  houses	  in	  
Britain.	  Alongside	  this	  stands	  the	  Royal	  Navy,	  whose	  presence	  on	  the	  coast,	  as	  we	  shall	  
see,	  is	  what	  necessitated	  this	  supply	  chain	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
understand	  how	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  slave	  
traders	  came	  about,	  as	  it	  was	  on	  this	  reality	  that	  the	  representations,	  and	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misrepresentations,	  of	  men	  like	  Nicholls	  were	  built.	  It	  was	  these	  representations	  that	  
would	  shape	  metropolitan	  outrage	  and	  debates	  over	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  Africa	  and	  
the	  slave	  trade.	  
The	  first	  question	  posed	  by	  Tim	  Cresswell	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  determine	  a	  politics	  of	  
mobility	  is	  ‘why	  does	  a	  person	  or	  thing	  move?’54	  In	  terms	  of	  British	  manufactures	  and	  
merchants	  making	  their	  way	  to	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  the	  answer	  was	  simple,	  to	  buy	  
palm	  oil.	  Following	  abolition	  British	  merchants	  plying	  their	  trade	  in	  West	  Africa	  
switched	  attention	  to	  procuring	  palm	  oil	  rather	  than	  slaves.	  There	  was	  an	  increasing	  
demand	  for	  palm	  oil	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  due	  to	  its	  use	  in	  oiling	  
machinery	  and	  in	  soap	  manufacture.55	  This	  shift	  to	  ‘legitimate	  commerce’	  in	  palm	  oil	  
actually	  built	  on	  the	  long	  established	  commercial	  connections	  between	  British	  traders	  
and	  West	  African	  middlemen	  or	  brokers,	  which	  had	  been	  developed	  during	  the	  era	  of	  
the	  legal	  trade	  in	  slaves.	  These	  were	  trust	  relationships	  that	  were	  vital	  to	  West	  African	  
trade.	  Broking	  networks	  then	  channelled	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  to	  the	  
West	  African	  coast,	  and	  as	  Nicholls	  stated	  in	  his	  testimony,	  many	  of	  these	  coastal	  
brokers	  also	  traded	  in	  slaves.	  As	  Lynn	  notes	  ‘slaves	  and	  oil	  were	  exported	  together	  in	  a	  
symbiotic	  relationship’.56	  In	  many	  ways	  Nicholls’	  testimony,	  despite	  not	  explicitly	  
mentioning	  palm	  oil,	  accurately	  captures	  the	  difficulty	  British	  merchants	  faced	  in	  trying	  
to	  extricate	  themselves	  from	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  ability	  to	  purchase	  palm	  oil	  
required	  the	  location	  of	  brokers	  who	  could	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  retrieve	  the	  palm	  oil	  from	  
the	  African	  interior.	  Merchant	  companies	  had	  long-­‐standing	  contacts	  on	  the	  coast,	  and	  
this	  explained	  why	  traders	  from	  different	  cities	  dealt	  exclusively	  with	  specific	  areas	  of	  
the	  West	  African	  littoral.	  London	  companies	  dominated	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  trade,	  Liverpool	  
in	  Bonny	  and	  the	  Niger,	  and	  Bristol	  merchants	  on	  the	  Ivory	  Coast,	  which	  came	  to	  be	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known	  as	  the	  Bristol	  Coast.57	  The	  movement	  of	  manufactured	  goods	  to	  West	  Africa	  
then	  was	  a	  means	  to	  secure	  palm	  oil,	  but	  the	  necessity	  of	  relying	  on	  existing	  
commercial	  relationships	  meant	  that	  British	  merchants	  continued	  to	  trade	  with	  West	  
African	  brokers	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
Having	  established	  why	  British	  manufactures	  made	  their	  way	  to	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  
and	  how	  they	  were	  channelled	  into	  specific	  broking	  networks	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
understand	  how	  and	  why	  slave	  traders	  entered	  the	  equation.	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  answer	  
is	  simple	  and	  has	  already	  been	  established	  the	  purchase	  of	  slaves,	  much	  like	  the	  
purchase	  of	  palm	  oil,	  required	  manufactured	  goods.	  This	  is	  why	  in	  Nicholls’s	  testimony	  
the	  Cuban	  merchants	  purchased	  goods	  from	  Africans.	  West	  African	  trade	  functioned	  
through	  the	  extension	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  form	  of	  trade	  goods	  (British	  manufactures,	  usually	  
iron	  and	  textiles)	  that	  were	  determined	  by	  the	  specific	  demand	  emanating	  from	  
different	  areas	  within	  Africa.58	  It	  was	  vital	  that	  merchants	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  goods	  
desired	  in	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  West	  African	  littoral;	  otherwise	  their	  ventures	  faced	  
ruin.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  statement	  of	  William	  Hutton	  before	  the	  1842	  select	  
committee	  who	  when	  presented	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  cotton	  goods	  told	  the	  committee	  ‘If	  
you	  sent	  a	  ship	  load	  of	  those	  to	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  …	  they	  would	  not	  give	  even	  yams	  or	  
plantains	  for	  them.’59	  In	  many	  ways	  then	  British	  merchants,	  and	  more	  specifically	  the	  
supercargoes	  of	  their	  vessels,	  were	  locked	  into	  broking	  networks	  where	  they	  could	  
confidently	  adjudge	  what	  goods	  were	  needed	  to	  guarantee	  a	  satisfactory	  return.	  The	  
importance	  of	  identifying	  reliable	  brokers	  had	  been	  key	  to	  reducing	  risk	  in	  Britain’s	  
West	  African	  trade	  and	  many	  connections	  forged	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  era	  likely	  
continued.60	  Slave	  traders	  travelling	  from	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  same	  
issue,	  and	  as	  such	  sought	  to	  acquire	  the	  British	  made	  goods	  that	  their	  African	  trading	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  Haggerty,	  ‘Risk	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partners	  desired.	  Britain	  was	  the	  leading	  manufacturer	  of	  cotton	  textiles	  and	  had	  the	  
industry	  to	  provide	  goods	  for	  states	  across	  the	  world.61	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  physical	  
movements	  of	  both	  slave	  traders	  and	  palm	  oil	  merchants	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  trust	  
relationships	  through	  which	  all	  West	  African	  commerce	  functioned.	  
Traditionally	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  goods	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  slave	  traders	  had	  been	  
conceived	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  goods	  being	  sent	  to	  Cuba	  or	  Brazil	  and	  then	  re-­‐exported.	  This	  
was	  a	  prominent	  means	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  rested	  largely	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  
British	  merchant	  houses	  could	  provide	  credit	  in	  the	  form	  of	  goods	  for	  up	  to	  24	  
months.62	  However,	  this	  form	  of	  movement	  became	  somewhat	  restricted	  by	  the	  actions	  
of	  the	  naval	  suppression	  squadron,	  especially	  following	  the	  Anglo-­‐Spanish	  treaty	  of	  
1835.	  This	  treaty	  reaffirmed	  both	  nations’	  commitment	  to	  suppressing	  the	  slave	  trade,	  
but	  more	  importantly	  it	  introduced	  the	  equipment	  clause.	  This	  clause	  laid	  out	  various	  
goods	  and	  articles	  that	  could	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  to	  seize	  a	  vessel	  suspected	  of	  slave	  
trading,	  even	  if	  no	  slaves	  were	  found	  to	  be	  on	  board.	  These	  included	  shackles	  and	  items	  
such	  as	  planks	  for	  constructing	  slave	  decks,	  as	  well	  as	  suspicious	  amounts	  of	  water	  
casks.63	  Writing	  in	  1836	  Charles	  Tolmé,	  British	  consul	  to	  Cuba,	  accurately	  predicted	  
that	  slave	  traders	  would	  establish	  factories	  or	  baracoons,	  basically	  warehouses	  stocked	  
with	  goods	  or	  housing	  enslaved	  Africans,	  on	  the	  coast	  and	  begin	  sending	  smaller	  slave	  
vessels	  in	  ballast	  to	  avoid	  seizure.64	  This	  would	  also	  result	  in	  more	  goods	  being	  
acquired	  on	  the	  coast	  itself,	  though	  some	  would	  still	  be	  shipped	  from	  Cuba	  in	  different	  
vessels.	  	  
The	  Royal	  Navy’s	  job	  was	  clearly	  to	  inhibit	  the	  mobility	  of	  slave	  traders	  and	  it	  was	  legal	  
architecture	  such	  as	  the	  1835	  treaty	  that	  allowed	  this	  to	  occur.	  The	  slave	  trade	  
however	  was	  reactive	  to	  such	  measures	  and	  as	  such	  it	  became	  more	  common	  to	  send	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  Beckert,	  Empire	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  Cotton,	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  60-­‐74.	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  Eltis,	  Economic	  Growth,	  p.	  142.	  	  
63	  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	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vessels	  to	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  in	  ballast	  and	  under	  different	  flags	  not	  liable	  to	  
seizure,	  such	  as	  the	  Portuguese	  and	  US	  flags.	  The	  difficulty	  the	  Navy	  faced	  in	  stopping	  
this	  practice,	  as	  alluded	  to	  by	  Nicholls,	  demonstrates	  how	  ‘overlapping	  legal	  spheres	  
between	  national	  and	  international	  space	  …	  impacted	  the	  possibilities	  of	  “where”	  
surveillance	  could	  occur	  and	  how	  surveillance	  could	  be	  enacted.’65	  The	  ability	  to	  search	  
and	  seize	  ships	  was	  restricted	  by	  international	  law.	  The	  right	  of	  the	  British	  navy	  to	  
inspect	  foreign	  ships	  was	  hard	  won	  and	  often	  opposed	  by	  foreign	  powers.66	  As	  such	  it	  
was	  only	  through	  securing	  international	  treaties	  that	  slave	  trade	  suppression	  could	  be	  
put	  into	  effect.	  In	  response	  to	  naval	  surveillance	  slave	  traders	  forged	  new	  mobilities	  
and	  were	  able	  to	  acquire	  the	  British	  goods	  necessary	  for	  their	  nefarious	  traffic	  on	  the	  
coast	  of	  Africa	  itself.	  One	  of	  these	  new	  mobilities	  was	  the	  increased	  role	  of	  factors	  
working	  on	  the	  coast	  and	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  timing	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  slave	  vessel	  to	  
coincide	  with	  the	  assembling	  of	  a	  cargo	  of	  enslaved	  Africans.67	  Anyaa	  Anim-­‐Addo	  in	  her	  
study	  of	  the	  coaling	  of	  British	  steamships	  argues	  that	  British	  companies	  literally	  
‘circumnavigated	  emancipation’	  by	  taking	  on	  coal	  in	  Danish	  colonies	  where	  a	  slave	  
workforce	  would	  be	  employed	  to	  refuel	  the	  ships.68	  In	  much	  the	  same	  way	  slave	  
traders	  looked	  to	  circumnavigate	  abolition	  by	  seeking	  to	  purchase	  British	  
manufactures	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  and	  fragmenting	  voyages	  into	  two	  part	  
ventures.	  It	  was	  these	  novel	  mobilities	  devised	  by	  slave	  traders	  to	  avoid	  naval	  attention	  
that	  brought	  slavers	  and	  British	  merchants	  into	  contact	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast,	  
constituting	  the	  physical	  reality	  on	  which	  metropolitan	  outrage	  would	  be	  based.	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The	  most	  common	  way	  in	  which	  British	  manufactures	  moved	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  converging	  mobilities	  of	  British	  palm	  oil	  traders	  and	  foreign	  slavers	  who	  
both	  relied	  on	  the	  same	  African	  broking	  networks.	  This	  in	  many	  ways	  matched	  the	  
testimony	  of	  John	  G.	  Nicholls,	  and	  appears	  to	  absolve	  British	  merchants	  of	  the	  most	  
direct	  responsibility	  for	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.	  However,	  there	  were	  much	  more	  
direct	  connections	  between	  British	  merchants	  and	  slavers	  and	  these	  must	  be	  
considered	  to	  get	  the	  fullest	  picture	  of	  the	  varying	  mobilities	  of	  British	  goods	  into	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  One	  route	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  the	  supplying	  of	  
Spanish	  and	  Portuguese	  vessels	  at	  British	  owned	  forts	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Dos	  
Amigos.	  The	  Dos	  Amigos,	  a	  Spanish	  slave	  trading	  vessel	  seized	  in	  1839	  under	  the	  terms	  
of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Spanish	  treaty,	  was	  found	  to	  have	  docked	  and	  traded	  at	  Cape	  Coast	  Castle,	  
a	  British	  fort	  on	  the	  Gold	  Coast.	  There	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  had	  purchased	  ‘113	  Dane	  guns’	  
and	  ’16	  barrels	  of	  gunpowder’	  from	  resident	  merchant	  and	  magistrate	  James	  Thomson;	  
the	  goods	  were	  paid	  for	  in	  ‘Mexican	  Doubloons’.69	  This	  case	  would	  be	  discussed	  at	  
length	  by	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  and	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  1842	  select	  committee.	  
The	  Dos	  Amigos	  case	  clearly	  saw	  a	  much	  more	  direct	  link	  between	  British	  merchant	  
and	  slave	  trader	  and	  removed	  Africans,	  who	  in	  Nicholls’s	  testimony	  appeared	  to	  
represent	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  prophylactic	  between	  merchant	  and	  slave	  trader.	  
The	  location	  of	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  raises	  another	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  
mobility	  politics	  that	  of	  moorings;	  the	  fixed	  infrastructural	  points	  that	  allow	  mobilities	  
to	  occur.70	  	  In	  a	  very	  real	  sense	  British	  goods	  could	  not	  make	  their	  way	  into	  the	  hands	  
of	  slave	  traders	  if	  there	  was	  no	  site	  to	  trade	  them	  and	  forts	  like	  Cape	  Coast	  Castle	  
evidently	  provided	  a	  place	  for	  vessels	  to	  dock	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast.	  That	  a	  British	  
property	  should	  provide	  the	  mooring	  for	  slave	  trading	  was	  viewed	  as	  particularly	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egregious	  by	  government	  officials	  with	  one	  stating	  ‘[i]t	  appears	  remarkable	  that	  a	  
vessel	  so	  evidently	  engaged	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  ...	  should	  be	  thus	  allowed	  to	  remain	  with	  
impunity	  in	  a	  British	  port'.71	  There	  were	  of	  course	  also	  moorings	  that	  facilitated	  the	  
African	  broking	  networks	  of	  palm	  oil	  and	  slave	  traders.	  The	  fact	  that	  supplying	  of	  the	  
slave	  trade	  required	  not	  only	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  ships	  but	  also	  somewhere	  for	  
them	  to	  dock	  is	  perhaps	  an	  obvious	  point,	  but	  also	  one	  worth	  making.	  This	  spatial	  
aspect	  was	  of	  important	  consequence	  to	  metropolitan	  outrage	  over	  supplying	  of	  the	  
slave	  trade	  because	  slavery	  related	  abuses	  that	  occurred	  within	  the	  political	  
boundaries	  of	  empire	  that	  were	  most	  offensive.	  Cases	  such	  as	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  fell	  
within	  the	  moral	  geography	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiment,	  but	  only	  did	  so	  because	  
of	  the	  practical	  demands	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.	  	  
The	  Dos	  Amigos	  case’s	  potential	  to	  provoke	  outrage	  lay	  not	  only	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
occurred	  within	  British	  territory,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  appeared	  to	  directly	  
contravene	  British	  law.	  The	  1824	  Act	  for	  the	  More	  Effectual	  Suppression	  of	  the	  African	  
Slave	  Trade	  had	  among	  its	  provisions	  a	  prohibition	  against	  any	  British	  subject	  
‘knowingly	  and	  wilfully…	  assist	  in	  shipping,	  embarking,	  receiving	  …	  any	  person	  or	  
persons	  …	  conveyed	  or	  removed	  as	  a	  Slave	  or	  as	  Slaves’.72	  This	  act	  was	  clearly	  another	  
attempt	  to	  immobilise	  slave	  traders	  by	  limiting	  the	  support	  that	  could	  facilitate	  slaving	  
voyages.	  However,	  it	  also	  served	  the	  purpose	  of	  meeting	  criticisms	  that	  abolition	  and	  
suppression	  were	  cynical	  moves	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Britain.	  Even	  abolitionists	  had	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  accusation	  of	  insincerity	  and	  the	  British	  government	  were	  concerned	  at	  such	  a	  
portrayal.73	  The	  1824	  Act	  would	  also	  be	  central	  to	  another	  example	  of	  British	  supplying	  
of	  slave	  traders;	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Robert	  Heddell.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  ‘Report	  on	  the	  Seizure	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos’,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐155.	  
72	  5	  Geo.	  IV.	  –	  Sess.	  1824	  ‘A	  Bill	  for	  the	  More	  Effectual	  Suppression	  of	  the	  African	  Slave	  Trade’,	  
PP,	  136	  (1824).	  
73	  P.	  M.	  Kielstra,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Slave	  Trade	  Suppression	  in	  Britain	  and	  France,	  1814-­‐1848	  
(Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2000),	  p.	  207.	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In	  many	  ways	  this	  was	  the	  most	  flagrant	  example	  of	  commercial	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  
as	  the	  case	  revolved	  around	  the	  Robert	  Heddell’s	  captain	  Groves	  selling	  a	  plank	  to	  
Francisco	  Felix	  de	  Souza,	  a	  near-­‐legendary	  slave	  trader	  operating	  out	  of	  the	  port	  of	  
Whydah	  in	  Dahomey	  (modern	  day	  Benin).74	  Planks	  were	  among	  the	  items	  that	  the	  
1835	  Anglo-­‐Spanish	  treaty	  designated	  as	  slave	  trading	  equipment,	  as	  such	  selling	  them	  
to	  a	  slave	  trader	  arguably	  represented	  a	  much	  greater	  potential	  offence	  than	  the	  sale	  of	  
guns,	  iron	  goods	  or	  textiles.	  Upon	  learning	  of	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  case	  officials	  at	  the	  
Colonial	  Office	  were	  clear	  that	  Britain’s	  role	  in	  the	  suppression	  slave	  trade	  required	  
something	  to	  be	  done.	  G.	  W.	  Hope	  argued	  that	  legal	  proceedings	  were	  necessitated	  by	  
‘our	  obligation	  to	  other	  nations’.75	  This	  case	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  alongside	  the	  
moral	  geography	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  there	  was	  another	  imperative	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  
responsibility	  and	  that	  was	  the	  international	  treaty	  system	  that	  had	  been	  constructed	  
from	  1807	  onwards.	  	  
Both	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  and	  Robert	  Heddell	  cases	  go	  some	  way	  to	  revealing	  the	  grounds	  
upon	  which	  anti-­‐slavery	  outrage	  may	  have	  occurred,	  specifically	  when	  the	  slave	  trade	  
flowed	  through	  British	  possessions	  or	  undermined	  Britain’s	  legal	  obligations.	  However,	  
it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  cases	  came	  to	  light.	  In	  both	  instances	  the	  
Royal	  Navy	  intercepted,	  and	  therefore	  interrupted	  the	  mobility,	  of	  either	  slave	  traders	  
or	  those	  who	  supplied	  them.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  was	  seized	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  1835	  Anglo-­‐Spanish	  treaty.	  The	  Robert	  Heddell	  case	  however,	  was	  much	  more	  
unusual	  as	  it	  was	  an	  English	  vessel	  that	  was	  boarded	  the	  Royal	  Navy.	  This	  situation	  
came	  about	  when	  Richard	  Robert	  Madden,	  an	  abolitionist	  sent	  by	  the	  government	  to	  
investigate	  British	  possessions	  in	  West	  Africa	  following	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  case,	  learnt	  that	  
the	  Robert	  Heddell	  had	  traded	  with	  de	  Souza.	  Madden	  then	  informed	  Captain	  Tucker,	  a	  
naval	  commander	  who	  was	  touring	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  For	  more	  on	  de	  Souza	  see	  R.	  Law,	  Ouidah:	  The	  Social	  History	  of	  a	  West	  African	  Slaving	  ‘Port’,	  
1727-­‐1892	  (Athens:	  University	  of	  Ohio	  Press,	  2004).	  	  
75	  Memorandum	  of	  G.	  W.	  Hope	  for	  Lord	  Stanley,	  11	  Nov	  1841,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐170.	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government	  grant	  given	  to	  those	  forts	  should	  be	  reduced.	  Previous	  to	  this	  another	  
naval	  officer,	  Lieutenant	  Levinge,	  had	  attempted	  to	  purchase	  the	  planks	  from	  the	  
Robert	  Heddell	  only	  to	  be	  told	  they	  had	  been	  consigned	  to	  de	  Souza.	  Tucker	  would	  
pursue	  the	  vessel	  and	  upon	  boarding	  issued	  a	  declaration	  forbidding	  the	  captain	  from	  
dealing	  with	  de	  Souza	  until	  the	  British	  government	  had	  passed	  judgement	  on	  the	  
case.76	  In	  both	  cases	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Navy	  played	  the	  key	  role	  in	  interrupting,	  or	  
attempting	  to	  interrupt,	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  Navy	  in	  revealing	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  is	  vitally	  important	  to	  
understanding	  how	  British	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  could	  develop	  into	  a	  wider	  
controversy.	  	  
J.	  G.	  Nicholls’s	  testimony	  before	  the	  1842	  select	  committee	  clearly	  foregrounded	  how	  
the	  intersection	  of	  different	  vessels	  allowed	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  to	  take	  
place.	  British	  merchant	  ships	  moved	  manufactured	  goods	  to	  West	  Africa,	  whilst	  Royal	  
Navy	  vessels	  patrolled	  the	  coast	  hoping	  to	  obstruct	  slaving	  voyages	  out	  of	  Cuba	  and	  
Brazil.	  Nicholls’s	  vision	  of	  course	  also	  involved	  African	  brokers,	  who	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  
played	  a	  vital	  part	  in	  the	  British	  palm	  oil	  trade	  whilst	  still	  remaining	  heavily	  involved	  in	  
the	  export	  of	  slaves.	  However,	  there	  were	  also	  much	  more	  direct	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  
such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  and	  Robert	  Heddell.	  What	  binds	  
together	  these	  different	  instances	  of	  commercial	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  is	  the	  very	  real	  
and	  physical	  movements	  of	  goods	  from	  the	  possession	  of	  British	  merchants	  into	  the	  
hands	  of	  those	  who	  looked	  to	  enslave	  Africans.	  The	  physical	  movement	  of	  vessels	  
involved	  in	  this	  system	  was	  restricted,	  or	  channelled,	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  Firstly,	  
through	  the	  commercial	  relationships	  forged	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  upon	  which	  
both	  British	  merchants	  and	  slave	  traders	  had	  to	  rely,	  as	  alluded	  to	  in	  Nicholls’s	  
testimony.	  Alongside	  this	  there	  were	  the	  treaties	  and	  laws	  that	  set	  out	  what	  made	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  R.	  R.	  Madden	  to	  Capt.	  Tucker,	  22	  Mar	  1841;	  Capt.	  Tucket	  to	  R.	  More	  O’Ferrall,	  29	  Mar	  1841,	  
Enclosed	  in	  J.	  Stephen	  to	  Viscount	  Canning,	  20	  July	  1842,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐177.	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vessels	  liable	  to	  seizure	  and	  led	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  slave	  traders	  purchasing	  
manufactures	  in	  West	  Africa	  rather	  than	  in	  Latin	  America.	  All	  these	  factors	  had	  to	  be	  in	  
place	  to	  provide	  the	  material	  basis	  for	  outrage	  at	  British	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade;	  
the	  slavers	  need	  for	  trade	  goods,	  British	  trade	  in	  palm	  oil,	  and	  finally	  the	  Royal	  Naval	  
seizing	  vessels	  and	  drawing	  attention	  to	  potential	  abuses.	  However,	  being	  aware	  of	  	  the	  
movement	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  on	  its	  own	  
to	  provoke	  anti-­‐slavery	  outrage,	  to	  understand	  why	  this	  developed	  we	  must	  continue	  
to	  follow	  Cresswell’s	  politics	  of	  mobility	  and	  explore	  how	  the	  movement	  of	  these	  goods	  
was	  understood	  and	  the	  social	  significance	  attached	  to	  their	  mobility.	  
Inappropriate	  Movements	  and	  Guilty	  Knowledge	  
The	  shift	  towards	  a	  geography	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  focused	  on	  West	  Africa	  was	  
entirely	  tied	  up	  in	  naval	  suppression	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast.	  This	  was	  true	  in	  two	  
ways,	  both	  from	  a	  practical	  perspective	  as	  it	  was	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  that	  
sparked	  a	  wider	  inquiry,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  way	  the	  issue	  was	  represented.	  This	  section	  
explores	  how	  the	  undercurrents	  of	  concern	  over	  the	  role	  of	  British	  manufactures	  being	  
moved	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  were	  given	  expression	  by	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  and	  Robert	  
Heddell	  cases.	  The	  response	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  to	  the	  issues	  reveals	  that	  the	  
perception	  of	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  Britain’s	  moral	  standing	  was	  maintained.	  I	  will	  
also	  explore	  how	  the	  attention	  paid	  to	  these	  cases	  allowed	  figures	  such	  as	  R.	  R.	  Madden	  
and	  several	  naval	  captains	  to	  propose	  radical	  measures	  that	  would	  limit	  the	  mobility	  of	  
British	  manufactures	  and	  greatly	  extend	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  British	  subjects	  for	  
slavery.	  	  
Concern	  at	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  goods	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  cannot	  be	  separated	  
from	  the	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  naval	  suppression,	  a	  process	  that	  required	  the	  
cooperation	  of	  other	  states.	  This	  had	  been	  the	  case	  throughout	  the	  1830s	  when	  
Palmerston	  had	  sought	  extra	  information	  on	  supplying	  of	  slave	  traders	  in	  Cuba	  and	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Brazil,	  the	  same	  concerns	  would	  rear	  their	  head	  once	  again	  with	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  Dos	  
Amigos.	  Henry	  Macaulay	  and	  Colonel	  Doherty	  of	  the	  Mixed	  Commission	  Court	  at	  Sierra	  
Leone	  stated	  in	  their	  letter	  informing	  Lord	  Palmerston	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos’s	  seizure:	  
[W]e	  can	  hardly	  complain	  of	  the	  conduct	  of	  Spain	  in	  this	  respect,	  if	  we	  
hesitate	  to	  require	  from	  our	  own	  authorities	  on	  this	  coast	  a	  strict	  search	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  equipment	  of	  every	  foreign	  vessel.77	  
The	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  relied	  on	  the	  interruption	  of	  the	  mobility	  of	  slaving	  
vessels.	  If	  British	  subjects	  were	  free	  to	  deal	  directly	  with	  slave	  traders,	  then	  this	  whole	  
process	  was	  undermined.	  Both	  Lord	  Palmerston	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  and	  Lord	  John	  
Russell,	  the	  Colonial	  Secretary,	  were	  well	  aware	  that	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  
weakened	  British	  attempts	  to	  secure	  suppression	  treaties	  with	  other	  nations.	  The	  
seizure	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  appeared	  to	  provide	  the	  perfect	  opportunity	  to	  make	  an	  
example	  of	  those	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Cape	  Coast	  was	  a	  British	  possession,	  and	  
what	  is	  more	  the	  perpetrator	  James	  Thomson	  was	  clearly	  identified	  by	  the	  papers	  
found	  on	  board	  the	  Dos	  Amigos.	  This	  was	  firmer	  evidence	  than	  the	  accusations	  levelled	  
in	  David	  Turnbull’s	  Travels	  in	  the	  West.	  Upon	  learning	  of	  the	  case	  Colonial	  Secretary	  
Lord	  John	  Russell	  moved	  swiftly	  to	  call	  for	  Thomson’s	  arrest.	  78	  Support	  for	  this	  move	  
came	  not	  only	  from	  the	  Colonial	  and	  Foreign	  Office	  but	  also	  from	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  
Lord	  Melbourne.	  The	  Treasury	  expressed	  Melbourne’s	  wish	  that	  steps	  would	  be	  taken	  
for	  ‘the	  future	  prevention	  of	  any	  similar	  connivance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  residents	  in	  the	  
British	  settlements	  on	  the	  Coast	  of	  Africa	  with	  persons	  engaged	  in	  carrying	  on	  the	  slave	  
trade'.79	  However,	  these	  calls	  were	  to	  fall	  upon	  deaf	  ears.	  To	  understand	  why	  the	  Dos	  
Amigos	  case	  spiralled	  into	  a	  wider	  controversy	  we	  must	  explore	  the	  grounds	  for	  this	  
refusal,	  and	  how	  it	  was	  received	  within	  the	  metropole.	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  H.	  W.	  Macaulay,	  Col.	  Doherty	  to	  Palmerston,	  31	  Jan	  1839,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐155.	  
78	  Russell	  to	  G.	  Maclean,	  28	  Sep	  1839,	  TNA:	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  W.	  Fox-­‐Strangeways	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105	  
	  
Lord	  John	  Russell	  was	  informed	  of	  the	  refusal	  to	  prosecute	  Thomson	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  
Captain	  MacLean,	  governor	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  forts,	  which	  aimed	  to	  placate	  the	  Colonial	  
Office	  and	  ensure	  the	  issue	  was	  quickly	  forgotten.	  This	  backfired	  spectacularly.	  In	  
defending	  Thomson	  Maclean	  stated	  ‘I	  have	  never	  seen	  a	  Spanish,	  Brazilian	  or	  
Portuguese	  vessel	  on	  this	  coast	  (and	  I	  have	  seen	  hundreds)	  that	  was	  not	  so	  engaged’.80	  
MacLean,	  like	  the	  merchants	  who	  would	  appear	  before	  the	  select	  committee,	  was	  
attempting	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  quotidian	  nature	  of	  such	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  that	  
were	  simply	  the	  price	  of	  doing	  business	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast.	  However,	  the	  actual	  
effect	  of	  this	  admission	  was	  to	  reorient	  the	  focus	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  concern.	  It	  was	  now	  
West	  Africa	  where	  British	  manufactures	  moved	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  it	  was	  the	  
government’s	  responsibility	  to	  disrupt	  this	  mobility.	  This	  refusal	  to	  prosecute	  was	  also	  
justified	  in	  terms	  of	  ignorance	  with	  the	  council	  of	  merchants,	  including	  Thomson,	  who	  
ran	  Cape	  Coast	  claiming	  they	  had	  been	  unaware	  of	  any	  obligation	  not	  to	  deal	  with	  slave	  
trading	  vessels.81	  These	  objections	  however	  were	  met	  with	  a	  frosty	  reception	  at	  the	  
Colonial	  Office,	  and	  as	  G.	  E.	  Metcalfe	  has	  noted	  this	  only	  hardened	  the	  resolve	  to	  
investigate	  what	  had	  occurred	  on	  the	  coast.82	  	  
The	  reaction	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  to	  this	  refusal	  reveals	  how	  the	  decision	  to	  further	  
investigate	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  forts	  was	  rooted	  not	  only	  in	  a	  commitment	  to	  suppression	  
but	  also	  scepticism	  of	  government	  by	  commercial	  men.	  The	  Gold	  Coast	  forts	  whilst	  
British	  properties	  were	  not	  governed	  by	  the	  Crown,	  but	  rather	  by	  the	  merchants	  who	  
resided	  there.	  This	  had	  been	  the	  arrangement	  since	  1828	  when	  Britain	  had	  abandoned	  
control	  of	  the	  forts	  after	  period	  of	  prolonged	  warfare	  in	  the	  region.	  In	  the	  intervening	  
years	  Captain	  George	  MacLean	  had	  restored	  peace	  and	  stability.83	  However,	  the	  refusal	  
to	  arrest	  Thomson	  and	  admission	  of	  dealing	  with	  slave	  traders	  raised	  the	  question	  of	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  G.	  MacLean	  to	  Russell,	  27	  Jan	  1840,	  TNA:	  CO	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81	  Cape	  Coast	  Council	  Minutes,	  12	  Nov	  1839	  in	  G.	  MacLean	  to	  Russell,	  27	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82	  Metcalfe,	  MacLean	  of	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  Gold	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  248.	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whether	  this	  stability	  was	  built	  upon	  nefarious	  means.	  As	  G.	  R.	  Searle	  has	  argued	  many	  
Victorians	  were	  sceptical	  of	  the	  moral	  effect	  of	  unfettered	  commercial	  activity.	  One	  of	  
the	  areas	  were	  government	  could	  rightfully	  interfere	  in	  the	  economy	  was	  if	  commerce	  
was	  viewed	  as	  ‘nefarious’,	  and	  an	  association	  with	  slavery	  was	  often	  the	  qualification	  
for	  such	  a	  description.84	  	  Throughout	  the	  long	  correspondence	  between	  the	  Colonial	  
Office,	  MacLean,	  and	  the	  committee	  of	  merchants	  who	  represented	  the	  forts	  in	  London,	  
the	  scepticism	  of	  colonial	  officials	  is	  abundantly	  clear.	  Robert	  Vernon	  Smith	  and	  James	  
Stephen	  handled	  most	  of	  the	  correspondence	  and	  were	  critical	  of	  the	  merchant’s	  claims	  
at	  every	  turn.	  For	  example	  Vernon	  Smith	  questioned	  whether	  the	  increase	  in	  imports	  
to	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  was	  due	  to	  an	  increase	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.85	  This	  scepticism	  
may	  well	  have	  been	  rooted	  in	  what	  Alan	  Lester	  has	  identified	  as	  a	  humanitarian	  
governmentality,	  where	  figures	  such	  as	  Stephen	  promoted	  ‘a	  divinely	  inspired,	  just	  and	  
stable	  order	  of	  government	  within	  the	  colonial	  space’	  in	  which	  dealings	  with	  slave	  
traders	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  wholly	  illegitimate.86	  An	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐
slavery	  clearly	  framed	  how	  information	  about	  the	  Gold	  Cost	  forts	  was	  interpreted	  and	  
for	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  merchant	  rule	  appeared	  grubby	  and	  dishonest,	  something	  
clearly	  had	  to	  be	  done.	  
Before	  taking	  action	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  had	  to	  garner	  more	  information	  and	  confirm	  
whether	  suspicions	  of	  widespread	  dealing	  with	  slave	  traders	  were	  correct.	  Russell	  
decided	  a	  commissioner	  for	  inquiry	  would	  gather	  this	  information	  and	  the	  man	  he	  
appointed	  to	  the	  role	  was	  a	  striking	  choice.	  Richard	  Robert	  Madden	  was	  an	  ardent	  
abolitionist	  and	  vocal	  critic	  of	  the	  employment	  of	  British	  capital	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  An	  
Irish	  Catholic,	  Madden	  had	  spoken	  out	  publicly	  on	  the	  issue	  in	  a	  speech	  to	  America-­‐
bound	  Irish	  emigrants,	  as	  well	  as	  attending	  the	  1840	  convention.87	  Whilst	  Metcalfe	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  Smith	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attributes	  Madden’s	  appointment	  to	  the	  connections	  he	  had	  forged	  through	  his	  literary	  
career	  it	  seems	  more	  likely	  his	  experiences	  in	  Cuba	  were	  of	  greater	  import.88	  Serving	  as	  
commissioner	  for	  liberated	  Africans	  on	  the	  Mixed	  Commission	  Court	  in	  Cuba,	  Madden	  
had	  railed	  against	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  had	  been	  drawn	  into	  
conflicts	  with	  colleagues	  over	  the	  issue.89.	  In	  many	  ways	  then,	  although	  the	  controversy	  
over	  British	  manufactures	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  would	  centre	  on	  West	  Africa	  it	  was	  very	  
much	  forged	  in	  Cuba.	  It	  was	  Madden’s	  time	  on	  the	  island	  that	  informed	  his	  views	  of	  
supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
Lord	  John	  Russell’s	  instructions	  to	  Madden	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  trip	  to	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  
was	  intended	  to	  procure	  evidence	  of	  wrongdoing	  by	  the	  merchants,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  check	  
up	  on	  the	  state	  of	  things	  in	  Britain’s	  other	  African	  properties	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  the	  
Gambia.	  The	  Colonial	  Secretary	  expected	  that	  ‘these	  inquiries	  will	  occupy	  your	  time	  
and	  attention	  for	  nearly	  a	  year.’90	  On	  this	  front	  Russell	  would	  be	  disappointed	  as	  
Madden	  spent	  only	  three	  months	  on	  the	  coast	  often	  bed-­‐ridden	  with	  the	  illnesses	  that	  
confronted	  so	  many	  European	  visitors	  to	  Africa.91	  However,	  this	  short	  time	  was	  enough	  
for	  Madden	  to	  return	  with	  myriad	  tales	  of	  dealings	  with	  slave	  traders.	  He	  believed	  the	  
practice	  to	  be	  rife	  not	  only	  at	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  forts,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  Gambia.	  Even	  in	  Sierra	  
Leone	  British	  subjects	  moved	  goods	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  slavers	  as	  vessels	  and	  equipment	  
seized	  by	  the	  naval	  squadron	  were	  auctioned	  off	  only	  to	  be	  purchased	  by	  the	  agents	  of	  
slave	  traders.92	  The	  Colonial	  and	  Foreign	  Offices	  had	  been	  informed	  of	  such	  instances	  
in	  the	  past,	  but	  Madden	  was	  particularly	  keen	  to	  name	  and	  shame	  perpetrators.	  
Perhaps,	  the	  most	  useful	  aspect	  of	  Madden’s	  inquiry	  was	  how	  his	  presence	  on	  the	  coast	  
facilitated	  Captain	  Tucker’s	  encounter	  with	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  as	  it	  was	  Madden	  who	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  ‘Richard	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  His	  Career	  as	  a	  Slavery	  Abolitionist’,	  Studies:	  An	  Irish	  
Quarterly	  Review,	  61:241	  (1972),	  pp.	  41-­‐53.	  
90	  Russell	  to	  Madden,	  26	  Nov	  1840,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐170.	  
91	  Metcalfe,	  MacLean	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  p.	  261.	  
92	  D.	  Ryder	  1st	  E.	  Harrowby.	  Report	  from	  the	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  West	  Coast	  of	  Africa	  
together	  with	  the	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence,	  Appendix	  and	  Index,	  Part-­‐II	  -­‐	  Appendix	  and	  Index	  
(hereafter	  WCA),	  PP,	  551-­‐II	  (1842),	  p.	  253.	  
108	  
	  
informed	  Tucker	  of	  the	  vessel	  having	  traded	  with	  de	  Souza.93	  Combined	  with	  Madden’s	  
report	  this	  provided	  confirmation	  to	  Colonial	  Office	  suspicions	  that	  British	  
manufactures	  were	  being	  utilised	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  a	  basis	  for	  taking	  further	  
action.	  	  
The	  Robert	  Heddell	  case	  offered	  a	  second	  opportunity	  for	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  to	  institute	  
legal	  proceedings	  and	  make	  an	  example	  of	  British	  merchants	  undermining	  
suppression.	  Having	  failed	  to	  secure	  the	  prosecution	  of	  Thomson	  Russell	  was	  keen	  to	  
make	  sure	  that	  the	  ‘most	  effective	  measures	  in	  his	  power’	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  ‘remedy	  
the	  abuses’.94	  The	  Colonial	  Office	  wrote	  to	  the	  government’s	  solicitors	  looking	  to	  bring	  
about	  legal	  action,	  but	  was	  keen	  that	  ‘no	  further	  publicity’	  be	  given	  to	  the	  case.95	  This	  
was	  most	  likely	  because	  Matthew	  Forster,	  the	  vessel’s	  owner,	  was	  a	  prominent	  figure	  
who	  served	  as	  the	  MP	  for	  Berwick.	  His	  prosecution	  would	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  value	  in	  
demonstrating	  the	  folly	  of	  supplying	  slave	  traders,	  but	  would	  be	  very	  embarrassing	  if	  it	  
publicly	  fell	  apart.	  	  
The	  desire	  to	  prosecute	  Forster	  bears	  further	  consideration	  as	  it	  speaks	  to	  an	  
expansive	  view	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  that	  was	  held	  not	  only	  by	  radical	  abolitionists	  
such	  as	  Madden,	  but	  also	  important	  government	  officials.	  Captain	  Tucker,	  who	  boarded	  
the	  vessel,	  noted	  in	  his	  report	  to	  the	  admiralty	  that	  ‘the	  owners	  were	  more	  to	  be	  
blamed	  than	  the	  master,	  they	  having	  consigned	  goods	  to	  the	  notorious	  slave	  dealer	  de	  
Souza.’96	  It	  was	  those	  who	  orchestrated	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  to	  slave	  traders	  who	  
were	  at	  fault	  rather	  than	  captains	  themselves	  who	  were	  following	  orders.	  James	  
Stephen	  in	  offering	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  case	  to	  the	  new	  Colonial	  Secretary	  Lord	  Stanley	  
in	  September	  of	  1842	  stated	  a	  similar	  opinion:	  ‘A	  man	  who	  should	  sell	  crow	  bars	  and	  
other	  instruments	  of	  housebreaking	  to	  a	  notorious	  burglar,	  is	  presumably	  guilty	  of	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  20	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accessory	  to	  burglary.’97	  The	  official	  mind	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  suppression	  clearly	  
thought	  that	  British	  merchants	  should	  be	  liable	  for	  how	  the	  goods	  they	  used	  were	  sold,	  
particularly	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  where	  the	  goods	  constituted	  slaving	  
equipment.	  As	  such	  we	  must	  reconsider	  Marika	  Sherwood’s	  hagiographic	  portrait	  of	  
Madden	  as	  a	  lone	  voice	  speaking	  out	  against	  British	  involvement	  in	  slaving.98	  Similarly,	  
one	  must	  not	  be	  fooled	  by	  the	  Colonial	  Office’s	  later	  attempts	  to	  characterise	  the	  
Irishman	  as	  a	  loose	  cannon	  whose	  role	  in	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  case	  overstepped	  the	  
mark.99	  Rather,	  Madden’s	  views	  on	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  chimed	  with	  broader	  
thought	  on	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities.	  Their	  novelty	  lay	  in	  their	  vehemence	  
and	  the	  logical	  extension	  of	  this	  view	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  encapsulate	  all	  links	  to	  
the	  slave	  trade,	  no	  matter	  how	  indirect.	  	  
The	  Colonial	  Office’s	  attempts	  to	  bring	  legal	  action	  against	  Forster	  would	  be	  thwarted	  
by	  a	  consideration	  that	  plagued	  any	  attempt	  to	  outlaw	  indirect	  links	  to	  slavery,	  the	  
need	  for	  evidence.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  had	  clearly	  traded	  with	  de	  
Souza	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  goods	  on	  the	  vessel	  had	  been	  consigned	  to	  him	  attorney	  
general	  Frederick	  Pollock	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  convict.	  
This	  rather	  conservative	  legal	  opinion	  rested	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  
‘guilty	  knowledge’	  on	  Forster’s	  part.100	  As	  Eltis	  notes	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  person	  to	  
have	  ‘knowingly	  and	  willingly’	  assisted	  a	  slave	  trader	  was	  a	  massive	  stumbling	  block	  
for	  officials	  who	  looked	  to	  curb	  the	  practice	  of	  supplying	  slave	  traders.101	  It	  would	  
appear	  that	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  men	  such	  as	  Pollock	  the	  only	  firm	  evidence	  of	  ‘guilty	  
knowledge’	  would	  be	  written	  evidence	  where	  British	  merchants	  acknowledged	  slaving	  
intentions	  of	  customers.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  some	  British	  merchants,	  fallaciously,	  
refused	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  had	  any	  idea	  who	  they	  were	  trading	  with	  on	  the	  West	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African	  coast.	  To	  prove	  otherwise	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  say	  the	  least.	  This	  rejection	  of	  
legal	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  my	  next	  chapter.	  
The	  seeming	  inability	  to	  take	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  likes	  of	  Matthew	  Forster	  did	  not	  
entirely	  deter	  those	  invested	  in	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  In	  fact,	  several	  
strategies	  were	  put	  forward	  that	  might	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  British	  goods	  moving	  
into	  the	  slave	  trade,	  many	  of	  which	  focused	  on	  restricting	  the	  mobility	  of	  British	  
merchants.	  For	  Madden	  the	  fault	  lay	  in	  part	  with	  the	  1824	  law	  and	  one	  of	  his	  principle	  
recommendations	  was:	  
[A]	  new	  law	  to	  prevent	  British	  subjects	  in	  any	  settlements	  abroad,	  British	  
or	  foreign,	  from	  holding,	  hiring,	  buying,	  or	  selling	  slaves,	  or	  pawns;	  from	  
suffering	  vessels	  equipped	  for	  the	  slave	  trade	  to	  anchor	  in	  the	  parts,	  to	  be	  
supplied	  with	  provisions	  of	  merchandize;	  from	  selling	  goods	  at	  foreign	  
slave	  trade	  factories	  to	  notorious	  slave	  dealers.102	  
This	  would	  explicitly	  outlaw	  all	  the	  practices	  Madden	  had	  observed	  on	  the	  West	  
African	  coast.	  He	  was	  also	  keen	  that	  ‘[t]his	  Act	  should	  be	  freed	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  
from	  the	  jargon	  of	  the	  law.’103	  James	  Stephen	  was	  similarly	  critical	  of	  the	  1824	  Act	  
stating	  in	  a	  Colonial	  Office	  memo	  that	  ‘Words	  have	  thus	  been	  accumulated	  in	  this	  
statute	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  as	  to	  render	  it	  incomprehensible.’104	  Eltis	  attributes	  the	  
refusal	  to	  redraft	  the	  bill	  to	  Victorian	  respect	  for	  free	  and	  civilizing	  commerce.105	  As	  we	  
shall	  see	  in	  chapter	  three	  there	  is	  something	  to	  this	  theory,	  though	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  
complicated	  as	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  clearly	  viewed	  much	  of	  the	  commerce	  in	  West	  Africa	  
as	  somewhat	  dubious.	  Rather,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  practicalities	  of	  such	  a	  wide-­‐
ranging	  proposal	  as	  Madden’s	  were	  likely	  seen	  as	  insurmountable,	  and	  there	  was	  also	  a	  
desire	  for	  some	  leeway	  in	  dealing	  with	  West	  Africans.	  Ultimately,	  James	  Stephen	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concluded	  that	  changing	  the	  law	  was	  unnecessary.	  A	  trained	  lawyer,	  he	  argued	  that	  
because	  the	  Act	  did	  outlaw	  commerce	  such	  as	  that	  conducted	  by	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  all	  
that	  was	  required	  was	  a	  ‘diligent	  and	  a	  practised	  reader	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  parliament	  to	  
perceive	  it.’106	  
More	  interesting	  than	  abortive	  suggestions	  of	  new	  laws	  were	  the	  attempts	  to	  reshape	  
what	  constituted	  evidence	  and	  a	  guilty	  knowledge.	  A	  clear	  theme	  in	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  
case	  was	  that	  the	  notoriety	  of	  de	  Souza	  as	  a	  slave	  trader	  was	  proof	  enough	  of	  intentions	  
to	  supply	  the	  slave	  trade.	  This	  was	  a	  constant	  in	  the	  opinions	  expressed	  by	  Tucker,	  
Madden	  and	  Stephen.	  This	  belief	  in	  particular	  informed	  Tucker’s	  actions	  as	  he	  boarded	  
the	  Robert	  Heddell	  where	  he	  made	  the	  vessel’s	  skipper	  sign	  the	  following	  declaration:	  
I	  hereby	  solemnly	  promise	  that	  I	  will	  not	  carry	  or	  convey	  or	  cause	  to	  be	  
carried	  or	  conveyed,	  nor	  in	  any	  way	  assist	  in	  the	  conveyance	  of	  any	  cargo	  
or	  cargoes,	  goods,	  or	  merchandises,	  nor	  furnish	  any	  goods	  or	  merchandises	  
consigned	  to	  be	  carried	  or	  conveyed	  to	  Mr.	  de	  Souza	  […]	  or	  to	  any	  other	  
slave	  merchants	  &	  factors	  at	  Whydah,	  or	  any	  slave	  trading	  place	  on	  the	  
Western	  Coast	  of	  Africa;	  that	  I	  will	  […]	  wind	  up	  any	  mercantile	  transactions	  
there	  with	  de	  Souza	  so	  soon	  as	  possible	  and	  I	  will	  not	  in	  any	  way	  trade	  
their	  again	  until	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  government	  law	  officers	  has	  been	  
obtained.107	  
Upon	  learning	  of	  this	  an	  apoplectic	  Forster	  would	  denounce	  the	  oath	  as	  illegal	  and	  
‘arbitrary’.108	  In	  many	  ways	  he	  was	  right,	  Tucker’s	  oath	  was	  an	  extraordinary	  
document.	  In	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  manner	  he	  had	  set	  out	  exactly	  where	  British	  goods	  should	  not	  
go	  and	  who	  they	  could	  not	  be	  traded	  with.	  If	  goods	  were	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  hands	  of	  
de	  Souza	  or	  the	  port	  of	  Whydah	  then	  they	  must	  be	  intended	  for	  slaving.	  Eltis	  has	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argued	  that	  a	  clear	  tension	  existed	  between	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  
Victorian	  respect	  for	  law	  and	  property.109	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  suppressionist	  cause	  
British	  commerce	  could	  be	  constrained	  and	  channelled	  away	  from	  the	  areas	  where	  it	  
was	  seen	  to	  do	  harm.	  
Tucker’s	  oath	  was	  of	  course	  highly	  informal	  and	  it	  is	  far	  from	  certain	  that	  it	  had	  any	  
effect	  on	  the	  trading	  of	  Forster	  &	  Smith	  once	  the	  Robert	  Heddell	  was	  released.	  However,	  
the	  reference	  to	  the	  law	  officers	  clearly	  indicated	  that	  Tucker	  hoped	  his	  opinion	  would	  
be	  enshrined	  in	  law.	  For	  this	  to	  happen	  the	  literal	  movement	  of	  ships	  to	  sites	  of	  slave	  
trading	  would	  have	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  guilty	  knowledge.	  Cresswell	  in	  setting	  
out	  his	  politics	  of	  mobility	  discusses	  how	  movement	  is	  often	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  
appropriate	  and	  inappropriate	  rhythms.	  Drawing	  on	  Lefebrve	  he	  argues	  that	  certain	  
patterns	  of	  movement	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  suspicious	  or	  retrograde.110	  Men	  like	  Tucker,	  
Stephen	  and	  Madden	  in	  discussing	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  set	  about	  defining	  
inappropriate	  rhythms,	  making	  note	  of	  the	  sites	  were	  it	  would	  be	  suspect	  for	  British	  
ships	  and	  goods	  to	  pass	  through.	  This	  was	  the	  same	  work	  done	  by	  Turnbull’s	  Travels	  in	  
the	  West	  only	  now	  the	  focus	  was	  shifted	  to	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  
Where	  exactly	  where	  these	  moorings	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  through	  which	  British	  
merchants	  should	  not	  pass?	  One	  of	  course	  was	  Whydah,	  home	  to	  the	  notorious	  de	  
Souza	  and	  described	  by	  Madden	  as	  a	  ‘great	  slave	  place.’111	  Alongside	  this	  was	  the	  
Gallinas	  River	  near	  the	  Gambia,	  which	  was	  home	  to	  many	  slave	  factories.	  The	  
representation	  of	  these	  areas	  as	  sites	  of	  slave	  trading	  was	  mostly	  achieved	  through	  the	  
testimony	  of	  naval	  officers	  such	  as	  Captain	  Tucker	  and	  Captain	  Denman	  at	  the	  1842	  
select	  committee.	  Key	  to	  this	  representation	  was	  the	  idea	  that	  no	  legitimate	  commerce	  
in	  palm	  oil	  existed	  in	  these	  places,	  and	  therefore	  any	  British	  presence	  there	  was	  
suspect.	  Denman	  for	  example	  claimed	  that	  the	  commerce	  between	  Gambia	  and	  Bissao	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Eltis,	  Economic	  Growth,	  pp.	  103-­‐122.	  
110	  Cresswell,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Politics	  of	  Mobility’,	  p.	  24.	  
111	  WCA,	  PP,	  551-­‐II,	  p.	  10.	  
113	  
	  
was	  ‘not	  very	  beneficial	  trade,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  trade	  with	  the	  natives	  at	  all;	  it	  is	  
a	  trade	  between	  the	  slave	  dealer	  and	  the	  British	  merchants.’112	  Denman	  particularly	  
viewed	  trade	  on	  the	  Gallinas	  as	  worrying	  and	  echoed	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  
when	  he	  stated	  that	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  suppression	  made	  her	  ‘bound	  to	  prevent	  
such	  a	  direct	  system	  of	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  the	  slave	  trade.’113	  These	  representations,	  
as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  were	  contested,	  but	  what	  is	  important	  though	  
is	  they	  were	  a	  key	  part	  of	  the	  attempt	  to	  redefine	  evidence	  of	  complicity	  in	  terms	  of	  
mobility	  and	  geography	  rather	  than	  what	  was	  written	  on	  paper.	  
The	  geography	  of	  suppression	  was	  not	  only	  constructed	  through	  words,	  but	  also	  
through	  actions.	  Incursions	  by	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  onto	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  were	  
common	  in	  the	  late	  1830s	  and	  1840s	  and	  they	  represented	  physical	  marking	  of	  certain	  
sites	  as	  off	  limits.	  Captain	  William	  Blount	  for	  example	  had	  gone	  ashore	  in	  the	  Gallinas	  
and	  burnt	  down	  slave	  trading	  factories.114	  As	  Law	  notes	  this	  demonstrated	  a	  worrying	  
disregard	  for	  African	  sovereignty	  and	  foreshadowed	  later	  anti-­‐slavery	  imperialism	  on	  
Britain’s	  part.115	  Such	  actions	  designated	  certain	  areas	  as	  sites	  of	  slave	  trading	  which	  
were	  open	  to	  attack,	  and	  also	  in	  a	  very	  real	  way	  limited	  the	  mobility	  of	  British	  
merchants.	  This	  was	  most	  clear	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Thomas	  Hutton,	  son	  of	  the	  London	  
merchant	  William,	  who	  had	  attempted	  to	  establish	  a	  factory	  trading	  palm	  oil	  at	  
Whydah	  only	  for	  it	  to	  be	  destroyed	  in	  a	  naval	  bombardment	  of	  1841.116	  Whilst	  
merchants	  and	  parliamentarians	  did	  challenge	  these	  actions,	  they	  helped	  solidify	  the	  
view	  of	  certain	  sites	  as	  slaving	  areas	  and	  rendered	  British	  travel	  there	  suspicious.	  
These	  attempts	  to	  redefine	  evidence	  in	  terms	  of	  mobility	  and	  geography	  were	  put	  to	  
the	  test	  by	  a	  court	  case	  that	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  1842	  select	  committee.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	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the	  hearings	  a	  number	  of	  witnesses	  pointed	  the	  finger	  at	  the	  London	  based	  shipping	  
agent	  Zulueta	  &	  Co.	  as	  having	  ‘abetted	  the	  slave	  trade	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  by	  acting	  
as	  agents	  for	  slave	  dealers.’117	  This	  was	  the	  opinion	  expressed	  by	  Captain	  Hill	  of	  the	  
naval	  suppression	  squadron,	  and	  echoed	  by	  Henry	  Macaulay,	  judge	  at	  the	  Sierra	  Leone	  
mixed	  commission	  court.	  The	  specific	  case	  discussed	  was	  the	  seizure	  of	  a	  vessel,	  The	  
Augusta,	  captained	  by	  an	  Englishman	  and	  believed	  to	  be	  owned	  by	  Zulueta	  &	  Co.	  The	  
vessel	  had	  travelled	  to	  the	  Gallinas	  with	  goods	  consigned	  to	  factors	  on	  the	  coast	  that	  
were	  known	  slave	  traders.	  Letters	  referencing	  the	  slave	  trade	  were	  discovered	  on	  
board.	  Zulueta	  &	  Co.	  was	  also	  held	  to	  have	  a	  commercial	  relationship	  with	  Pedro	  
Blanco	  and	  Pedro	  Martinez,	  prominent	  Havannah	  slave	  traders.118	  Pedro	  de	  Zulueta	  jr.,	  
a	  partner	  in	  the	  firm,	  would	  appear	  before	  the	  committee	  to	  meet	  these	  charges.	  He	  
admitted	  to	  shipping	  goods	  to	  West	  Africa	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  Martinez,	  but	  he	  maintained	  
he	  had	  no	  knowledge	  of	  how	  they	  would	  be	  used.119	  The	  select	  committee	  ultimately	  
appeared	  satisfied	  by	  this	  claim,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  prove	  the	  end	  of	  the	  affair.	  Following	  
the	  publication	  of	  the	  select	  committee’s	  report	  George	  Stephen	  would	  bring	  a	  private	  
prosecution	  against	  Pedro	  de	  Zulueta,	  utilising	  his	  evidence	  before	  the	  committee	  as	  
proof	  of	  guilty	  knowledge.	  It	  was	  within	  this	  trial	  that	  these	  attempts	  to	  redefine	  
evidence	  were	  put	  to	  the	  test.	  
The	  trial	  of	  Pedro	  de	  Zulueta	  revolved	  a	  great	  deal	  around	  what	  constituted	  admissible	  
evidence	  and	  Zulueta’s	  lawyers	  succeeded	  in	  having	  many	  items	  excluded.	  A	  prime	  
example	  of	  this	  were	  the	  letters	  referring	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  which,	  it	  was	  successfully	  
argued,	  Zulueta	  could	  not	  have	  known.120	  Somewhat	  stymied	  by	  this	  development	  the	  
prosecution,	  led	  by	  Serjeant	  Bompas,	  attempted	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  all	  trade	  to	  the	  
Gallinas	  was	  illegal	  in	  nature.	  To	  do	  so	  he	  called	  on	  witnesses	  such	  as	  Captain	  Hill	  who	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had	  been	  responsible	  for	  seizing	  the	  vessel.	  In	  his	  evidence	  he	  said	  that	  if	  goods	  were	  
sent	  to	  the	  Gallinas	  ‘I	  doubt	  it	  was	  for	  a	  legal	  purpose,	  because	  no	  produce	  was	  given	  in	  
exchange	  for	  it.’121	  Captain	  Denman	  would	  appear	  and	  further	  corroborate	  these	  claims	  
saying	  no	  produce,	  meaning	  palm	  oil,	  was	  ever	  exported	  from	  the	  Gallinas.	  Zulueta’s	  
defence	  did	  attempt	  to	  counter	  these	  claims	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  only	  ‘the	  gentleman	  on	  
the	  spot’	  in	  Africa	  would	  possess	  such	  knowledge.122	  There	  was	  a	  clear	  attempt	  to	  
construct	  travel	  to	  the	  Gallinas	  as	  inherently	  suspicious.	  The	  prosecution	  also	  pointed	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  the	  Augusta	  had	  been	  damaged	  by	  a	  storm	  rather	  than	  sailing	  to	  
the	  nearby	  port	  of	  Cork	  it	  travelled	  to	  Cadiz,	  home	  to	  an	  associate	  of	  Pedro	  Martinez.123	  
This	  was	  represented	  as	  an	  irregular,	  and	  therefore	  troubling,	  mobility.	  In	  a	  long	  
summing	  up	  of	  the	  case	  the	  presiding	  judge,	  Justice	  Maule,	  suggested	  that	  he	  at	  least	  
had	  been	  convinced	  that	  the	  Augusta	  was	  involved	  in	  slave	  trading,	  and	  that	  Zulueta	  
knew	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  matters	  connected	  to	  the	  vessel.	  All	  the	  jury	  had	  to	  decide	  was	  
whether	  this	  constituted	  a	  guilty	  knowledge.124	  Zulueta	  was	  found	  not	  guilty,	  providing	  
a	  firm	  rebuff	  to	  attempts	  to	  redefine	  the	  nature	  of	  evidence.	  
Whilst	  attempts	  to	  limit	  the	  mobility	  of	  British	  merchants,	  capital	  and	  manufactures	  
failed	  to	  be	  enshrined	  in	  law	  there	  was	  some	  evidence	  of	  merchants	  taking	  the	  step	  
themselves.	  During	  the	  select	  committee	  hearings	  a	  number	  of	  owners	  of	  merchant	  
houses	  came	  forward	  and	  claimed	  that	  they	  explicitly	  instructed	  the	  captains	  of	  their	  
vessels	  not	  to	  deal	  with	  slave	  traders.	  One	  company,	  Laurie,	  Hamilton	  &	  Co.,	  claimed	  to	  
have	  ‘severely	  remonstrated’	  with	  a	  supercargo	  John	  Courtland	  who	  had	  been	  accused	  
of	  dealing	  with	  de	  Souza	  and	  another	  prominent	  slave	  trader	  Theodore	  Canot.125	  
Having	  seen	  similar	  accusations	  levelled	  against	  his	  own	  vessels	  William	  Hutton,	  of	  the	  
Gold	  Coast	  Committee,	  wrote	  to	  Lord	  Stanley	  protesting	  that	  he	  instructed	  all	  captains	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not	  to	  deal	  with	  slave	  traders.126	  Appearing	  before	  the	  select	  committee	  Hutton	  
presented	  the	  instructions	  given	  to	  one	  of	  his	  captains	  in	  March	  of	  1840,	  they	  read:	  
‘You	  are	  fully	  aware	  that	  having	  any	  communications	  with	  the	  slave	  trade	  or	  slave	  
traders	  is	  against	  the	  laws	  of	  England.’127	  The	  full	  instructions	  bear	  a	  striking	  similarity	  
to	  Tucker’s	  oath,	  but	  they	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  scrutiny.	  Hutton	  asserted	  
that	  once	  he	  passed	  on	  such	  instructions	  he	  had	  totally	  divested	  himself	  of	  any	  moral	  
responsibility	  and	  as	  such	  had	  little	  control	  over	  whether	  his	  goods	  made	  their	  way	  to	  
slave	  traders.	  As	  he	  said	  when	  cases	  of	  trading	  in	  the	  Gallinas	  were	  raised	  ‘we	  cannot	  
always	  be	  responsible	  for	  what	  masters	  do.’128	  Captains’	  instructions	  might	  be	  best	  
understood	  as	  somewhat	  cynical	  attempt	  to	  pass	  moral	  responsibility	  onto	  the	  
supercargoes	  of	  vessels.	  However,	  this	  belied	  the	  realities	  of	  West	  African	  commerce,	  
which	  required	  the	  extension	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  economic	  responsibility	  and	  trust	  to	  
such	  individuals.129	  At	  the	  very	  least	  captains’	  instructions	  spoke	  to	  an	  acceptance	  that	  
some	  branches	  of	  the	  trade	  were	  off	  limits	  and	  to	  be	  discouraged,	  even	  if	  they	  held	  little	  
to	  no	  legal	  weight.	  	  
A	  more	  official	  restriction	  on	  mobility	  was	  the	  suggestion	  put	  forward	  to	  deal	  with	  
seized	  vessels	  and	  equipment	  being	  sold	  into	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Madden	  had	  identified	  a	  
number	  of	  individuals	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  engaged	  in	  this	  practice,	  and	  it	  was	  one	  that	  was	  
particularly	  troubling	  as	  the	  British	  government	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  auction	  of	  
vessels.130	  The	  suppression	  treaty	  with	  Portugal	  required	  the	  auctioning	  of	  these	  
vessels	  and	  equipment,	  Spanish	  vessels	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  could	  be	  broken	  up.131	  One	  
solution	  suggested	  by	  Henry	  Macaulay	  was	  that	  purchasers	  from	  auctions	  should	  have	  
to	  take	  out	  a	  bond	  that	  they	  would	  not	  sell	  the	  vessel	  or	  equipment	  on	  to	  slave	  traders.	  
Whilst	  Macaulay	  noted	  that	  this	  bond	  could	  not	  extend	  beyond	  the	  first	  purchaser	  it	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might	  at	  least	  complicate	  slave-­‐trading	  ventures	  by	  increasing	  risk	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  
capital	  that	  slavers	  had	  to	  invest.132	  Some	  questions	  were	  raised	  over	  the	  practicality	  
and	  legality	  of	  such	  an	  arrangement.	  When	  pressed	  former	  naval	  officer	  William	  
Hamilton	  said	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  government	  had	  any	  right	  to	  restrict	  who	  people	  
traded	  with.133	  Despite	  these	  objections	  the	  proposed	  bond	  system	  represented	  
another	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  that	  looked	  to	  limit,	  and	  
interrupt,	  the	  mobility	  of	  merchants	  and	  the	  goods	  they	  sold.	  
The	  fallout	  from	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos,	  and	  related	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  Robert	  
Heddell	  and	  Augusta,	  make	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  a	  willingness	  among	  some	  to	  extend	  
moral	  responsibility	  to	  those	  who	  supplied	  slave	  traders.	  In	  attempting	  to	  curb	  these	  
practices	  government	  officials,	  anti-­‐slavery	  activists	  and	  naval	  officers	  focused	  on	  a	  
politics	  of	  mobility.	  They	  advanced	  a	  view	  of	  evidence	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  movement	  
through	  sites	  of	  slavery	  and	  proposed	  measures	  such	  as	  bonds	  and	  oaths	  aimed	  at	  
limiting	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  merchants.	  Whilst	  these	  measures	  were	  not	  always	  
successful	  they	  do	  clearly	  demonstrate	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  government	  to	  interfere	  
with	  commercial	  activities	  if	  they	  were	  seen	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  commitment	  to	  ending	  
the	  slave	  trade.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  official	  mind	  an	  idea	  of	  appropriate	  mobilities	  of	  
British	  merchants	  had	  begun	  to	  develop	  and	  that	  could	  indeed	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  their	  
behaviour.	  This	  was	  evident	  not	  only	  in	  the	  captain’s	  instructions	  provided	  by	  some	  
merchant	  houses	  but	  also	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Mr.	  Herring	  a	  merchant	  who	  decided	  to	  
abandon	  his	  trade	  to	  the	  Gallinas	  after	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  could	  not	  guarantee	  his	  
safety	  from	  prosecution	  for	  trading	  there.134	  Even	  without	  legal	  force	  the	  debates	  over	  
the	  movements	  of	  British	  manufactures	  into	  the	  slave	  trade	  clearly	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  
influence	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  West	  Africa.	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According	  to	  Christopher	  Brown	  there	  are	  certain	  criteria	  that	  have	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  
an	  ‘antislavery	  movement’	  to	  occur.	  These	  are	  that	  an	  issue	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  
morally	  wrong;	  it	  must	  attain	  a	  degree	  of	  political	  resonance;	  there	  must	  be	  solutions	  
and	  means	  for	  addressing	  the	  problem,	  and	  finally	  it	  must	  attract	  the	  committed	  action	  
of	  groups	  and	  individuals.135	  Brown	  was	  of	  course	  discussing	  the	  emergence	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  a	  political	  movement,	  but	  I	  believe	  this	  chapter	  had	  demonstrated	  
that	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degree	  concern	  at	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  fulfilled	  these	  
criteria.	  	  
	  Few,	  if	  any,	  could	  justify	  profiting	  from	  slavery	  in	  the	  abstract.	  The	  popularity	  of	  the	  
abolitionist	  cause	  was	  at	  its	  peak	  in	  the	  years	  directly	  following	  the	  end	  of	  
apprenticeship	  and	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  slave	  trade	  suppression	  meant	  that	  many	  
within	  government	  were	  deeply	  interested	  in	  the	  issue.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  shift	  in	  
perspective	  from	  Latin	  America	  to	  West	  Africa	  also	  allowed	  practical	  solutions	  to	  the	  
problem	  to	  be	  aired.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  mobility	  politics	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  
abolitionists,	  civil	  servants	  and	  naval	  officers	  offered	  suggestions	  on	  how	  to	  stop	  
British	  goods	  and	  capital	  making	  reaching	  the	  hands	  of	  slave	  traders.	  Within	  British	  
economic	  culture	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  British	  goods	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  slave	  
traders	  could	  be	  represented	  as	  either	  deeply	  troubling	  or	  unproblematic.	  At	  the	  same	  
time	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  West	  African	  littoral	  were	  represented	  as	  inappropriate	  sites	  
for	  British	  trade.	  However,	  this	  explicitly	  spatialised	  view	  of	  complicity	  with	  slavery	  
could	  only	  emerge	  when	  abolitionists	  and	  colonial	  officials	  received	  material	  evidence	  
of	  trade	  with	  slavers.	  
Yet,	  the	  various	  strategies	  designed	  to	  the	  deal	  with	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  often	  
faced	  objections	  or	  practical	  difficulties.	  The	  biggest	  of	  course	  was	  proving	  ‘guilty	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knowledge’	  on	  the	  part	  of	  merchants.	  To	  get	  around	  this	  issue	  abolitionists	  and	  
government	  officials	  attempted	  to	  define	  where	  British	  merchants	  could,	  and	  could	  not,	  
go	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  and	  whom	  exactly	  they	  could	  trade	  with.	  Whilst	  
abolitionists	  like	  Madden	  wanted	  this	  enshrined	  in	  law	  for	  government	  officials	  
limiting	  trade	  could	  prove	  extremely	  problematic.	  A	  quick	  return	  to	  the	  
correspondence	  between	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  and	  Captain	  MacLean	  will	  demonstrate	  
why.	  	  
Following	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  MacLean	  became	  particularly	  keen	  to	  ensure	  
that	  he	  did	  not	  attract	  any	  further	  criticism	  from	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  and	  as	  such	  took	  
steps	  to	  ensure	  the	  scandal	  would	  not	  be	  repeated.	  This	  included	  issuing	  a	  
proclamation	  but	  also	  refusing	  to	  allow	  vessels	  he	  deemed	  suspicious	  to	  dock	  at	  Cape	  
Coast.	  This	  amounted	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  all	  Spanish,	  Portuguese	  and	  Brazilian	  vessels	  
from	  trading	  on	  the	  Gold	  Coast.136	  However,	  this	  outcome	  was	  seen	  as	  far	  from	  
desirable	  by	  James	  Stephen	  at	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  who	  commented	  that	  perhaps,	  the	  
merchants	  were	  ‘moving	  too	  far	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.’137	  Unlike	  Madden	  most	  
critics	  did	  not	  want	  to	  hermetically	  seal	  Britain	  from	  all	  connection	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
Rather,	  the	  likes	  of	  Stephen,	  Russell	  and	  various	  naval	  commanders	  wanted	  to	  
eliminate	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  nefarious	  commerce,	  whilst	  keeping	  up	  the	  profitable	  and	  
beneficial	  trade	  that	  took	  place	  in	  West	  Africa.	  The	  outrage	  generated	  over	  supplying	  
the	  slave	  trade	  could	  lead	  to	  political	  inquiry	  and	  proposals	  for	  limits	  on	  merchant	  
activity,	  but	  outside	  of	  the	  most	  blatant	  cases	  it	  could	  not	  easily	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  
what	  should	  and	  should	  not	  be	  illegal.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  select	  
committee	  of	  1842,	  and	  various	  other	  controversies,	  sought	  to	  draw	  this	  line	  and	  how	  
metropolitan	  figures	  struggled	  to	  resolve	  the	  contradictions	  between	  Britain’s	  
commitments	  to	  commerce	  and	  anti-­‐slavery.
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Chapter	  III:	  Ambivalent	  Commerce:	  Merchants,	  Character,	  and	  Anti-­‐
Slavery	  
In	  late	  October	  of	  1843	  Pedro	  de	  Zulueta	  jr.	  stood	  trial	  for	  the	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  of	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  The	  young	  Spaniard	  represented	  a	  London	  shipping	  agent,	  Zulueta	  &	  Co,	  
who	  had	  been	  accused	  of	  supplying	  a	  vessel,	  the	  Augusta,	  intended	  for	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
Determined	  to	  prove	  his	  innocence	  and	  vindicate	  his	  firm	  Zulueta	  confidently	  rejected	  
the	  offer	  of	  a	  jury	  half	  composed	  of	  foreign	  nationals,	  a	  quirk	  of	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
English	  legal	  system.	  ‘I	  am	  quite	  well	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Englishmen	  as	  anyone	  else’,	  he	  
told	  the	  court.1	  Yet,	  Zulueta	  may	  have	  sat	  somewhat	  nervously	  as	  the	  trial	  came	  to	  a	  
close.	  In	  summing	  up	  Justice	  Maule,	  the	  presiding	  judge,	  had	  chastised	  Zulueta	  for	  a	  
poor	  defence	  as	  well	  as	  instructing	  the	  jury	  that	  the	  Augusta	  had	  clearly	  been	  intended	  
for	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  only	  question	  that	  remained	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  Zulueta	  had	  
been	  aware	  of	  this	  fact.2	  Hanging	  over	  the	  merchant’s	  head	  was	  the	  threat	  of	  
transportation,	  a	  somewhat	  poetic	  fate	  for	  an	  accused	  slave	  trader.	  Zulueta	  was	  spared	  
this	  fate.	  The	  jury’s	  verdict	  read	  ‘Not	  Guilty’	  and	  a	  ‘shout	  of	  applause	  burst	  from	  all	  
parts	  of	  the	  court,	  which	  continued	  for	  upwards	  of	  a	  minute	  without	  any	  interruption,	  
it	  being	  evidently	  dictated	  by	  an	  almost	  irrepressible	  enthusiasm.’3	  	  
The	  shouts	  and	  cheers	  that	  met	  the	  Zulueta	  verdict	  may	  well	  have	  represented	  a	  wider	  
sense	  of	  relief	  for	  London’s	  merchant	  community.	  Certainly,	  several	  merchants	  and	  
bankers	  had	  been	  called	  forth	  to	  defend	  Pedro	  Zulueta’s	  character	  over	  the	  course	  of	  
the	  court	  proceedings.	  Zulueta	  himself	  would	  publish	  the	  trial’s	  proceedings	  casting	  
himself	  as	  part-­‐victim,	  part-­‐prophet	  and	  warning	  that	  prosecutions	  like	  his	  would	  be	  
the	  end	  of	  British	  commerce	  should	  they	  be	  allowed	  to	  happen	  again.4	  Zulueta’s	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  The	  Morning	  Post,	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  The	  Morning	  Post,	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  de	  Zulueta	  Jr.,	  Trial	  of	  Pedro	  de	  Zulueta	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‘Address	  to	  the	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  of	  Britain’	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
wider	  effort	  by	  capitalists	  to	  defend	  their	  commercial	  activity	  in	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  
Merchants	  relied	  upon	  appeals	  to	  economic	  rationality	  combined	  with	  an	  explicit	  
rejection	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  foreign	  commercial	  partners,	  effectively	  
limiting	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  within	  Britain’s	  borders.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  such	  
defences	  of	  British	  commerce	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  argues	  that	  debates	  over	  supplying	  the	  
slave	  trade	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  struggle	  to	  define	  the	  boundaries	  of	  acceptable	  
economic	  behaviour.	  	  
The	  British	  government’s	  failure	  to	  secure	  a	  prosecution	  of	  merchants	  involved	  in	  the	  
slave	  trade	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  British	  faith	  in	  a	  laissez	  faire	  approach	  to	  the	  
economy.5	  However,	  as	  David	  Eltis	  has	  argued	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  by	  its	  
very	  nature	  required	  a	  questioning	  of	  these	  principles,	  particularly	  respect	  for	  
property	  by	  British	  officials	  and	  naval	  officers	  in	  slave	  societies.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  
‘ambivalence	  of	  suppression’,	  as	  Eltis	  terms	  it,	  laissez-­‐faire	  ideas	  on	  their	  own	  fail	  to	  
explain	  the	  success	  of	  British	  capitalists	  in	  avoiding	  serious	  government	  censure.6	  
Similarly,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  a	  hard-­‐line	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  symbolised	  by	  the	  
likes	  of	  R.	  R.	  Madden	  and	  David	  Turnbull	  was	  impractical	  and	  economically	  irrational	  
has	  to	  be	  problematized.7	  Defences	  of	  commercial	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  rested	  on	  the	  
ability	  of	  merchants	  to	  provide	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  why	  attempts	  at	  regulation	  would	  
have	  negative	  economic	  consequences.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  Pedro	  Zulueta’s	  apocalyptic	  
predictions	  for	  the	  future	  of	  British	  trade	  were	  common	  to	  all	  merchants	  who	  stood	  
accused	  of	  dealing	  with	  slave	  traders.	  As	  with	  debates	  over	  the	  slave	  trade	  prior	  to	  
1807	  such	  arguments	  depended	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  trade	  merchants	  were	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engaging	  in	  was	  beneficial	  to	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.8	  If	  then,	  as	  Eltis	  has	  also	  argued,	  the	  
British	  government’s	  belief	  in	  the	  civilizing	  benefits	  of	  commerce	  prevented	  the	  
government	  from	  censuring	  merchants	  then	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  British	  
capitalists	  successfully	  represented	  their	  economic	  activity	  as	  legitimate.9	  This	  chapter	  
then	  offers	  an	  insight	  to	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  British	  economic	  culture	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  
role	  of	  ideas	  such	  as	  civilization	  in	  underpinning	  appeals	  to	  economic	  rationality,	  and	  
how	  these	  ideas	  were	  often	  expressed	  in	  spatial	  terms.	  
Defining	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	  economic	  activity	  was	  a	  constant	  concern	  for	  Victorian	  
politicians,	  government	  officials	  and	  capitalists	  themselves.	  G.	  R.	  Searle	  has	  argued	  that	  
for	  many	  Victorians	  traffic	  in	  human	  beings	  and	  any	  connection	  to	  it	  became	  the	  
dividing	  line	  between	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable	  profit,	  or	  as	  Searle	  put	  it	  ‘legitimate’	  
and	  ‘nefarious	  commerce’.10	  This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  complicate	  this	  view	  by	  examining	  
how	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  were	  able	  to	  defend	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  and	  
reconcile	  them	  within	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  defence	  of	  Britain’s	  
commercial	  community	  and	  the	  various	  levels	  on	  which	  it	  operated.	  Specifically	  it	  will	  
focus	  on	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  commerce	  and	  slavery	  in	  West	  Africa,	  Cuba,	  and	  
Brazil.	  Historians	  interested	  in	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  West	  Africa,	  Cuba	  or	  Brazil	  have	  
previously	  dealt	  with	  slave	  trade	  controversies	  individually.	  It	  has	  been	  less	  common	  
to	  draw	  together	  these	  various	  case	  studies	  in	  hope	  of	  finding	  wider	  themes.	  This	  
chapter	  seeks	  to	  remedy	  this	  omission.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  merchants	  were	  unanimous	  in	  
their	  rejection	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  economic	  partners.	  In	  doing	  so	  
men	  like	  Zulueta	  and	  Matthew	  Forster	  not	  only	  asserted	  the	  strict	  legality	  of	  their	  
trade,	  but	  they	  also	  projected	  an	  image	  of	  respectability.	  Personal	  reputation	  or	  
“character”	  was	  understood	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  social	  capital	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
and	  merchants	  were	  determined	  to	  avoid	  damage	  to	  their	  social	  standing	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Swaminathan,	  Debating	  the	  Slave	  Trade,	  pp.	  157-­‐158.	  
9	  Eltis,	  Economic	  Growth,	  p.	  84.	  
10	  Searle,	  Morality	  and	  the	  Market,	  p.	  63,	  p.76.	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accusations	  of	  commercial	  intercourse	  with	  man-­‐stealers.11	  This	  distancing	  and	  
rejection	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  was	  key	  to	  merchant	  claims	  to	  legitimate	  commerce.	  
This	  chapter	  also	  investigates	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  process-­‐based	  trust	  
through	  with	  transatlantic	  commerce	  functioned,	  and	  the	  public	  reputation	  of	  
merchants	  within	  Victorian	  Britain.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  it	  was	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  subjects	  and	  
commodities	  that	  allowed	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  to	  function.	  Similarly,	  critics’	  
attempts	  to	  curtail	  this	  practice	  looked	  to	  stem	  these	  flows	  by	  restricting	  the	  physical	  
movement	  of	  British	  subjects	  and	  the	  goods	  they	  traded.	  Recognition	  of	  these	  criminal	  
mobilities	  required	  the	  imagination	  of	  a	  specific	  Atlantic	  geography	  where	  the	  
movement	  of	  goods	  through	  certain	  sites	  and	  spaces	  was	  suspicious.	  This	  
representation	  was	  far	  from	  uncontested.	  Merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  confronted	  
abolitionists	  and	  officials	  with	  a	  staunch	  defence	  that	  was	  similarly	  shaped	  by	  political	  
and	  physical	  geographies.	  As	  such	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  split	  into	  two	  sections.	  Firstly,	  I	  
will	  explore	  how	  merchants	  operating	  in	  Britain’s	  West	  African	  possessions	  responded	  
to	  critiques	  and	  proposed	  reforms	  during	  an	  1842	  Select	  Committee.	  At	  issue	  here	  was	  
not	  only	  whether	  Britons	  materially	  contributed	  to	  the	  slave	  trade,	  but	  also	  whether	  
their	  commercial	  activity	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  Colonial	  Office’s	  humanitarian	  designs	  
for	  West	  Africa.	  Section	  two	  addresses	  debates	  outside	  the	  borders	  of	  empire.	  I	  explore	  
how	  government	  attempts	  to	  moralise	  British	  commerce	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  through	  
the	  appointment	  of	  abolitionist	  consuls	  or	  attempted	  prosecutions	  met	  firm	  resistance	  
from	  merchants.	  Ultimately,	  British	  merchants	  operating	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  
Empire	  succeeded	  in	  gaining	  recognition	  of	  their	  claims	  to	  be	  champions	  of	  legitimate	  
and	  civilizing	  commerce.	  	  
Civilization	  and	  the	  West	  African	  Consumer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Finn,	  Character	  of	  Credit,	  p.	  20..	  For	  the	  particular	  importance	  of	  reputation	  to	  merchants	  see	  
S.	  Haggerty,	  Merely	  for	  Money?:	  Business	  Culture	  in	  the	  British	  Atlantic,	  1750-­‐1815	  (Liverpool:	  
Liverpool	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  pp.	  101-­‐130.	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British	  possessions	  in	  West	  Africa	  were	  key	  sites	  in	  the	  war	  of	  representation	  over	  
British	  commerce	  and	  the	  slave	  trade.	  This	  is	  unsurprising	  given	  that,	  as	  explained	  in	  
the	  previous	  chapter,	  physical	  evidence	  of	  British	  dealing	  with	  slave	  traders	  could	  be	  
most	  easily	  uncovered	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast.	  The	  cases	  of	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  and	  
Robert	  Heddle	  were	  among	  the	  most	  publicised	  instances	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
Whilst	  neither	  of	  these	  cases	  resulted	  in	  prosecution,	  they	  combined	  to	  spark	  a	  wider	  
debate	  over	  the	  role	  British	  commerce	  played	  in	  Africa.	  This	  debate	  would	  play	  out	  
across	  a	  number	  of	  different	  arenas	  from	  official	  correspondence,	  to	  parliament	  and	  
the	  press.	  Arguably	  the	  most	  important	  arena	  was	  the	  1842	  select	  committee	  on	  the	  
West	  Coast	  of	  Africa,	  prompted	  by	  R.	  R.	  Madden’s	  accusatory	  report.	  This	  section	  of	  the	  
chapter	  explores	  this	  debate	  over	  British	  commerce	  in	  West	  Africa	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  
merchants	  were	  fit	  to	  govern	  British	  possessions	  there.	  Key	  to	  these	  debates	  was	  the	  
perception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  commercial	  activity	  and	  British	  designs	  for	  
civilizing	  Africa.	  West	  African	  merchants	  ultimately	  succeeded	  in	  winning	  a	  begrudging	  
acceptance	  of	  their	  claim	  that	  trade	  of	  any	  kind	  advanced	  the	  cause	  of	  civilization	  and	  
anti-­‐slavery	  on	  the	  coast.	  	  
The	  summer	  of	  1841	  was	  a	  period	  of	  great	  political	  upheaval	  in	  Britain	  as	  a	  general	  
election	  saw	  Viscount	  Melbourne’s	  Whig	  ministry	  replaced	  by	  Robert	  Peel’s	  Tories.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  one	  Melbourne’s	  government	  was	  a	  casualty	  of	  the	  clash	  over	  free	  
trade,	  anti-­‐slavery,	  and	  the	  sugar	  duties.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  concerns	  were	  of	  clear	  
importance	  in	  Westminster,	  and	  away	  from	  the	  parliamentary	  spotlight	  another	  
scandal	  was	  taking	  shape.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  was	  
contemplating	  their	  next	  steps	  in	  both	  the	  Dos	  Amigos	  and	  Robert	  Heddle	  cases.	  Having	  
read	  Madden’s	  report	  and	  following	  a	  long	  correspondence	  with	  merchants	  and	  naval	  
officers	  Lord	  John	  Russell	  composed	  a	  memo	  to	  advise	  his	  successor	  of	  his	  opinions	  on	  
the	  controversy.	  Among	  the	  issues	  addressed	  in	  this	  memo	  was	  Russell’s	  concern	  that	  ‘I	  
fear	  the	  spirit	  of	  commerce	  has	  superseded	  the	  spirit	  of	  humanity	  in	  our	  mercantile	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government	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast'.12	  This	  fear	  was	  grounded	  not	  only	  in	  the	  specific	  
problem	  of	  Britons	  profiting	  from	  slavery,	  but	  also	  in	  a	  wider	  concern	  with	  that	  morally	  
correct	  behaviour	  and	  profit	  seeking	  might	  be	  at	  odds.	  This	  was	  not	  an	  unfamiliar	  
concern	  with	  regard	  to	  Britain’s	  African	  possessions;	  the	  1830s	  had	  witnessed	  debates	  
over	  British	  government	  in	  the	  Cape	  Colony	  and	  which	  economic	  practices	  could	  be	  
considered	  legitimate	  in	  terms	  of	  land	  acquisition.13	  In	  Britain’s	  West	  African	  
possessions	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  threatened	  the	  aim	  of	  
promoting	  Christianity	  and	  so-­‐called	  civilization.	  
Russell’s	  memo	  to	  Stanley	  conveyed	  a	  concern	  held	  within	  the	  Whig	  ministry	  of	  the	  
early	  1840s	  that	  representatives	  of	  the	  British	  government,	  whether	  merchants	  or	  
colonial	  officials,	  had	  duties	  that	  transcended	  the	  simple	  accumulation	  of	  capital.	  
Russell’s	  concern	  about	  government	  on	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  related	  not	  only	  to	  supplying	  of	  
the	  slave	  trade,	  but	  also	  to	  disturbing	  reports	  of	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  domestic	  
slavery	  and	  pawnage	  in	  and	  around	  the	  forts.	  These	  matters	  had	  been	  exposed	  by	  
Madden’s	  report	  on	  Britain’s	  West	  African	  possessions,	  which	  had	  revealed	  that	  British	  
subjects	  in	  and	  around	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  forts	  still	  possessed	  slaves.	  In	  one	  particularly	  
troubling	  incident	  Mr.	  Hanson,	  a	  British	  subject	  resident	  at	  James	  Fort	  near	  Accra,	  had	  
possessed	  around	  300	  slaves	  who	  upon	  his	  death	  Captain	  MacLean	  had	  sold	  off	  to	  pay	  
debts	  owned	  by	  Hanson’s	  estate.14	  Pawnage	  was	  a	  form	  of	  debt	  bondage	  practiced	  on	  
the	  Gold	  Coast	  that	  many	  metropolitan	  observers,	  including	  Madden,	  viewed	  as	  
indistinguishable	  from	  slavery.15	  Whilst	  slavery	  in	  West	  Africa	  was	  perceived	  as	  more	  
benign	  than	  that	  which	  had	  existed	  in	  the	  British	  Caribbean	  the	  thought	  of	  any	  renewal	  
of	  British	  slaveholding	  was	  still	  extremely	  troubling.	  Madden’s	  sojourn	  in	  West	  Africa	  
coincided	  with	  an	  attempt	  by	  John	  Jeremie,	  governor	  of	  Sierra	  Leone,	  to	  ensure	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Memorandum	  of	  Russell	  to	  Stanley,	  26	  Aug	  1841,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐170.	  
13	  Lester,	  Imperial	  Networks,	  p.	  107.	  
14	  Metcalfe,	  MacLean	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  p.	  259.	  
15	  For	  Pawnship	  see	  Lovejoy,	  Transformations	  in	  Slavery,	  pp.	  115-­‐122.	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emancipation	  of	  slaves	  and	  pawns	  by	  promulgating	  the	  Emancipation	  Act	  of	  1833.	  
Jeremie	  wished	  to	  protect	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  committed	  abolitionist	  and	  he	  aimed	  to	  
undercut	  claims	  by	  British	  subjects	  in	  Africa	  that	  they	  were	  unaware	  that	  emancipation	  
applied	  to	  them.16	  Ultimately,	  Jeremie’s	  proclamation	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  enforce	  as	  
the	  line	  between	  who	  was,	  and	  was	  not,	  a	  British	  subject	  on	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  was	  far	  
from	  clear.17	  What	  was	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  merchants	  had	  seen	  the	  issue	  of	  pawnage	  as	  
unproblematic,	  a	  fact	  that	  added	  weight	  to	  Colonial	  Office	  concerns.	  
It	  was	  not	  only	  in	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  that	  concerns	  were	  raised	  about	  the	  damaging	  effect	  
of	  mercantile	  influence	  on	  Britain’s	  campaign	  against	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  Gambia	  was	  
singled	  out	  by	  Madden	  both	  in	  his	  reports	  and	  private	  correspondence	  as	  a	  place	  where	  
‘[t]he	  opinion	  is	  sung	  into	  the	  ears	  of	  the	  governors	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  commerce	  is	  
the	  sole	  aim	  and	  end	  of	  colonial	  governance.’18	  Madden	  appeared	  to	  hold	  Gambia’s	  
governor,	  Sir	  Henry	  Vere	  Huntley,	  in	  particular	  contempt	  casting	  him	  as	  a	  racist	  who	  
acted	  as	  little	  more	  than	  an	  agent	  for	  firms	  like	  Forster	  &	  Smith.19	  Madden	  levelled	  
similar	  accusations	  against	  Captain	  MacLean,	  but	  he	  appeared	  particularly	  offended	  by	  
Huntley’s	  low	  opinion	  of	  Africans.20	  This	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising,	  as	  Madden	  had	  
worked	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  apprentices	  in	  Jamaica	  and	  as	  commissioner	  for	  
liberated	  Africans	  in	  Cuba.21	  Madden	  saw	  himself	  in	  sharp	  relief	  to	  Huntley	  who	  he	  
claimed	  was	  ‘strongly	  prejudiced’	  against	  liberated	  Africans	  in	  Gambia	  and	  that	  they	  
were	  ‘associated	  in	  his	  mind	  with	  everything	  that	  is	  base,	  barbarous	  and	  besotted.’22	  
This	  construction	  of	  Huntley	  as	  a	  racist	  beholden	  to	  commercial	  interests	  is	  striking,	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  A.	  Franklin,	  ‘Jeremie,	  Sir	  John	  (1795-­‐1841)’,	  ODNB	  	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.liverpool.idm.oclc.org/view/article/14773,	  accessed	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  2016]	  
17	  Metcalfe,	  Maclean	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  p.	  283.	  
18	  R.	  R.	  Madden	  to	  E.	  Howard,	  4	  Aug	  1841,	  TNA:	  CO	  267-­‐170.	  
19	  Ibid.	  
20	  WCA,	  PP,	  551-­‐I,	  p.	  599.	  
21	  Murray,	  ‘Richard	  Robert	  Madden’,	  pp.	  42-­‐48.	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  R.	  R.	  Madden	  to	  E.	  Howard,	  4	  Aug	  1841,	  TNA:	  CO	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it	  was	  these	  exact	  characteristics	  that	  Madden	  defined	  himself	  against	  throughout	  his	  
‘imperial	  career’	  across	  multiple	  colonies.23	  
Madden’s	  attack	  on	  Huntley	  deserves	  further	  consideration	  as	  it	  reveals	  a	  particular	  
conception	  of	  what	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  Africa	  and	  Africans	  should	  be.	  Whilst	  
Madden	  chastised	  Huntley	  for	  racial	  prejudice,	  the	  abolitionist’s	  own	  reports	  embraced	  
representations	  of	  Africans	  as	  backward.	  In	  fact,	  Madden	  commented	  in	  his	  official	  
report	  on	  the	  Gambia	  that	  '[w]e	  are	  very	  loth	  [sic]	  in	  our	  colonies	  to	  meddle	  with	  the	  
habits	  and	  prejudices	  of	  the	  natives,	  however	  opposed	  to	  humanity	  or	  favourable	  to	  
superstition,	  when	  pecuniary	  or	  mercantile	  interests	  are	  not	  affected	  by	  their	  
barbarity'.24	  In	  this	  representation	  of	  colonialism	  its	  role	  was	  to	  improve	  the	  
indigenous	  populations	  through	  education	  and	  prohibition	  of	  “backward”	  practices.	  
Madden’s	  perspective	  fit	  within	  what	  Alan	  Lester	  and	  Fae	  Dussart	  have	  identified	  as	  a	  
colonial	  humanitarian	  register	  that	  placed	  Europeans	  at	  one	  end	  of	  a	  civilizational	  
spectrum	  and	  Africans	  in	  need	  of	  help	  at	  the	  other.25	  This	  perspective	  reflected	  Lord	  
John	  Russell’s	  concern	  with	  the	  persistence	  of	  slavery	  and	  pawnage	  on	  the	  Gold	  Coast.	  
For	  Madden,	  Huntley’s	  racism	  toward	  liberated	  Africans	  and	  his	  failure	  to	  instruct	  the	  
local	  population	  of	  Gambia	  were	  tied	  up	  in	  his	  being	  beholden	  to	  the	  merchants.	  	  
The	  concerns	  aired	  about	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  and	  the	  Gambia	  identifies	  these	  places	  as	  sites	  
of	  particular	  anxiety	  for	  abolitionists	  and	  the	  British	  government.	  The	  problem	  of	  
supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  only	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  fear	  that	  the	  Britain’s	  
representatives	  in	  West	  Africa	  were	  ignoring	  their	  paternalistic	  duties	  as	  envisioned	  by	  
metropolitan	  humanitarians.	  Philip	  Curtin	  has	  highlighted	  the	  ‘cultural	  chauvinism’	  
that	  saw	  missionaries	  reporting	  on	  Africa	  attribute	  perceived	  misery	  there	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  D.	  Lambert,	  A.	  Lester	  ,‘Imperial	  spaces,	  Imperial	  Subjects’,	  in	  D.	  Lambert,	  A.	  Lester,	  (eds),	  
Colonial	  Lives	  Across	  the	  British	  Empire:	  Imperial	  Careering	  in	  the	  Long	  Nineteenth	  Century,	  .	  
24	  WCA,	  PP,	  551-­‐II,	  p.	  30.	  
25	  A.	  Lester,	  F.	  Dussart,	  Colonization	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Humanitarian	  Governance	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  p.3.	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Christianity	  or	  western	  practices.26	  If	  Britain’s	  goal	  was	  to	  bring	  civilization	  and	  
Christianity	  to	  West	  Africa	  then	  this	  process	  could	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  greed	  of	  the	  
mercantile	  community.	  As	  Searle	  notes,	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  saw	  something	  of	  
a	  struggle	  to	  reconcile	  Christianity	  and	  the	  profit	  motive	  where	  ultimately	  the	  
‘acquisition	  of	  wealth	  was	  deemed	  eminently	  desirable,	  provided	  it	  was	  subsequently	  
put	  to	  “good”	  uses	  and	  not	  coveted	  for	  its	  own	  sake.’27	  The	  representation	  of	  merchant	  
government	  in	  Gambia	  and	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  gave	  articulation	  to	  these	  concerns.	  
Bronwen	  Everill	  has	  argued	  that	  many	  Britons	  saw	  “Civilization,	  Commerce	  and	  
Christianity”	  as	  interrelated	  tools	  that	  could	  be	  employed	  to	  end	  the	  slave	  trade,	  but	  in	  
the	  early	  1840s	  government	  officials	  and	  abolitionists	  believed	  this	  relationship	  was	  
breaking	  down.28	  This	  was	  pithily	  captured	  by	  Madden’s	  claim	  that	  in	  Britain’s	  African	  
possessions	  ‘[c]ommerce	  and	  civilization	  have	  not	  kept	  pace,	  or	  indeed	  preserved	  any	  
terms	  of	  companionship	  together.’29	  Merchants	  dealing	  with	  slave	  traders	  and	  
tolerating	  practices	  such	  as	  pawning	  appeared	  to	  be	  abandoning	  the	  civilizing	  mission	  
in	  pursuit	  of	  profit.	  It	  was	  this	  accusation	  that	  merchants	  had	  to	  meet	  at	  the	  1842	  select	  
committee.	  
The	  1842	  select	  committee	  on	  West	  Africa	  grew	  out	  of	  another	  committee	  on	  the	  
British	  Caribbean	  earlier	  that	  year,	  which	  had	  concluded	  that	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  
labour	  crisis	  in	  the	  West	  Indies	  might	  be	  solved	  by	  West	  African	  emigration.30	  The	  
hearings,	  which	  stretched	  over	  three	  months,	  then	  provided	  the	  perfect	  opportunity	  for	  
merchants	  to	  answer	  claims	  that	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  coast	  was	  pernicious.	  This	  
opportunity	  was	  seized	  with	  both	  hands,	  particularly	  as	  Matthew	  Forster	  both	  sat	  on	  
the	  select	  committee	  and	  appeared	  as	  a	  witness	  before	  it.	  Unsurprisingly	  R.	  R.	  Madden	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Curtin,	  Image	  of	  Africa,	  p.	  327.	  
27	  Searle,	  Morality	  and	  the	  Market,	  p.	  25.	  
28	  B.	  Everill,	  Abolition	  and	  Empire	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Liberia	  (London:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  
2012),	  p.	  9.	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  R.	  R.	  Madden	  to	  E.	  Howard,	  4	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  WCA,	  PP,	  551-­‐II,	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was	  apoplectic	  that	  Forster	  was	  allowed	  to	  act	  ‘in	  a	  twofold	  capacity,	  as	  a	  judge	  of	  his	  
own	  cause	  and	  a	  witness	  in	  support	  of	  it'.31	  Whilst	  G.	  E.	  Metcalfe	  has	  argued	  that	  
Forster	  did	  not	  unduly	  influence	  the	  select	  committee,	  he	  was	  its	  most	  frequent	  
attendee	  and	  he	  led	  the	  questioning,	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  frame	  British	  commerce	  in	  a	  
positive	  light.32	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  select	  committees	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  
public	  affairs	  as	  evidence	  given	  before	  them	  was	  published;	  witnesses	  did	  have	  a	  
chance	  to	  edit	  their	  testimony	  but	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  correcting	  transcription	  errors.33	  
Both	  witnesses	  and	  questioners	  were	  constrained	  by	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  discourse.	  
Merchants	  could	  not	  argue	  that	  the	  slave	  trade	  itself	  was	  morally	  defensible	  rather	  they	  
had	  to	  represent	  their	  economic	  activity	  as	  working	  to	  its	  detriment.	  Parallels	  can	  be	  
drawn	  to	  Lester’s	  work	  on	  the	  Thomas	  Buxton	  headed	  1835	  select	  committee	  on	  
aborigines	  which	  advocated	  ‘profitable	  economics,	  but	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  particular	  
vision	  of	  justice	  was	  enshrined	  in	  material	  transactions.’34	  Whilst	  Viscount	  Sandon,	  the	  
committee’s	  chairman,	  could	  not	  be	  described	  as	  humanitarian	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
Buxton,	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  profit	  and	  the	  civilizing	  mission	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  both	  the	  
hearings	  and	  subsequent	  report.	  It	  was	  up	  to	  merchants	  such	  as	  Forster	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  their	  trade	  was	  in	  fact	  legitimate	  and	  contributed	  to	  this	  civilizing	  
process.	  
The	  merchants	  who	  appeared	  before	  the	  West	  Africa	  select	  committee	  had	  to	  face	  two	  
criticisms.	  First,	  that	  they	  had	  undermined	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  by	  
supplying	  slavers.	  Second,	  that	  profit	  seeking	  in	  West	  Africa	  was	  having	  a	  morally	  
deleterious	  effect	  on	  the	  local	  population.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  saw	  how	  this	  first	  
accusation	  was	  met	  by	  an	  abdication	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  after	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they	  had	  been	  sold.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  this	  defence	  could	  apply	  across	  a	  number	  of	  
contexts,	  but	  there	  were	  certain	  defences	  invoked	  by	  merchants	  that	  were	  peculiar	  to	  
West	  Africa	  itself.	  A	  key	  claim	  voiced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  merchants	  who	  appeared	  before	  
the	  select	  committee	  was	  that	  they	  provided	  a	  class	  of	  goods	  essentially	  different	  in	  
character	  to	  those	  desired	  by	  slave	  traders.	  Witnesses	  such	  as	  George	  Clavering	  
Redman	  argued	  that	  ‘there	  are	  houses	  in	  Manchester	  that	  make	  no	  other	  goods’	  except	  
those	  fit	  for	  the	  slave	  trade.35	  Abolitionists	  had	  also	  previously	  made	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  
class	  of	  goods	  existed	  especially	  fit	  for	  slave	  trading.	  For	  example,	  at	  the	  1840	  anti-­‐
slavery	  convention	  Richard	  Allen	  had	  claimed	  that	  ‘cotton	  goods	  of	  a	  particular	  fabric’	  
were	  being	  manufactured	  ‘solely	  intended	  for	  being	  used	  in	  barter	  for	  African	  slaves!’36	  
If	  this	  was	  the	  case	  clearly	  manufacturers	  should	  have	  borne	  much	  of	  the	  criticism	  and	  
scrutiny	  being	  aimed	  at	  merchants	  by	  Madden	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Office.	  
Merchants’	  claims	  about	  a	  particular	  quality	  of	  ‘slave	  goods’	  deserve	  further	  scrutiny	  as	  
it	  was	  parroted	  by	  many	  who	  appeared	  before	  the	  select	  committee.	  The	  Manchester	  
textiles	  discussed	  by	  Redman	  were	  generally	  coloured	  and	  patterned	  cloth,	  which	  had	  
displaced	  the	  Indian	  dyed	  textiles	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  central	  to	  British	  trade	  with	  
Africa.37	  The	  claim	  that	  there	  was	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  textile	  suited	  to	  use	  in	  the	  slave	  
trade	  was	  oft	  repeated	  but	  is	  hard	  to	  substantiate.	  A	  rare	  example	  of	  a	  manufacturer	  
commenting	  on	  the	  issue	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Thomas	  Buxton’s	  research	  for	  the	  Niger	  
expedition,	  which	  saw	  him	  consult	  Manchester	  manufacturers	  to	  calculate	  the	  extent	  of	  
the	  slave	  trade.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  letters,	  James	  Aspinall	  Turner,	  a	  Lancashire	  cotton	  
manufacturer	  and	  future	  head	  of	  the	  Manchester	  Commercial	  Association,	  discussed	  
the	  production	  of	  goods	  for	  slave	  trading.	  This	  included	  the	  assertion	  that	  ‘we	  know	  
pretty	  well	  what	  is	  the	  destination	  of	  our	  African	  goods	  from	  their	  being	  very	  different	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in	  style	  and	  quality	  when	  intended	  for	  slave	  trading.’38	  The	  latter	  assertion	  reappeared	  
during	  the	  select	  committee	  hearings.	  For	  example,	  William	  B.	  Sewell,	  Gold	  Coast	  
merchant	  and	  associate	  of	  Forster,	  claimed	  that	  the	  goods	  used	  for	  slaving	  were	  of	  a	  
coarser	  quality	  than	  those	  sold	  by	  British	  merchants.39	  The	  blame	  for	  supplying	  the	  
slave	  trade	  then	  lay	  not	  with	  merchants	  in	  West	  Africa	  but	  with	  the	  manufacturers	  of	  
Manchester	  and	  the	  foreign	  merchants	  who	  peddled	  these	  lesser	  goods.	  
The	  assertion	  that	  slaving	  goods	  were	  of	  inferior	  quality	  appears	  have	  been	  tied	  into	  a	  
moral	  and	  civilizational	  discourse	  that	  surrounded	  consumption	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  
century.	  Catherine	  Hall	  has	  noted	  how	  Birmingham	  prided	  itself	  on	  producing	  goods	  
associated	  with	  civilization	  and	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  life,	  and	  merchants	  in	  West	  Africa	  
made	  similar	  claims	  for	  themselves.40	  For	  example	  when	  select	  committee	  member	  
John	  Wilson-­‐Patten,	  a	  Lancashire	  MP,	  asked	  whether	  the	  colours	  of	  the	  textiles	  were	  
‘[s]o	  gaudy	  that	  no	  civilized	  person	  would	  wear	  them?’,	  George	  Redman	  answered	  in	  
the	  affirmative.41	  The	  implication	  was	  that	  British	  merchants	  traded	  a	  higher	  class	  of	  
product	  with	  a	  higher	  class	  of	  person.	  These	  claims	  could	  even	  justify	  dealing	  directly	  
with	  slave	  traders	  as	  in	  the	  testimony	  of	  Henry	  Dring	  a	  captain	  who	  had	  dealt	  with	  de	  
Souza.	  The	  merchant	  argued	  that	  the	  coastal	  middle	  men	  ‘keep	  almost	  the	  fine	  English	  
goods	  about	  the	  beach	  for	  their	  own	  use,	  and	  they	  send	  the	  coarser	  ones	  up	  for	  
slaves.’42	  However,	  when	  pushed,	  palm	  oil	  merchant	  Thomas	  Midgely	  could	  not	  deny	  
that	  the	  goods	  they	  exported	  might	  potentially	  be	  used	  in	  the	  slave	  trade,	  or	  that	  they	  
were	  in	  any	  way	  more	  suited	  to	  legitimate	  trade	  in	  palm	  oil.43	  It	  seems	  more	  likely	  that	  
different	  styles	  of	  goods	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  cater	  to	  the	  demand	  on	  different	  parts	  of	  
the	  coast.	  The	  term	  ‘slave	  goods’	  can	  perhaps	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  pejorative	  term	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for	  foreign	  trade	  viewed	  that	  was	  as	  represented	  as	  lacking	  the	  civilizing	  properties	  of	  
British	  commerce.	  What	  is	  clear	  though	  is	  that	  British	  commerce	  in	  West	  Africa	  was	  
represented	  as	  meeting	  a	  specific,	  more	  civilized	  type	  of	  demand	  that	  would	  disqualify	  
the	  goods	  exported	  from	  being	  used	  in	  slavery.	  The	  fact	  that	  material	  transactions	  were	  
represented	  in	  such	  a	  way	  is	  evidence	  of	  how	  economic	  activity	  was	  regularly	  
discussed	  in	  moral	  terms.	  
Claims	  about	  ‘slave	  goods’	  were	  implicitly	  linked	  to	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  supposedly	  civilizing	  
benefits	  of	  British	  commerce.	  These	  beliefs	  had	  a	  long	  history	  in	  British	  thinking	  about	  
West	  Africa.	  Christopher	  Brown	  has	  traced	  the	  origins	  of	  legitimate	  commerce	  to	  1751	  
and	  the	  works	  of	  Malachy	  Postlethwayt	  who	  as	  editor	  of	  the	  Universal	  Dictionary	  of	  
Trade	  and	  Commerce	  began	  to	  argue	  for	  diversification	  of	  African	  trade	  based	  upon	  its	  
economic	  potential.44	  The	  idea	  of	  legitimate,	  “civilizational”	  commerce	  therefore	  played	  
a	  role	  in	  British	  debates	  about	  Africa	  decades	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  serious	  
abolitionist	  movement.	  Once	  the	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  movement	  began	  to	  take	  shape	  
Postlethwayt's	  calls	  for	  a	  relationship	  with	  Africa	  based	  on	  trade	  of	  goods	  rather	  than	  
people	  naturally	  attracted	  opponents	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  When	  merchants	  represented	  
themselves	  as	  champions	  of	  legitimate	  commerce	  they	  consciously	  placed	  themselves	  
within	  a	  longer	  anti-­‐slavery	  tradition	  as	  opposed	  to	  Madden's	  representation	  of	  them	  
as	  slave	  trade	  profiteers.	  	  
Of	  all	  the	  merchants	  involved	  in	  the	  select	  committee	  it	  was	  Matthew	  Forster	  who	  had	  
championed	  the	  role	  of	  British	  commerce	  loudest	  and	  longest.	  In	  1838	  he	  invoked	  the	  
civilizing	  benefits	  of	  British	  trade	  in	  a	  dispute	  over	  taxation	  on	  African	  coffee.	  In	  a	  
correspondence	  with	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade,	  later	  published	  in	  The	  Times,	  Forster	  had	  
claimed	  that	  'to	  promote	  the	  industry	  of	  the	  natives	  of	  the	  coast	  of	  Africa	  is	  to	  dry	  up	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the	  stream	  of	  slavery	  at	  its	  source'.45	  As	  such	  high	  import	  duties	  on	  African	  produce	  
were	  represented	  as	  a	  boon	  to	  slave	  traders.	  The	  Times	  would	  return	  to	  this	  theme	  on	  a	  
number	  of	  occasions	  printing	  letters	  from	  the	  pseudonymous	  ‘Potestas’	  during	  the	  
controversy	  over	  the	  Dos	  Amigos.	  These	  letters	  bemoaned	  how	  ‘the	  exertions	  of	  private	  
individuals	  are	  frustrated	  by	  the	  supineness,	  ignorance,	  and	  neglect’	  of	  the	  Colonial	  
Office.46	  These	  letters	  particularly	  poured	  scorn	  on	  Colonial	  Under-­‐Secretary	  James	  
Stephen	  and	  argued	  that	  governmental	  interference	  was	  hampering	  both	  civilization	  
and	  commerce	  in	  West	  Africa.	  Whilst	  we	  cannot	  be	  certain	  that	  Forster	  authored	  these	  
letters,	  they	  certainly	  corresponded	  with	  his	  views.	  
Forster	  and	  other	  merchants	  championing	  legitimate	  commerce	  offered	  a	  different	  
view	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  to	  Madden,	  the	  BFASS,	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Office.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  Madden	  did	  accept	  British	  commerce’s	  role	  in	  improving	  West	  Africa,	  but	  
only	  when	  totally	  insulated	  from	  slavery.	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  recent	  anti-­‐slavery	  
precedent	  for	  utilising	  legitimate	  commerce	  as	  a	  means	  to	  end	  the	  slave	  trade	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  Thomas	  Buxton’s	  Niger	  expedition.	  That	  attempt	  to	  trade	  directly	  with	  the	  
African	  interior	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  eliminating	  the	  slave	  trade	  had	  failed	  spectacularly,	  but	  
it	  worked	  on	  the	  same	  logic	  as	  that	  of	  Forster	  and	  the	  merchants.47	  George	  Clavering	  
Redman	  who	  claimed	  ‘as	  you	  extend	  the	  trade	  you	  extend	  civilization’	  summed	  up	  the	  
central	  contention	  of	  the	  merchants’	  defence.48	  Similarly,	  Buxton	  had	  argued	  that	  in	  
attempting	  to	  tackle	  the	  slave	  trade	  Britain	  should	  shift	  its	  focus	  away	  from	  naval	  
suppression	  to	  'the	  encouragement	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  give	  to	  the	  legitimate	  commerce	  
and	  the	  agricultural	  cultivation	  of	  Africa'.49	  The	  logic	  that	  supported	  these	  assertions	  
reveals	  how	  cultural	  concerns	  helped	  shape	  economic	  rationality.	  Trentmann's	  study	  of	  
the	  Liberal	  electoral	  victory	  of	  1906	  argues	  that	  the	  power	  of	  'free	  trade'	  appeals	  lay	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  The	  Times,	  30	  Aug	  1838.	  
46	  The	  Times,	  29	  Apr	  1840.	  
47	  Temperley,	  White	  Dreams,	  Black	  Africa,	  pp.	  134-­‐138.	  
48	  WCA,	  PP,	  551-­‐I,	  p.	  174	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  Buxton,	  The	  African	  Slave	  Trade	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not	  in	  the	  objective	  ‘logic	  of	  the	  free	  market’	  but	  in	  an	  ideological	  construction	  of	  the	  
consumer.50	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  ideological	  and	  moral	  concerns	  worked	  to	  shape	  
economic	  expectations	  by	  constructing	  an	  ideal	  African	  consumer	  who	  could	  be	  
weaned	  off	  the	  slave	  trade	  by	  legitimate	  commerce.	  This	  combined	  with	  a	  belief	  in	  
Africa's	  economic	  potential	  are	  representative	  of	  how	  moral	  and	  economic	  success	  
were	  conflated.	  
The	  shared	  philosophy	  of	  Buxton	  and	  the	  West	  Africa	  merchants	  is	  far	  from	  surprising	  
given	  that	  many	  prominent	  figures	  who	  appeared	  before	  the	  select	  committee	  had	  in	  
fact	  advised	  on	  the	  planning	  of	  the	  Niger	  expedition.51	  Both	  Matthew	  Forster	  and	  
William	  Hutton	  had	  corresponded	  and	  met	  with	  Thomas	  Buxton	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
abolitionist’s	  research	  on	  West	  Africa.	  Yet	  at	  the	  select	  committee	  Forster	  played	  down	  
these	  links	  and	  sought	  to	  elide	  his	  role	  in	  the	  planning	  of	  the	  expedition.52	  This	  was	  in	  
part	  because	  the	  Niger	  expedition’s	  failure	  helped	  to	  bolster	  merchant	  claims	  that	  only	  
those	  who	  had	  a	  long-­‐term	  relationship	  with	  West	  Africa	  knew	  what	  was	  best	  for	  the	  
Gold	  Coast,	  Gambia,	  and	  Sierra	  Leone.	  In	  particular	  it	  served	  to	  discredit	  many	  of	  
Madden’s	  claims	  as	  he	  was	  represented	  as	  having	  spent	  far	  too	  little	  time	  on	  the	  coast	  
to	  make	  fair	  judgements.	  53	  Forster	  would	  also	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  Niger	  expedition	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  justifying	  the	  perceived	  lack	  of	  moral	  progress	  in	  West	  Africa,	  arguing	  
such	  development	  would	  take	  'patience'	  a	  quality	  'so	  many	  zealous	  and	  apparently	  
well-­‐planned	  attempts	  at	  colonization'	  lacked.54	  Allied	  to	  these	  claims	  were	  Forster’s	  
assertions	  in	  the	  press	  that	  anti-­‐slavery	  campaigners	  such	  as	  Madden	  and	  the	  BFASS	  
were	  ‘traders	  in	  philanthropy’	  whose	  interest	  in	  West	  Africa	  was	  merely	  self-­‐serving.55	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  Trentmann,'Political	  Culture	  and	  Political	  Economy’,	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  of	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  Forster,	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  PP,	  551-­‐I,	  pp.	  728-­‐731.	  
53	  Metcalfe,	  Maclean	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  p.	  281.	  
54	  WCA,	  PP,	  551-­‐I,	  p.	  699.	  
55	  ‘Letter	  from	  Matthew	  Forster	  to	  the	  Berwick	  Warder’,	  enclosed	  in	  M.	  Forster	  to	  Stanley,	  18	  
Nov	  1842,	  TNA:	  CO-­‐267-­‐179.	  
135	  
	  
In	  this	  representation	  legitimate	  commerce	  was	  the	  only	  effective	  means	  for	  securing	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  and	  it	  had	  to	  precede	  the	  spread	  of	  civilization	  and	  
Christianity	  to	  West	  Africa.	  
Matthew	  Forster,	  and	  the	  other	  merchants	  who	  appeared	  before	  the	  select	  committee,	  
maintained	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  British	  commerce	  to	  West	  Africa	  would	  prove	  
unworkable	  if	  there	  was	  any	  attempt	  at	  further	  regulation.	  The	  slave	  trade	  could	  not	  be	  
arrested	  'by	  harassing	  and	  annoying	  the	  legitimate	  trader	  when	  employing	  his	  capital,	  
and	  risking	  the	  lives	  of	  his	  people,	  in	  diffusing	  the	  blessings	  of	  lawful	  commerce'.56	  
Forster	  made	  full	  use	  of	  the	  select	  committee	  hearings	  to	  expose	  the	  failings	  of	  the	  
naval	  suppression	  particularly	  focusing	  on	  the	  violence	  and	  abuses	  committed	  in	  the	  
campaign	  against	  the	  slave	  trade	  accusing	  them	  of	  'carrying	  fire	  and	  sword	  along	  the	  
coast	  of	  Africa'.57	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Britain's	  naval	  squadron	  pursuit	  of	  suppression	  policies	  
could	  result	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  African	  life	  and,	  as	  Robin	  Law	  has	  argued,	  a	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  
the	  sovereignty	  of	  African	  states.58	  Forster	  instead	  argued	  that	  burning	  the	  factories	  
run	  by	  slave	  traders	  on	  the	  African	  coast,	  or	  as	  he	  termed	  it	  'destroying	  the	  property	  of	  
foreigners	  in	  a	  foreign	  country',	  might	  have	  a	  negative	  moral	  influence	  on	  Africans.59	  
Whilst	  Forster’s	  critique	  of	  naval	  suppression	  did	  not	  find	  its	  way	  into	  the	  select	  
committee's	  final	  report	  it	  arguably	  proved	  the	  lasting	  legacy	  of	  the	  West	  Africa	  
controversy.	  William	  Hutt,	  who	  sat	  on	  the	  1842	  select	  committee,	  would	  lead	  the	  anti-­‐
suppression	  movement	  in	  Parliament	  throughout	  the	  late	  1840s	  when	  many	  of	  
Forster’s	  criticisms	  of	  naval	  barbarity	  would	  be	  repeated.60	  The	  criticism	  of	  
suppression	  policies	  formed	  a	  part	  of	  the	  merchants’	  broader	  argument	  that	  
interference	  with	  British	  merchants	  was	  damaging	  British	  ambitions	  for	  Africa.	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  Law,	  'Abolition	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  WCA,	  PP,	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West	  Africa	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  site	  of	  particular	  anxiety	  within	  the	  British	  
imagination	  during	  the	  1840s.	  Both	  the	  critiques	  and	  defences	  of	  British	  commerce	  
centred	  on	  the	  belief	  in	  a	  civilizing	  mission.	  For	  critics	  like	  Madden	  and	  Russell	  
mercantile	  desire	  for	  profit	  had	  distracted	  British	  subjects	  on	  the	  coast	  from	  this	  civic	  
duty.	  This	  desire	  to	  civilize	  was	  somewhat	  unique	  to	  West	  Africa.	  In	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  
Britain	  had	  no	  imperial	  possessions	  and	  government	  officials	  would	  have	  felt	  little	  
obligation	  to	  “improve”	  the	  local	  population’s	  morals	  and	  habits.	  The	  merchants’	  
defence	  was	  also	  geographically	  specific	  and	  was	  built	  around	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  
African	  consumer	  who	  could	  be	  weaned	  off	  the	  slave	  trade	  through	  British	  goods.	  In	  
defending	  the	  role	  commerce	  played	  on	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  the	  likes	  of	  Matthew	  
Forster	  also	  made	  claims	  that	  would	  be	  echoed	  in	  different	  contexts.	  These	  were	  that	  
profit-­‐seeking	  bought	  wider	  societal	  benefits	  and	  that	  any	  unwarranted	  governmental	  
interference	  could	  put	  British	  trade	  asunder.	  The	  report	  produced	  by	  the	  select	  
committee	  ultimately	  recognised	  these	  arguments	  and	  asked	  whether	  regulating	  the	  
activity	  of	  merchants	  would	  be	  worth	  ‘infus[ing]	  so	  much	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  into	  a	  
trade	  which	  it	  wishes	  to	  encourage.’61	  Whilst	  this	  was	  certainly	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  West	  
African	  merchants	  the	  select	  committee	  were	  far	  from	  unequivocal	  in	  their	  support	  and	  
the	  report	  concluded	  by	  expressing,	  
hope	  that	  the	  English	  merchant,	  animated	  as	  he	  is	  by	  the	  same	  feelings	  of	  
horror	  for	  the	  Slave	  Trade,	  will	  endeavour	  to	  extend	  the	  influence	  of	  those	  
feelings	  through	  the	  whole	  of	  his	  transactions.62	  
As	  in	  the	  sugar	  duties	  debate	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  the	  West	  Africa	  select	  
committee	  considered	  whether	  the	  British	  state	  should	  intervene	  in	  economic	  activity	  
that	  contributed	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Whilst	  some	  reform	  was	  undertaken	  with	  the	  
appointment	  of	  a	  judicial	  assessor	  to	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  forts,	  this	  was	  more	  a	  means	  of	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  PP,	  551-­‐I,	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  420,	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  Ibid,	  p.	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solving	  difficult	  questions	  relating	  to	  pawnage	  in	  and	  around	  British	  colonial	  
possessions.63	  When	  it	  came	  to	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade,	  though,	  the	  critics	  of	  
merchants	  could	  condemn,	  critique	  and	  implore,	  but	  not	  convict.	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  
chapter	  will	  explore	  how	  this	  ambivalence	  recurred	  outside	  of	  the	  colonial	  context.	  
	  
Character	  and	  Commerce	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  
Whilst	  the	  relationship	  between	  British	  commerce	  and	  slavery	  was	  under	  great	  
scrutiny	  in	  West	  Africa	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  similar	  debates	  were	  being	  played	  out.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  one	  Britons	  were	  keenly	  aware	  that	  purchase	  of	  sugar	  gave	  
impetus	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  to	  both	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil.	  Direct	  commercial	  links	  between	  
British	  subjects	  and	  Latin	  American	  slave	  trading	  drew	  less	  parliamentary	  attention	  
than	  those	  on	  the	  Gold	  Coast.	  Instead	  this	  dialogue	  played	  out,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  behind	  
closed	  doors	  as	  the	  British	  government	  tried	  to	  reconcile	  its	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐
slavery	  with	  the	  commercial	  activity	  of	  merchants	  overseas.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  
explore	  how	  merchants	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  were	  subject	  to	  similar	  critiques	  as	  those	  in	  
West	  Africa	  and	  how	  they	  offered	  similar	  defences.	  In	  these	  cases,	  Britain	  had	  no	  legal	  
territoriality,	  but	  officials	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  still	  hoped	  to	  influence	  the	  activity	  of	  
British	  merchants	  overseas.	  Attempts	  to	  moralise	  commerce	  in	  both	  contexts	  met	  
staunch	  opposition	  from	  merchants	  who	  maintained	  that	  they	  were	  already	  acting	  in	  a	  
morally	  correct	  fashion.	  By	  the	  late	  1840s	  concern	  at	  the	  role	  of	  Britons	  in	  the	  slave	  
trade	  was	  superseded	  by	  debates	  over	  the	  value	  of	  suppression	  as	  a	  policy	  in	  of	  itself.	  
In	  Cuba,	  as	  in	  West	  Africa,	  government	  officials	  feared	  that	  British	  mercantile	  interests	  
might	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  commitment	  to	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade.	  No	  position	  
crystallised	  the	  contradictions	  in	  British	  foreign	  policy	  more	  than	  the	  role	  of	  the	  consul	  
in	  a	  slave	  society.	  D.	  C.	  M.	  Platt	  has	  argued	  that	  British	  consuls	  were	  first	  and	  foremost	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  Maclean	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‘agents	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  British	  trade’.64	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  slave-­‐trade	  
suppression	  added	  new	  anti-­‐slavery	  responsibilities	  to	  this	  role,	  highlighting	  the	  
tensions	  between	  suppression	  and	  commercial	  expansion.	  The	  debate	  over	  the	  Havana	  
consulate	  in	  the	  late	  1830s	  and	  early	  1840s	  captures	  much	  of	  the	  tensions	  in	  Britain’s	  
anti-­‐slavery	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  two	  men	  who	  filled	  that	  role	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  proxies	  for	  
the	  war	  of	  representation.	  Charles	  Tolmé	  was	  a	  British	  merchant	  deeply	  embedded	  
within	  Cuban	  commercial	  society	  and	  with	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade,	  whilst	  his	  successor	  
David	  Turnbull	  was	  a	  staunch	  and	  militant	  abolitionist.	  David	  Murray	  has	  argued	  that	  
Havana	  in	  the	  early	  1840s	  bore	  witness	  to	  a	  ‘rivalry	  between	  commerce	  and	  
humanitarianism	  in	  British	  foreign	  policy.’65	  Whilst	  I	  draw	  on	  Murray’s	  account	  of	  the	  
clash	  between	  Tolmé	  and	  Turnbull,	  I	  maintain	  that	  commerce	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  were	  
not	  necessarily	  seen	  as	  oppositional.	  Rather,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  appointed	  
David	  Turnbull	  as	  a	  means	  of	  moralising	  British	  commercial	  activity	  in	  Havana.	  	  
British	  consuls	  were	  intended	  to	  champion	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  British	  trading	  community	  
within	  the	  city	  that	  they	  were	  posted.	  In	  1839	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  from	  a	  
British	  merchant	  resident	  in	  the	  Cuban	  port	  city	  of	  Matanzas	  listed	  the	  reasons	  why	  a	  
consul	  was	  necessary.	  He	  argued	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  potential	  increase	  in	  export	  of	  British	  
manufactures	  and	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  British	  investments	  in	  Cuban	  estates.66	  From	  the	  
perspective	  of	  merchants	  the	  British	  government’s	  primary	  role	  was	  to	  secure	  and	  
defend	  their	  property	  rights.	  In	  many	  ways	  Charles	  Tolmé,	  who	  was	  appointed	  
Britain’s	  first	  consul	  in	  Havana	  upon	  arrival	  from	  Hamburg	  in	  1833,	  was	  a	  perfect	  fit	  
for	  this	  role.67	  Tolmé	  was	  a	  partner	  in	  a	  Havana	  merchant	  firm,	  a	  position	  that	  was	  
consistent	  with	  Palmerston’s	  1831	  reform	  of	  the	  consular	  service	  that	  slashed	  consular	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  D.	  C.	  M.	  Platt,	  The	  Cinderella	  Service:	  British	  Consuls	  Since	  1825	  (London,	  Longman,	  1971),	  pp.	  
16-­‐19.	  
65	  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	  p.	  154.	  
66	  Petition	  from	  a	  Merchant,	  9	  Aug	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  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	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salaries	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  private	  enterprise	  would	  meet	  the	  shortfall.	  68	  
British	  consuls	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  community	  they	  represented,	  as	  this	  
would	  allow	  access	  to	  accurate	  information	  about	  British	  commercial	  needs.	  The	  
emergence	  of	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  complicated	  this	  position.	  
Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  foreign	  policy	  was	  built	  upon	  the	  information	  about	  slavery	  and	  
the	  slave	  trade	  provided	  by	  officials	  on	  the	  ground.	  Being	  embedded	  within	  a	  
mercantile	  community	  provided	  access	  to	  this	  information	  and	  Tolmé	  provided	  
important	  evidence	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  Cuban	  slave	  trade	  in	  the	  1830s.69	  Tensions	  
between	  Tolmé	  and	  British	  officials	  emerged	  when	  James	  Kennedy,	  Britain’s	  
representative	  on	  the	  Havana	  Mixed	  Commission	  Court,	  accused	  the	  Consul’s	  firm	  of	  
having	  purchasing	  a	  part	  share	  in	  the	  Cardenas,	  a	  vessel	  that	  had	  imported	  300	  slaves	  
from	  the	  West	  African	  coast.70	  This	  in	  fact	  was	  something	  that	  the	  consul	  could	  not	  
deny.	  However,	  he	  forwarded	  correspondence	  with	  the	  Cardenas’s	  captain,	  which	  
stated	  that	  though	  Tolmé	  had	  personally	  objected	  to	  the	  vessel	  it	  had	  been	  ‘agree’d	  
however	  in	  order	  not	  to	  lose	  the	  money	  advanced	  by	  your	  house	  to	  keep	  the	  one	  
quarter	  share	  originally	  destined	  for	  you	  for	  your	  partner.’71	  Tolmé,	  like	  the	  West	  
African	  merchants,	  was	  actively	  trying	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  responsibility	  for	  his	  
trading	  partner’s	  actions	  by	  refusing	  the	  spoils	  of	  slave	  trading.	  Lord	  Palmerston	  at	  the	  
Foreign	  Office	  was	  far	  from	  impressed	  with	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  and	  declared	  that	  the	  
consul’s	  explanation	  was	  unsatisfactory.72	  This	  controversy	  would	  not	  immediately	  
cost	  Tolmé	  his	  position	  but	  it	  did	  spark	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  consulate	  in	  slave	  
societies.	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  The	  Cinderella	  Service,	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69	  As	  Murray	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  Tolmé	  was	  particularly	  keen	  to	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  what	  he	  saw	  as	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  Slave	  Trade,	  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	  p.	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70	  C.	  Tolmé	  to	  Palmerston,	  17	  July	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  Tolmé,	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  1838,	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Charles	  Tolmé’s	  unwelcome	  commercial	  connections	  raised	  similar	  issues	  to	  the	  
conduct	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  merchants,	  namely	  that	  they	  appeared	  to	  undermine	  
Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  posturing.	  James	  Kennedy	  who	  appeared	  to	  be	  locked	  in	  a	  bitter	  
feud	  with	  Tolmé	  complained	  to	  Palmerston	  that	  ‘it	  is	  most	  trying	  to	  have	  the	  conduct	  of	  
the	  British	  consul	  constantly	  brought	  forward	  against	  us’.73	  Kennedy	  believed	  that	  
Britain	  lost	  all	  claims	  to	  moral	  righteousness	  when	  its	  representatives	  were	  free	  to	  
reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  slave	  trading	  ventures.	  This	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  
who	  concluded	  ‘[i]t	  is	  well	  known	  that	  no	  Merchant	  at	  the	  Havana	  can	  be	  totally	  
unconnected	  with	  the	  trade.’74	  Palmerston’s	  concern	  went	  further	  than	  a	  worry	  that	  
such	  connections	  were	  embarrassing.	  He	  feared	  the	  split	  loyalties	  of	  commerce	  and	  
anti-­‐slavery	  might	  influence	  the	  consul’s	  work.	  Palmerston	  believed	  that	  an	  official	  
interested	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  ‘dare	  not,	  without	  ruining	  his	  own	  mercantile	  interests,	  
make	  known	  to	  H.	  M.	  commissioners	  …	  facts	  which	  he	  ought	  to	  communicate	  to	  
them.’75	  Kennedy,	  who	  had	  accused	  Tolmé	  of	  withholding	  information	  and	  expressed	  
concerns	  that	  English	  fraternising	  within	  Cuban	  society	  might	  lead	  to	  information	  
about	  suppression	  leaking	  to	  slave	  traders,	  may	  well	  have	  stoked	  Palmerston’s	  fears.76	  
This	  Foreign	  Office	  correspondence	  constructed	  Havana	  as	  a	  city	  in	  which	  it	  was	  nearly	  
impossible	  to	  disentangle	  commercial	  activity	  from	  the	  traffic	  in	  enslaved	  Africans.	  
Economic	  partnership	  with	  slave	  traders	  was	  perceived	  as	  morally	  and	  practically	  
compromising	  Tolmé’s	  position.	  
Palmerston	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  slave	  a	  society	  such	  as	  Cuba	  there	  was	  no	  
way	  to	  reconcile	  anti-­‐slavery	  commitments	  with	  commercial	  pursuits.	  The	  only	  
answer,	  then,	  was	  to	  forbid	  British	  consuls	  from	  engaging	  in	  trade.	  Allied	  to	  this	  move	  
was	  the	  decision	  to	  combine	  the	  offices	  of	  British	  consul	  and	  commissioner	  for	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  Kennedy	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Liberated	  Africans	  through	  the	  appointment	  of	  David	  Turnbull	  in	  1840.	  Replacing	  both	  
R.	  R.	  Madden	  and	  Charles	  Tolmé,	  Turnbull	  was	  tasked	  with	  simultaneously	  promoting	  
British	  commerce	  and	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade.77	  This	  shift	  to	  a	  consular	  focus	  on	  
preventing	  the	  slave	  trade,	  and	  therefore	  being	  removed	  from	  the	  potential	  taint	  of	  
commerce,	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  Palmerston’s	  aforementioned	  reform	  of	  consulate	  salaries.	  
The	  Foreign	  Secretary,	  however,	  was	  clearly	  set	  on	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  
consular	  role	  and	  the	  prohibition	  from	  trade	  was	  extended	  to	  consular	  appointments	  in	  
other	  Spanish	  colonies	  such	  as	  Porto	  Rico.78	  Turnbull,	  in	  Travels,	  had	  also	  attributed	  
Tolmé’s	  connection	  to	  slave	  traders	  to	  his	  salary	  only	  being	  set	  at	  £300,	  but	  his	  
appointment	  to	  the	  role	  was	  not	  accompanied	  by	  any	  form	  of	  raise.79	  When	  the	  
Scotsman	  suggested	  that	  he	  might	  supplement	  his	  income	  Palmerston	  reminded	  him	  
that	  since	  ‘all	  commercial	  transactions	  at	  the	  Havana	  are	  more	  or	  less	  connected	  …	  
with	  the	  slave	  trade,	  it	  is	  unfitting	  that	  you	  should	  engage	  in	  any	  commercial	  
pursuits.’80	  Turnbull’s	  appointment	  therefore	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  Foreign	  
Office	  to	  moralise	  British	  commerce	  in	  the	  island	  through	  a	  particularly	  ascetic	  brand	  
of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  More	  importantly,	  a	  prohibition	  against	  commerce	  was	  considered	  a	  
practical	  means	  of	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade.	  F.	  R.	  Cocking,	  an	  abolitionist	  and	  one	  of	  
Turnbull’s	  few	  supporters	  in	  Cuba,	  heralded	  the	  move	  as	  such	  stating	  that	  Turnbull	  had	  
allowed	  a	  ‘clearing	  out	  of	  the	  Augean	  stable’	  and	  Britain’s	  reputation	  in	  Cuba	  was	  being	  
expunged	  of	  the	  taint	  of	  slavery.81	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  British	  merchants	  within	  Havana	  
would	  interpret	  Turnbull’s	  appointment	  in	  a	  different	  manner	  representing	  the	  
consul’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  antithetical	  to	  commercial	  success.	  
Upon	  arrival	  in	  Havana	  Turnbull	  set	  about	  cleansing	  British	  commerce	  and	  officialdom	  
of	  connections	  to	  slavery.	  The	  Scotsman’s	  appointment	  had	  come	  not	  only	  with	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  D.	  Turnbull	  to	  Palmerston,	  15	  Dec	  1840,	  TNA:	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  72-­‐559.	  
78	  W.	  Fox-­‐Strangeways	  to	  B.	  C.	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  Gray,	  24	  July	  1839,	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  Turnbull,	  Travels	  in	  the	  West,	  p.	  43.	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  J.	  Bidwell	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  Turnbull,	  29	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prohibition	  against	  trade	  but	  also	  a	  ban	  on	  slave	  holding	  for	  all	  British	  officials.82	  Soon	  
after	  Turnbull’s	  arrival	  he	  was	  drawn	  into	  a	  conflict	  with	  James	  Kennedy	  and	  other	  
officials	  who	  were	  thrown	  into	  a	  frantic	  correspondence	  explaining	  their	  own	  
slaveholding	  and	  decrying	  Turnbull’s	  belligerence.83	  As	  Murray	  has	  noted	  Turnbull’s	  
relationship	  with	  his	  colleagues	  would	  be	  fractious	  throughout	  his	  spell	  in	  Cuba.84	  
Turnbull	  also	  reported	  British	  subjects	  he	  suspected	  of	  involvement	  in	  slave	  trading	  in	  
the	  hope	  of	  securing	  prosecution.	  One	  particularly	  controversial	  incident	  was	  that	  of	  
the	  Antonio,	  an	  English-­‐built	  vessel	  which	  had	  been	  sold	  to	  Messrs	  Fernandez,	  Pozo	  &	  
Co.,	  who	  according	  to	  Turnbull	  were	  ‘notorious	  slave	  dealers.’85	  The	  consul	  was	  
convinced	  that	  the	  vessel	  was	  due	  to	  set	  sail	  for	  Africa	  and	  was	  determined	  to	  ‘protect	  
our	  English	  dockyards	  from	  the	  reproach	  which	  had	  long	  been	  too	  justly	  applied	  to	  
those	  of	  the	  clipper	  builders	  of	  Baltimore.’86	  Refusal	  to	  grant	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  vessel	  was	  
the	  prime	  example	  of	  Turnbull	  using	  his	  consular	  powers	  to	  further	  anti-­‐slavery	  ends	  
by	  interrupting	  the	  mobility	  of	  a	  ship	  he	  believed	  to	  be	  guilty	  of	  nefarious	  commerce.	  
The	  Antonio	  case	  saw	  the	  Cuban	  consular	  position	  become	  a	  lightning	  rod	  for	  the	  
tensions	  between	  British	  commerce	  and	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Thomas	  Lloyd	  of	  Rabone	  
Brothers,	  the	  British	  firm	  involved	  in	  the	  Antonio	  case,	  wrote	  to	  new	  Foreign	  Secretary	  
Lord	  Aberdeen	  complaining	  of	  the	  ‘heavy	  loss’	  he	  had	  suffered	  due	  to	  Turnbull’s	  
conduct.87	  Lloyd	  was	  of	  course	  keen	  to	  prove	  his	  innocence	  and	  refute	  the	  accusation	  
that	  the	  vessel	  was	  built	  with	  a	  slaving	  intention,	  enclosing	  testimony	  to	  that	  effect	  
from	  a	  Royal	  Navy	  lieutenant	  who	  had	  examined	  the	  ship.88	  Lloyd	  was	  also	  keen	  to	  
protect	  his	  reputation	  and	  avoid	  publicity.	  He	  told	  Aberdeen	  ‘the	  pecuniary	  loss	  is	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small	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  libellous	  charge	  of	  being	  concerned	  in	  such	  nefarious	  
transactions.’89	  	  If,	  as	  Hall	  and	  Davidoff,	  have	  argued	  ‘the	  personality	  of	  the	  
entrepreneur	  …	  was	  the	  firm’	  then	  connections	  to	  slave-­‐owners	  could	  prove	  socially	  
damaging.90	  At	  the	  same	  time	  he	  echoed	  Matthew	  Forster’s	  rejection	  of	  responsibility	  
for	  the	  actions	  of	  trading	  partners	  accusing	  Turnbull	  of	  ‘injuring	  English	  property	  on	  
account	  of	  the	  crimes	  real	  or	  supposed	  of	  foreigners.'91	  Such	  a	  position	  was	  a	  direct	  
refutation	  of	  Palmerston’s	  logic	  in	  appointing	  Turnbull.	  Whereas	  the	  former	  Foreign	  
Secretary	  viewed	  links	  to	  slave	  traders	  as	  morally	  and	  practically	  compromising	  Lloyd	  
appeared	  to	  imply	  that	  ‘foreigners’	  could	  not	  be	  held	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  or	  civilizational	  
standards.	  Whilst	  Lloyd’s	  business	  could	  only	  function	  through	  placing	  trust	  in	  his	  
Cuban	  partners	  his	  reputation	  within	  Britain	  required	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  moralism	  that	  
governed	  business	  partnerships	  within	  Britain.	  Implicit	  in	  this	  logic	  was	  a	  suggestion	  
that	  the	  moral	  expectations	  placed	  upon	  British	  subjects	  could	  not	  cross	  national	  
boundaries.	  
Merchants	  in	  both	  Havana	  and	  London	  banded	  together	  to	  criticise	  Turnbull.	  In	  early	  
1841	  they	  petitioned	  Aberdeen	  to	  complain	  that	  their	  interests	  had	  been	  ‘materially	  
prejudiced’	  by	  the	  union	  of	  commissioner	  for	  liberated	  Africans	  and	  consul.92	  On	  both	  
occasions	  the	  petitioners	  also	  argued	  for	  the	  return	  of	  Tolmé	  who	  had	  the	  ‘accustomed	  
ability	  and	  intelligence’	  for	  the	  role	  of	  consul.93	  Murray	  has	  argued	  that	  these	  petitions	  
were	  organised	  by	  Tolmé	  himself	  a	  contention	  supported	  a	  letter	  from	  an	  ally	  of	  Tolmé	  
at	  the	  same	  time,	  which	  aimed	  to	  dispel	  any	  ‘erroneous	  impressions’	  that	  his	  
partnership	  in	  a	  merchant	  firm	  made	  him	  favourable	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.94	  Whilst	  much	  
of	  this	  criticism	  may	  have	  been	  rooted	  in	  Turnbull’s	  abrasive	  personality,	  which	  had	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won	  him	  few,	  if	  any,	  friends	  in	  Havana,	  it	  was	  firmly	  articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  tension	  
between	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  commerce.	  A	  key	  contention	  of	  the	  London	  merchants’	  
petition	  was	  that	  Tolmé	  had	  served	  as	  consul	  with	  ‘great	  benefit	  to	  the	  Public	  Service	  
and	  to	  British	  Interests.’95	  This	  conflation	  of	  national	  interest	  with	  individual	  profits	  
was	  vital	  to	  the	  merchants’	  representation	  of	  themselves	  as	  engaged	  in	  legitimate	  
commerce.	  Thomas	  Lloyd	  had	  made	  similar	  claims	  when	  he	  accused	  Turnbull	  of	  
‘opposing	  a	  legitimate	  and	  innocent	  transaction	  in	  which	  English	  interests	  were	  so	  
much	  at	  stake’.96	  From	  this	  perspective	  Turnbull’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  commitments	  became	  
irrational	  and	  impractical,	  whereas	  merchants	  became,	  to	  borrow	  Swaminathan’s	  term,	  
‘loyal	  citizens	  of	  the	  empire’	  advancing	  Britain’s	  commercial	  goals.97	  
The	  protest	  of	  merchants	  appears	  to	  have	  succeeded	  in	  convincing	  Aberdeen	  to	  remove	  
Turnbull	  as	  consul.	  The	  Foreign	  Secretary	  told	  the	  Scotsman	  that	  commercial	  interests	  
‘require	  the	  entire	  and	  undivided	  attention	  of	  an	  individual	  of	  tact	  and	  experience.’98	  
This	  was	  an	  admission	  that	  if	  commerce	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  were	  not	  entirely	  in	  
opposition,	  they	  were	  at	  least	  awkward	  bedfellows.	  Turnbull	  himself	  highlighted	  the	  
tensions	  inherent	  in	  his	  role	  when	  he	  complained	  about	  acting	  as	  notary	  for	  ‘papers	  of	  
a	  most	  doubtful	  and	  repugnant	  character’	  when	  British	  merchants	  claimed	  insurance	  
on	  goods	  shipped	  to	  Africa.99	  What	  is	  more	  interesting	  is	  how	  the	  same	  logic	  that	  had	  
led	  to	  Turnbull’s	  appointment	  was	  redeployed	  whilst	  critiquing	  him.	  Palmerston	  had	  
prohibited	  the	  Scotsman	  from	  engaging	  in	  any	  trade	  because	  he	  believed	  Havana	  to	  be	  
a	  site	  where	  commerce	  could	  not	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  merchants	  
who	  petitioned	  Aberdeen	  maintained	  that	  Havana	  was	  a	  site	  of	  slavery,	  but	  they	  used	  
this	  representation	  to	  argue	  that	  Turnbull’s	  position	  as	  commissioner	  for	  Liberated	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Africans	  necessitated	  ‘collision	  with	  the	  Local	  Authorities’.100	  The	  merchants	  argued	  
that	  this	  limited	  Turnbull’s	  ability	  to	  represent	  them	  in	  legal	  matters.	  Turnbull	  clearly	  
was	  unpopular	  with	  the	  Cuban	  authorities	  who	  protested	  to	  Aberdeen	  over	  fears	  the	  
Scotsman	  was	  attempting	  to	  promote	  abolitionist	  sentiment	  and	  insurrection	  in	  the	  
island.101	  Aberdeen’s	  separation	  of	  the	  consulship	  from	  the	  role	  of	  commissioner	  of	  
Liberated	  Africans	  suggests	  that	  the	  hope	  of	  moralising	  commerce	  through	  the	  
consulship	  itself	  has	  been	  abandoned,	  though	  continued	  attempts	  to	  prosecute	  
merchants	  mean	  that	  this	  decision	  should	  not	  simply	  be	  read	  as	  a	  triumph	  of	  commerce	  
over	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
Aberdeen	  remained	  interested	  in	  pursuing	  British	  merchants	  accused	  of	  connections	  to	  
the	  slave	  trade.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Robert	  Wardrop,	  the	  Glasgow	  based	  
merchant	  who	  Turnbull	  accused	  of	  being	  partnered	  in	  a	  slave-­‐trading	  firm.102	  
Turnbull’s	  accusation	  was	  a	  familiar	  one,	  that	  Wardrop	  was	  partner	  in	  a	  Havana	  firm	  
who	  exported	  manufactured	  goods	  and	  textiles	  to	  Cuba.	  These	  goods,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  
vital	  to	  the	  prosecution	  of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  were	  also	  paid	  for	  ‘in	  the	  form	  of	  shares	  in	  
slaving	  ventures.’103	  This	  was	  apparently	  a	  common	  practice,	  but	  the	  case	  of	  Wardrop	  
and	  his	  partner	  Villoldo	  drew	  particular	  attention,	  as	  Turnbull	  believed	  that	  he	  could	  
definitively	  prove	  a	  guilty	  knowledge.	  The	  consul	  claimed	  to	  have	  seen	  the	  company’s	  
records	  and	  that	  since	  Wardrop	  received	  ‘complete	  copies	  of	  the	  journal’	  he	  must	  be	  
fully	  aware.104	  Wardrop	  remained	  a	  figure	  of	  interest	  even	  after	  Turnbull	  had	  been	  
removed	  from	  his	  consular	  position.	  Due	  to	  the	  slow	  nature	  of	  transatlantic	  
communication	  it	  was	  only	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1842	  that	  the	  Treasury,	  Foreign	  Office	  
and	  government	  lawyers	  would	  begin	  discussing	  the	  case.	  William	  Rothery,	  the	  legal	  
counsel	  for	  the	  admiralty,	  did	  not	  believe	  there	  was	  enough	  evidence	  to	  bring	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proceedings	  against	  Wardrop.	  However,	  the	  Treasury	  remained	  ‘very	  anxious	  that	  the	  
matter	  should	  be	  thoroughly	  investigated.’105	  This	  included	  following	  Turnbull’s	  
suggestion	  that	  the	  matter	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  Lord	  Advocate	  of	  Scotland.106	  This	  detail	  
chimed	  with	  the	  Colonial	  Office’s	  abortive	  attempts	  to	  prosecute	  James	  Thomson.	  
Wardrop	  resided	  within	  British	  jurisdiction	  and	  as	  such	  could	  be	  reached	  by	  the	  law.	  
Clearly,	  involvement	  in	  slave	  trading	  remained	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  government	  as	  the	  
Treasury	  stressed	  that	  ‘strong	  measures	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  prevent	  this	  nefarious	  
traffic	  of	  British	  merchants.’107	  The	  timing	  of	  these	  discussions	  bears	  comment	  as	  well	  
as	  they	  occurred	  alongside	  the	  select	  committee	  investigation	  on	  West	  Africa.	  As	  such	  it	  
is	  fair	  to	  conclude	  that	  government	  interest	  in	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  
did	  not	  end	  with	  parliamentary	  hearings.	  
Governmental	  desire	  to	  prosecute	  Wardrop	  did	  not	  result	  in	  legal	  action	  and	  it	  is	  
unclear	  what	  further	  steps	  if	  any	  were	  taken	  to	  address	  the	  situation.	  In	  April	  of	  1842	  
the	  merchant	  had	  been	  interrogated	  by	  the	  Lord	  Advocate	  of	  Scotland,	  and	  as	  such	  had	  
been	  forced	  to	  account	  for	  his	  links	  to	  slave	  trading.	  In	  his	  statement	  Wardrop	  that	  
whilst	  his	  partner	  in	  Havana	  had	  received	  payment	  in	  slaves	  he	  had	  severely	  
remonstrated	  with	  him	  about	  this	  fact.108	  Wardrop	  contended	  that	  any	  blame	  for	  slave	  
trading	  lay	  elsewhere	  with	  trading	  or	  commercial	  partners,	  whose	  actions	  were	  
beyond	  his	  control.	  This	  position	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  individuals	  or	  firms	  
should	  be	  held	  to	  account,	  both	  morally	  and	  legally,	  for	  who	  they	  dealt	  with;	  an	  idea	  
which	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  debates	  over	  limited	  liability.109	  Whilst	  
the	  Treasury’s	  comments	  on	  the	  Wardrop	  case	  appear	  to	  suggest	  dissatisfaction	  with	  
this	  defence	  a	  prosecution	  was	  not	  forthcoming.	  Wardrop,	  echoing	  Thomas	  Lloyd,	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explicitly	  rejected	  the	  suggestion	  that	  he	  be	  held	  morally	  accountable	  for	  the	  action	  of	  
foreign	  partners.	  
	  Debates	  surrounding	  British	  involvement	  in	  Cuban	  slave	  trading	  revolved	  around	  
many	  of	  the	  same	  anxieties	  as	  the	  West	  Africa	  controversy.	  The	  experiences	  of	  Charles	  
Tolmé	  and	  David	  Turnbull	  as	  consuls	  highlighted	  the	  tensions	  between	  Britain’s	  
commercial	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  commitments.	  Ascetic	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  demanded	  by	  
Palmerston	  and	  practiced	  by	  Turnbull	  was	  represented	  as	  inimical	  to	  Britain’s	  interests	  
by	  merchants	  operating	  in	  Havana.	  Ultimately,	  these	  two	  strands	  could	  not	  be	  fully	  
reconciled	  resulting	  in	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  consulate	  and	  commissioner	  of	  liberated	  
Africans.	  Despite	  this	  concession	  to	  the	  merchant	  community	  the	  government	  
remained	  keen	  to	  make	  an	  example	  of	  those	  who	  were	  most	  closely	  linked	  to	  slave	  
traders,	  but	  as	  the	  case	  of	  Wardrop	  revealed	  this	  was	  much	  easier	  said	  than	  done.	  
Turnbull’s	  tenure	  as	  consul	  coincided	  with	  the	  investigation	  into	  West	  Africa	  and	  might	  
be	  understood	  to	  represent	  the	  high	  point	  of	  this	  self-­‐reflexive	  anti-­‐slavery.	  However,	  
concern	  at	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  would	  continue	  into	  Aberdeen’s	  tenure	  as	  
Foreign	  Secretary.	  
The	  other	  great	  slave-­‐trading	  society	  of	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  period	  was	  of	  course	  
Brazil.	  The	  former	  Portuguese	  colony,	  now	  independent,	  was	  home	  to	  a	  thriving,	  and	  
illegal,	  trade	  in	  enslaved	  Africans.	  Whilst	  Brazil	  had	  nominally	  abolished	  its	  slave	  trade	  
there	  was	  little	  enforcement.	  British	  attempts	  to	  push	  for	  more	  effective	  measures	  
were	  rebuffed	  as	  bullying	  and	  overbearing.110	  At	  the	  same	  time	  British	  merchants	  
engaged	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  commercial	  ventures	  in	  Brazil,	  with	  British	  capital	  and	  
credit	  being	  particularly	  important	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  slave	  trade	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  
trade	  goods	  on	  credit	  via	  Brazilian	  intermediaries.111	  	  As	  in	  Cuba	  and	  West	  Africa	  these	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links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  were	  potentially	  embarrassing	  for	  Britain,	  particularly	  as	  the	  
Foreign	  Office	  made	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  end	  the	  illegal	  Brazilian	  slave	  trade.	  As	  in	  
other	  contexts	  British	  complicity	  in	  slave	  trading	  could	  provide	  ammunition	  for	  rival	  
nations	  who	  sought	  to	  discredit	  the	  British	  campaign	  for	  suppression.	  This	  section	  
explores	  the	  response	  to	  a	  particularly	  public	  airing	  of	  accusations	  against	  British	  
merchants	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1845.	  The	  government,	  press,	  and	  
merchants	  responded	  in	  different	  ways	  to	  these	  public	  attacks,	  but	  these	  responses	  
echoed	  many	  of	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  Cuban	  and	  West	  African	  controversies.	  
Reports	  of	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  slave	  trade	  were	  a	  prominent	  feature	  of	  
Foreign	  Office	  correspondence	  throughout	  the	  1830s	  and	  early	  1840s.	  Consuls	  and	  
visitors	  to	  Rio	  would	  often	  pass	  comment	  on	  how	  British	  merchants	  supplied	  slave	  
traders.	  As	  early	  as	  1838	  Lord	  Glenelg	  was	  reporting	  to	  Palmerston	  that	  commission	  
houses	  in	  Rio	  were	  ‘deeply	  engaged	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.’112	  Glenelg	  also	  called	  for	  the	  
prosecution	  of	  the	  ‘most	  conspicuous’	  offenders,	  further	  demonstrating	  that	  belief	  in	  
criminality	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  radicals	  like	  Madden	  and	  
Turnbull.113	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  other	  cases,	  this	  willingness	  to	  prosecute	  did	  not	  
equate	  to	  action	  and	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  case	  one	  issue	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  how	  diffuse	  
the	  accusations	  were.	  Glenelg	  offered	  no	  example	  of	  specific	  firms	  involved,	  rather	  he	  
presented	  British	  involvement	  as	  systemic.	  This	  was	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  role	  British	  
merchants	  played	  in	  supplying	  the	  Brazilian	  slave	  trade.	  Charlotte	  Pilkington,	  who	  
along	  with	  her	  husband	  George	  reported	  on	  Brazilian	  slavery	  to	  the	  BFASS,	  noted	  that	  
‘it	  is	  very	  true	  English	  capital	  supports	  voyages	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  get	  at,	  
in	  the	  first	  place	  the	  same	  goods	  are	  needed	  for	  the	  legal	  and	  illegal	  trade.’114	  In	  many	  
ways	  this	  observation	  was	  the	  flipside	  of	  the	  defence	  offered	  by	  merchants	  accused	  of	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  Britain	  and	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  in	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  1850-­‐1914	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1968).	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  Glenelg	  to	  Palmerston,	  20	  Oct	  1838,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐265.	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  Ibid.	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  C.	  Pilkington	  to	  BFASS,	  24	  Feb	  1840,	  PASS,	  WLO:	  MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22	  G79.	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supplying	  slavers.	  As	  in	  Havana	  merchants	  would	  argue	  that	  they	  could	  not	  remove	  
themselves	  from	  the	  slave	  trade,	  whilst	  anti-­‐slavery	  campaigners	  continually	  struggled	  
to	  pin	  down	  who	  was	  legally	  liable	  for	  supplying	  slave	  traders.	  
Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  prosecutions,	  the	  threat	  of	  potential	  investigations	  of	  British	  
merchants	  still	  loomed	  and	  this	  was	  confirmed	  by	  events	  in	  early	  1845.	  On	  20	  February	  
outgoing	  US	  President	  John	  Tyler	  spoke	  before	  Congress	  in	  a	  speech,	  which	  condemned	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  American	  flag	  in	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Tyler	  argued	  that	  the	  fault	  lay	  with	  
British	  subjects	  who	  provided	  the	  credit	  and	  ‘coast	  goods’	  necessary	  for	  the	  trade	  to	  
function.115	  This	  declaration	  was	  pointed	  and	  was	  almost	  certainly	  intended	  to	  jab	  at	  
England	  over	  the	  tensions	  surrounding	  the	  right	  of	  search.	  Tyler	  also	  went	  further	  in	  
arguing	  that	  Britain’s	  suppression	  efforts	  were	  merely	  a	  cover	  for	  securing	  a	  cheap	  
labour	  source	  in	  the	  form	  of	  liberated	  Africans.116	  It	  was	  this	  latter	  accusation	  of	  bad	  
faith	  that	  provoked	  Prime	  Minister	  Peel	  to	  fire	  back	  a	  refutation	  of	  Tyler’s	  claims	  about	  
the	  treatment	  of	  former	  slaves.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  he	  was	  far	  
more	  equivocal	  stating	  ‘that	  if	  the	  law	  could	  reach	  the	  owners	  of	  British	  capital	  
embarked	  in	  the	  Slave	  Trade,	  every	  exertion	  should	  be	  made	  to	  enforce	  it	  to	  the	  
utmost.’117	  This	  last	  statement	  in	  many	  ways	  summed	  up	  the	  government’s	  position	  
following	  the	  1842	  select	  committee.	  	  
Within	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  the	  President’s	  comments	  sparked	  an	  audit	  of	  previous	  
investigations	  into	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  in	  Cuba,	  Brazil	  and	  West	  
Africa.	  Throughout	  the	  twenty	  pages	  of	  the	  list	  a	  striking	  pattern	  emerges.	  Time	  and	  
again	  the	  British	  government	  would	  be	  alerted	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  British	  subjects	  in	  
the	  slave	  trade.	  When	  these	  accusations	  were	  weightier	  and	  came	  with	  names	  and	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  Tyler,	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  Project	  (Santa	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  University	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  accessed	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places	  attached,	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary,	  usually	  Palmerston,	  would	  direct	  the	  question	  
to	  government	  lawyers.	  Each	  time	  their	  response	  would	  be	  that	  the	  evidence	  was	  
insufficient	  or	  that	  the	  law	  did	  not,	  and	  could	  not	  reach	  those	  involved.118	  The	  official	  
attitude	  toward	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  appeared	  to	  be	  stuck	  in	  some	  
form	  of	  limbo.	  Officials	  were	  keen	  to	  investigate,	  and	  prosecute	  where	  possible,	  but	  
they	  failed	  to	  extend	  legal	  responsibility	  to	  the	  British	  firms	  involved.	  
For	  all	  of	  the	  government’s	  impotence	  in	  addressing	  the	  supply	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  
merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  were	  clearly	  concerned	  in	  the	  issue	  rearing	  its	  ugly	  head	  
again.	  The	  Manchester	  firm	  and	  shipping	  agent	  Carruthers,	  De	  Castro	  &	  Co	  were	  among	  
those	  who	  protested	  President	  Tyler’s	  attack	  on	  British	  merchants.	  This	  was	  motivated	  
by	  accusations	  of	  slave	  trading	  levelled	  at	  the	  firm.	  The	  American	  consul	  in	  Rio,	  Mr.	  
Wise,	  had	  claimed	  that	  British	  goods	  had	  been	  shipped	  on	  the	  slaver	  Agnes.	  Wise,	  in	  
correspondence	  with	  Hamilton	  Hamilton,	  the	  British	  minister	  in	  Rio,	  had	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  
to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  refused	  to	  seize	  Brazilian	  slavers	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  
protect	  the	  interests	  of	  British	  manufacturing.119	  The	  Agnes	  case	  had	  all	  the	  hallmarks	  
of	  one	  that	  would	  pique	  government	  interest	  as	  Britain’s	  diplomatic	  efforts	  appeared	  to	  
be	  undermined	  by	  a	  British	  subject.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  Carruthers,	  De	  Castro	  &	  Co,	  in	  
protesting	  their	  innocence,	  echoed	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  merchants	  in	  the	  Cuban	  or	  West	  
African	  context.	  However,	  archival	  material	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  firm	  
utilised	  a	  wider	  network	  to	  defend	  their	  reputation.	  
Carruthers,	  De	  Castro	  &	  Co	  asserted	  their	  innocence	  in	  the	  Agnes	  case	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
ways,	  which	  demonstrate	  the	  social	  and	  material	  aspects	  of	  the	  war	  of	  representation.	  
Key	  to	  this	  was	  the	  Manchester	  Commercial	  Association	  (MCA)	  a	  group	  of	  merchants	  
through	  which	  the	  firm	  co-­‐ordinated	  their	  response.	  The	  MCA	  launched	  a	  petition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




complaining	  of	  the	  ‘derogatory’	  nature	  of	  Tyler’s	  comments	  and	  Peel’s	  lack	  of	  denial.120	  
The	  petitioners	  challenged	  the	  government	  to	  undertake	  a	  proper	  investigation,	  but	  
also	  expressed	  their	  confidence	  that	  ‘the	  charge	  is	  totally	  unwarrantable.’121	  Contacting	  
the	  government	  through	  the	  MCA	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  important	  part	  of	  stressing	  
Carruthers’	  respectability.	  As	  Aeron	  Hunt	  has	  argued	  nineteenth-­‐century	  firms	  viewed	  
the	  connections	  of	  a	  businesses	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  firm’s	  good	  character,	  or	  lack	  of.122	  In	  
associating	  themselves	  with	  the	  MCA	  Carruthers	  looked	  to	  position	  themselves	  as	  
connected	  to	  respectable	  businesses,	  rather	  than	  nefarious	  slave	  trading	  practices	  
located	  in	  Brazil.	  The	  firm’s	  contact	  with	  local	  MP	  Thomas	  Milner	  Gibson	  and	  the	  
appendage	  of	  this	  correspondence	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Earl	  of	  Aberdeen	  is	  further	  
evidence	  this	  social	  aspect	  of	  legitimisation.123	  The	  firm	  also	  secured	  a	  personal	  
audience	  with	  Lord	  Aberdeen,	  alongside	  Milner	  Gibson	  and	  a	  ‘Mr	  Hutton’,	  who	  was	  the	  
owner	  of	  the	  merchandise	  shipped	  on	  the	  Agnes.124	  These	  various	  steps	  are	  evidence	  of	  
the	  ‘people,	  objects,	  and	  practices’	  involved	  in	  asserting	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  firm’s	  
commercial	  activity	  and	  similar	  processes	  were	  likely	  at	  work	  in	  the	  London	  
merchants’	  protests	  over	  David	  Turnbull’s	  appointment.125	  The	  arguments	  made	  in	  
favour	  of	  commercial	  activity	  in	  Brazil,	  Cuba,	  or	  anywhere	  gained	  legitimacy	  through	  
the	  social	  practices	  firms	  like	  Carruthers	  took	  to	  construct	  their	  reputation.	  
The	  arguments	  contained	  within	  Carruthers’	  various	  letters	  bore	  similarities	  to	  the	  
defences	  offered	  by	  other	  merchants.	  As	  in	  Havana,	  merchants	  represented	  
connections	  to	  the	  slave	  trade	  as	  inevitable	  and	  it	  was	  claimed	  that	  extending	  credit	  in	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  5	  Aug	  1845,	  Manchester	  Central	  Library:	  GB127.M8/7.	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the	  form	  of	  goods	  was	  simply	  the	  price	  of	  doing	  business	  in	  Brazil.	  Carruthers	  
complained	  of	  ‘a	  ruinous	  system	  of	  long	  open-­‐credit	  has	  been	  established	  to	  which	  all	  
are	  obliged	  to	  submit’.126	  This	  comment	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  British	  merchants	  give	  
their	  Brazilian	  trade	  partners	  up	  to	  two	  years	  credit	  before	  payment	  was	  required.127	  
This	  was,	  of	  course,	  hugely	  beneficial	  to	  slave	  traders	  as	  voyages	  to	  Africa	  were	  both	  
risky	  and	  a	  long	  drawn	  out	  process.	  In	  this	  telling,	  Carruthers,	  De	  Castro	  &	  Co.	  
represented	  themselves	  as	  the	  victims	  of	  undesirable	  market	  conditions	  and	  the	  fact	  
that	  ‘the	  energies	  of	  British	  merchants	  are	  cramped	  by	  absurd	  legislation.’128	  Here	  they	  
echoed	  the	  doom	  mongering	  of	  Forster	  through	  claims	  that	  undue	  interference	  would	  
hobble	  British	  commerce.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  legitimate	  commerce	  could	  be	  
equated	  with	  any	  form	  of	  trade	  that	  was	  not	  the	  direct	  purchase	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  
the	  British	  government’s	  responsibility	  began	  and	  ended	  with	  guaranteeing	  the	  market	  
conditions	  in	  which	  business	  could	  take	  place.	  Aberdeen’s	  response	  was	  to	  echo	  the	  
sentiments	  of	  the	  1842	  select	  committee	  stating	  that	  merchants	  should	  be	  guided	  by	  
their	  ‘consciences’,	  but	  that	  he	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  prosecute	  Carruthers,	  De	  Castro	  &	  
Co.129	  	  
As	  with	  other	  firms,	  Carruthers	  not	  only	  looked	  to	  defend	  the	  firm’s	  own	  reputation,	  
they	  also	  made	  wider	  claims	  about	  commercial	  activity.	  In	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  firm’s	  
partner	  in	  Rio	  this	  was	  made	  explicit	  by	  warning	  that	  if	  British	  merchants	  were	  to	  cut	  
themselves	  off	  from	  those	  involved	  in	  slavery	  it	  would	  ‘throw	  out	  of	  employment	  
thousands	  and	  thousands	  of	  our	  fellow	  countrymen’.130	  This	  claim	  mirrored	  those	  
invoked	  during	  the	  struggle	  over	  the	  sugar	  duties	  where	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  working	  class	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  Carruthers,	  De	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  &	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  T.	  Milner	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  June	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  Growth,	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128Carruthers,	  De	  Castro	  &	  Co	  to	  T.	  Milner	  Gibson,	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  ‘Report	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Proceedings	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would	  be	  levied	  against	  abolitionist	  protestations.131	  Where	  Britain’s	  West	  African	  
commerce	  was	  explicitly	  linked	  to	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade	  Carruthers	  argued	  that	  the	  
Brazilian	  market	  for	  British	  manufactures	  sustained	  the	  working	  classes	  at	  home.	  The	  
legitimacy	  of	  commercial	  activity	  was	  inextricably	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  
larger	  societal	  good	  was	  being	  performed	  by	  those	  merchants	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  
The	  Tyler	  controversy	  and	  Peel’s	  speech	  also	  prompted	  Matthew	  Forster	  to	  re-­‐enter	  
the	  debate	  and	  he	  wrote	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  claiming	  to	  speak	  for	  the	  merchants	  of	  
Brazil,	  Cuba	  and	  Africa.	  The	  Berwick	  MP	  was	  particularly	  concerned	  that	  Tyler’s	  
message	  and	  Peel’s	  lack	  of	  condemnation	  hinted	  at	  a	  more	  expansive	  view	  of	  moral	  
responsibility	  and	  a	  return	  to	  Madden’s	  position	  that	  any	  link	  to	  slavery	  was	  illegal.	  
Forster	  was	  also	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  geographic	  thinking	  that	  lay	  behind	  criticism	  of	  
merchants.	  As	  he	  told	  Peel,	  ‘[b]ecause	  there	  are	  pick	  pockets	  in	  the	  strand	  it	  does	  not	  
follow	  that	  every	  gentleman	  traversing	  the	  strand	  is	  to	  be	  charged	  with	  or	  suspected	  of	  
picking	  pockets’.132	  The	  implication	  was	  clear.	  British	  merchants	  had	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  
operate	  in	  Africa,	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil	  without	  fear	  of	  prosecution.	  Forster	  followed	  up	  this	  
message	  with	  a	  petition	  from	  a	  number	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  on	  the	  
subject.133	  Forster	  and	  those	  he	  represented	  were	  keenly	  aware	  that	  Tyler’s	  taunts	  
might	  reignite	  official	  interest	  into	  the	  question	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
The	  press	  in	  general	  sounded	  a	  jingoistic	  note	  in	  response	  to	  Tyler’s	  attack	  and	  Peel’s	  
response.	  The	  Manchester	  Observer	  asked	  why	  France	  and	  the	  United	  States	  had	  ‘such	  a	  
desire	  to	  malign	  this	  country,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  by	  any	  means,	  however	  absurd	  or	  
fraudulent?’	  According	  to	  the	  Observer	  it	  was	  America’s	  own	  fault	  that	  they	  let	  
‘scoundrels	  of	  all	  nations’	  abuse	  their	  flag,	  whilst	  ‘British	  subjects	  …	  engaged	  in	  the	  
slave	  trade	  will	  find	  no	  shelter.’134	  Even	  the	  Morning	  Chronicle	  which	  had	  sided	  with	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Madden	  in	  his	  conflict	  with	  Forster	  found	  itself	  more	  preoccupied	  with	  condemning	  
President	  Tyler’s	  hypocrisy	  casting	  him	  as	  ‘one	  of	  the	  corresponding	  members	  of	  the	  
slave-­‐trade	  and	  anti-­‐Anglican	  bureau.’135	  The	  patriotic	  register	  of	  this	  press	  coverage	  
should	  be	  read	  alongside	  the	  consistent	  refusal	  of	  British	  merchants	  to	  be	  held	  
accountable	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  foreign	  partners	  and	  the	  implicit	  suggestion	  that	  
opposition	  to	  slavery	  was	  only	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  Britons.	  	  
The	  case	  of	  the	  Agnes	  and	  President	  Tyler’s	  message	  demonstrates	  many	  of	  the	  
recurring	  themes	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  British	  merchants	  in	  
operating	  in	  Brazil	  were	  understood	  to	  be	  implicated	  in	  various	  ways	  in	  slave	  trading.	  
The	  government	  continued	  to	  be	  keen	  on	  curbing	  this	  practice	  and	  were	  particularly	  
likely	  to	  be	  provoked	  into	  action	  when	  the	  issue	  was	  publicised	  by	  a	  rival	  power.	  
However,	  as	  the	  list	  of	  investigations	  produced	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Tyler’s	  remarks	  
demonstrates	  attempts	  at	  serious	  action	  often	  fell	  flat.	  The	  response	  of	  the	  mercantile	  
community	  was	  also	  familiar.	  Complicity	  in	  slave	  trading	  was	  denied	  and	  any	  
government	  intervention	  was	  treated	  as	  inimical	  to	  Britain’s	  commercial	  goals.	  British	  
merchants	  operating	  in	  both	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba	  took	  steps	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  
the	  slave	  trade	  and	  reject	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  foreign	  trading	  
partners.	  As	  in	  West	  Africa	  this	  individual	  defence	  of	  reputation	  was	  allied	  to	  wider	  
claims	  that	  represented	  the	  commercial	  success	  of	  merchants	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
nation	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  the	  wake	  Tyler’s	  comments	  ‘A	  British	  Merchant’	  writing	  in	  The	  
Times	  had	  scorn	  for	  both	  Tyler	  and	  Peel.	  He	  attacked	  the	  former	  as	  a	  hypocrite	  and	  the	  
latter	  as	  pandering	  to	  ‘the	  West	  India	  interest	  and	  his	  new	  friends	  the	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  
Society.’136	  The	  letter	  to	  The	  Times	  also	  rehashed	  the	  Madden	  controversy	  and	  held	  up	  
the	  	  conclusions	  of	  the	  1842	  select	  committee	  of	  the	  innocence	  of	  British	  merchants,	  a	  
line	  of	  argument	  that	  will	  have	  pleased	  Forster,	  who	  given	  his	  previous	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correspondence	  with	  the	  paper	  may	  well	  have	  authored	  the	  letter.	  In	  anti-­‐slavery	  
Britain,	  any	  critiques	  of	  merchants	  could	  be	  rebutted	  as	  sectional,	  self-­‐interested	  and	  
working	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  humanity.	  
The	  merchants’	  success	  in	  avoiding	  censure	  and	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Turnbull	  
experiment	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  identity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  government,	  but	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  their	  approach	  shifted.	  In	  both	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba	  
the	  British	  government’s	  focus	  increasingly	  moved	  from	  attempts	  to	  moralise	  the	  
overseas	  activities	  of	  its	  own	  subjects	  to	  attributing	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  to	  
bad	  faith	  on	  the	  part	  of	  foreign	  governments.	  Frustration	  at	  a	  lack	  of	  Brazilian	  
enforcement	  of	  suppression	  treaties	  led	  to	  the	  Aberdeen	  Act	  of	  1845	  which	  was	  saw	  
the	  British	  navy	  intensify	  its	  searching	  and	  seizure	  of	  Brazilian	  ships	  by	  interpreting	  
the	  slave	  trade	  as	  piracy.137	  British	  subjects	  clearly	  remained	  involved	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  
slave	  trade	  for	  example	  Rio	  consul	  James	  Hudson	  noted	  that	  British	  engines	  could	  be	  
found	  on	  steamship	  slavers,	  but	  naval	  suppression	  took	  precedence.138	  1850	  would	  see	  
Britain’s	  naval	  campaign	  ramped	  up	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  committed	  
to	  suppression	  as	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  conflict	  with	  Britain.139	  This	  was	  effectively	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade.	  
David	  Turnbull’s	  replacement	  in	  Cuba	  was	  Joseph	  Crawford,	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  of	  Charles	  
Tolmé,	  and	  clearly	  more	  at	  home	  amongst	  Havana’s	  commercial	  community.	  There	  
remained	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  aspect	  to	  the	  consul’s	  role	  which	  Crawford	  would	  assiduously	  
fulfil	  until	  the	  Cuban	  slave	  trade	  faded	  away	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1860s.140	  The	  ascetic	  anti-­‐
slavery	  of	  Turnbull	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  mostly	  abandoned	  and	  Mixed	  Commission	  
judge	  George	  Canning	  Backhouse’s	  diary	  records	  evidence	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	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  Ibid,	  p.	  286.	  
139	  Ibid,	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British	  officials	  as	  domestic	  servants	  in	  the	  1850s.141	  The	  illegal	  trade	  in	  enslaved	  
Africans	  to	  Cuba	  would	  continue,	  and	  even	  expand,	  throughout	  the	  1850s,	  a	  fact	  that	  
garnered	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  from	  British	  abolitionists.142	  David	  Murray	  has	  
argued	  that	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  finally	  ending	  the	  Cuban	  
trade	  as	  American	  fitting	  out	  of	  slave	  ships	  almost	  ceased	  and	  more	  British	  naval	  ships	  
were	  committed	  to	  suppression	  in	  the	  Caribbean.	  Finally,	  a	  Spanish	  Slave	  Trade	  Bill	  of	  
1866	  increased	  Cuban	  powers	  to	  prosecute	  slavers,	  though	  there	  would	  be	  no	  recorded	  
landing	  of	  slave	  ships	  after	  its	  promulgation.143	  
Conclusion	  
Many	  of	  the	  themes	  addressed	  in	  this	  chapter	  came	  together	  in	  Zulueta’s	  1844	  ‘Address	  
to	  the	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  of	  Britain’.	  This	  text	  was	  intended	  to	  both	  
vindicate	  its	  author	  as	  innocent,	  but	  also	  to	  represent	  the	  proceedings	  as	  a	  potential	  
threat	  to	  his	  ‘brother	  merchants’.144	  This	  work	  also	  included	  all	  the	  defences	  that	  other	  
merchants	  had	  publicly	  and	  privately	  used	  to	  defend	  links	  to	  slavery.	  Zulueta	  invoked	  
ignorance	  of	  his	  trading	  partner’s	  intentions	  claiming	  ‘it	  most	  frequently	  happens,	  that	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  trade	  carried	  on	  at	  that	  particular	  port	  is	  very	  imperfectly	  or	  rather	  
not	  at	  all	  known.’145	  He	  also	  championed	  the	  benefits	  of	  overseas	  trade	  arguing	  that	  
merchants	  not	  only	  advanced	  civilization	  and	  commerce	  together,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  
made	  a	  vital	  contribution	  to	  the	  country	  through	  the	  revenues	  generated	  by	  levies	  on	  
imports	  and	  exports.146	  Zulueta’s	  address	  took	  the	  arguments	  seen	  throughout	  this	  
chapter	  to	  their	  logical	  extent	  by	  arguing	  that	  his	  prosecution	  meant	  that	  any	  merchant	  
who	  traded	  with	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world	  were	  slavery	  existed	  was	  similarly	  at	  risk.	  In	  doing	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so	  he	  dissolved	  the	  boundary	  between	  legitimate	  and	  nefarious	  commerce	  and	  framed	  
the	  problem	  of	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  as	  an	  all	  or	  nothing	  question.	  	  
Zulueta’s	  trial	  and	  its	  fallout	  attracted	  press	  interest	  from	  both	  supporters	  and	  
detractors.	  Unsurprisingly	  the	  BFASS’s	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter	  paid	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
attention	  to	  the	  case,	  as	  did	  publications	  such	  as	  The	  Patriot,	  published	  by	  the	  
abolitionist	  Joseph	  Pease.147	  But,	  the	  most	  common	  reaction	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  
support	  for	  Zulueta	  and	  the	  use	  of	  his	  case	  to	  champion	  free	  trade	  and	  laissez-­‐faire	  
ideals.	  This	  was	  the	  line	  of	  The	  Economist,	  which	  argued	  that	  prosecutions	  against	  
British	  merchants	  were	  meaningless	  and	  the	  real	  answer	  would	  be	  removal	  of	  the	  
sugar	  duties.148	  Elsewhere	  the	  periodical	  John	  Bull	  interpreted	  the	  failure	  of	  Zulueta’s	  
prosecution	  as	  anti-­‐slavery	  meeting	  with	  ‘public	  reason’	  whereas	  Zulueta	  himself	  was	  
praised	  as	  ‘manly	  and	  temperate.’149	  John	  Bull	  would	  continue	  to	  bang	  this	  drum	  for	  
some	  time	  and	  in	  a	  later	  issue	  repeated	  Forster’s	  assertion	  that	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  British	  
merchants	  who	  did	  the	  most	  to	  further	  the	  cause	  of	  suppression.150	  Similar	  opinions	  
were	  put	  forth	  in	  The	  Spectator	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  defence	  of	  merchants	  like	  
Zulueta	  was	  often	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  a	  critique	  of	  abolitionism.151	  These	  
publications	  echoed	  the	  suggestion	  that	  attempts	  to	  moralise	  commercial	  activity	  
through	  government	  regulation	  or	  prosecutions	  were	  irrational,	  and	  did	  little	  to	  aid	  the	  
campaign	  against	  the	  slave	  trade.	  	  
It	  is	  tempting	  to	  see	  the	  various	  controversies	  over	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  as	  a	  
contest	  between	  commerce	  and	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Such	  a	  reading	  might	  naturally	  lead	  to	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  commercial	  goals	  and	  pecuniary	  desires	  won	  the	  day.	  More	  nuanced	  
approaches,	  such	  as	  David	  Eltis’	  suggestion	  of	  the	  ‘ambivalence	  of	  suppression’	  has	  
argued	  that	  suppression	  required	  a	  questioning	  of	  the	  respect	  for	  property	  and	  laissez	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faire	  principals	  that	  underpinned	  Victorian	  politics.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  much	  to	  
recommend	  Eltis’s	  view	  this	  chapter	  has	  taken	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach,	  one	  that	  
might	  be	  seen	  as	  opening	  the	  way	  to	  discuss,	  what	  might	  be	  called,	  the	  ‘ambivalence	  of	  
commerce.’	  It	  has	  done	  so	  by	  looking	  how	  the	  boundary	  between	  legitimate	  and	  
nefarious	  commerce	  was	  negotiated	  between	  merchants	  and	  their	  critics.	  
By	  using	  the	  term	  ambivalence	  of	  commerce	  I	  mean	  to	  propose	  that	  the	  commercial	  
links	  of	  British	  merchants	  to	  slave	  traders	  could	  cut	  both	  ways.	  Drawing	  from	  the	  same	  
evidence	  interlocutors	  in	  the	  debate	  could	  represent	  mercantile	  government	  in	  West	  
Africa	  as	  corrupting	  or	  civilizing.	  Likewise,	  in	  Cuba	  the	  belief	  that	  commerce	  required	  
dealing	  with	  slave	  traders	  could	  be	  used	  to	  argue	  for	  or	  against	  appointing	  an	  
abolitionist	  consul.	  Merchants	  met	  every	  critique	  of	  their	  behaviour	  and	  suggestion	  
that	  they	  were	  driven	  only	  by	  avarice	  with	  claims	  that	  they	  actually	  had	  the	  true	  
interests	  of	  Britain	  at	  heart.	  Allied	  to	  this	  was	  the	  constant	  assertion	  that	  governmental	  
interference	  in	  trade	  in	  Africa,	  Cuba,	  or	  Brazil	  would	  damage	  any	  commercial	  
aspirations	  for	  these	  places.	  Whilst	  the	  government	  sought	  to	  balance	  suppression	  and	  
commerce	  merchants	  responded	  with	  a	  totalising	  discourse.	  
The	  various	  means	  by	  which	  merchants	  defended	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  reveal	  
the	  nuances	  of	  British	  economic	  culture.	  It	  was	  never	  enough	  to	  simply	  demonstrate	  
that	  a	  certain	  branch	  of	  trade	  was	  profitable	  and	  would	  be	  harmed	  by	  government	  
interference.	  In	  the	  West	  African	  context	  merchants	  represented	  their	  trade	  as	  
promoting	  anti-­‐slavery,	  to	  do	  so	  required	  an	  assertion	  that	  commercial	  men	  knew	  
more	  about	  West	  African	  consumers	  than	  their	  metropolitan	  critics.	  	  Elsewhere	  
merchants	  showed	  a	  keen	  awareness	  of	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  their	  public	  reputation.	  
Thomas	  Lloyd	  hoped	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  his	  own	  character	  and	  the	  trust	  
relationships	  through	  which	  his	  business	  functioned,	  whilst	  Carruthers’	  rooted	  their	  
defence	  in	  the	  good	  reputation	  of	  other	  firms.	  Geography	  was	  key	  in	  both	  these	  cases	  as	  
the	  implicit	  suggestion	  was	  that	  those	  outside	  the	  British	  metropole,	  whether	  they	  be	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African	  consumers	  or	  Cuban	  merchants	  could	  not	  be	  held	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  standards	  
as	  Britons.	  In	  defending	  their	  commerce	  as	  legitimate	  merchants	  sought	  to	  position	  
themselves	  as	  possessing	  more	  accurate	  knowledge	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  trade	  in	  
Havana,	  the	  Gambia,	  or	  Brazil.	  
In	  the	  war	  of	  representation	  over	  supplying	  the	  slave	  trade,	  vice	  could	  be	  transformed	  
into	  virtue.	  Therefore,	  Searle’s	  assertion	  that	  slavery	  was	  the	  dividing	  line	  between	  
legitimate	  and	  nefarious	  commerce	  has	  to	  be	  reassessed.	  This	  belief	  may	  have	  been	  
held	  by	  abolitionists	  and	  the	  government	  tried	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  to	  prosecute	  
those	  offenders	  whose	  links	  to	  slavery	  were	  the	  most	  explicit.	  These	  attempts	  always	  
resulted	  in	  failure.	  As	  the	  cases	  of	  Zulueta,	  Forster,	  and	  other	  merchants,	  made	  clear	  an	  
extension	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  did	  not	  equate	  to	  legal	  liability.	  Links	  to	  slavery	  then	  
might	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  abolitionists	  and	  politicians	  to	  criticise	  merchants,	  but	  this	  
criticism	  could	  not	  go	  much	  further.	  All	  that	  could	  be	  done	  was	  to	  promulgate	  warnings	  
and	  plead	  with	  merchants	  to	  exercise	  self-­‐restraint	  in	  dealings	  with	  slave	  traders.	  
Supplying	  the	  slave	  trade	  could	  always	  be	  defended	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent.	  
Perhaps,	  then,	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  world	  it	  was	  only	  ownership	  of	  slaves	  that	  
could	  be	  universally	  condemned.	  Yet,	  as	  my	  next	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate,	  even	  this	  




Chapter	  IV:	  ‘Drawing	  the	  Line’:	  Legitimising	  British	  Slave-­‐ownership	  after	  
Emancipation.	  
In	  the	  summer	  of	  1843	  veteran	  abolitionist	  Lord	  Henry	  Brougham	  introduced	  a	  bill	  
aimed	  at	  curbing	  the	  involvement	  of	  British	  subjects	  in	  slavery.	  	  A	  decade	  previously	  
the	  British	  government	  had	  paid	  out	  £20	  million	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  ending	  slave-­‐
ownership	  by	  its	  subjects.	  Yet,	  British	  ownership	  of	  slaves	  was	  not	  simply	  contained	  
within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  Empire.	  Emigration,	  investment,	  and	  transnational	  commerce	  
meant	  that	  many	  Britons	  continued	  to	  acquire	  slave	  property	  overseas	  after	  1833.	  
There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  British	  subjects	  owned	  slaves	  overseas,	  but	  Brougham	  hoped	  
to	  question	  the	  distinction	  between	  slave-­‐owner	  and	  slave	  trader.	  Was	  the	  plantation	  
owner	  who	  acquired	  slaves	  in	  the	  port	  of	  Rio	  any	  different	  from	  the	  man	  who	  
purchased	  the	  same	  individuals	  in	  West	  Africa?	  And	  if	  he	  was,	  as	  Brougham	  put	  it,	  ‘How	  
was	  the	  line	  to	  be	  drawn?’1	  
	  This	  chapter	  uses	  Brougham’s	  bill,	  which	  would	  be	  passed	  into	  law	  as	  the	  1843	  Act	  for	  
the	  More	  Effectual	  Suppression	  of	  the	  Slave	  Trade,	  to	  frame	  a	  discussion	  of	  British	  
slave-­‐ownership	  after	  emancipation.	  The	  line	  between	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable	  
forms	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  was	  drawn	  not	  only	  by	  abolitionists,	  parliamentarians,	  and	  
government	  officials,	  but	  also	  by	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  who	  attempted	  to	  legitimise	  
their	  slave	  property	  through	  lobbying	  for,	  and	  then	  exploiting,	  concessions	  in	  the	  1843	  
Act.	  Despite	  technically	  outlawing	  the	  purchase	  and	  sale	  of	  slaves	  by	  British	  subjects	  
throughout	  the	  world	  the	  1843	  Act	  recognised	  property	  held	  by	  existing	  slave-­‐owners.	  
The	  debates	  over	  the	  1843	  Act,	  then,	  reveal	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  certain	  forms	  of	  slave-­‐
ownership	  were	  justified,	  and	  contested,	  in	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  this	  
legitimation	  was	  secured	  by	  examining	  the	  claims	  made	  in	  defence	  of	  slave-­‐ownership.	  
The	  Act	  affirmed	  the	  acceptability	  of	  slave	  property	  purchased	  prior	  to	  1843	  as	  well	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hansard,	  7	  July	  1843,	  3rd	  series	  vol.	  70,	  c.	  739.	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the	  acquisition	  of	  slaves	  via	  inheritance	  and	  the	  hiring	  of	  slaves,	  whilst	  the	  issue	  of	  
mortgaging	  slave	  property	  remained	  ambiguous.	  These	  forms	  of	  “acceptable”	  slave-­‐
ownership	  did	  not	  go	  uncontested	  and	  there	  were	  sporadic	  instants	  when	  the	  awkward	  
realities	  of	  slave	  ownership	  came	  to	  light.	  I	  will	  explore	  these	  brief	  moments	  of	  
contestation,	  usually	  emanating	  from	  the	  British	  and	  Foreign	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Society,	  and	  
the	  difficult	  questions	  slave-­‐ownership	  posed	  for	  the	  Foreign	  and	  Colonial	  Offices.	  
The	  1843	  Act	  is	  a	  little	  heralded	  and	  oft	  overlooked	  piece	  of	  legislation,	  but	  it	  captures	  
key	  aspects	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  Inspired	  in	  part	  by	  the	  debates	  discussed	  in	  
chapters	  one	  and	  two,	  the	  1843	  Act	  looked	  to	  curb	  all	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  slave	  
trade.	  Brougham’s	  intention	  in	  prohibiting	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  overseas	  was	  
justified	  as	  preventing	  ‘a	  competition	  of	  English	  capital	  against	  English	  colonists’	  and	  
consolidating	  previous	  slave	  trade	  acts.2	  The	  British	  government’s	  primary	  interest	  
was	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  interference	  with	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  slave	  societies	  
was	  rare.	  However,	  British	  officials	  in	  slave	  states	  were	  often	  activist	  in	  promoting	  anti-­‐
slavery	  and	  from	  1843	  this	  included	  highlighting	  examples	  of	  British	  slave-­‐ownership.3	  
Chris	  Evans,	  in	  one	  of	  the	  few	  articles	  on	  the	  1843	  Act,	  cast	  it	  as	  ‘ineffectual	  and	  
unloved’	  by	  contemporaries.4	  However,	  Brougham’s	  original	  bill	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  
much	  protest	  and	  would	  have	  some	  of	  its	  clauses	  removed	  before	  coming	  before	  the	  
Commons.	  As	  such	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  Brougham’s	  Bill	  and	  the	  1843	  Act	  as	  distinct	  entities.	  I	  
will	  also	  show	  that	  on	  a	  few	  occasions,	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  activist	  officials	  and	  in	  the	  right	  
circumstances,	  the	  1843	  Act	  was	  not	  entirely	  a	  dead	  letter.	  
This	  chapter	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  after	  the	  1843	  Act	  or	  quantify	  the	  number	  of	  people	  held	  in	  bondage	  by	  
British	  subjects.	  The	  latter	  objective	  is	  near	  impossible,	  though	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  did	  
try	  to	  acquire	  estimates	  from	  overseas	  consuls	  in	  1848.	  At	  that	  point	  consuls	  estimated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ibid,	  cc.	  736-­‐7.	  
3	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  pp.	  40-­‐65.	  
4	  C.	  Evans,	  ‘Brazilian	  Gold’,	  pp.	  118-­‐134.	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3,500	  British	  owned	  slaves	  in	  Brazil	  and	  the	  Havana	  consul	  named	  at	  least	  32	  British	  
slave-­‐owners	  in	  Cuba.5	  Whilst,	  these	  numbers	  represent	  a	  tiny	  proportion	  of	  slave-­‐
owners	  in	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba	  they	  still	  posed	  awkward	  questions	  about	  Britons’	  and	  the	  
British	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  smaller	  Caribbean	  
nations	  Britons	  made	  up	  a	  significant	  and	  influential	  part	  of	  the	  slave-­‐owning	  
population.	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  left	  little	  historical	  
evidence	  though	  emigration	  and	  commercial	  connections	  mean	  that	  Britons	  certainly	  
acquired	  slave	  property	  in	  America.6	  In	  1844	  the	  British	  consul	  in	  Savannah	  inquired	  
about	  the	  legality	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  a	  British	  subject	  who	  had	  become	  naturalised	  
American	  citizen,	  but	  he	  failed	  to	  name	  the	  individual.7	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  section	  two	  
British	  financiers	  certainly	  had	  an	  economic	  stake	  in	  American	  slavery,	  but	  became	  less	  
likely	  to	  acquire	  slave	  property	  after	  the	  “Panic	  of	  1837”.	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  exact	  figures	  
of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  overseas	  a	  different	  approach	  focusing	  on	  the	  few	  slave-­‐owners	  
who	  stuck	  their	  head	  above	  the	  parapet	  better	  serves	  my	  purpose.	  This	  chapter	  then	  
will	  be	  split	  into	  three	  sections	  focused	  on	  inherited	  slave	  property,	  mortgages	  on	  
slaves,	  and	  slaves	  owned	  by	  joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies.	  Each	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  slave	  
property	  were	  partially	  legitimised	  by	  concessions	  made	  in	  the	  1843	  Act,	  and	  here	  I	  
explore	  how	  this	  legitimacy	  was	  both	  constructed	  and	  contested	  in	  the	  decades	  that	  
followed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  J.	  C.	  Westwood	  to	  Palmerston,	  28	  Dec	  1848,	  J.	  Crawford	  to	  Palmerston,	  31	  Dec	  1848,	  in	  
Correspondence	  with	  British	  Ministers	  and	  Agents	  in	  Foreign	  Countries,	  and	  with	  Foreign	  
Ministers	  in	  England,	  on	  Slave	  Trade,	  1848-­‐49	  (Class	  B),	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  1128	  (1849),	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  303;	  For	  an	  in	  
depth	  discussion	  of	  this	  census	  see	  J.	  Mulhern,	  ‘Britain,	  the	  British	  and	  Labour	  in	  Brazil,	  c.	  1830-­‐
1888’,	  Durham	  University	  PhD	  thesis,	  forthcoming	  2017,	  chapter	  4.	  Thank	  you	  to	  the	  author	  for	  
the	  advance	  sight	  of	  his	  research.	  
6	  230,800	  Britons	  left	  for	  America	  emigrated	  in	  the	  period	  1853-­‐60	  alone,	  see:	  Magee,	  
Thompson,	  Empire	  and	  Globalization,	  p.	  64.	  For	  evidence	  of	  two	  British	  emigrant	  slave-­‐owners	  
see	  C.	  Erickson,	  Invisible	  Immigrants:	  The	  Adaptation	  of	  English	  and	  Scottish	  Immigrants	  in	  
Nineteenth-­‐Century	  (London:	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  1971),	  p.38,	  
p.75,	  pp.	  129-­‐133.	  
7	  E.	  Molyneux,	  to	  Aberdeen,	  2	  Feb	  1844,	  in	  ‘Correspondence	  with	  Foreign	  Powers,	  not	  Parties	  to	  
Treaties	  or	  Conventions	  giving	  Mutual	  Right	  of	  Search	  of	  Vessels	  suspected	  of	  Slave	  Trade’,	  
1844	  (Class	  D),	  PP,	  635	  (1844),	  p.	  139.	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The	  key	  concession	  of	  both	  Brougham’s	  bill	  and	  the	  1843	  Act	  was	  the	  recognition	  of	  all	  
extant	  slave	  property	  as	  legitimate.	  As	  such	  the	  1843	  Act	  can	  be	  conceived	  as	  the	  
progeny	  of	  the	  Emancipation	  Act	  of	  1833	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  condemnation	  of	  
slavery	  with	  respect	  for	  property.	  In	  making	  a	  case	  designed	  to	  appeal	  to	  conservatives	  
Brougham	  also	  invoked	  the	  £20	  million	  in	  compensation	  that	  had	  been	  ‘generously,	  but	  
not	  more	  generously	  than	  justly’	  paid	  to	  West	  Indian	  slave-­‐owners.8	  The	  apparent	  
justness	  of	  this	  compensation	  highlighted	  a	  contradiction	  that	  cast	  a	  shadow	  over	  
attempts	  to	  curtail	  British	  slave-­‐owning.	  British	  emancipation	  by	  paying	  recompense	  to	  
slave-­‐owners	  had	  at	  once	  ended	  slavery	  and	  affirmed	  the	  right	  to	  property	  in	  human	  
beings.	  This	  recognition	  of	  property	  rights	  in	  man	  had	  been	  a	  hard	  won	  victory	  for	  
slave-­‐owners	  in	  the	  battle	  over	  emancipation.	  As	  Draper	  has	  demonstrated	  owners	  of	  
human	  beings	  were	  able	  to	  reposition	  themselves	  as	  ‘proprietors’	  and	  ‘land	  owners’	  
first	  and	  foremost.9	  This	  recognition	  that	  it	  had	  been	  possible,	  and	  legal,	  for	  British	  
subjects	  to	  own	  human	  beings	  meant	  that	  certain	  concessions	  had	  to	  be	  made.	  
Brougham	  could	  not	  hope	  to	  immediately	  declare	  all	  British	  owned	  slave	  property	  
illegitimate.	  Instead	  he	  conceded	  that	  any	  slave	  purchased	  before	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  bill	  
would	  be	  considered	  legal	  -­‐	  an	  allowance	  he	  claimed	  had	  been	  ‘warmly	  opposed	  by	  
other	  abolitionists.’10	  Brougham	  also	  conceded	  that	  ‘a	  British	  subject	  might	  become	  
possessed	  of	  slaves	  without	  any	  voluntary	  act	  of	  his	  own.’11	  This	  concession	  and	  the	  
stress	  on	  voluntarily	  acquiring	  slave	  property	  echoes	  the	  laws	  against	  supplying	  the	  
slave	  trade,	  which	  rested	  upon	  proving	  the	  intention	  of	  perpetrators.	  The	  sanctity	  of	  
private	  property	  and	  the	  passive	  acquisition	  of	  slave	  property	  would	  become	  key	  
pillars	  of	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  slave-­‐owners’	  claim	  to	  legitimacy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Hansard,	  7	  July	  1843,	  3rd	  series	  vol.	  70,	  c.	  736.	  
9	  Draper,	  Price	  of	  Emancipation,	  pp.	  78-­‐80.	  




The	  ways	  in	  which	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  legitimised	  their	  slave	  property	  can	  be	  
understood	  in	  relation	  to	  defences	  of	  slavery	  offered	  prior	  to	  emancipation.	  Bankers,	  
mining	  companies,	  and	  overseas	  plantation	  owners	  all	  stressed	  the	  necessity	  of	  slave	  
property	  in	  their	  specific	  circumstances,	  despite	  being	  united	  in	  their	  professed	  
opposition	  to	  slavery.	  Rather	  than	  pro-­‐slavery	  the	  critiques	  of	  prohibitions	  on	  British	  
slave-­‐ownership	  can	  be	  categorised	  as	  ‘anti-­‐abolitionist’	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Paula	  Dumas	  
in	  her	  recent	  survey	  of	  pro-­‐slavery	  opinion.12	  Whilst	  these	  anti-­‐abolitionists	  all	  
defended	  their	  specific	  form	  of	  slave	  property,	  their	  rhetoric	  drew	  on	  similar	  themes.	  
First	  and	  foremost	  apologists	  stressed	  the	  necessity	  of	  slave	  property	  in	  each	  
circumstance,	  often	  by	  invoking	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  labour	  or	  property.	  
Allied	  to	  this	  was	  the	  recurring	  claim	  that	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  was	  more	  benign	  
than	  that	  of	  foreigners,	  be	  they	  Cuban,	  Brazilian,	  or	  anything	  else.	  Such	  claims	  rested	  on	  
assumptions	  of	  British	  moral	  superiority,	  often	  shared	  by	  abolitionists,	  which	  had	  been	  
forged	  during	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  debate	  over	  the	  slave	  trade.13	  Property	  rights,	  
necessity,	  and	  British	  moral	  superiority	  were	  all	  part	  of	  what	  Michael	  Taylor	  has	  
described	  as	  the	  ‘intellectual	  toolkit’	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners.14	  Deploying	  this	  toolkit	  to	  
defend	  slave-­‐ownership	  elsewhere	  rested	  on	  slave-­‐owners	  ability	  to	  shape	  
metropolitan	  knowledge	  about	  the	  slave	  economies	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  world.	  	  
Slave-­‐ownership	  was	  not	  simply	  defended	  in	  the	  abstract.	  As	  David	  Lambert	  has	  
argued	  for	  the	  pre-­‐emancipation	  period	  pro-­‐slavery,	  or	  anti-­‐abolitionism,	  was	  also	  a	  
material	  and	  social	  practice.	  Whilst	  post-­‐emancipation	  slave-­‐owners	  lacked	  an	  
organised	  parliamentary	  presence	  like	  the	  West	  India	  interest	  they	  made	  use	  of	  the	  
same	  tactics	  of	  petitioning	  and	  lobbying	  MPs	  that	  had	  been	  utilised	  by	  West	  Indian	  
slave-­‐owners.	  Britons	  also	  sought	  to	  restrict	  the	  information	  about	  how	  many	  slaves	  
they	  owned	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  alternative	  sources	  of	  labour	  in	  Cuba,	  Brazil,	  or	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Dumas,	  Proslavery	  Britain,	  pp.	  1-­‐6.	  
13	  Swaminathan,	  Debating	  the	  Slave	  Trade,	  p.	  204.	  
14	  Taylor,	  ‘Conservative	  Political	  Economy’,	  p.	  975.	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Caribbean.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  practically	  undermined	  the	  critiques	  of	  abolitionists	  and	  
government	  officials.	  By	  highlighting	  these	  practices	  and	  the	  individuals	  involved	  I	  
propose	  that	  post-­‐emancipation	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  be	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  ‘counter-­‐revolutionary	  Atlantic’	  in	  their	  commitment	  to	  defending	  property	  rights	  
and	  the	  right	  of	  compensation.	  15	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  was	  also	  shaped	  by	  the	  1843	  
Act	  as	  British	  subjects	  found	  new	  ways	  to	  legally	  acquire	  slave	  property	  or	  maintain	  an	  
unfree	  workforce.	  Through	  such	  action,	  Brougham’s	  line	  between	  acceptable	  and	  
unacceptable	  slave-­‐ownership	  would	  be	  moved,	  altered,	  and	  at	  times	  erased.	  
Compensation	  and	  Counter-­‐Revolution	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  
From	  its	  inception,	  the	  1843	  Act	  affirmed	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  acquiring	  slave	  property	  via	  
inheritance	  or	  marriage	  agreement.	  In	  such	  instances	  enslaved	  people	  could	  be	  
conceptualised	  as	  being	  forced	  upon	  unfortunate	  heirs	  through	  no	  wrong	  of	  their	  own.	  
Brougham	  himself	  endorsed	  this	  position	  in	  1845	  stating	  that	  owners	  of	  slaves	  
overseas	  ‘should	  be	  made	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  great	  delicacy	  of	  the	  predicament	  in	  which	  
they,	  perhaps	  unconsciously,	  stood.’16	  These	  slave-­‐owners	  resided	  both	  in	  Britain	  and	  a	  
number	  of	  Caribbean	  colonies.	  In	  some	  cases,	  specifically	  in	  the	  Dutch	  and	  Danish	  West	  
Indies,	  they	  made	  up	  a	  very	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  slave-­‐owning	  population.	  The	  
‘delicate	  predicament’	  adverted	  to	  by	  Brougham	  would	  raise	  awkward	  questions	  for	  
the	  government	  from	  the	  1840s	  onwards.	  This	  section	  explores	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  in	  Surinam	  and	  St.	  Croix	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  slave-­‐owners	  dealt	  with	  
abolitionist	  critique	  and	  the	  looming	  threat	  of	  emancipation.	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  
defended	  their	  human	  property	  by	  positioning	  themselves	  as	  primarily	  being	  
landowners	  and	  campaigning	  for	  a	  compensated	  emancipation.	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  some	  
contexts	  British	  emancipation	  had	  a	  fundamentally	  conservative	  legacy,	  as	  ideas	  and	  
practices	  employed	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  British	  slavery	  were	  redeployed	  in	  new	  arenas.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  D.	  Lambert,	  ‘The	  Counter-­‐Revolutionary	  Atlantic:	  White	  West	  Indian	  Petitions	  and	  Proslavery	  
Networks’,	  Social	  &	  Cultural	  Geography,	  6:3	  (2005),	  pp.	  405-­‐420,	  pp.	  406-­‐7.	  
16	  Hansard,	  20	  July	  1855,	  3rd	  series	  vol.	  139,	  c.	  1197.	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Whilst	  the	  scale	  of	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  outside	  of	  the	  Empire	  is	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  
its	  presence	  in	  certain	  sites	  can	  be	  effectively	  demonstrated.	  The	  Legacies	  of	  British	  
Slave-­‐ownership	  database	  (LBS),	  through	  its	  examination	  of	  wills	  and	  probate	  records	  
has	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  recipients	  of	  compensation	  who	  also	  held	  slave	  property	  
outside	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  here	  are	  British	  subjects	  who	  
possessed	  or	  had	  links	  to	  slave	  property	  in	  the	  Dutch	  colony	  of	  Surinam.	  The	  LBS	  
contains	  details	  of	  thirty-­‐nine	  individuals	  who	  have	  links	  to	  slave	  property	  in	  
Surinam.17	  Whilst	  this	  represents	  a	  tiny	  number	  of	  the	  47,000	  individuals	  in	  the	  
database	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  the	  3,000	  of	  primary	  interest,	  they	  nonetheless	  illustrate	  that	  
British	  subjects	  owned	  slaves	  outside	  of	  the	  empire	  and,	  more	  importantly	  continued	  
to	  do	  so	  post-­‐emancipation.18	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  did	  represent	  a	  
significant	  minority	  in	  Surinam	  and	  their	  actions	  as	  slave-­‐owners	  both	  contradicted	  the	  
image	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain	  and	  their	  own	  representation	  as	  passive	  or	  involuntary	  
owners	  of	  slave	  property.	  
The	  presence	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  tumultuous	  
conflict	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  Wars.	  Britain	  had	  occupied	  Surinam	  between	  1799	  and	  1802,	  
and	  then	  again	  from	  1804	  to	  1816.	  In	  this	  period	  trade	  was	  opened	  up	  to	  all	  British	  
subjects,	  increasing	  the	  commercial	  possibilities	  of	  the	  colony.19	  Whilst	  Surinam	  was	  
returned	  to	  the	  Dutch	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  its	  Nickerie	  district,	  named	  after	  a	  local	  
river,	  was	  largely	  made	  up	  of	  English	  planters	  who	  had	  resided	  there	  since	  the	  late	  
eighteenth	  century.	  These	  planters	  owned	  around	  1,500	  slaves	  between	  them.	  They	  
successfully	  petitioned	  the	  English	  government	  for	  the	  right	  of	  free	  export	  and	  import	  
of	  commodities	  to	  British	  colonies,	  a	  similar	  privilege	  having	  been	  granted	  to	  the	  Dutch	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Legacies	  of	  British	  Slave-­‐Ownership	  database	  (hereafter	  LBS).	  
[https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/search/,	  accessed	  12	  Sep	  2017]	  Thanks	  you	  to	  Dr.	  Nicholas	  Draper	  
for	  drawing	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam.	  
18	  K.	  McClelland,	  ‘Appendix	  3:	  A	  note	  on	  the	  database’	  in	  C.	  Hall,	  N.	  Draper,	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Legacies	  of	  
British	  Slave-­‐Ownership:	  Colonial	  Slavery	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  Victorian	  Britain	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2014).	  
19	  C.	  Goslinga,	  The	  Dutch	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  Surinam,	  1791/5-­‐1942	  (Maastricht:	  Van	  Gorcum,	  
1990),	  p.	  170.	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in	  neighbouring	  Berbice	  and	  Guiana.20	  This	  close	  geographic	  proximity	  and	  openness	  of	  
trade	  appears	  to	  have	  facilitated	  movement	  into	  the	  Dutch	  property	  by	  British	  subjects	  
from	  Crown	  colonies	  who	  had	  experienced	  compensated	  emancipation.	  Of	  the	  thirty-­‐
nine	  individuals	  with	  links	  to	  Surinam	  in	  LBS,	  nineteen	  had	  previously	  owned	  property	  
in	  nearby	  colonies	  like	  Guiana,	  Berbice,	  and	  Demerara.	  At	  least	  some	  appear	  to	  have	  
relocated	  to	  Surinam	  from	  the	  1820s	  onwards	  potentially	  due	  to	  a	  concern	  that	  
emancipation	  was	  on	  the	  horizon.	  For	  example,	  in	  1836	  Hugh	  McLeod	  moved,	  with	  his	  
nephew	  and	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  Hugh	  Wright,	  from	  Demerara	  to	  Surinam,	  where	  he	  became	  a	  
slave-­‐owner.21	  As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  appeared	  to	  have	  brought	  
not	  only	  their	  capital	  to	  Surinam	  but	  also	  a	  commitment	  to	  compensated	  emancipation.	  	  
By	  the	  time	  the	  1843	  Act	  had	  passed	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  were	  well	  established	  in	  
Surinam	  and	  a	  known	  quantity	  to	  government.	  In	  fact	  the	  mid-­‐1840s	  witnessed	  a	  
number	  of	  conflicts	  between	  the	  British	  community	  and	  consul	  Edward	  Schenley,	  who	  
was	  particularly	  activist	  in	  his	  pursuit	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  In	  1845	  Schenley	  informed	  
Aberdeen	  of	  'acts	  of	  cruelty’	  committed	  towards	  slaves	  on	  the	  Kent	  Estate	  belonging	  to	  
Sir	  William	  Young,	  by	  an	  attorney	  who	  was	  also	  British.22	  The	  employment	  of	  British	  
overseers	  was	  common	  in	  Surinam	  as	  an	  1859	  consular	  report	  attested	  absentee	  
British	  slave-­‐owners	  preferred	  other	  Britons	  to	  manage	  their	  estates	  ‘seldom	  liking	  to	  
have	  foreigners	  to	  do	  with	  them.’23	  Schenley’s	  criticisms	  garnered	  protests	  from	  both	  
the	  governor	  of	  Surinam	  and	  the	  British	  subjects	  resident	  there,	  but	  he	  remained	  
confident	  that	  ‘the	  dread	  of	  publicity	  &	  public	  opinion	  has	  at	  length	  commenced	  its	  
powerful	  operation	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  poor	  negro'.24	  Schenley	  also	  raised	  concerns	  with	  
the	  Foreign	  Office	  that	  some	  British	  subjects	  had	  illegally	  imported	  slaves	  during	  the	  
1820s	  accusing	  British	  subject	  Alexander	  Ferrier	  of	  contravening	  an	  1818	  treaty	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Ibid,	  pp.	  180-­‐181.	  
21	  'Hugh	  Macleod',	  LBS.	  [http://wwwdepts-­‐live.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/7594,	  accessed	  8	  
Dec	  2016]	  
22	  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  4	  Jan	  1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565.	  
23	  	  ‘Report	  on	  the	  Consular	  District	  of	  Surinam’,	  30	  Apr	  1859,	  TNA:	  FO	  37-­‐376.	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  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  20	  Jan	  1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565.	  
168	  
	  
had	  abolished	  the	  Dutch	  slave	  trade.25	  The	  consul	  also	  championed	  the	  rights	  of	  
enslaved	  people	  who	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  moved	  from	  British	  colonies	  by	  their	  
owners	  to	  Surinam.	  Schenley	  argued	  that	  these	  individuals,	  such	  as	  the	  “mulatto	  John	  
Cleaver”	  from	  St.	  Kitts,	  were	  free	  British	  subjects	  who	  had	  been	  re-­‐enslaved	  through	  
their	  relocation	  to	  Surinam.26	  Whilst	  the	  Earl	  of	  Aberdeen	  did	  remonstrate	  with	  the	  
Dutch	  government	  over	  these	  cases,	  Schenley	  was	  advised	  that	  there	  was	  little	  that	  
could	  be	  done	  from	  a	  legal	  standpoint.	  Schenley	  would	  ultimately	  purchase	  Cleaver	  and	  
manumit	  him,	  as	  well	  as	  arranging	  his	  travel	  out	  of	  Surinam	  to	  avoid	  potential	  re-­‐
enslavement.27	  Thus	  it	  would	  appear	  some	  slave-­‐owners	  moved	  people	  as	  well	  as	  
capital	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  avoid	  emancipation.	  Despite	  these	  controversies	  the	  vast	  
majority	  of	  British-­‐owned	  slaves	  in	  Surinam	  were	  perceived	  as	  having	  been	  
legitimately	  acquired	  prior	  to	  the	  1843	  Act.	  However,	  for	  some	  abolitionists	  the	  
existence	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  set	  a	  moral	  
example.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  the	  BFASS,	  who	  saw	  the	  existence	  of	  slave-­‐owners	  
overseas	  as	  a	  source	  of	  national	  embarrassment,	  believed	  in	  the	  power	  of	  public	  
discussion	  and	  moral	  suasion.	  This	  strategy	  characterised	  their	  approach	  to	  the	  
Surinam	  question.	  An	  1844	  editorial	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter	  reeled	  off	  a	  list	  of	  
British	  sounding	  names	  gleaned	  from	  the	  ‘Surinam	  Almanack’.	  Whilst	  the	  BFASS’s	  use	  
of	  such	  texts	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  imperfect	  information	  available	  
about	  Surinam	  many	  of	  the	  names	  identified,	  such	  as	  ‘Balfour’,	  ‘Carstairs’,	  and	  ‘Parry’,	  
correspond	  to	  the	  slave-­‐owners	  identified	  by	  LBS.28	  The	  Reporter	  estimated	  that	  British	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  01	  Feb	  1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565;	  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  14	  May	  
1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565.	  
26	  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  04	  Jan	  1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565.	  	  
27	  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  17	  Feb	  1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565;	  E.	  Schenley	  to	  Aberdeen,	  26	  Aug	  
1845,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐565.	  
28	  ‘Editorial’,	  ASR,	  25	  Dec	  1844;	  'W.	  A.	  Carstairs',	  LBS.	  [http://wwwdepts-­‐
live.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/2146648665,	  accessed	  5	  Aug	  2017];	  'James	  Balfour	  of	  Surinam',	  
LBS.	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  accessed	  12	  Sep	  2017];	  
169	  
	  
subjects	  held	  71	  estates	  and	  around	  7000	  slaves	  in	  Surinam	  at	  this	  point,	  a	  highly	  
significant	  number	  given	  that	  the	  enslaved	  population	  of	  Surinam	  has	  been	  estimated	  
at	  53,072	  in	  1833	  and	  38,592	  in	  1855.29	  The	  revelation	  of	  large-­‐scale	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  in	  Surinam	  came	  at	  a	  point	  when	  the	  BFASS	  had	  fixed	  their	  sights	  on	  the	  
Netherlands	  as	  fertile	  ground	  for	  an	  abolitionist	  movement.	  The	  enthusiasm	  to	  foster	  a	  
global	  abolitionist	  movement	  had	  seen	  prominent	  figures	  like	  G.	  W.	  Alexander,	  
Elizabeth	  Fry,	  and	  Samuel	  Gurney	  travel	  to	  Holland	  in	  the	  1840s.	  Whilst	  these	  missions	  
led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  some	  small-­‐scale	  anti-­‐slavery	  societies	  British	  abolitionists	  
misread	  Dutch	  society	  and	  were	  perceived	  as	  condescending	  to	  their	  audience.30	  
British	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  then	  offer	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  win	  over	  the	  Dutch	  to	  the	  
abolitionist	  cause	  and	  as	  the	  Reporter	  noted	  they	  ‘possess[ed]	  an	  influence	  which	  might	  
be	  most	  beneficially	  directed	  to	  slavery’s	  extinction.'	  Later	  revelations	  that	  ‘one-­‐sixth	  of	  
the	  whole	  agricultural	  property	  of	  Surinam	  may	  be	  in	  …	  English	  hands’	  strengthened	  
this	  conviction	  that	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  provide	  a	  grand	  example	  through	  
emancipation.31	  To	  utilise	  the	  influence	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners,	  the	  BFASS	  attempted	  
to	  delegitimise	  the	  property	  that	  had	  been	  protected	  by	  the	  Act	  of	  1843.	  
The	  BFASS	  sought	  to	  act	  against	  Dutch	  slavery	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  consciences	  of	  
British	  subjects	  through	  a	  Christmas	  day	  address	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter.	  This	  
address	  set	  about	  problematizing	  the	  slave	  property	  of	  these	  British	  subjects	  first	  and	  
foremost	  by	  asserting	  the	  humanity	  of	  the	  slaves	  telling	  them	  ‘you	  thus	  deprive	  human	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  Butler	  Parry’,	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accessed	  12	  Sep	  2017]	  
29	  ‘Editorial’,	  ASR,	  25	  Dec	  1844;	  P.	  C.	  Emmer,	  E.	  van	  den	  Boogaart	  ‘Plantation	  Slavery	  in	  Surinam	  
in	  the	  Last	  Decade	  before	  Emancipation:	  The	  Case	  of	  Catharina	  Sophia’	  in	  P.	  C.	  Emmer	  (ed.)	  The	  
Dutch	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Economy,	  1580-­‐1880:	  Trade,	  Slavery	  and	  Emancipation	  (Ashgate:	  London,	  
1998),	  Table	  	  8.1,	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  181.	  
30	  Janse,	  ’Holland	  as	  a	  Little	  England’,	  pp.	  133-­‐139.	   	  
31	  ‘Editorial’,	  ASR,	  8	  Jan	  1845.	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beings	  …	  of	  their	  personality.’32	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  was	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  respectable	  
slave-­‐owner:	  
Many	  of	  you,	  no	  doubt,	  bear	  a	  fair	  reputation	  amongst	  men	  -­‐	  many	  of	  you	  
endeavour	  to	  reconcile	  your	  treatment	  of	  your	  slaves	  with	  your	  better	  
feelings	  -­‐	  many	  of	  you,	  especially	  non-­‐resident	  proprietors,	  would	  shrink	  
from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  whip	  by	  your	  own	  hands;	  and	  probably,	  to	  ease	  
your	  consciences,	  send	  out	  instructions	  to	  your	  attorney	  and	  agents	  to	  be	  
humane.	  But	  we	  tell	  you	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  humane,	  and	  return	  you	  an	  
income	  such	  as	  you	  may	  require	  at	  their	  hands.33	  
Here,	  the	  Reporter	  explicitly	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  contradiction	  between	  respectability	  
and	  the	  brutality	  of	  slavery.	  By	  focusing	  particularly	  on	  ‘non-­‐resident’	  proprietors	  they	  
redeployed	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  British	  emancipation	  campaign	  where	  absentee	  planters	  
had	  been	  chastised	  for	  their	  inability	  to	  effectively	  ameliorate	  the	  treatment	  of	  slaves.34	  
The	  address	  was	  a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  collapse	  the	  distance	  between	  those	  with	  a	  
‘fair	  reputation’	  and	  their	  slaves,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  passive	  manner	  in	  which	  British	  
subjects	  might	  have	  received	  their	  slave	  property	  and	  the	  violent	  expropriation	  of	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  character	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  capital	  abolitionists	  
would	  have	  hoped	  that	  attacks	  on	  the	  reputation	  of	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  have	  proved	  
effective	  in	  convincing	  Britons	  to	  reject	  slave-­‐ownership.	  
This	  attempt	  to	  remove	  the	  moral	  legitimacy	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  was	  tied	  to	  an	  
assertion	  that	  emancipation	  was	  also	  a	  rational	  economic	  choice.	  Here	  the	  Reporter	  
turned	  to	  demography	  and	  information	  drawn	  from	  the	  Surinam	  Almanack	  and	  works	  
on	  Dutch	  slavery	  by	  G.	  W.	  Alexander.	  The	  Address	  ‘computed	  that	  the	  number	  of	  deaths	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  ‘Address	  of	  the	  Committee	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  British	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  Foreign	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  Society	  to	  British	  Subjects	  
Holding	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  in	  the	  Dutch	  Colony	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surpasses	  the	  number	  of	  births	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  from	  three	  to	  five	  per	  cent	  annually.’35	  
This	  ‘fearful	  fact’	  was	  raised	  to	  give	  an	  objective	  weight	  to	  the	  moral	  cause	  against	  
slavery.36	  The	  Dutch	  government	  had	  itself	  accepted	  the	  inevitability	  of	  slavery	  coming	  
to	  an	  end	  in	  1842	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  to	  Surinam	  had	  led	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  slave	  
numbers,	  if	  not	  productivity.37	  The	  Reporter	  asserted	  that	  ‘emancipation	  may	  save	  you	  
if	  you	  set	  wisely,	  promptly	  and	  zealously	  about	  it.’38	  The	  BFASS	  then	  sought	  to	  offer	  
British	  slaveholders	  a	  chance	  to	  get	  ahead	  of	  the	  curve	  and	  emancipate	  their	  slaves	  safe	  
in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  they	  ‘would	  be	  amply	  compensated	  by	  the	  satisfaction	  it	  would	  
bring	  your	  own	  hearts.’39	  
The	  Reporter	  was	  correct	  to	  identify	  a	  desire	  for	  compensation	  among	  British	  slave-­‐
owners;	  however,	  the	  recompense	  they	  sought	  was	  far	  more	  material	  than	  moral.	  The	  
Christmas	  Address	  prompted	  a	  reply	  that	  stressed	  the	  necessity	  of	  monetary	  
compensation,	  following	  the	  examples	  of	  Britain’s	  own	  colonies.	  In	  a	  letter	  printed	  in	  
the	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter	  ‘A	  Surinam	  Slaveholder	  and	  Subject	  of	  Great	  Britain’	  at	  once	  
professed	  an	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  and	  a	  defence	  of	  his	  own	  slave-­‐ownership.	  Seeking	  
to	  rebut	  the	  economic	  case	  for	  emancipation,	  the	  author	  aired	  his	  concern	  that	  ‘the	  
resignation	  of	  slave	  property	  without	  compensation,	  by	  men,	  who,	  already	  too	  old	  to	  
commence	  a	  new	  life,	  would	  thus	  consign	  themselves	  to	  the	  worst	  description	  of	  
pauperism'.40	  	  This	  was	  paired	  with	  a	  condemnation	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  slavery	  as	  
‘abhorrent	  to	  every	  feeling	  and	  principle	  of	  humanity’.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  ‘Surinam	  
Slaveholder’	  mirrored	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  British	  Emancipation	  of	  1833,	  at	  once	  rejecting	  
slavery	  and	  asserting	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  slave	  property.	  Noting	  that	  Dutch	  slave-­‐owners	  
in	  British	  colonies	  were	  compensated	  after	  1833,	  the	  ‘Surinam	  Slaveholder’	  asked	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  ‘Address’,	  ASR,	  25	  Dec	  1844.	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  Ibid.	  
37	  Janse,	  ’Holland	  as	  a	  Little	  England’,	  pp.	  140-­‐142;	  E.	  Horlings,	  ‘An	  Economic	  Explanation	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  the	  
Late	  Abolition	  of	  Slavery	  in	  Surinam’	  in	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  Years	  Later:	  Antislavery,	  
Capitalism	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  Modernity	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Orbit,	  p.	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38	  ‘Address’,	  ASR,	  25	  Dec	  1844.	  
39	  Ibid.	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  ‘Surinam	  -­‐	  British	  Slaveholders’,	  ASR,	  23	  July	  1845.	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'Shall	  Great	  Britain	  use	  her	  step-­‐sons	  better	  than	  her	  native	  born	  children?'41	  Michael	  
Taylor	  has	  argued	  that	  during	  the	  pre-­‐emancipation	  period	  that	  ‘historically-­‐informed	  
economic	  arguments	  [were]	  an	  essential	  constituent	  of	  pro-­‐slavery	  apologia.’42	  For	  
British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  West	  Indian	  emancipation	  became	  a	  powerful	  
historical	  precedent	  to	  draw	  upon	  as	  the	  only	  economically,	  and	  morally,	  sound	  means	  
of	  ending	  slavery.	  Historicism	  also	  allowed	  slave-­‐owners	  to	  appeal	  to	  an	  imagined	  
geography,	  which	  positioned	  the	  British	  model	  of	  emancipation	  as	  something	  that	  
should	  be	  emulated	  across	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Caribbean.	  	  
A	  secondary	  argument	  offered	  by	  the	  ‘Surinam	  Slaveholder’	  was	  a	  representation	  of	  
manumission	  as	  a	  folly	  prohibited	  by	  Surinam’s	  stringent	  laws.	  Any	  slave	  freed	  ‘would	  
become	  in	  a	  short	  space	  of	  time,	  if	  not	  in	  name,	  in	  reality	  the	  slaves	  of	  the	  colonial	  
Government.’43	  The	  claim	  that	  emancipation	  was	  against	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  slaves	  
themselves	  was	  a	  common	  defence	  offered	  by	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  but	  was	  modified	  to	  
fit	  the	  location,	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  section	  three	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  Surinam	  
Slaveholder	  conceded	  that	  ‘coercive	  labour	  may	  be	  a	  milder	  term	  than	  slavery’,	  but	  
when	  it	  came	  to	  government	  labour	  ‘a	  rose	  by	  any	  other	  name	  would	  smell	  as	  sweet:	  
slavery	  by	  any	  other	  name	  would	  smell	  as	  foully.'44	  However,	  the	  main	  thrust	  remained	  
the	  need	  for	  compensation,	  a	  fact	  that	  was	  conceptualised	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  
British	  Emancipation.	  Whilst	  such	  pleas	  were	  unlikely	  to	  engender	  much	  sympathy	  
among	  the	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter’s	  audience	  they	  did	  speak	  to	  a	  central	  concern	  of	  
Dutch	  emancipation.	  	  
Historians	  have	  long	  been	  intrigued	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  slavery	  in	  the	  Dutch	  empire	  ended	  
thirty	  years	  after	  British	  emancipation	  in	  light	  of	  the	  perceived	  economic	  and	  political	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  Ibid.	  
42	  Taylor,	  ‘Conservative	  Political	  Economy’,	  pp.	  987-­‐988.	  
43	  ‘Surinam	  -­‐	  British	  Slaveholders’,	  ASR,	  23	  July	  1845.	  
44	  Ibid.	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similarities	  between	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  England.45	  Maartje	  Janse	  has	  noted	  the	  desire	  
for	  an	  orderly	  emancipation	  within	  the	  Netherlands	  that	  distrusted	  the	  activities	  of	  
British	  abolitionists	  as	  potentially	  revolutionary.46	  In	  the	  Dutch	  context,	  compensation	  
was	  understood	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  slavery	  to	  freedom,	  and	  
Erik	  Horlings	  has	  attributed	  the	  longevity	  of	  Dutch	  slavery	  to	  the	  poor	  finances	  of	  the	  
metropolitan	  government	  and	  the	  consequent	  difficulties	  of	  raising	  a	  compensation	  
package.47	  This	  preoccupation	  with	  compensation	  was	  captured	  by	  the	  ‘Surinam	  
Slaveholder’	  and	  would	  be	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  around	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  
the	  colony.	  
The	  arguments	  made	  for	  compensation	  by	  British	  subjects	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  
part	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  stave	  off	  colonial	  reform.	  This	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  by	  
considering	  the	  rhetoric	  deployed	  in	  response	  to	  proposed	  reforms	  of	  Dutch	  colonial	  
governance	  in	  1851	  and	  1859.	  In	  1851	  the	  Dutch	  government	  considered	  reforms	  
including	  a	  law	  emancipating	  children	  born	  to	  enslaved	  mothers	  thereafter.	  
Unsurprisingly,	  there	  was	  widespread	  opposition	  from	  slave-­‐owners.	  However,	  one	  
complaint	  of	  particular	  interest	  came	  from	  the	  Amsterdam	  merchant	  firm	  Wittering	  
Brothers,	  who	  protested	  to	  Sir	  Ralph	  Abercromby,	  the	  British	  ambassador	  at	  Den	  Haag,	  
on	  behalf	  of	  their	  British	  clients.	  The	  substance	  of	  Wittering’s	  protest	  was	  that	  ‘[British	  
subjects]	  who	  are	  owners	  of	  slaves	  would	  be	  ruined	  if	  negro	  children	  would	  be	  free	  by	  
their	  birth.’48	  Predictions	  of	  economic	  collapse	  in	  the	  face	  of	  emancipation	  had	  been	  a	  
hallmark	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  slavery	  and,	  as	  Paula	  Dumas	  has	  noted,	  slavery	  apologism	  
rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  economic	  utility	  of	  slave	  labour	  or	  the	  slave	  trade.49	  
The	  precedent	  of	  compensation	  would	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  continued	  anti-­‐abolitionist	  
action	  by	  British	  subjects	  in	  1859.	  This	  time	  a	  bill	  for	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	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  pp.	  112-­‐113	  
48	  Wittering	  Brothers	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  Economy’,	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Dutch	  empire	  was	  under	  consideration	  and	  another	  raft	  of	  protests	  was	  launched.	  This	  
petition	  echoed	  the	  claims	  of	  Wittering	  Brothers	  and	  characterised	  abolition	  as	  ‘an	  
almost	  complete	  confiscation	  of	  their	  property	  in	  Surinam.’50	  The	  1859	  petition	  
expressed	  these	  concerns	  with	  added	  historical	  edge,	  arguing	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  example	  
in	  any	  civilized	  state	  of	  a	  project	  so	  destructive	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  property	  as	  the	  one	  in	  
question,	  ever	  been	  taken	  into	  serious	  consideration	  even	  during	  the	  anarchy	  of	  a	  
revolution.’51	  Britain’s	  emancipation	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  
measure	  whilst	  respect	  for	  property	  was	  portrayed	  as	  the	  hallmark	  of	  civilization.	  
Rather	  than	  encouraging	  other	  states	  to	  adopt	  emancipation	  the	  principal	  of	  
compensation	  could	  be	  invoked	  as	  a	  means	  of	  delaying	  reform.	  	  
The	  British	  government	  were	  aware	  of	  both	  the	  1851	  and	  1859	  protests	  by	  British	  
subjects	  and	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  how	  they	  represented	  their	  slave	  property	  in	  these	  
texts.	  Wittering	  Brothers,	  in	  1851,	  made	  an	  effort	  to	  represent	  their	  clients	  as	  ‘owners	  
of	  plantations	  in	  the	  colony	  of	  Surinam’	  or	  ‘owners	  of	  Estates	  and	  Negroes	  or	  Slaves.’52	  
Similarly,	  the	  1859	  petition	  saw	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  styled	  as	  ‘English	  colonist	  owners	  
of	  or	  interested	  in	  plantations	  in	  Surinam.’53	  As	  noted	  in	  this	  chapter’s	  introduction,	  
British	  slave-­‐owners	  had	  often	  explicitly	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  landowners	  rather	  
than	  proprietors	  of	  human	  beings.	  In	  a	  British	  context,	  the	  elision	  of	  enslaved	  people	  
and	  land	  holdings	  corresponded	  with	  the	  view	  of	  land	  as	  a	  ‘unique	  form	  of	  property’	  
that	  ‘conferr[ed]	  a	  special	  status.54	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  BFASS	  contested	  this	  
representation	  of	  landed	  respectability,	  as	  did	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  in	  their	  response	  to	  
Wittering	  Brothers.	  The	  Earl	  of	  Malmesbury,	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary,	  gave	  short-­‐shrift	  to	  
these	  concerns	  and	  instructed	  Abercomby	  to	  inform	  the	  Dutch	  minister	  of	  foreign	  
affairs	  ‘that	  H.	  M's	  Government	  have	  no	  sympathy	  with	  British	  Subjects	  who	  own	  slaves	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  W.	  R.	  Ward	  to	  Malmesbury,	  14	  Feb	  1859,	  TNA:	  CO	  218-­‐222.	  
51	  Ibid.	  
52	  Wittering	  Brothers	  Circular,	  9	  Oct	  1852;	  Wittering	  Brothers	  to	  R.	  Abercromby,	  10	  Oct	  1852,	  
TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐883.	  
53	  Ibid.	  
54	  Davidoff,	  Hall,	  Family	  Fortunes,	  pp.	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in	  Foreign	  Countries.’55	  Whilst	  the	  British	  rarely	  interfered	  with	  the	  internal	  slave	  
systems	  of	  sovereign	  countries	  Malmesbury	  made	  clear	  that	  Britain	  privileged	  
emancipation	  over	  its	  subjects’	  desire	  for	  compensation	  and	  explicitly	  ruled	  out	  
interference	  on	  their	  behalf.	  Abercromby	  expressed	  a	  similar	  view	  in	  a	  private	  note	  to	  
Wittering	  Brothers	  where	  he	  explained	  that	  ‘slavery	  has	  ever	  been	  held	  as	  one	  of	  those	  
extreme	  cases	  where	  the	  proprietary	  right	  may	  be	  cancelled	  as	  contravening	  a	  still	  
higher	  right.’56	  This	  was	  a	  laudable	  sentiment.	  However,	  it	  also	  represented	  an	  act	  of	  
historical	  amnesia	  as	  British	  emancipation	  and	  legislation	  like	  the	  1843	  Act	  had	  of	  
course	  recognised	  property	  rights	  in	  man.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  not	  only	  the	  rhetorical	  strategies	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  but	  
the	  practical	  means	  by	  which	  they	  sought	  to	  legitimise	  their	  property.	  David	  Lambert’s	  
work	  on	  pro-­‐slavery	  petitioning	  in	  Jamaica	  and	  the	  Bahamas	  has	  stressed	  that	  the	  
materiality	  of	  petitions	  were	  as	  important	  as	  the	  rhetoric	  they	  contained.	  Petitions	  
gained	  legitimacy	  through	  both	  the	  texts	  that	  accompanied	  it	  and	  individuals	  who	  
presented	  the	  petition	  which	  demonstrated	  ‘it	  had	  been	  created	  in	  an	  appropriate	  
manner’.57	  Examining	  the	  practical	  means	  by	  which	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  pursued	  
compensation	  also	  reveals	  their	  liminal	  position.	  After	  the	  French	  emancipation	  of	  
1848,	  Dutch	  slave-­‐owners	  became	  increasingly	  desperate	  to	  secure	  compensation	  and	  
the	  sugar	  planters’	  lobby	  petitioned	  the	  Dutch	  government	  over	  the	  issue	  a	  number	  of	  
times.	  However,	  British	  subjects	  theoretically	  did	  not	  possess	  this	  privilege.58	  Wittering	  
Brothers’	  letter	  to	  Abercromby	  occurred	  in	  this	  context	  as	  they	  looked	  to	  gain	  
government	  support	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  clients	  including	  the	  Western	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Malmesbury	  to	  R.	  Abercromby,	  11	  Nov	  1852,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐883.	  
56	  R.	  Abercromby	  to	  Wittering	  Brothers,	  26	  Oct	  1852,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐883.	  
57	  Lambert.	  ‘Counter-­‐Revolutionary	  Atlantic’,	  p.	  413.	  




and	  Sir	  John	  Young,	  the	  MP	  for	  Cavan	  and	  future	  Governor-­‐General	  of	  Canada.59	  Upon	  
further	  enquiry,	  Abercromby	  discovered	  that	  Wittering	  Brothers	  had	  taken	  the	  
initiative	  in	  approaching	  the	  British	  and	  the	  ambassador	  made	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  
little	  he	  could	  do	  if	  not	  approached	  by	  British	  subjects.60	  This	  was	  a	  failure	  on	  
Wittering’s	  part	  and	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  texts	  travelled	  was	  an	  
important	  means	  of	  securing	  legitimacy	  and	  it	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  negative	  
response	  from	  the	  British	  government.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  in	  1859	  British	  subjects	  
addressed	  the	  Second	  Chamber	  of	  the	  States	  directly	  with	  ambassador	  William	  Ward	  
informing	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  British	  signatories	  among	  the	  
petitioners.61	  This	  second	  petition	  suggests	  British	  subjects	  in	  Surinam	  had	  gained	  
political	  rights	  that	  gave	  their	  calls	  for	  compensation	  greater	  weight	  as	  they	  now	  
moved	  through	  the	  correct	  channels.	  	  
The	  social	  aspect	  of	  anti-­‐abolitionist	  protest	  by	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  also	  
deserves	  some	  consideration.	  Six	  British	  subjects	  signed	  the	  1859	  petition.	  Three	  of	  
them	  were	  absentees	  and	  this	  suggests	  close	  transatlantic	  collaboration	  among	  slave-­‐
owners	  in	  Surinam.62	  	  Among	  these	  absentees	  was	  George	  Nicholson,	  whose	  uncle	  had	  
been	  compensated	  following	  British	  emancipation,	  and	  who	  may	  have	  received	  
compensation	  himself	  for	  slaves	  owned	  in	  British	  Honduras.63	  Other	  Britons	  such	  as	  
Thomas	  Green	  also	  had	  experience	  of	  the	  British	  compensation	  process	  and	  they	  may	  
well	  have	  helped	  to	  promote	  the	  idea	  of	  compensation	  among	  fellow	  Dutch	  slave-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Wittering	  Brothers	  to	  R.	  Abercromby,	  16	  Oct	  1852,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐883;	  'Sir	  John	  Young	  1st	  
Baron	  Lisgar',	  LBS.	  [http://wwwdepts-­‐live.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/2146645295,	  accessed	  9	  
Dec	  2016]	  
60	  R.	  Abercromby	  to	  Wittering	  Brothers,	  17	  Oct	  1852,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐883.	  
61	  W.	  R.	  Ward	  to	  Malmesbury,	  14	  Feb	  1859,	  TNA:	  CO	  218	  222.	  
62	  Ibid,	  Absentee	  slave-­‐owners	  identified	  via	  the	  LBS	  were	  'Charlotte	  Anne	  Howard	  formerly	  
Gray	  (née	  Cort)',	  LBS.	  [http://wwwdepts-­‐
live.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/2146648593,	  accessed	  15	  Dec	  2016];	  'Gordon	  MacDonald	  of	  
Surinam',	  LBS.	  [http://wwwdepts-­‐live.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/2146648555,	  accessed	  10	  
Aug	  2017];	  'George	  Nicholson	  of	  Whitehayes,	  Hampshire',	  LBS.	  [http://wwwdepts-­‐
live.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/2146648839,	  accessed	  10	  Aug	  2017]	  
63	  'George	  Nicholson	  of	  Whitehayes,	  Hampshire',	  LBS.	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owners.64	  The	  BFASS	  certainly	  feared	  this	  was	  the	  case	  and	  in	  response	  they	  sent	  a	  
memorial	  to	  William	  III,	  King	  of	  the	  Netherlands,	  claiming	  that	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  
were	  ‘following	  the	  example	  set	  by	  the	  West	  India	  proprietary	  …	  during	  the	  agitation	  
for	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery’.65	  Showing	  acute	  awareness	  for	  how	  the	  legacy	  of	  
emancipation	  could	  be	  used	  to	  undermine	  anti-­‐slavery,	  the	  memorialists	  stressed	  that	  
economic	  failure	  in	  British	  colonies	  was	  the	  result	  of	  ‘planter	  misconduct’	  and	  that	  
slave-­‐owners	  should	  focus	  on	  offering	  'proper	  inducement'	  to	  former	  slaves	  to	  secure	  
their	  continued	  labour.66	  Whilst	  hard	  evidence	  of	  organisation	  amongst	  British	  slave-­‐
owners	  in	  Surinam	  cannot	  be	  found	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
chapter	  that	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  did	  band	  together	  to	  lobby	  governments.	  In	  this	  
context,	  personal	  or	  familial	  experience	  of	  the	  British	  compensation	  process	  may	  well	  
have	  informed	  debates	  in	  Surinam.	  
From	  1843	  onwards	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  had	  been	  portrayed	  in	  a	  very	  
sympathetic	  light	  but	  by	  1859	  and	  the	  second	  protest	  the	  BFASS	  leadership	  had	  
decided	  an	  example	  must	  be	  made.	  Louis	  Chamerovzow,	  the	  society’s	  secretary,	  wrote	  
to	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Lord	  John	  Russell,	  forwarding	  on	  evidence	  gleaned	  from	  a	  
Surinam	  newspaper	  that	  a	  British	  subject,	  Hugh	  Wright,	  had	  purchased	  two	  plantations	  
and	  the	  234	  slaves	  attached	  to	  them.67	  Chamerovzow	  was	  clearly	  concerned	  that	  the	  
legitimacy	  attached	  to	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  Surinam	  should	  be	  challenged	  and	  his	  letter	  
prompted	  Russell	  to	  take	  action.	  The	  Foreign	  Secretary’s	  inquiries	  to	  D.	  C.	  Munro,	  
British	  consul	  in	  Surinam	  at	  the	  time,	  provide	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  the	  character	  of	  
Surinam	  slave-­‐ownership.	  In	  an	  exchange	  later	  reprinted	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter,	  
Munro	  confirmed	  that	  Wright	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  slave-­‐owner	  on	  a	  huge	  scale	  and	  purchased	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  'Thomas	  Green	  of	  Surinam',	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  accessed	  10	  Aug	  2017]	  
65	  ‘Memorial	  to	  H.	  M.	  William	  the	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  6	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  1859,	  enclosed	  in	  L.	  Chamerovzow	  to	  W.	  R.	  Ward,	  25	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  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐1091.	  
66	  Ibid.	  
67	  L.	  Chamerovzow	  to	  Russell,	  25	  Apr	  1859,	  in	  Correspondence	  with	  British	  Ministers	  and	  
Agents	  in	  Foreign	  Countries,	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  Foreign	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‘upwards	  of	  1700	  slaves’	  by	  1859.68	  Hugh	  Wright	  had	  first	  acquired	  slave	  property	  in	  
Surinam	  via	  inheritance	  from	  his	  uncle	  Hugh	  MacLeod	  in	  1843	  but	  had	  continued	  to	  
purchase	  slaves,	  thereafter.69	  Munro,	  however	  leapt	  to	  Wright’s	  defence	  stating	  ‘that	  he	  
is	  not	  purchasing	  slaves,	  but	  merely	  the	  properties	  on	  which	  they	  are	  attached’.70	  As	  we	  
have	  seen,	  this	  elision	  of	  enslaved	  and	  landed	  property	  was	  a	  common	  strategy	  
amongst	  slave-­‐owners.	  The	  apology	  may	  well	  have	  been	  prompted	  by	  Munro’s	  own	  
slave-­‐ownership	  as	  he	  was	  among	  the	  recipients	  of	  Dutch	  compensation	  in	  1863.71	  
Alongside	  this	  defence	  of	  Wright	  Munro	  provided	  a	  survey	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  
Surinam.72	  Munro	  also	  maintained	  the	  representation	  of	  Surinamese	  slave-­‐owners	  as	  
passively	  acquiring	  property.	  When	  discussing	  one	  of	  the	  petitioners	  he	  stressed	  how	  
'the	  greatest	  part	  of	  which	  has	  fallen	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  Mr.	  [Robert]	  Kirk	  by	  inheritance	  
and	  transfer.'73	  Munro’s	  correspondence	  with	  Russell	  represented	  an	  attempt	  to	  
further	  legitimise	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  Surinam	  through	  the	  elision	  of	  their	  human	  
property	  and	  landed	  estates.	  	  
Whilst	  Munro	  clearly	  hoped	  to	  legitimise	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  Surinam	  there	  was	  no	  
doubt	  that	  individuals	  such	  as	  Hugh	  Wright	  were	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  1843	  Act.	  	  
However,	  Munro	  argued	  that	  Wright	  had	  believed	  he	  was	  acting	  as	  a	  Burgher	  of	  
Surinam	  and	  that	  if	  any	  attempt	  at	  prosecution	  was	  made	  he	  would	  have	  ‘recourse	  to	  
naturalization	  as	  a	  Dutch	  subject.'74	  From	  the	  Foreign	  Office’s	  perspective	  naturalised	  
citizens	  were	  still	  liable	  to	  prosecution,	  but	  in	  practice	  they	  lay	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	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law.75	  Wright’s	  willingness	  to	  eschew	  his	  Britishness	  is	  evidence	  of	  how	  the	  political	  
geography	  of	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  world	  had	  shifted	  pro-­‐slavery	  practices.	  Prior	  to	  
1833	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  had	  represented	  themselves	  as	  loyal	  subjects,	  particularly	  
through	  petitions	  to	  the	  Crown	  which	  were	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘[h]umility,	  faithfulness,	  
affection	  and	  loyalty’.76	  Even	  the	  ‘Surinam	  Slave-­‐holder’	  who	  addressed	  the	  Anti-­‐
Slavery	  Reporter	  cast	  themselves	  as	  a	  ‘loyal	  subject	  of	  Great	  Britain’,	  but	  the	  value	  of	  
this	  loyalty	  came	  into	  question	  when	  it	  threatened	  slave	  property.	  For	  Hugh	  Wright	  
and	  other	  overseas	  slave-­‐owners	  Britishness	  was	  only	  useful	  so	  long	  as	  it	  guaranteed	  
their	  property	  rights.	  
Russell’s	  intervention	  would	  lead	  Munro	  to	  post	  a	  notice	  of	  the	  1843	  Act	  in	  the	  colony’s	  
newspaper	  and	  fulfilling	  his	  duty	  he	  soon	  reported	  back	  that	  a	  British	  subject,	  Charlotte	  
Gray,	  had	  purchased	  eighty	  five	  slaves	  in	  acquiring	  a	  cotton	  estate.77	  Charlotte	  Gray	  had	  
first	  inherited	  her	  slave	  property	  after	  the	  death	  of	  her	  husband	  Thomas	  in	  1856,	  
which	  left	  her	  as	  the	  owner	  of	  plantation	  Burnside	  with	  Hope	  plantation	  being	  a	  
neighbouring	  property.78	  Gray	  was	  resident	  in	  London	  at	  the	  time,	  a	  fact	  that	  made	  her	  
liable	  to	  prosecution	  and	  Russell	  ordered	  the	  Attorney	  and	  Solicitor	  Generals	  to	  
consider	  mounting	  a	  case.	  Ultimately,	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  concluded	  that	  though	  Gray’s	  
purchase	  of	  slaves	  was	  clearly	  illegal	  a	  prosecution	  would	  require	  the	  testimony	  of	  her	  
attorney	  who	  had	  undertaken	  the	  purchase	  in	  Surinam.79	  Enforcement	  of	  the	  1843	  Act	  
was	  always	  limited	  by	  physical	  geography	  as	  the	  British	  subjects	  involved	  were	  often	  
literally	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  law.	  As	  such	  even	  when	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  slave-­‐
ownership	  in	  Surinam	  had	  been	  eroded	  no	  example	  could	  be	  made.	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Surinam	  was	  not	  the	  only	  arena	  of	  British	  overseas	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  the	  Caribbean.	  
British	  subjects	  also	  formed	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  the	  Danish	  
West	  Indies.	  The	  Danish	  presence	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  received	  as	  little	  attention	  from	  
contemporary	  authors	  as	  it	  has	  from	  historians.80	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
emancipation	  in	  the	  islands	  was	  secured	  by	  a	  slave	  uprising	  in	  July	  1848.81	  The	  
Manchester	  Times’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  ‘prosperity	  of	  the	  island	  is	  irretrievably	  ruined’	  
was	  typical	  of	  the	  scant,	  and	  mostly	  negative	  coverage,	  this	  momentous	  event	  received	  
in	  Britain.82	  However,	  some	  British	  subjects	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  Danish	  
islands,	  particularly	  in	  St.	  Croix,	  the	  only	  island	  large	  enough	  to	  support	  a	  plantation	  
economy.83	  Thirty	  of	  the	  seventy-­‐five	  estates	  of	  over	  300	  acres	  belonged	  to	  English	  
speaking	  families	  and	  26	  individuals	  with	  links	  to	  St.	  Croix	  can	  be	  found	  within	  LBS.84	  
British	  subjects	  likely	  represented	  an	  even	  more	  significant	  proportion	  of	  slave-­‐
ownership	  in	  St.	  Croix	  than	  they	  did	  in	  Surinam.	  Their	  presence	  in	  the	  island	  was	  the	  
result	  of	  a	  similar	  occupation	  during	  the	  Napoleonic	  Wars	  and	  the	  Danish	  
government’s	  open	  support	  of	  foreign	  land	  ownership.85	  Whilst	  this	  British	  presence	  in	  
St.	  Croix	  did	  receive	  occasional	  comment	  from	  abolitionists	  it	  generated	  nowhere	  near	  
as	  much	  controversy	  as	  the	  Surinam	  case.86	  Despite	  being	  unheralded	  at	  the	  time,	  
investors	  in	  St.	  Croix	  have	  left	  behind	  vital	  contextual	  evidence	  about	  how	  British	  
slave-­‐ownership	  functioned	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	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The	  Dyotts	  of	  Staffordshire,	  a	  family	  of	  country	  landowners	  and	  Tory	  MPs,	  were	  among	  
the	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  who	  had	  acquired	  their	  slave	  property	  in	  St.	  Croix	  via	  
marriage.87	  The	  Dyotts	  gained	  a	  one-­‐fourth	  share	  of	  the	  Betty’s	  Hope	  estate	  through	  
William	  Dyott’s	  marriage	  to	  Eleanor	  Thompson	  and	  it	  would	  be	  passed	  to	  his	  son	  
Richard	  upon	  his	  death	  in	  1847.88	  Betty’s	  Hope	  and	  its	  slave	  workforce	  then	  
corresponded	  to	  the	  vision	  of	  involuntary	  slave-­‐ownership	  imagined	  by	  Brougham	  in	  
the	  1843	  Act.	  Whilst	  the	  Dyotts’	  acquisition	  of	  slaves	  was	  passive	  they	  kept	  in	  regular	  
correspondence	  with	  the	  various	  attorneys	  who	  administered	  Betty’s	  Hope.89	  These	  
attorneys	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  British	  community	  in	  St.	  Croix	  and	  were	  charged	  with	  
employing	  plantation	  managers,	  organising	  sugar	  sales,	  and	  maintaining	  the	  estates.90	  	  
As	  such	  their	  letters	  generally	  relate	  to	  mundane	  details	  of	  sugar	  prices	  and	  how	  
weather	  might	  be	  affecting	  crops.	  The	  enslaved	  workforce	  makes	  few	  appearances	  
except	  for	  comments	  on	  their	  health	  or	  behaviour.	  For	  example,	  H.	  A.	  Walker	  
misguidedly	  reassured	  his	  employers	  that	  ‘I	  have	  no	  apprehension	  of	  disaffection	  
[among	  the	  slaves]	  here’	  only	  a	  week	  before	  emancipation.91	  Absentee	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  
Surinam	  would	  have	  relied	  on	  attorneys	  to	  administer	  and	  provide	  information	  about	  
their	  property	  in	  the	  same	  way	  and	  the	  Dyott	  letters	  provide	  illustration	  of	  this	  
relationship.	  	  
The	  Betty’s	  Hope	  correspondence	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Britain	  
actively	  opposed	  emancipation.	  An	  1846	  proposal	  for	  emancipation	  was	  opposed	  by	  St.	  
Croix	  slave-­‐owners	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inadequate	  compensation.	  Walker’s	  letter	  to	  Richard	  
Dyott	  on	  this	  subject	  refers	  to	  a	  meeting	  amongst	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  London	  where	  they	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‘unanimously	  resolved’	  to	  propose	  a	  voluntary	  emancipation,	  but	  postponed	  for	  16	  
years.92	  Discussion	  of	  compensation	  in	  private	  correspondence	  echoed	  the	  arguments	  
made	  in	  the	  Surinam	  petitions.	  Edward	  Dewhurst,	  Dyott’s	  attorney	  and	  a	  St.	  Croix	  
slave-­‐owner,	  portrayed	  emancipation	  as	  ‘future	  disfranchisement	  of	  all	  our	  rights	  &	  
property	  without	  compensation.’93	  When	  the	  enslaved	  people	  of	  St.	  Croix	  took	  
emancipation	  into	  their	  own	  hands,	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  the	  island	  continued	  to	  
organise	  and	  sought	  post	  hoc	  compensation.	  This	  became	  a	  running	  theme	  in	  the	  
correspondence	  of	  the	  Dyotts’	  attorneys.94	  This	  correspondence	  provides	  evidence	  of	  
slave-­‐owner	  organisation	  lacking	  in	  the	  Surinam	  case	  and	  is	  suggestive	  of	  a	  network	  of	  
slave-­‐owners	  collectively	  asserting	  their	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  face	  of	  reform.	  
Slave-­‐owner	  demands	  for	  compensation	  also	  spilled	  into	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Writing	  in	  
The	  Times	  ‘JUSTITIA’	  sought	  to	  wield	  the	  paper’s	  ‘very	  extensive	  influence	  [as]	  an	  
appeal	  through	  its	  pages	  will	  have	  more	  weight	  than	  remonstrances	  [sic]	  or	  petitions	  
from	  those	  aggrieved,	  addressed	  directly	  to	  the	  Legislature	  of	  Denmark.'95	  The	  
representation	  of	  slavery	  in	  St.	  Croix,	  as	  put	  forth	  in	  this	  letter,	  made	  similar	  claims	  to	  
those	  of	  Surinam	  slave-­‐owners,	  stressing	  that	  not	  only	  was	  the	  end	  of	  slavery	  harmful	  
to	  the	  formerly	  enslaved,	  but	  that	  ‘proprietors	  are	  becoming	  every	  day	  more	  and	  more	  
impoverished’.	  The	  'unwarrantable'	  and	  'unnecessary'	  slave	  revolt	  was	  cast	  in	  stark	  
contrast	  to	  an	  orderly,	  compensated	  emancipation	  that	  supposedly	  benefited	  all	  
involved.	  96	  Both	  public	  and	  private	  representations	  of	  slave-­‐owning	  in	  St.	  Croix	  were	  
suffused	  with	  this	  assertion	  of	  property	  rights	  in	  man	  and	  the	  natural	  corollary	  that	  
compensation	  was	  necessary.	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The	  Surinam	  and	  St.	  Croix	  examples	  also	  further	  demonstrate	  how	  imagined	  and	  
physical	  geographies	  helped	  maintain	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
abolitionist	  critique.	  Slave-­‐owners	  at	  first	  appealed	  to	  an	  imagined	  geography	  that	  
positioned	  the	  British	  state	  as	  guarantor	  of	  their	  property	  rights	  overseas	  by	  eliding	  
slaves	  into	  land.	  When	  this	  approach	  failed	  individuals	  such	  as	  Hugh	  Wright	  
repositioned	  themselves	  as	  falling	  outside	  of	  Britain’s	  legal	  reach.	  Wright	  and	  other	  
slave-­‐owners	  could	  rely	  upon	  physical	  geography	  to	  prevent	  the	  British	  government	  
from	  acquiring	  the	  material	  evidence	  to	  mount	  a	  prosecution.	  
When	  Dutch	  emancipation	  and	  its	  ten	  year	  apprenticeship	  period	  were	  announced	  in	  
1863	  BFASS	  secretary	  Louis	  Chamerovzow	  was	  forced	  to	  admit	  that	  British	  
compensation	  may	  have	  been	  a	  stumbling	  block	  to	  emancipation	  elsewhere.97	  The	  
example	  of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  and	  St.	  Croix	  is	  very	  suggestive	  of	  this	  fact.	  
Both	  groups	  were	  keen	  to	  postpone	  emancipation	  and	  secure	  compensation.	  
Ultimately,	  in	  both	  Surinam	  and	  St.	  Croix	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  were	  compensated	  for	  
their	  human	  property,	  though	  the	  Dyotts	  had	  to	  wait	  nearly	  a	  decade	  to	  receive	  their	  
money.98	  In	  attempting	  to	  do	  so	  slave-­‐owners	  organised	  both	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  in	  
Britain	  itself	  and	  potentially	  drew	  directly	  on	  the	  tactics	  and	  experience	  of	  British	  
emancipation.	  Protests	  against	  emancipation	  by	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  be	  
considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  Atlantic	  as	  they	  explicitly	  opposed	  
‘radical,	  reformist	  and	  abolitionist’	  politics.99	  The	  case	  of	  St.	  Croix	  in	  particular	  makes	  
clear	  that	  slave-­‐owners	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  came	  together	  to	  defend	  their	  
human	  property.	  These	  slave-­‐owners,	  who	  had	  been	  conceptualised	  as	  involuntary	  and	  
unproblematic	  by	  Brougham’s	  bill,	  proved	  to	  be	  active	  and	  determined	  in	  their	  
campaign	  to	  prolong	  human	  bondage.	  Attempts	  to	  ward	  off	  emancipation	  in	  both	  
Surinam	  and	  St.	  Croix	  rested	  on	  the	  assertion	  that	  a	  gradual,	  compensated	  process	  of	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emancipation	  was	  the	  only	  civilized	  way	  to	  bring	  slavery	  to	  an	  end.	  Slave-­‐owners	  
represented	  any	  divergence	  from	  this	  model	  as	  disastrous	  to	  both	  slave	  and	  master.	  
Such	  claims	  rested	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  slave	  property	  had	  been	  legitimately	  acquired	  as	  
recognised	  in	  the	  1843	  Act.	  However,	  not	  all	  British	  slave	  property	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  
was	  acquired	  through	  inheritance	  or	  marriage	  as	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  region	  were	  also	  
home	  to	  British	  commercial	  activity.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  debates	  
surrounding	  credit	  relations	  and	  slavery,	  a	  form	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  more	  controversial	  
than	  that	  discussed	  above.	  
Human	  Collateral:	  Mortgages	  and	  Slavery	  
By	  the	  early	  1840s	  the	  credit	  provided	  by	  British	  banks	  was	  vital	  to	  industrial	  
expansion	  throughout	  the	  world.	  Merchant	  banks	  in	  particular	  helped	  finance	  slave-­‐
produced	  commodities	  such	  as	  sugar	  and	  cotton	  through	  shipping	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  
credit.	  However,	  these	  chains	  of	  credit	  not	  only	  tied	  British	  banks	  to	  merchants	  
overseas,	  but	  also	  the	  plantation	  system	  and	  its	  ruthless	  exploitation	  of	  slave	  labour.	  
The	  distance	  between	  financier	  and	  slave-­‐owner	  could	  collapse	  as	  economic	  crises	  and	  
bankruptcies	  saw	  slaves	  transferred	  to	  balance	  the	  books.	  Brougham’s	  bill	  of	  1843	  
raised	  a	  concern	  among	  some	  bankers	  that	  their	  links	  to	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  be	  
transformed	  into	  irredeemable	  debts	  or,	  worse	  still,	  might	  land	  them	  before	  a	  judge.	  
Previous	  discussion	  of	  the	  1843	  Act	  has	  mainly	  been	  concerned	  with	  its	  inability	  to	  
curb	  the	  exploitation	  of	  slave	  labour	  by	  British	  owned	  mining	  companies	  in	  Brazil,	  
however	  during	  Commons	  debate	  the	  issue	  of	  credit	  and	  mortgaging	  was	  a	  more	  
prominent	  theme.100	  This	  section	  focuses	  on	  one	  banking	  firm,	  Baring	  Brothers,	  which	  
both	  lobbied	  against	  the	  1843	  Act	  and	  acquired	  slave	  property	  in	  Cuba	  and	  St.	  Croix.	  As	  
we	  shall	  see	  Barings	  and	  other	  merchants	  sought	  to	  represent	  mortgaging	  of	  slave	  
property	  as	  a	  necessary,	  and	  natural,	  part	  of	  overseas	  commercial	  activity.	  The	  
ambiguous	  conclusions	  of	  the	  Act	  when	  it	  came	  to	  mortgages	  is	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	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ambivalence	  inherent	  in	  British	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  commercial	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  
goals.	  	  
Transatlantic	  debt	  and	  credit	  relations	  had	  long	  been	  a	  feature	  of	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership.	  S.	  D.	  Smith	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  mortgage	  was	  a	  key	  credit	  instrument	  as	  far	  
back	  as	  the	  1740s,	  rather	  than	  being	  characteristic	  of	  the	  decades	  before	  
emancipation.101	  Richard	  Sheridan’s	  study	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  West	  Indian	  firm	  Mannings	  
and	  Anderdon	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  the	  long	  chain	  of	  credit	  linking	  metropole	  and	  
colony	  and	  the	  role	  mortgaging	  played	  in	  the	  “Sugar	  Crisis”	  of	  the	  1820s.102	  The	  
importance	  of	  mortgages	  to	  the	  West	  Indian	  economy	  was	  certainly	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  
compensation	  process	  tied	  to	  emancipation.	  Draper	  calculates	  that	  metropolitan	  
merchants	  and	  bankers	  were	  beneficiaries	  of	  awards	  amounting	  to	  £3.76	  million.	  
Whilst	  not	  all	  of	  this	  compensation	  was	  the	  result	  of	  mortgages,	  it	  did	  make	  up	  a	  large	  
proportion	  of	  the	  money	  paid	  to	  merchants	  who	  might	  have	  foreclosed	  on	  existing	  
mortgages	  or	  made	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  slave-­‐owners	  to	  whom	  they	  had	  previously	  
lent	  money.103	  Price	  has	  usefully	  termed	  this	  process	  as	  the	  ‘ontogeny	  of	  debt’.	  The	  
term	  ‘ontogeny’,	  borrowed	  from	  biological	  sciences,	  refers	  to	  the	  development	  and	  
lifespan	  of	  an	  organism.	  The	  ‘ontogeny	  of	  debt’	  ran	  as	  follows:	  planters	  who	  became	  
indebted	  to	  merchants	  would,	  often	  having	  been	  sued	  by	  the	  merchant,	  look	  to	  clear	  
their	  debt	  via	  mortgaging	  of	  their	  property.	  104	  This	  process	  was	  viewed	  by	  figures	  such	  
as	  Adam	  Smith	  as	  a	  natural	  function	  of	  the	  Caribbean	  plantation	  economy	  and	  was	  
proof	  of	  how	  metropolitan	  capital	  flowed	  to	  the	  West	  Indies.105	  Whilst	  S.	  D.	  Smith	  
maintains	  that	  not	  all	  West	  Indian	  mortgages	  were	  the	  result	  of	  bankruptcy	  the	  debates	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over	  the	  1843	  Act	  conceptualised	  of	  mortgaging	  in	  this	  way.106	  By	  the	  1820s	  British	  
merchants	  and	  bankers	  were	  increasingly	  extending	  credit	  beyond	  the	  British	  Empire	  
and,	  in	  many	  cases,	  into	  slave	  economies.	  The	  potential	  for	  credit	  relations	  in	  Cuba,	  
Brazil	  or	  elsewhere	  to	  transform	  into	  slave-­‐ownership	  had	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  
British	  commitments	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
The	  merchant-­‐banking	  firm	  Baring	  Brothers	  provides	  an	  excellent	  entry	  point	  into	  
understanding	  the	  role	  of	  mortgaged	  slave	  property.	  The	  firm	  had	  first-­‐hand	  
experience	  of	  mortgaging	  plantations	  both	  before	  and	  after	  British	  emancipation.	  
Barings	  had	  begun	  life	  as	  a	  family	  merchant	  firm	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  and	  had	  
developed	  into	  a	  major	  financier	  of	  transatlantic	  trade	  and	  government	  loans	  by	  the	  
1830s.107	  Several	  senior	  partners	  of	  the	  bank	  appear	  among	  the	  LBS	  compensation	  
awardees.	  These	  individuals	  include	  Alexander	  Baring,	  later	  Lord	  Ashburton,	  who	  
would	  negotiate	  the	  1842	  treaty	  with	  the	  US	  known	  as	  the	  Webster-­‐Ashburton	  
treaty.108	  Whilst	  Ashburton	  left	  the	  firm	  in	  1830s	  other	  senior	  partners	  were	  among	  
the	  recipients	  of	  compensation,	  including	  his	  nephew	  Thomas	  Baring	  and	  the	  American	  
Joshua	  Bates.109	  These	  two	  shared	  management	  of	  the	  bank	  from	  the	  late	  1820s	  and	  
Bates,	  who	  oversaw	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  business,	  is	  credited	  as	  the	  driving	  force	  
behind	  Barings’	  expansion	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  the	  bank	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  
Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  and	  political	  relations.110	  Ashburton’s	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  and	  MP	  for	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Southampton	  Humphrey	  St	  John-­‐Mildmay	  was	  another	  recipient	  of	  compensation.	  Both	  
St	  John-­‐Mildmay’s	  son	  (also	  Humphrey)	  and	  grandson	  (Henry)	  would	  go	  on	  to	  be	  
partners	  in	  Barings.111	  All	  of	  these	  claims	  were	  tied	  to	  a	  single,	  very	  large,	  mortgage	  on	  
the	  property	  of	  Wolfert	  Katz,	  the	  single	  largest	  slave-­‐owner	  in	  British	  Guiana.	  Whilst	  
Barings	  never	  took	  actual	  possession	  of	  Katz’s	  plantation,	  their	  pursuit	  of	  
compensation	  demonstrated	  both	  familiarity	  and	  comfort	  with	  slave	  mortgages	  and	  a	  
belief	  in	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  those	  property	  rights.	  In	  Cuba	  and	  St.	  Croix	  Barings	  would	  
see	  the	  ontogeny	  of	  debt	  reach	  its	  conclusion	  as	  Barings	  acquired	  slave	  property.	  As	  I	  
will	  demonstrate	  Ashburton,	  Bates,	  and	  Mildmay	  worked	  actively	  to	  try	  and	  legitimise	  
this	  slave	  property	  during	  the	  debates	  over	  Brougham’s	  bill.	  	  
Barings’	  acquisition	  of	  sugar	  estates,	  and	  more	  importantly	  slaves,	  in	  Cuba	  and	  St.	  Croix	  
corresponds	  neatly	  with	  Price’s	  ontogeny	  of	  debt.	  The	  extent	  of	  Barings’	  commercial	  
interests	  in	  Cuba	  has	  received	  attention	  from	  Ines	  Roldan	  de	  Montaud	  who	  casts	  the	  
bank	  as	  exemplary	  among	  ‘the	  creators	  of	  the	  intricate	  circuit	  of	  commerce,	  money,	  
and	  capital	  flows	  which	  shaped	  a	  single	  transatlantic	  economy.’112	  Barings’	  activity	  in	  
Cuba	  dated	  back	  to	  1814	  when	  credit	  was	  extended	  to	  James	  Drake,	  a	  British	  merchant	  
resident	  in	  Havana.113	  Whilst	  Barings	  extended	  credit	  to	  merchants	  rather	  than	  
planters	  by	  facilitating	  the	  sugar	  trade	  it	  helped	  provide	  the	  capital	  that	  supported	  the	  
revolution	  in	  Cuban	  sugar	  production	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  
century.114	  It	  was	  this	  continued	  expansion	  of	  sugar	  production	  that	  created	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  Barings	  would	  acquire	  their	  slave	  property.	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Barings’	  Cuban	  estates	  were	  the	  result	  of	  a	  partnership	  developed	  from	  the	  1830s	  
onwards	  with	  the	  Havana-­‐based	  firm	  Mariategui,	  Knight,	  &	  Co.	  In	  1829	  Barings	  opened	  
a	  £10,000	  credit	  with	  the	  firm	  to	  support	  the	  export	  of	  Cuban	  sugar	  to	  North	  America,	  
in	  1831	  a	  joint-­‐exchange	  account	  for	  the	  same	  amount	  was	  opened	  and	  finally	  the	  firm	  
was	  appointed	  as	  Barings’	  Cuban	  agents	  in	  1834.115	  From	  1836	  the	  firm,	  now	  George	  
Knight	  &	  Co,	  began	  to	  provide	  short	  term	  loans	  to	  the	  proprietors	  of	  sugar	  plantations	  
to	  meet	  running	  costs.	  This	  extension	  of	  credit	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  ‘deliberate	  
strategy	  of	  taking	  over	  estates.’116	  However,	  an	  American	  trade	  crisis,	  the	  “Panic	  of	  
1837”,	  and	  a	  subsequent	  global	  drop	  in	  sugar	  prices	  proved	  disastrous	  for	  Knight	  &	  Co.	  
In	  response	  Barings	  looked	  to	  restrict	  credit	  to	  its	  agents	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  
Knight’s	  assets	  were	  tied	  up	  in	  mortgaged	  plantation	  property.	  The	  various	  estates	  
mortgaged	  by	  Knight	  required	  an	  inflow	  of	  capital	  to	  meet	  running	  costs	  causing	  
Knight	  &	  Co	  to	  overextend	  credit	  lines	  both	  from	  Barings	  and	  other	  Cuban	  merchants,	  
and	  the	  firm	  ceased	  payments	  in	  May	  of	  1840.117	  Whilst	  Knight	  &	  Co	  had	  several	  
creditors	  Barings	  was	  by	  far	  the	  worst	  hit	  with	  their	  credit	  having	  been	  extended	  to	  
£70,000,	  amounting	  to	  around	  10%	  of	  the	  company’s	  capital	  at	  the	  time.118	  The	  
liquidation	  proceedings	  determined	  to	  sell	  off	  the	  produce	  from	  the	  various	  estates	  to	  
pay	  off	  Knight	  &	  Co.’s	  debts	  but	  by	  1842	  Barings’	  accounts	  were	  not	  settled	  and	  they	  
agreed	  with	  the	  creditors	  to	  take	  over	  the	  mortgages	  of	  the	  estates,	  gaining	  full	  title	  and	  
completing	  the	  ontogeny	  of	  debt.119	  	  
Barings’	  acquisition	  of	  slave	  property	  in	  St.	  Croix	  also	  appears	  to	  have	  followed	  the	  
ontogeny	  of	  debt,	  though	  it	  was	  a	  long	  and	  arduous	  process.	  The	  first	  reference	  to	  the	  
estates	  can	  be	  found	  in	  an	  1825	  letter	  from	  a	  Copenhagen	  based	  firm	  who	  were	  seeking	  
a	  legal	  opinion	  on	  behalf	  of	  Barings	  relating	  to	  ‘mortgage	  rights	  on	  the	  estates	  of	  Upper	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Roldan	  de	  Montaud,	  ‘Baring	  Brothers’,	  pp.	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  G.	  Knight	  to	  Barings,	  1	  Jan	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  Brothers’	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  London	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  Brothers’,	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  Barings	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Bethlehem	  and	  Fredensborg.’120	  J.	  M.	  Heyliger	  &	  Brothers	  had	  taken	  out	  a	  mortgage	  
bond	  on	  the	  property	  in	  1816,	  but	  their	  right	  to	  do	  so	  was	  disputed	  by	  John	  Gray	  who	  
argued	  that	  he	  also	  had	  mortgage	  rights	  to	  the	  estates.	  Determined	  to	  foreclose	  on	  the	  
mortgage	  Barings	  began	  legal	  proceedings	  in	  July	  1827.121	  Barings’	  attorney	  in	  St.	  Croix	  
would	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  trouble	  coming	  to	  an	  agreement	  with	  Gray	  over	  the	  
properties,	  an	  issue	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  complicated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  other	  debts	  that	  
Heyliger’s	  estates	  had	  accrued	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  Heyliger’s	  heirs	  all	  laid	  some	  claim	  to	  
the	  estates.	  Barings	  would	  finally	  secure	  the	  title	  to	  the	  estates	  in	  a	  decision	  from	  the	  
Upper	  Court	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  1832	  when	  their	  mortgage	  of	  £30,000	  plus	  three	  years	  
interest	  at	  five	  percent	  was	  given	  priority	  over	  Gray’s	  claim.122	  The	  process	  of	  acquiring	  
these	  St.	  Croix	  estates	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  loosely	  following	  the	  ontogeny	  of	  debt,	  
where	  a	  bond	  became	  a	  transfer	  of	  title	  after	  a	  legal	  decision.	  However,	  the	  protracted	  
nature	  of	  acquiring	  Upper	  Bethlehem	  and	  Fredensborg	  belied	  the	  representation	  of	  
mortgaging	  as	  a	  passive	  way	  of	  securing	  slave	  property.	  
Barings’	  pursuit	  of	  the	  mortgage	  required	  legal	  counsel	  in	  Copenhagen	  and	  St.	  Croix,	  as	  
well	  as	  hiring	  an	  attorney	  William	  Beech	  to	  oversee	  their	  properties.	  The	  expenses	  did	  
not	  end	  there	  as	  various	  claims	  existed	  against	  the	  estates	  preceding	  their	  own	  
amounting	  to	  £7000,	  though	  he	  argued	  the	  mortgage	  was	  still	  worth	  pursuing.123	  The	  
Heyliger	  heirs	  still	  resided	  on	  the	  estate	  and	  Lord	  Ashburton	  was	  convinced	  by	  Beech	  
to	  provide	  an	  annual	  allowance	  to	  support	  them.124	  All	  these	  decisions	  were	  made	  at	  a	  
point	  when	  the	  British	  government	  was	  dismantling	  slavery	  in	  its	  Caribbean	  
possessions.	  For	  all	  that	  effort	  Barings	  acquired	  two	  sugar	  estates	  with	  272	  slaves	  
between	  them,	  42	  of	  whom	  were	  hired	  from	  a	  neighbouring	  property.	  According	  to	  
Beech	  they	  were	  ‘in	  a	  most	  ruinous	  state’	  and	  had	  decreased	  in	  value	  a	  great	  deal	  since	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  C.	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  (trans),	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  C.	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  Black’s	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  &	  Co	  to	  Barings,	  31	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  BB,	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  June	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Gray	  had	  them	  appraised	  in	  1825.125	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  Barings	  had	  expended	  a	  
significant	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  money	  in	  acquiring	  the	  estates,	  a	  fact	  that	  somewhat	  
undermines	  the	  image	  merchant	  bankers	  hoped	  to	  promote	  of	  themselves	  
involuntarily	  acquiring	  slave	  property.	  
Barings’	  acquisition	  of	  slave	  property	  in	  Cuba	  and	  St.	  Croix	  was	  a	  means	  of	  settling	  
large	  debts.	  Whilst	  this	  was	  undoubtedly	  construed	  by	  the	  firm’s	  partners	  as	  a	  natural	  
resolution	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  mood	  of	  the	  early	  1840s	  clearly	  caused	  some	  concern.	  As	  
Barings	  foreclosed	  on	  their	  Cuban	  mortgages	  they	  set	  about	  legitimising,	  both	  publicly	  
and	  privately,	  their	  slave	  property.	  This	  private	  legitimisation	  began	  by	  seeking	  a	  legal	  
opinion	  on	  whether	  they	  could	  in	  fact	  lawfully	  foreclose	  on	  mortgaged	  slave	  property.	  
This	  process	  began	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1843	  when	  Barings	  paid	  for	  two	  consultations	  from	  
lawyer	  William	  Burge	  and	  Solicitor	  General	  William	  Webb	  Follett.126	  Burge	  was	  an	  
interesting	  choice	  of	  consultant;	  he	  had	  been	  a	  lobbyist	  on	  behalf	  of	  Jamaican	  slave-­‐
owners,	  and	  so	  he	  was	  perhaps	  approached	  as	  a	  respected	  authority	  on	  colonial	  law.127	  
Burge	  has	  been	  characterised	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  colonial	  slavery	  apologists	  who	  
were	  ‘forced	  to	  condemn	  [slavery]’	  even	  as	  they	  attempted	  to	  stave	  off	  emancipation.128	  
Barings’	  consultation	  with	  the	  former	  Attorney	  General	  for	  Jamaica	  is	  more	  evidence	  of	  
continuities	  in	  pro-­‐slavery	  argumentation,	  expertise,	  and	  networks	  after	  emancipation.	  	  
It	  appears	  that	  Barings	  had	  been	  worried	  by	  the	  increasing	  publicity	  given	  to	  slave-­‐
ownership	  by	  the	  BFASS	  and	  figures	  like	  Brougham	  and	  this	  motivated	  their	  decision	  
to	  seek	  legal	  advice.	  Roldan	  de	  Montaud	  mistakenly	  attributes	  Barings’	  nervousness	  
over	  acquiring	  slave	  property	  to	  the	  1843	  Act.	  However	  this	  consultation	  pre-­‐dated	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  (Oxford:	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Brougham’s	  announcement	  of	  his	  bill	  by	  several	  months.129	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  
consultation	  also	  undermines	  this	  interpretation	  as	  it	  specifically	  refers	  to	  clauses	  in	  
the	  1824	  Slave	  Trade	  Consolidation	  Act	  (Act	  5	  Geo:	  4	  c.113),	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  
Brougham	  and	  many	  other	  abolitionists	  believed	  had	  already	  made	  the	  acquisition	  of	  
slaves	  by	  British	  subjects	  illegal.130	  Whilst	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  consultation	  indicates	  it	  
was	  prompted	  by	  Barings’	  acquisition	  of	  Knight	  &	  Company’s	  mortgages	  it	  appears	  
likely	  that	  the	  firm	  hoped	  to	  legitimise	  the	  acquisition	  of	  slave	  property	  in	  similar	  
circumstances;	  including	  that	  in	  St.	  Croix.	  This	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  by	  paying	  
attention	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  opinions	  offered	  by	  Burge	  and	  
Follett,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  rejected	  Barings’	  claims	  to	  slave	  property	  and	  the	  second	  
which	  went	  in	  the	  firm’s	  favour.	  
Barings’	  first	  legal	  enquiry	  was	  pitched	  in	  broad	  terms,	  specifically	  it	  enquired	  whether	  
British	  subjects	  would	  be	  able	  to	  take	  over	  a	  mortgage	  made	  in	  a	  ‘foreign	  West	  India	  
island’	  by	  a	  ‘Foreign	  mercantile	  house’	  as	  security	  for	  a	  debt.131	  However,	  this	  attempt	  
to	  secure	  legal	  affirmation	  for	  their	  right	  to	  mortgage	  slave	  property	  met	  with	  
disappointment.	  Burge	  and	  the	  Solicitor	  General	  offered	  an	  opinion	  that	  whilst	  they	  did	  
not	  believe	  the	  1824	  Act	  intended	  to	  prevent	  such	  actions	  ‘that	  we	  could	  not	  advise	  a	  
Mercantile	  House	  in	  London	  to	  accept	  as	  a	  security	  for	  a	  debt	  due	  to	  it	  a	  mortgage	  upon	  
an	  Estate	  in	  a	  Foreign	  West	  Indian	  Island	  of	  which	  slaves	  form	  a	  part.’132	  Barings	  
returned	  to	  the	  drawing	  board,	  literally	  editing	  the	  first	  draft	  case	  to	  add	  greater	  
specificity.	  The	  ‘foreign	  West	  Indian	  island’	  now	  became	  Cuba	  and	  the	  ‘Foreign	  
Mercantile	  House’	  was	  now	  explicitly	  noted	  as	  the	  ‘Havannah	  House’.133	  This	  specificity	  
was	  clearly	  drawn	  from	  the	  George	  Knight	  &	  Co	  case,	  as	  was	  the	  additional	  detail	  that	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the	  ‘Havannah	  House	  is	  otherwise	  unable	  to	  pay.’134	  This	  second	  opinion	  affirmed	  
Barings’	  right	  to	  foreclose	  on	  the	  mortgage,	  but	  only	  due	  to	  the	  vagaries	  of	  property	  
laws	  in	  Cuba.	  Specifically,	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘the	  mortgagee	  cannot	  of	  his	  own	  authority	  
either	  take	  possession	  of	  or	  sell	  the	  mortgage	  property’	  rather	  the	  court	  in	  Cuba	  could	  
order	  for	  the	  property	  to	  be	  sold.135	  Burge	  deemed	  it	  legal	  on	  these	  grounds	  to	  have	  the	  
mortgage	  transferred	  to	  Barings	  and	  that	  the	  bank	  should	  be	  represented	  in	  Cuba	  by	  
power	  of	  attorney,	  as	  such	  because	  Barings	  would	  not	  legally	  own	  the	  plantations	  in	  a	  
strict	  sense	  they	  could	  not	  be	  liable	  for	  acquiring	  them.136	  Whilst	  this	  decision	  
legitimised	  the	  acquisition	  of	  slave	  property	  it	  did	  so	  in	  a	  very	  narrow	  sense	  relating	  to	  
the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Knight	  &	  Co.	  case.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  slave	  property	  
could	  act	  as	  security	  remained	  ambiguous,	  so	  Brougham’s	  bill	  would	  provide	  an	  
opportunity	  for	  Barings,	  and	  others,	  to	  try	  to	  secure	  a	  firmer	  answer.	  
When	  Brougham	  presented	  his	  bill	  to	  prevent	  the	  purchase	  of	  slaves	  before	  the	  Lords	  
in	  1843	  he	  was	  met	  with	  no	  opposition,	  but	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  was	  sounded	  by	  one	  Lord	  
who	  remarked	  that	  ‘there	  were	  a	  thousand	  chances	  by	  which	  property	  in	  slaves	  might	  
come	  into	  a	  man’s	  hands.’137	  This	  dissenting	  voice	  belonged	  to	  Lord	  Ashburton	  who	  
stressed	  the	  passivity	  of	  acquiring	  slave	  property	  via	  commercial	  connections	  and	  
urged	  that	  the	  bill	  ‘be	  carefully	  looked	  at	  and	  examined	  by	  persons	  whose	  interests	  
were	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  it.’138	  Here	  Ashburton	  repeated	  a	  familiar	  justification	  that	  
acquiring	  slave	  property	  might	  be	  blamed	  on	  bad	  luck	  or	  ‘chance’.	  His	  former	  position	  
as	  head	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  likely	  added	  a	  sheen	  of	  objectivity	  to	  his	  assertion	  that	  
‘men	  of	  extensive	  connections’	  in	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba	  might	  find	  it	  impossible	  to	  ‘pass	  their	  
lives	  in	  such	  a	  country	  without	  being	  drawn	  into	  the	  commission	  of	  acts	  that	  might	  be	  








construed	  into	  offences.’139	  Ashburton	  here	  sought	  to	  naturalise	  the	  idea	  that	  
commercial	  activity	  overseas	  might	  lead	  to	  slave	  ownership	  and	  argue	  that	  his	  
concerns	  related	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  British	  commercial	  interests.	  Ashburton’s	  pose	  as	  
a	  disinterested	  critic	  belied	  his	  family	  firm’s	  involvement	  in	  slave-­‐ownership	  and	  
resembles	  the	  role	  played	  by	  individuals	  with	  military	  or	  mercantile	  links	  to	  the	  West	  
Indies	  who	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  neutral	  observers	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  West	  Indian	  
emancipation.140	  As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  Barings,	  like	  the	  St.	  Croix	  slave-­‐owners,	  worked	  
together	  with	  other	  merchants	  to	  attempt	  to	  secure	  the	  right	  to	  mortgage	  slave	  
property.	  
When	  Brougham’s	  Bill	  arrived	  before	  the	  Commons	  there	  remained	  some	  uncertainty	  
around	  the	  issue	  of	  slaves	  acting	  as	  security	  for	  debts.	  This	  anxiety	  was	  expressed	  most	  
clearly	  by	  Humphrey	  St	  John-­‐Mildmay	  who	  declared	  that	  ‘[t]he	  bill	  ought	  to	  be	  called	  a	  
bill	  to	  supress	  the	  foreign	  colonial	  trade	  of	  the	  empire.’	  141	  St	  John-­‐Mildmay	  of	  course	  
did	  not	  speak	  as	  a	  neutral	  observer,	  though	  he	  positioned	  himself	  as	  offering	  a	  broad	  
defence	  of	  mercantile	  activity.	  The	  Barings’	  partner	  argued	  that:	  
No	  man	  could	  enter	  into	  trade	  with	  any	  country	  between	  Virginia	  and	  
Brazils,	  who	  did	  not	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  falling	  under	  the	  penalties	  of	  the	  bill,	  or	  
seeing	  the	  Spaniard,	  Frenchmen,	  and	  others	  getting	  securities	  for	  their	  
debts,	  and	  payments	  for	  their	  advances,	  which	  this	  bill	  would	  withhold	  
from	  the	  English	  merchant.142	  
Mildmay	  here	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  recovering	  debts,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  
placed	  British	  merchants	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  foreign	  merchants	  who	  would	  be	  more	  
eager	  to	  provide	  credit	  than	  the	  British	  subjects	  disempowered	  by	  the	  law.	  By	  
adverting	  to	  foreign	  competition	  Mildmay	  also	  made	  clear	  that	  he	  saw	  the	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government’s	  role	  as	  protecting	  the	  property	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  British	  merchants.	  
These	  sentiments	  were	  echoed	  by	  the	  Glasgow	  MP	  John	  Dennistoun	  who	  raised	  the	  
spectre	  of	  ‘Portuguese	  and	  Spanish	  capitalists,	  who	  would	  have	  no	  restraint	  upon	  them	  
from	  realising	  upon	  the	  sale	  of	  slave	  estates	  the	  advances	  of	  money’.143	  Dennistoun	  
here	  played	  on	  the	  implicit	  suggestion	  that	  British	  commerce	  brought	  a	  civilizing	  
benefit	  not	  possessed	  by	  subjects	  of	  other	  nations.	  Dennistoun’s	  objections	  were	  likely	  
linked	  to	  his	  own	  commercial	  dealings	  as	  both	  a	  cotton	  merchant	  and	  spinner	  engaged	  
in	  trade,	  and	  therefore	  credit	  relations,	  with	  American	  slave-­‐owners.144	  By	  raising	  the	  
threat	  to	  British	  trade	  in	  general,	  MPs	  could	  protect	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  attempt	  to	  
naturalise	  certain	  forms	  of	  slave	  property	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  credit	  relations.	  
The	  objections	  to	  Brougham’s	  bill	  voiced	  by	  Ashburton	  and	  Mildmay	  in	  parliament	  can	  
be	  viewed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  concerted	  effort	  by	  Barings	  to	  legitimise	  mortgages	  on	  slave	  
property.	  Among	  the	  series	  of	  petitions	  sent	  to	  parliament	  protesting	  Brougham’s	  bill	  
was	  one	  addressed	  from	  the	  ‘Merchants	  of	  London’.145	  This	  petition	  appears	  to	  
correspond	  with	  one	  from	  the	  ‘Merchants	  of	  London	  engaged	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Trade	  of	  
the	  Country’	  currently	  held	  by	  the	  Baring	  archive.146	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  Barings	  
drafted	  the	  petition	  as	  it	  bears	  annotations	  and	  corrections,	  potentially	  made	  by	  the	  
firm’s	  lawyer’s	  given	  the	  document’s	  presence	  among	  the	  bank’s	  legal	  papers.	  	  The	  
wording	  of	  the	  petition	  is	  key	  as	  it	  demonstrates	  an	  attempt	  to	  normalise	  acquisition	  of	  
slave	  property	  as	  a	  basic	  element	  of	  ‘ordinary	  commercial	  operations	  with	  countries	  
where	  slavery	  prevails’.147	  The	  petitioners	  also	  appealed	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  property	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rights	  and	  the	  ‘recovery	  of	  debts	  …	  which	  cannot	  be	  collected	  in	  any	  other	  manner.’148	  
Merchants	  represented	  themselves	  as	  being	  obligated	  by	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  
credit	  economy	  to	  take	  security	  of	  debts	  and	  on	  certain	  occasions	  that	  property	  
happened	  to	  be	  slaves.	  In	  such	  a	  representation	  slave-­‐ownership	  resulting	  from	  credit	  
relations	  was	  not	  something	  that	  detracted	  from	  the	  character	  of	  merchants,	  rather	  it	  
constituted	  a	  key	  part	  of	  their	  claim	  to	  respectability.	  	  
Debates	  over	  the	  status	  of	  mortgaged	  slave	  property	  took	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
“Panic	  of	  1837”,	  an	  American	  financial	  crisis	  with	  global	  repercussions.	  Liverpool’s	  
American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  made	  up	  of	  merchants	  mostly	  involved	  in	  the	  US	  
cotton	  trade,	  referenced	  the	  “Panic”	  in	  a	  petition	  protesting	  the	  1843	  Bill.149	  The	  “Panic	  
of	  1837”	  had	  occurred	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  president	  Andrew	  Jackson’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  
charter	  of	  the	  Second	  Bank	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  leading	  to	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  credit	  
from	  several	  state	  banks	  among	  which	  Southern	  states	  were	  particularly	  hard	  hit.150	  
This	  crisis	  had	  clearly	  effected	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  cotton	  trade	  and	  the	  Chamber	  
argued	  their	  members	  had	  been	  ‘obliged	  to	  take	  securities	  of	  this	  kind	  in	  a	  very	  large	  
amount	  &	  many	  were	  as	  yet	  unrealised.’151	  This	  language	  of	  obligation	  echoed	  that	  of	  
the	  London	  merchants’	  petition	  and	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  shadow	  of	  1837	  loomed	  
over	  all	  discussions	  of	  mortgaged	  slave	  property.	  Sexton	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  
repudiation	  of	  debts	  by	  Southern	  states	  led	  to	  a	  wariness	  in	  investing	  directly	  in	  slave	  
property,	  citing	  an	  1839	  investment	  manual	  that	  argued	  for	  the	  morally	  degrading	  
effect	  of	  slavery	  on	  Southern	  financial	  institutions.152	  Liverpool	  cotton	  merchants	  were	  
anxious	  to	  secure	  themselves	  against	  future	  financial	  crises,	  though	  after	  1837	  British	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financial	  involvement	  in	  the	  South	  was	  increasingly	  conducted	  through	  banks,	  
including	  Barings,	  based	  in	  the	  North.153	  This	  perhaps	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  
evidence	  of	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  though	  the	  Chamber’s	  protest	  
clearly	  indicates	  that	  British	  merchants	  wanted	  the	  option	  to	  mortgage	  slave	  property.	  
The	  Chamber’s	  memorial	  deployed	  similar	  logic	  to	  London	  Merchants	  in	  defending	  the	  
right	  to	  secure	  debts	  on	  slave	  property.	  Specifically	  the	  petitioners	  stressed	  the	  
normality	  of	  the	  practice	  whilst	  arguing	  it	  ‘deprived’	  British	  merchants	  of	  a	  key	  
protection	  in	  doing	  business	  overseas.	  Whilst	  extant	  records	  of	  British	  mortgages	  on	  
American	  slave	  property	  are	  lacking,	  they	  clearly	  existed	  and	  the	  Liverpool	  merchants	  
were	  as	  keen	  as	  their	  London	  counterparts	  to	  represent	  slave-­‐ownership	  of	  this	  kind	  as	  
involuntary.	  Like	  St	  John-­‐Mildmay	  they	  also	  raised	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	  ‘foreign	  creditor	  
[who	  will]	  sweep	  away	  all	  before	  his	  eyes'.154	  The	  protests	  of	  the	  American	  Chamber	  of	  
Commerce	  and	  Barings	  demonstrate	  the	  anxiety	  British	  merchants	  felt	  towards	  the	  
Brougham’s	  Bill;	  an	  anxiety	  that	  was	  represented	  as	  damaging	  to	  British	  commercial	  
interests.	  
The	  concerns	  of	  various	  British	  merchants	  and	  banks	  over	  mortgaging	  reflected	  a	  lack	  
of	  clarity	  in	  the	  redrafted	  version	  of	  Brougham’s	  bill	  when	  it	  appeared	  before	  the	  
Commons.	  The	  bill	  now	  protected	  any	  ‘bona	  fide’	  slave	  property	  that	  may	  have	  been	  
acquired	  ‘through	  operation	  of	  law’.155	  During	  the	  Commons	  debate	  Viscount	  Sandon	  
asked	  ‘[c]ould	  a	  British	  subject	  take	  as	  security	  for	  money	  lent,	  an	  estate	  with	  the	  
slaves	  on	  it	  within	  Maryland,	  Virginia,	  or	  other	  slave-­‐owning	  provinces?’156	  Sandon’s	  
examples	  were	  telling,	  since	  as	  MP	  for	  Liverpool	  he	  had	  been	  lobbied	  by	  the	  American	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  Sexton,	  Debtor	  Diplomacy,	  pp.	  74-­‐75.	  
154	  Liverpool	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Minutebooks,	  9	  Aug	  1843,	  LCL:	  380	  AME.	  
155	  Slave	  trade	  suppression.	  A	  bill,	  [as	  amended	  by	  the	  committee,	  and	  as	  proposed	  to	  be	  
amended	  on	  report]	  intituled,	  an	  act	  for	  the	  more	  effectual	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  PP,	  
132	  (1843),	  p.	  5.	  
156	  Hansard,	  18	  Aug	  1843,	  3rd	  series	  vol.	  71,	  c.	  950.	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Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  in	  parliament.157	  In	  addressing	  this	  ambiguity	  
Sandon	  drew	  forth	  other	  speakers	  who	  appeared	  to	  accept	  the	  assertion	  that	  securing	  
debts	  on	  slaves	  was	  a	  natural	  part	  of	  mercantile	  business.	  Lord	  Stanley	  asked	  if	  
merchants	  involuntarily	  acquiring	  slave	  property	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  ‘divest	  
themselves	  of	  it	  by	  sale?’158	  Robert	  Peel	  closed	  the	  debate	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  Bill	  
‘ought	  to	  give	  the	  British	  creditor	  in	  these	  countries	  all	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  secure	  
him	  an	  equal	  probability	  of	  the	  recovery	  of	  his	  debts	  as	  a	  foreigner’.159	  The	  assertions	  of	  
passivity	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  competition	  raised	  by	  merchants	  had	  won	  favour	  
with	  some	  in	  Parliament.	  However,	  there	  were	  discordant	  voices	  such	  as	  Sir	  Thomas	  
Wilde,	  the	  Bill’s	  main	  proponent	  in	  the	  Commons.	  Whilst	  Wilde	  accepted	  the	  right	  to	  
secure	  debts	  on	  slave	  property	  he	  also	  was	  determined	  not	  to	  ‘not	  to	  give	  a	  colour	  to	  a	  
fraudulent	  transfer	  of	  the	  slaves	  of	  one	  man	  to	  another	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  act.’160	  
Parliament	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  convinced	  of	  the	  normality	  of	  mortgaging	  slave	  
property,	  but	  there	  MPs	  retained	  lingering	  fears	  that	  any	  loopholes	  might	  be	  exploited.	  
The	  Commons	  debate	  over	  mortgaging	  of	  slave	  property	  then	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  yet	  
another	  example	  of	  the	  ambivalence	  of	  commerce	  discussed	  in	  my	  third	  chapter.	  
Whilst	  the	  1843	  Act	  did	  not	  end	  Barings’	  slave-­‐ownership	  it	  may	  well	  have	  influenced	  
the	  management	  of	  their	  estates.	  By	  1852	  Adot,	  Spalding,	  &	  Co,	  the	  attorneys	  charged	  
with	  administering	  the	  Arroyo	  estate	  were	  pressuring	  the	  firm	  over	  a	  perceived	  labour	  
shortage.	  In	  1851	  the	  estate	  had	  produced	  3,400	  boxes	  of	  sugar	  and,	  hoping	  to	  up	  
production	  to	  4,500	  boxes,	  the	  attorneys	  asked	  Barings	  to	  ‘authorise	  us	  to	  supply	  the	  
Arroyo	  with	  more	  hands’,	  specifically	  through	  the	  purchase	  of	  slaves	  or	  hiring	  of	  
Chinese	  indentured	  labourers.161	  The	  1843	  Act	  had	  of	  course	  prohibited	  the	  purchase	  
of	  slaves	  by	  British	  subjects	  and	  it	  would	  appear	  Barings	  adhered	  to	  this.	  Adot,	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  Liverpool	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Minutebooks,	  9	  Aug	  1843,	  LCL:	  380	  AME.	  
158	  Hansard,	  18	  Aug	  1843,	  3rd	  series	  vol.	  71,	  c.	  944.	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  Ibid,	  c.	  952.	  
160	  Ibid,	  c.	  951.	  	  
161	  Adot,	  Spalding	  &	  Co	  to	  Barings,	  26	  Feb	  1852,	  BBP,	  TBA:	  HC	  4.6.10.	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Spalding	  &	  Co.	  complained	  across	  a	  series	  of	  letters	  over	  the	  difficulty	  in	  finding	  slave	  
labour	  for	  hire,	  citing	  high	  prices	  and	  the	  reluctance	  of	  Cuban	  planters	  to	  hire	  out	  their	  
slaves	  for	  short	  periods	  of	  time.	  Hiring	  of	  slaves	  was	  still	  legal	  under	  the	  1843	  Act,	  but	  
having	  ‘advertised	  for	  them	  in	  the	  Newspapers,	  and	  …	  employed	  brokers’	  Barings’	  
attorneys	  failed	  to	  secure	  the	  forty	  labourers	  they	  desired.162	  At	  this	  point	  there	  were	  
189	  slaves	  at	  Arroyo,	  of	  which	  132	  were	  described	  as	  ‘working	  negroes’.163	  The	  
struggle	  to	  add	  labourers	  to	  the	  workforce	  may	  well	  have	  resulted	  from	  Barings’	  
refusal	  to	  contravene	  the	  law,	  a	  reluctance	  which	  -­‐	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  -­‐	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  
other	  British	  slave-­‐owners.	  However,	  the	  bank	  did	  sell	  its	  share	  in	  one	  Cuban	  sugar	  
estate,	  Santa	  Maria,	  in	  a	  move	  of	  ambiguous	  legality.164	  After	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  1843	  
Act	  Barings’	  slave-­‐ownership	  appeared	  to	  function	  without	  controversy,	  perhaps	  
because	  it	  did	  not	  come	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  British	  government.	  However,	  in	  other	  
contexts	  mortgaging	  and	  slavery	  remained	  controversial.	  
Whilst	  Barings	  quietly	  presided	  over	  their	  slave	  property	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  disputes	  
were	  emerging	  over	  mortgages	  and	  slavery	  in	  Brazil.	  Joseph	  Mulhern’s	  work	  on	  
escrituras,	  public	  debt	  contracts	  held	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  notary	  office	  records,	  has	  
demonstrated	  that	  British	  subjects	  acted	  as	  both	  creditors	  and	  debtors	  in	  mortgages	  
where	  slaves	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  collateral.165	  These	  mortgages	  were	  often,	  as	  in	  Cuba	  
and	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  result	  of	  the	  extension	  of	  credit	  by	  British	  merchants	  and	  
banks.	  Of	  course	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  only	  proved	  controversial	  when	  revealed	  by	  
government	  or	  anti-­‐slavery	  campaigners.	  	  Slave-­‐secured	  mortgages	  mostly	  fell	  outside	  
of	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  gaze	  until	  in	  1846	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  would	  be	  made	  aware	  of	  
two	  instances	  of	  slaves	  being	  used	  as	  collateral.	  Firstly,	  there	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Richard	  
Rogers	  a	  British	  subject	  in	  Paraiba	  who	  intended	  to	  clear	  a	  debt	  by	  transferring	  a	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  Adot,	  Spalding	  &	  Co	  to	  Barings,	  29	  Oct	  1852,	  BBP,	  TBA:	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163	  Adot,	  Spalding	  &	  Co	  to	  Barings,	  5	  Aug	  1852,	  BBP,	  TBA	  HC	  4.6.10.	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  Storey,	  Spalding	  &	  Co	  to	  Barings,	  8	  Apr	  1851,	  BBP,	  TBA:	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  Mulhern,	  ‘Britain,	  the	  British	  and	  Labour	  in	  Brazil’,	  ch.	  4.	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female	  slave	  to	  a	  Mr	  Gibson	  in	  Pernambucano.	  Consul	  Newcomen,	  in	  Paraiba,	  who	  
reported	  the	  case	  noted	  he	  had	  ‘not	  the	  slightest	  doubt’	  that	  other	  British	  subjects	  had	  
engaged	  in	  similar	  transactions.166	  	  In	  Pernambucano	  itself,	  Consul	  Cowper	  had	  
identified	  a	  number	  of	  advertisements	  for	  slave	  auctions	  as	  part	  of	  liquidation	  
proceedings.167	  According	  to	  Cowper	  British	  merchants	  viewed	  this	  as	  a	  legitimate	  part	  
of	  the	  debt	  relations,	  and	  this	  was	  a	  belief	  also	  held	  by	  merchants	  in	  Britain	  and	  some	  
members	  of	  parliament.	  	  
Both	  Brazilian	  cases	  passed	  through	  the	  usual	  procedure	  of	  being	  forwarded	  to	  the	  
crown	  law	  officers	  who	  concluded	  that	  the	  transfer	  or	  sale	  of	  slaves	  to	  clear	  debts	  was	  
in	  contravention	  of	  the	  1843	  Act.	  This	  conclusion	  appeared	  to	  unambiguously	  establish	  
that	  foreclosing	  on	  slave	  mortgages	  was	  illegal	  under	  British	  law	  and	  Foreign	  Secretary	  
Palmerston	  would	  send	  a	  circular	  to	  British	  consuls	  in	  1847	  asserting	  that	  fact.168	  
Mulhern	  rightly	  attributes	  Palmerston’s	  interest	  in	  Brazilian	  slave	  mortgages	  to	  his	  
determination	  to	  end	  the	  slave	  trade,	  noting	  the	  lack	  of	  official	  interest	  in	  similar	  
reports	  from	  consuls	  in	  non-­‐slave	  trading	  states	  such	  as	  Venezuela.169	  The	  
offensiveness	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  cases	  may	  also	  have	  been	  related	  to	  the	  transfer	  or	  sale	  of	  
slaves	  rather	  than	  landed	  property	  with	  slaves	  attached.	  Slave-­‐ownership	  through	  both	  
mortgaging	  and	  inheritance	  had	  often	  elided	  slaves	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  property	  
whereas	  the	  Richard	  Rodgers	  case	  involved	  a	  single	  slave	  being	  transferred.	  In	  either	  
case	  the	  fact	  that	  mortgages	  in	  Brazil,	  rather	  than	  Barings’	  longstanding	  activity	  in	  
Cuba,	  became	  a	  point	  of	  controversy	  demonstrates	  once	  again	  the	  uneven	  nature	  of	  
Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  concern.	  Barings	  were	  perhaps	  far	  enough	  removed	  from	  their	  
slave	  property	  to	  escape	  attention;	  they	  did	  not	  appear	  among	  the	  various	  British	  
slave-­‐owners	  reported	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  by	  Consul	  Joseph	  Crawford	  in	  an	  1848	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dispatch.170	  Slave-­‐owning	  via	  mortgage	  may	  have	  in	  many	  cases	  escaped	  attention	  as	  
sugar	  estates	  were	  administered	  by	  Cuban	  firms.	  Roldan	  de	  Montaud	  even	  suggests	  
that	  Barings’	  estates	  were	  held	  in	  the	  names	  of	  frontmen,	  a	  claim	  which	  I	  have	  been	  
unable	  to	  corroborate.171	  
Owners	  of	  both	  mortgaged	  and	  inherited	  slave	  property	  defended	  their	  possessions	  on	  
similar	  terms.	  Whilst	  the	  legality	  of	  slave	  mortgages	  remained	  ambiguous	  after	  the	  
1843	  Act,	  interested	  parties	  such	  as	  Barings	  made	  forceful	  arguments	  for	  their	  
legitimacy.	  The	  protestation	  that	  merchants	  operating	  in	  Cuba	  or	  Brazil	  had	  to	  take	  
slaves	  as	  security	  for	  debts	  bears	  a	  similarity	  to	  the	  claims	  that	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  
Surinam	  or	  St.	  Croix	  had	  to	  be	  compensated.	  Both	  assertions	  rested	  on	  the	  
understanding	  that	  human	  beings	  were	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  property	  in	  these	  states	  
and	  recognition	  of	  that	  fact	  was	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  of	  doing	  business	  there.	  Both	  forms	  of	  
slave	  property	  could	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  corresponding	  to	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  
before	  emancipation	  as	  slaves	  had	  regularly	  fulfilled	  the	  role	  of	  both	  collateral	  and	  
inheritance	  in	  the	  British	  West	  Indies.	  My	  final	  section	  deals	  with	  a	  novel	  form	  of	  slave-­‐
ownership,	  that	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies.	  Whilst	  joint-­‐stock	  slave-­‐ownership	  
differed	  greatly	  from	  those	  discussed	  above	  its	  adherents	  used	  similar	  strategies	  and	  
rhetoric	  to	  secure	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Brougham’s	  bill.	  
Limiting	  Liability:	  Corporate	  Slave-­‐Ownership	  
The	  most	  innovative	  aspect	  of	  Brougham’s	  bill	  in	  its	  original	  form	  was	  its	  attempt	  to	  
wrestle	  with	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  British	  joint-­‐stock	  companies.	  Unlike	  the	  inheritance	  
or	  mortgage	  of	  human	  property	  the	  corporate	  slave	  owner	  had	  not	  been	  a	  feature	  of	  
Britain’s	  Caribbean	  economy.	  The	  1843	  Act	  emerged	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  British	  
government	  were	  attempting	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  economic	  responsibility	  in	  joint-­‐
stock	  ventures,	  following	  the	  proliferation	  of	  these	  companies	  in	  the	  1820s.	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Brougham’s	  original	  draft	  proposed	  a	  model	  for	  corporate	  responsibility,	  specifically	  
attempting	  to	  prevent	  joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies	  from	  acquiring	  further	  slaves.	  The	  
mining	  companies	  opposed	  this	  move	  via	  lobbying	  and	  petitioning.	  They	  succeeded	  in	  
legitimising	  slave-­‐ownership	  and	  secured	  the	  right	  to	  hire	  slaves	  from	  1843	  onwards.	  
This	  form	  of	  slave	  property	  would	  be	  used,	  and	  abused,	  by	  joint-­‐stock	  mining	  
companies	  up	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  
A	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  can	  be	  most	  simply	  understood	  as	  a	  company	  whose	  ownership	  
is	  split	  between	  a	  large	  numbers	  of	  shareholders.	  Joint-­‐stock	  ventures	  began	  to	  
proliferate	  in	  Britain	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Prior	  to	  this	  period	  the	  majority	  of	  
businesses	  had	  been	  family	  ventures	  or	  small-­‐scale	  partnerships	  between	  individual	  
merchants,	  manufacturers,	  or	  bankers.172	  Joint-­‐stock	  companies	  were	  generally	  related	  
to	  ventures	  that	  required	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  capital	  raised	  through	  sale	  of	  shares,	  and	  
then	  calls	  upon	  those	  shares.	  The	  1820s	  would	  see	  an	  investment	  boom,	  partly	  inspired	  
by	  the	  wave	  of	  newly	  independent	  Latin	  American	  states,	  which	  looked	  to	  the	  City	  of	  
London	  for	  finance.	  Alongside	  shares	  in	  government	  loans,	  investors	  were	  offered	  the	  
ability	  to	  buy	  into	  a	  raft	  of	  mining	  companies	  that	  looked	  to	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  
supposedly	  mineral	  rich	  states.173	  Between	  1824	  and	  1825	  British	  businessmen	  
promoted	  companies	  with	  nominal	  capital	  amounting	  to	  £44	  million.174	  Among	  these	  
mining	  companies	  were	  a	  number	  in	  Brazil	  and	  Cuba,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  
labour	  force	  was	  made	  up	  of	  slaves.	  These	  slave-­‐owning	  mining	  companies	  were	  
unusual	  not	  only	  in	  their	  use	  of	  slave	  labour	  outside	  of	  the	  plantation	  environment,	  but	  
also	  in	  the	  way	  that	  ownership	  of	  slaves	  was	  spread	  across	  potentially	  hundreds	  of	  
shareholders.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  Brougham’s	  bill	  attempted	  to	  deal	  with	  
the	  novel	  fact	  of	  the	  corporate	  slave-­‐owner	  and	  how,	  in	  opposing	  the	  bill,	  mining	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companies	  secured	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  slave-­‐owning	  and	  the	  right	  to	  acquire	  more	  
slaves	  via	  hiring.	  
The	  majority	  of	  companies	  in	  Britain	  were	  governed	  by	  partnership	  law	  under	  which	  
partners,	  even	  those	  not	  involved	  in	  management,	  were	  financially	  and	  legally	  liable	  for	  
all	  contracts	  made.	  James	  Taylor	  argues	  that	  this	  arrangement	  was	  seen	  as	  morally	  
superior	  to	  corporate	  law;	  in	  which	  the	  company	  itself	  was	  granted	  legal	  personality	  
and	  individuals	  could	  transfer	  in	  and	  out	  at	  will.175	  The	  extension	  of	  limited	  liability	  
and	  incorporation	  to	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  was	  subject	  to	  much	  debate	  and	  in	  the	  first	  
half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  these	  privileges	  could	  only	  be	  granted	  by	  
government.	  Prominent	  figures	  such	  as	  the	  political	  economist	  J.	  R.	  McCulloch	  argued	  
that	  such	  protections	  prevented	  individuals	  from	  learning	  from	  financial	  mistakes	  and	  
led	  to	  ‘shirking	  responsibility’.176	  When	  Brougham	  addressed	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies	  not	  to	  purchase	  slaves	  he	  also	  made	  assertions	  on	  
whether,	  and	  how,	  companies	  might	  function	  as	  moral	  entities.	  Brougham’s	  solution	  
was	  to	  ground	  the	  moral	  in	  the	  economic	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  treasurers	  of	  Brazilian	  
and	  Cuban	  mining	  companies	  should	  ‘enter	  into	  a	  bond	  in	  the	  Penal	  sum	  of	  Five	  
thousand	  Pounds’	  not	  to	  purchase,	  hire,	  or	  employ	  slaves.177	  Here	  Brougham	  offered	  a	  
striking	  recognition	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  companies’	  legal	  personality,	  whilst	  extending	  
the	  prohibition	  on	  slave	  purchase	  and	  hire	  to	  ‘agents	  acting	  in	  the	  name	  of	  or	  on	  behalf	  
of	  such	  Company.’178	  At	  a	  point	  when	  political	  opinion	  on	  limited	  liability	  for	  companies	  
was	  still	  split,	  Brougham	  recognised	  that	  the	  punishment	  of	  imprisonment	  or	  
transportation	  could	  not	  be	  dished	  out	  to	  every	  company	  shareholder.	  Instead	  
penalties	  would	  target	  investors’	  pockets	  to	  instil	  morality.	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Brougham’s	  attempt	  to	  moralise	  joint-­‐stock	  ventures	  did	  not	  end	  with	  a	  prohibition	  on	  
the	  purchase	  or	  hire	  of	  slaves	  as	  his	  Bill	  also	  included	  measures	  to	  hold	  companies	  to	  
account.	  Joint-­‐stock	  companies	  were	  to	  provide	  ‘Half-­‐yearly	  a	  Register	  of	  all	  persons	  
employed	  by	  them	  as	  labourers	  or	  servants	  in	  their	  respective	  operations	  abroad.’	  
Contained	  in	  this	  register	  were	  to	  be	  details	  of	  ‘the	  name,	  age,	  sex,	  colour,	  condition	  and	  
employment,	  length	  of	  service,	  wages	  and	  place	  of	  nativity’	  of	  everyone	  employed	  by	  
the	  company.	  179	  This	  measure	  was	  clearly	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  companies	  had	  not	  
broken	  the	  law	  by	  adding	  to	  their	  enslaved	  workforce,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  evidence	  of	  
whether	  enslaved	  workers	  were	  being	  treated	  humanely.	  Information	  provided	  
through	  select	  committees	  and	  the	  reports	  of	  missionaries	  had	  been	  vital	  to	  the	  war	  of	  
representation	  over	  slavery	  in	  the	  British	  Caribbean,	  now	  Brougham’s	  bill	  looked	  to	  
shift	  the	  impetus	  of	  providing	  this	  information	  onto	  the	  companies	  themselves.180	  This	  
clause	  appears	  to	  have	  recognised	  the	  fact	  that	  slave-­‐owners	  might	  attempt	  to	  limit	  the	  
information	  available	  about	  their	  enterprises	  as	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  abolitionist	  or	  
government	  critique.	  An	  1844	  a	  select	  committee	  headed	  by	  William	  Gladstone	  
recommended	  all	  companies	  should	  register	  with	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  ‘to	  prevent	  the	  
establishment	  of	  fraudulent	  companies,	  and	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  shareholders	  
and	  of	  the	  public’	  and	  Brougham’s	  proposal	  chimed	  with	  such	  thinking.181	  Concern	  over	  
the	  reliability	  of	  company	  directors	  was	  rife	  in	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  economy,	  particularly	  
after	  a	  number	  of	  financial	  crashes	  in	  the	  1820s	  and	  1830s.	  Brougham’s	  bill	  appeared	  
to	  assert	  that	  if	  shareholders	  should	  be	  protected	  from	  dishonest	  directors	  then	  so	  
should	  the	  slaves	  of	  mining	  companies.	  The	  registration	  clause	  showed	  a	  keen	  
awareness	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  practical	  quandaries	  posed	  by	  corporate	  slave-­‐ownership.	  
Brazil-­‐based	  mining	  companies	  opposed	  Brougham’s	  attempts	  to	  wrestle	  with	  
corporate	  responsibility.	  The	  St.	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company	  (SJDR)	  and	  Imperial	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  Ibid,	  p.	  5.	  
180	  Hall,	  Civilising	  Subjects,	  p.	  108.	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  Harris,	  Industrializing	  English	  Law,	  p.	  281.	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Brazilian	  Mining	  Association	  (IBMA)	  petitioned	  both	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  and	  parliament	  
to	  protest	  the	  bill.	  The	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  both	  of	  these	  companies	  will	  be	  discussed	  
in	  my	  next	  chapter,	  but	  for	  now	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  they	  worked	  in	  concert	  to	  
oppose	  Brougham’s	  bill.	  George	  Keogh,	  secretary	  of	  the	  SJDR,	  wrote	  to	  his	  opposite	  
number	  at	  the	  IBMA	  proposing	  ‘that	  a	  deputation	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Mining	  Companies	  
should	  meet	  together	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  considering	  the	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  
oppose	  the	  Bill’.182	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  this	  co-­‐operation	  was	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  
deployed	  in	  defence	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  both	  companies	  in	  their	  petitions.	  The	  SJDR	  
also	  approached	  a	  number	  of	  prominent	  politicians	  on	  an	  individual	  basis.	  Chairman	  
John	  Diston	  Powles	  met	  with	  Lord	  Ashburton,	  Gladstone,	  and	  Lord	  Dalhousie	  (all	  of	  
whom	  headed	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  at	  some	  point)	  to	  express	  their	  objection	  to	  
prohibitions	  against	  hiring	  of	  slaves.183	  The	  SJDR	  would	  also	  reach	  outside	  of	  the	  
mining	  industry	  with	  A.	  W.	  Powles,	  the	  company’s	  main	  mercantile	  partner	  and	  relative	  
of	  its	  chairman,	  attending	  the	  Liverpool	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce’s	  discussions	  
of	  the	  1843	  Act.184	  This	  is	  yet	  more	  evidence	  of	  collaboration	  and	  networking	  among	  
individuals	  and	  firms	  interested	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  slave	  property.	  Brougham’s	  bill	  
was	  clearly	  an	  object	  of	  serious	  concern	  for	  mining	  companies	  who	  worked	  in	  concert	  
to	  register	  their	  opposition	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  forums.	  
The	  primary	  assertion	  of	  the	  petitions	  produced	  by	  British	  mining	  companies	  was	  that	  
their	  existing	  slave	  property	  had	  been	  acquired	  legally	  and	  that	  the	  purchase	  or	  hire	  of	  
slaves	  did	  not	  give	  impetus	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  SJDR’s	  claim	  that	  ‘[t]hey	  have	  no	  
connexion,	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  with	  the	  traffic	  in	  importing	  Negroes	  -­‐	  a	  traffic,	  to	  
which	  they	  are	  as	  much	  opposed	  as	  a	  person	  can	  be’	  was	  repeated	  across	  all	  the	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  G.	  D.	  Keogh	  to	  G.	  Thomas,	  5	  June	  1843,	  St.	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company	  Papers,	  Latin	  
American	  Studies	  Library,	  University	  of	  Texas,	  Austin	  (hereafter	  SJDR,	  BLUT):	  LB	  4.	  
183	  J.	  D.	  Powles	  to	  Ashburton	  10	  July	  1843;	  G.	  D.	  Keogh	  to	  J.	  Donaldson,	  20	  July	  1843;	  J.	  D.	  Powles	  
to	  W.	  Gladstone,	  31	  July	  1843;	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  	  LB4.	  
184	  Liverpool	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Minutebooks,	  9	  Aug	  1843,	  LCL:	  380	  AME.	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petitions.185	  Here	  the	  mining	  companies	  showed	  a	  keen	  awareness	  that	  the	  
government’s	  primary	  concern	  was	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade,	  rather	  than	  interfering	  with	  
the	  internal	  politics	  of	  slave	  societies.	  This	  distancing	  from	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  also	  a	  
means	  of	  asserting	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  slave	  property.	  As	  for	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  
Surinam	  it	  was	  important	  to	  avoid	  accusations	  that	  any	  slave	  property	  had	  been	  
acquired	  illegally	  through	  the	  transatlantic	  trade.	  The	  IBMA	  for	  example	  noted	  that	  it	  
purchased	  'Gongo	  Soco	  together	  with	  all	  the	  negroes	  attached	  to	  it,	  who,	  in	  this	  
country,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  our	  West	  India	  colonies	  at	  that	  time,	  formed	  a	  necessary	  
appendage	  to	  the	  estates.'186	  Once	  again	  slave	  property	  was	  elided	  with	  the	  purchase	  of	  
land	  and	  key	  to	  both	  companies’	  defence	  was	  that	  ownership,	  and	  purchase,	  of	  slaves	  
had	  not	  been	  outlawed	  by	  Britain	  or	  Brazil	  prior	  to	  1843.	  	  
The	  private	  correspondence	  of	  the	  SJDR	  however	  casts	  serious	  doubt	  on	  protestations	  
of	  innocence	  over	  connections	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  early	  years	  of	  the	  company	  
appear	  to	  have	  witnessed	  attempts	  to	  utilise	  free	  labour	  but	  company	  representatives	  
quickly	  arrived	  at	  the	  conclusion	  that	  ‘we	  shall	  do	  little	  or	  nothing	  without	  slaves.’187	  
The	  SJDR	  would	  contract	  with	  Rio-­‐based	  merchants	  Messrs	  William	  Harrison	  &	  Co.,	  
commending	  them	  for	  the	  ‘capital	  purchase’	  of	  16	  slaves	  in	  1830.188	  Lawrence	  
Bergard’s	  demographic	  study	  of	  slavery	  in	  Minas	  Gerais	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
demonstrates	  that	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  African	  born	  slaves	  in	  the	  region	  in	  the	  
1820s	  and	  1830s.189	  It	  is	  almost	  certain	  that	  slaves	  in	  both	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  mines	  
would	  have	  been	  victims	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  In	  fact	  SJDR	  staff	  would	  privately	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  ‘To	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  Lords	  Spiritual	  and	  Temporal	  in	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  Assembled,	  ‘The	  
Humble	  Petition	  of	  the	  Directors	  of	  the	  St.	  John	  del	  Rey	  Mining	  Company’,	  Enclosed	  in	  J.	  Walker	  
to	  Aberdeen,	  16	  June	  1843,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐501.	  
186	  ‘Lord	  Brougham's	  Suppression	  of	  Slavery	  Bill’,	  Enclosed	  in	  J.	  Walker	  to	  Aberdeen,	  16	  June	  
1843,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐501.	  
187	  ‘Report	  to	  Directors’,	  6	  July	  1830,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  LB1.	  
188	  C.	  Herring	  Jr	  to	  Messrs	  William	  Harrison	  &	  Co.,	  31	  Dec	  1830,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  LB1.	  
189	  L.	  W.	  Bergad,	  Slavery	  and	  the	  Demographic	  and	  Economic	  History	  of	  Minas	  Gerais,	  Brazil,	  
1720-­‐1888,	  pp.	  124-­‐126.	  See	  also	  D.	  C.	  Libby,	  ‘Proto-­‐Industrialisation	  in	  a	  Slave	  Society:	  The	  
Case	  of	  Minas	  Gerais’,	  Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Studies,	  23:1	  (1991),	  pp.	  1-­‐35.	  Libby	  argues	  
Minas	  remained	  one	  of	  the	  major	  destinations	  for	  newly	  imported	  slaves	  until	  termination	  of	  
the	  Brazilian	  slave	  trade	  in	  1850.	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acknowledge	  that	  the	  slaves	  they	  purchased	  had	  recently	  arrived	  in	  Brazil,	  callously	  
noting	  ‘they	  are	  to	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes	  no	  better	  than	  mere	  animal	  machines	  
during	  some	  years	  after	  their	  arrival	  in	  this	  country'.190	  Here	  then	  we	  see	  a	  disjoint	  
between	  the	  private	  discussions	  within	  the	  company	  and	  their	  public	  reputation.	  	  
Purchase	  of	  slaves	  illegally	  imported	  into	  Brazil	  would	  be	  a	  crime	  under	  the	  1824	  Act	  
and	  as	  such	  the	  dubious	  origin	  of	  slaves	  at	  British	  mining	  companies	  was	  concealed	  in	  
protests	  to	  the	  government.	  Both	  companies	  stressed	  the	  relative	  insignificance	  of	  
British	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  comparing	  the	  estimated	  2,000	  British-­‐owned	  slaves	  to	  the	  
2,000,000	  Brazilian	  slaves	  in	  total.191	  Mining	  companies	  attempted	  to	  both	  legitimise	  
their	  extant	  slave	  property	  and	  assert	  that	  interference	  with	  their	  business	  did	  little	  or	  
nothing	  to	  curb	  the	  slave	  trade.	  As	  the	  IBMA’s	  petition	  put	  it	  ‘[t]he	  true	  way	  of	  
beneficially	  dealing	  with	  this	  question	  is	  –	  to	  enforce	  the	  existing	  treaties.’192	  	  
Allied	  to	  this	  assertion	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  slave	  property	  was	  the	  defence	  of	  necessity.	  
Drawing	  parallels	  with	  the	  case	  of	  merchants	  and	  financiers	  one	  petition	  stressed	  that	  
whether	  in	  Brazil,	  Cuba	  or	  the	  United	  States	  ‘Negroes	  form	  a	  considerable	  portion	  of	  
the	  Property	  of	  the	  country.’193	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  assertion	  that	  human	  collateral	  and	  
slave	  labour	  were	  necessary	  evils	  when	  doing	  business	  abroad	  were	  common	  themes	  
in	  protests	  against	  the	  1843	  Act.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  it	  was	  said	  that	  ‘nineteen-­‐
twentieths	  of	  the	  labouring	  classes	  are	  Negroes’,	  in	  this	  telling	  it	  was	  demography	  
rather	  than	  avarice	  that	  led	  British	  companies	  into	  using	  unfree	  labour.194	  Such	  
rhetoric	  relied	  upon	  an	  imagined	  geography	  that	  split	  the	  world	  into	  a	  binary	  between	  
free	  and	  enslaved	  labour.	  Under	  such	  conditions	  a	  prohibition	  against	  slave	  labour	  
amounted	  to	  a	  prohibition	  against	  commerce.	  Again,	  the	  private	  records	  of	  the	  SJDR	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  ‘Report	  to	  Directors’,	  1	  Jan	  1831,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	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191	  ‘SJDR	  petition’,	  TNA:	  FO	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192	  ‘Petition	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  Enclosed	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complicate	  this	  representation.	  As	  noted,	  the	  company	  did	  attempt	  to	  utilise	  free	  
labourers	  and	  whilst	  reports	  to	  the	  directors	  were	  rife	  with	  complaints	  regarding	  free	  
Brazilian	  labourers,	  few	  related	  to	  numbers.	  In	  fact	  Charles	  Herring	  Jr.,	  head	  of	  
operations	  in	  Brazil,	  noted	  'you	  may	  perhaps	  remark	  immediately	  that	  when	  I	  have	  so	  
many	  free	  labourers	  what	  do	  I	  want	  with	  more	  slaves?’195	  His	  justification	  was	  that	  
slaves,	  as	  opposed	  to	  free	  labourers,	  could	  be	  compelled	  to	  work	  underground	  in	  the	  
mines.	  Herring	  had	  previously	  complained	  that	  ‘every	  person	  here	  entertains	  the	  
greatest	  horror	  of	  descending	  the	  shaft	  or	  of	  entering	  the	  mines	  of	  San	  Joze',	  but	  that	  
slaves	  ‘work	  more	  steadily	  and	  where	  you	  like	  them	  to	  work.'196	  Free	  labourers,	  then,	  
might	  not	  have	  been	  as	  scarce	  as	  the	  company	  petitions	  suggested,	  but	  they	  were	  
judged	  not	  fit	  for	  purpose.	  In	  stressing	  the	  need	  for	  slave	  labour	  Herring	  told	  his	  
directors	  ‘'I	  beg	  pardon	  of	  the	  ultra-­‐philanthropists	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  thoroughly	  
deal	  with	  the	  truth.'197	  The	  version	  of	  the	  truth	  presented	  by	  the	  petitioners	  however	  
wrote	  out	  the	  presence	  of	  free	  labourers	  at	  all.	  
Both	  mining	  companies	  also	  stressed	  the	  benefits	  their	  enterprises	  brought	  to	  Britain	  
as	  a	  whole.	  The	  SJDR,	  IBMA,	  and	  other	  mining	  companies	  claimed	  to	  both	  open	  up	  
markets	  for	  British	  manufactures	  and	  provide	  employment	  for	  Englishmen	  through	  the	  
miners	  hired	  to	  provide	  expertise	  in	  Brazil.198	  Such	  assertions	  had	  been	  associated	  with	  
Latin	  American	  mining	  ventures	  since	  the	  1820s	  and	  had	  featured	  prominently	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  prospectuses	  during	  the	  mining	  speculation	  boom.199	  The	  IBMA	  boasted	  that	  
it	  had	  raised	  310,000	  lbs	  of	  gold	  between	  1825	  and	  1842,	  which	  bar	  deductions	  for	  
export	  duties	  had	  been	  sent	  back	  to	  England.	  Imports	  of	  gold	  bullion	  and	  coin	  
underpinned	  Britain’s	  currency	  through	  the	  gold	  standard.200	  From	  this	  perspective	  
mining	  companies	  not	  only	  lined	  investors’	  pockets,	  but	  also	  the	  nation’s	  as	  a	  whole.	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However,	  these	  claims	  inflated	  the	  proportion	  of	  British	  gold	  resulting	  from	  slave	  
labour	  and	  relied	  upon	  the	  out-­‐dated	  perception	  of	  Brazil	  as	  the	  leading	  global	  
producer	  of	  gold.	  Whilst	  this	  had	  been	  true	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  Russia	  had	  
supplanted	  Brazil	  by	  the	  1820s	  and	  would	  provide	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  British	  stocks	  
until	  the	  California	  Gold	  Rush	  of	  1851.201	  Whilst	  these	  claims	  of	  public	  utility	  were	  
exaggerated,	  they	  were	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  detoxifying	  a	  tolerance	  of	  slave	  labour	  in	  
anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  	  
Brazilian	  mining	  companies	  claimed	  to	  not	  only	  bestow	  benefits	  upon	  Britain,	  but	  also	  
on	  the	  slaves	  they	  owned.	  As	  the	  SJDR	  petition	  put	  it,	  '[t]o	  prevent	  the	  Negroes	  who	  are	  
in	  Brazil	  from	  being	  under	  the	  care	  of	  British	  masters	  is	  not	  …	  the	  way	  to	  benefit	  those	  
Negroes.'202	  Claims	  that	  slave-­‐ownership	  could	  be	  exercised	  in	  a	  benevolent	  manner	  
had	  long	  been	  part	  of	  the	  British	  anti-­‐abolitionist	  repertoire,	  but	  had	  shifted	  post-­‐
emancipation.	  Now	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  were	  ‘doing	  all	  in	  their	  power	  to	  extend	  
civilizing	  influence	  around	  them’	  and	  through	  providing	  ‘every	  rational	  comfort’	  for	  
their	  slave	  workforces	  were	  setting	  a	  positive	  example	  for	  Brazilian	  slave	  owners.203	  
Foreign	  slave-­‐owners	  and	  their	  apparent	  lack	  of	  civilization	  compared	  to	  Britons	  
played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  justifying	  continued	  slave-­‐ownership,	  as	  did	  the	  Brazilian	  
government	  who	  it	  was	  claimed	  would	  not	  allow	  emancipation	  to	  take	  place.	  If	  British	  
companies	  were	  forced	  to	  emancipate	  their	  slaves	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  would	  
step	  in	  and	  ‘apportion	  the	  Negroes	  to	  adjoining	  estates.’204	  Re-­‐enslavement	  and	  
kidnapping	  did	  occur	  within	  Minas	  Gerais	  and	  the	  status	  of	  free	  blacks	  within	  Brazil	  
was	  clearly	  precarious.205	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  similar	  claims	  were	  been	  made	  by	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British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  and	  the	  spectre	  of	  crueller	  foreign	  slave-­‐owners	  
appears	  to	  have	  been	  generic	  to	  post-­‐emancipation	  defences	  of	  slave-­‐ownership.	  	  
Mining	  companies	  also	  called	  for	  the	  gradual	  emancipation	  favoured	  by	  other	  British	  
slave-­‐owners.	  Unlike	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam	  they	  couched	  these	  arguments	  in	  
explicitly	  radicalised	  terms	  with	  one	  petition	  claiming	  that	  ‘free	  Blacks	  in	  Brazil	  are	  the	  
least	  moral,	  the	  least	  sober,	  and	  the	  least	  industrious	  class	  of	  the	  population.’206	  Such	  
claims	  echoed	  the	  pro-­‐slavery	  rhetoric	  aired	  before	  West	  Indian	  emancipation	  which	  as	  
Catherine	  Hall	  notes	  had	  revolved	  around	  ‘the	  disputed	  figure	  of	  the	  African’.207	  
Depictions	  of	  black	  people	  as	  lacking	  in	  morals	  and	  work	  ethic	  had	  long	  been	  part	  of	  
the	  discussion	  surrounding	  slavery	  and	  race	  within	  a	  British	  context	  and	  mining	  
companies	  were	  happy	  to	  redeploy	  these	  arguments.	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  could	  
prepare	  these	  individuals	  for	  emancipation,	  but	  any	  pre-­‐emptive	  moves	  toward	  
freedom	  would	  'depriv[e	  them]	  of	  masters	  and	  of	  homes'.208	  This	  logic	  rested	  on	  the	  
assumption	  that	  the	  British	  slave-­‐owner,	  with	  his	  moral	  opposition	  to	  slavery,	  was	  the	  
best	  hope	  for	  enslaved	  people	  outside	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  
In	  justifying	  their	  slave-­‐ownership	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  mining	  companies	  deployed	  
rhetoric	  similar	  to	  other	  Britons	  interested	  in	  slave	  property.	  Claims	  of	  legality,	  
necessity	  and	  respect	  for	  property	  were	  also	  made	  by	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  in	  Surinam,	  
St.	  Croix	  and	  those	  interested	  in	  slave	  mortgages.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  
many	  of	  these	  defences	  had	  first	  been	  developed	  by	  mining	  companies	  in	  response	  to	  
shareholder	  pressure	  for	  emancipation,	  then	  redeployed	  against	  Brougham’s	  bill.	  The	  
1843	  petitions	  however	  also	  took	  specific	  umbrage	  against	  the	  clauses	  directed	  at	  
policing	  mining	  companies,	  specifically	  the	  £5,000	  penalty	  for	  acquiring	  slaves.	  One	  
petition	  wilfully	  misinterpreted	  the	  penalty	  as	  being	  levied	  on	  company	  treasurers	  as	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individuals,	  exploiting	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  over	  corporate	  responsibility	  in	  general.	  At	  the	  
same	  time	  they	  stressed	  that	  in	  times	  of	  crisis,	  for	  example	  a	  flood	  that	  ‘deranges	  the	  
machinery	  and	  works’.	  In	  such	  an	  emergency	  prohibitions	  on	  hiring	  slaves	  would	  have	  
to	  be	  ignored	  as	  labour	  would	  be	  desperately	  needed	  to	  save	  the	  mine	  or,	  as	  the	  
petitioner	  pithily	  noted,	  ‘the	  provisions	  of	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  cannot	  be	  attended	  to	  
when	  mischief	  and	  danger	  are	  afloat.’209	  Here,	  as	  in	  chapter	  three,	  we	  may	  see	  how	  
anti-­‐slavery	  concerns	  were	  represented	  as	  impractical	  and	  fanciful	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  
realities	  of	  commerce.	  Allied	  to	  this	  was	  a	  clear	  belief	  that	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  
actions	  in	  Brazil	  could	  not	  travel	  back	  to	  Britain.	  
	  The	  concerted	  protests	  and	  lobbying	  by	  mining	  companies	  succeeded	  in	  legitimising	  
their	  extant	  slave	  property	  and	  their	  continued	  right	  to	  use	  slave	  labour.	  Whilst	  the	  Bill	  
that	  appeared	  before	  the	  Commons	  maintained	  the	  prohibition	  on	  purchase	  of	  slaves,	  it	  
had	  been	  stripped	  of	  the	  registration	  and	  treasurer’s	  bond	  clauses.	  More	  importantly,	  
the	  mining	  companies’	  right	  to	  hire	  slaves	  from	  other	  slave-­‐owners	  had	  been	  
protected,	  allowing	  for	  a	  continued	  acquisition	  of	  slave	  labour.	  Sir	  Thomas	  Wilde,	  
whilst	  supporting	  the	  bill,	  raised	  concerns	  that	  this	  concession	  would	  lead	  to	  ‘hiring	  of	  
slaves	  for	  thirty	  and	  for	  fifty	  years,	  and	  this	  evasion	  would	  be	  as	  great	  an	  evil	  as	  
slavery.’210	  Wilde’s	  words	  proved	  prophetic	  as	  British	  mining	  companies	  moved	  to	  
meet	  their	  labour	  needs	  through	  large	  scale	  hiring	  of	  slave	  labourers	  from	  
neighbouring	  plantations	  and	  other	  mining	  concerns.	  	  
Whilst	  Chris	  Evans	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  1843	  Act	  was	  ‘ineffectual	  and	  unloved’	  it	  did	  
cause	  brief	  consternation	  for	  the	  SJDR.211	  Following	  its	  passage	  the	  company	  proceeded	  
cautiously,	  seeking	  multiple	  legal	  opinions	  on	  the	  legality	  of	  hiring	  slaves	  in	  both	  Brazil	  
and	  England,	  as	  well	  as	  cautioning	  employees	  from	  taking	  slaves	  as	  security	  for	  money	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advanced.212	  The	  company	  also	  petitioned	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  reiterating	  the	  
arguments	  of	  necessity	  made	  against	  the	  1843	  Act	  to	  secure	  approval	  for	  slave	  
hiring.213	  However,	  once	  confident	  in	  the	  law	  the	  SJDR	  aggressively	  pursued	  slave	  
hiring	  and	  by	  1861	  had	  rented	  200	  slaves	  from	  fifty	  or	  so	  slave-­‐owners.214	  In	  1845	  the	  
SJDR	  agreed	  a	  particularly	  large	  hiring	  scheme	  as	  they	  took	  on	  the	  385	  slaves	  of	  the	  
recently	  shuttered	  Cata	  Branca	  Company	  for	  an	  initial	  period	  of	  fourteen	  years,	  after	  
which	  the	  slaves	  and	  their	  children	  were	  to	  be	  emancipated.	  Matt	  Childs	  has	  explored	  
how	  the	  company	  refused	  to	  emancipate	  these	  slaves	  in	  1859	  and	  were	  only	  forced	  to	  
do	  so	  following	  negative	  attention	  garnered	  from	  Brazilian	  abolitionists	  in	  the	  
1870s.215	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  SJDR,	  at	  least,	  the	  continued	  exploitation	  of	  slave	  labour	  
rested	  as	  much	  on	  dishonesty	  as	  it	  did	  on	  legitimacy	  conferred	  by	  the	  1843	  Act.	  
Not	  all	  Brazilian	  mining	  companies	  would	  have	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  SJDR,	  which	  traded	  
well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  the	  1843	  Act	  would	  raise	  awkward	  questions	  for	  
other	  less	  successful	  British	  ventures.	  The	  IBMA	  was	  struck	  by	  a	  flood	  and	  consequent	  
mine	  collapse	  in	  1856	  which	  led	  to	  the	  company	  ceasing	  operations.216	  Traditionally,	  
the	  winding	  up	  of	  a	  company	  would	  result	  in	  the	  sale	  of	  all	  its	  property	  and	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  IBMA	  this	  would	  include	  the	  hundreds	  of	  slaves	  working	  the	  mine.	  This	  potential	  
sale	  of	  slaves	  received	  press	  attention	  in	  the	  Daily	  News	  where	  an	  anonymous	  
correspondent	  adverted	  to	  the	  1843	  Act	  and	  urged	  the	  paper	  ‘to	  prevent	  such	  an	  
atrocity,	  should	  it	  really	  be	  contemplated.’217	  Here	  the	  thought	  that	  British	  subjects	  
should	  profit	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  men,	  women,	  and	  especially	  children	  was	  unpalatable.	  
The	  company	  only	  abandoned	  the	  sale	  of	  its	  slave	  property	  when	  advised	  by	  the	  British	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consul	  in	  Rio	  that	  such	  an	  act	  would	  lead	  to	  prosecution.218	  The	  IBMA	  case	  eventually	  
resulted	  in	  vindication	  of	  the	  1843	  Act	  as	  Paulo	  Santos,	  who	  had	  originally	  contracted	  
to	  purchase,	  attempted	  to	  use	  the	  English	  courts	  to	  force	  through	  the	  sale.	  With	  Lord	  
Brougham	  in	  attendance,	  Justice	  Willes	  ruled	  that	  the	  proposed	  sale	  did	  in	  fact	  
contravene	  the	  1843	  Act.	  What	  is	  more	  he	  drew	  on	  the	  prosecution	  of	  Pedro	  Zulueta	  in	  
1842	  to	  argue	  British	  purchase	  of	  slaves	  had	  been	  illegal	  since	  at	  least	  1824.219	  This	  
represented	  a	  hardening	  of	  legal	  opinion	  and	  a	  challenge	  towards	  the	  supposed	  
legitimate	  forms	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  practiced	  by	  British	  subjects.	  This	  decision	  
demonstrates	  the	  surprising	  longevity	  of	  the	  1843	  Act	  and	  that	  in	  the	  right	  
circumstances	  anti-­‐slavery	  victories,	  however	  minor	  might	  be	  achieved.	  
The	  fall	  out	  of	  the	  IBMA	  decision	  appeared	  to	  influence	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  mining	  
companies	  in	  slave	  societies	  sold	  themselves	  to	  prospective	  shareholders.	  The	  East	  del	  
Rey	  Mining	  Company,	  a	  company	  promoted	  in	  late	  1861,	  claimed	  it	  would	  ‘engage	  
labourers	  by	  the	  ordinary	  system	  of	  contract	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  Brazils’220	  This	  followed	  
an	  advert	  circulated	  by	  BFASS,	  emboldened	  by	  the	  IBMA	  decision	  and	  the	  Foreign	  
Office’s	  rebuke	  of	  Surinamese	  slave-­‐owners,	  which	  called	  on	  any	  new	  mining	  
companies	  to	  ‘carefully	  guard	  themselves	  against	  any	  transaction	  which	  may	  involve	  
them	  in	  slave-­‐dealing	  or	  slave-­‐holding.’221	  December	  would	  see	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  
Monte	  Aureos	  Company,	  promoted	  by	  SJDR	  chairman	  John	  Hockin,	  whose	  prospectus	  
would	  explicitly	  state	  that	  ‘no	  slaves	  will	  be	  held	  by	  the	  Company	  or	  their	  servants’,	  a	  
claim	  that	  was	  lauded	  as	  a	  victory	  by	  the	  BFASS.222	  Both	  the	  East	  del	  Rey	  and	  Montes	  
Aureos	  drew	  on	  the	  example	  of	  the	  SJDR	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  profits	  that	  could	  be	  made	  
from	  Brazilian	  gold	  mining,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  company	  had	  thrived	  through	  its	  
exploitation	  of	  slave	  labour.	  Claims	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  slave	  labour	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  Mining	  Journal,	  2	  July	  1859.	  
219	  Daily	  News,	  11	  July	  1859,	  see	  chapter	  three	  for	  more	  on	  Zulueta.	  
220	  Mining	  Journal,	  ‘The	  East	  Del	  Rey	  Mining	  Company’,	  21	  Sep	  1861.	  
221	  Mining	  Journal,	  ‘British	  Mining	  Companies	  in	  Brazil’,	  14	  Sep	  1861.	  
222	  Daily	  News,	  19	  Dec	  1861;	  ‘British	  Mining	  Companies	  and	  Slaveholding’,	  ASR,	  1	  Feb	  1862.	  
213	  
	  
transformed	  into	  reassurances	  that	  'there	  are	  plenty	  of	  free	  blacks	  and	  Indians	  in	  the	  
neighbourhood	  to	  ensure	  plenty	  of	  labour	  at	  a	  moderate	  price.’223	  Given	  the	  continued	  
use	  of	  slave	  labour	  by	  the	  SJDR	  right	  up	  until	  emancipation	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  this	  shift	  
in	  advertising	  reflected	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  slavery’s	  legitimacy	  among	  British	  
investors	  rather	  than	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  labour	  market.	  	  
Conclusion	  
The	  1843	  Act	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  compromise	  between	  British	  abolitionists,	  
government,	  and	  slave-­‐owners.	  Brougham’s	  recognition	  of	  existing	  slave	  property	  in	  
his	  original	  bill	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  debates	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  for	  several	  decades.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  of	  three	  distinct	  
types	  developed	  defences	  of	  slavery	  or	  critiques	  of	  emancipation	  either	  in	  response	  to,	  
or	  drawing	  on,	  the	  1843	  Act.	  Whilst	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  many	  British	  subjects	  continued	  to	  
acquire	  slaves	  after	  1843	  there	  were	  rare	  occasions	  when	  the	  Act	  appeared	  to	  curb	  the	  
purchase	  or	  sale	  of	  slave	  by	  British	  companies,	  specifically	  Barings’	  apparent	  refusal	  to	  
sanction	  more	  slave	  purchases	  or	  the	  cancellation	  of	  slave	  sales	  by	  the	  IBMA.	  The	  1843	  
Act	  then	  may	  well	  not	  have	  been	  entirely	  a	  dead	  letter,	  but	  its	  concessions	  could	  be	  
subverted	  and	  exploited.	  
More	  broadly,	  this	  chapter	  has	  used	  the	  1843	  Act	  to	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  intellectual	  
toolkit	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐emancipation	  slave-­‐owners.	  Caribbean	  planters,	  merchant	  
bankers	  and	  gold	  mines	  were	  different	  types	  of	  slave-­‐owner,	  but	  can	  be	  drawn	  together	  
through	  the	  claims	  they	  made	  about	  slavery.	  Whist	  each	  type	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  
required	  its	  own	  idiosyncratic	  defence	  certain	  themes	  were	  universal.	  Among	  these	  
was	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  slave	  as	  property,	  which	  often	  required	  the	  elision	  of	  human	  
being	  and	  landholdings,	  mortgage	  contracts,	  or	  company	  shares.	  This	  legitimacy	  rested	  
upon	  the	  necessity	  of	  slave	  labour	  or	  property	  in	  the	  various	  overseas	  theatres	  in	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which	  British	  commerce	  operated.	  Allied	  to	  these	  claims	  of	  necessity	  was	  the	  frequent	  
invocation	  of	  a	  foreign	  other.	  This	  other	  might	  be	  the	  Surinamese	  government,	  a	  
Spanish	  merchant,	  or	  Brazilian	  planter.	  In	  each	  case	  a	  foreign	  slave-­‐owner,	  supposedly	  
less	  moral	  or	  civilized	  than	  their	  British	  counterpart,	  was	  always	  raised	  as	  the	  
consequence	  of	  emancipation.	  The	  rhetoric	  used	  to	  defend	  slave-­‐ownership	  and	  the	  
practical	  means	  through	  which	  slave	  property	  was	  legitimised	  provide	  further	  insights	  
into	  the	  workings	  of	  British	  economic	  culture.	  Plantation	  owners,	  merchant	  bankers,	  
and	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  directors	  worked	  in	  concert	  to	  detoxify	  their	  human	  property.	  
They	  did	  so	  not	  only	  by	  crafting	  imagined	  geographies	  that	  represented	  slavery	  as	  
essential	  to	  the	  economies	  of	  various	  Atlantic	  world	  societies,	  but	  also	  through	  limiting	  
access	  to	  information	  about	  how	  slaves	  were	  acquired.	  	  
British	  slave-­‐owners	  operating	  across	  various	  contexts	  drew	  on	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  1833	  
Emancipation	  Act	  to	  argue	  explicitly	  or	  tacitly	  for	  a	  gradual	  or	  compensated	  
emancipation	  that	  would	  allegedly	  benefit	  both	  slave	  and	  slave-­‐owner.	  As	  with	  the	  
merchants	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  British	  merchants	  appealed	  to	  economic	  rationality	  
by	  representing	  manumission	  or	  non-­‐compensated	  emancipation	  as	  precipitous	  and	  
implausible.	  Through	  positioning	  themselves	  as	  authorities	  on	  the	  economies	  in	  which	  
they	  were	  invested	  in	  human	  property	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  gained	  some	  legitimacy	  
and	  breathing	  space	  from	  a	  government	  formally	  committed	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  but	  
hesitant	  to	  interfere	  with	  commerce.	  However,	  for	  some	  of	  these	  companies	  the	  
government	  was	  not	  the	  only	  audience	  who	  needed	  to	  be	  won	  over.	  As	  my	  next	  chapter	  
will	  demonstrate,	  joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies	  found	  among	  their	  own	  shareholders	  
expression	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  critique	  that	  also	  had	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  placated.
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Chapter	  V:	  Slavery	  and	  Joint-­‐Stock	  Politics	  
British	  slave-­‐ownership	  suffered	  a	  slow	  death.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  emancipation	  
legislation	  of	  1833	  was	  far	  from	  the	  end	  of	  it.	  The	  slowest	  death	  of	  all	  was	  to	  be	  found	  
outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	  empire	  in	  the	  slave	  economies	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil.	  It	  was	  
through	  investment	  in	  these	  countries	  that	  British	  subjects	  still	  possessed	  slaves	  for	  
decades	  after	  emancipation.	  Whilst	  Britain	  trumpeted	  its	  anti-­‐slavery	  credentials	  in	  
both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  metropolitan	  investors	  reaped	  the	  benefits	  of	  unfree	  
labour.	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  British	  slave	  ownership	  in	  the	  post-­‐emancipation	  
period	  by	  focusing	  on	  two	  British	  owned	  joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies	  operating	  in	  
Brazil;	  the	  Saint	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company	  (SJDR)	  and	  Imperial	  Brazilian	  Mining	  
Association	  (IBMA).	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  both	  critiques	  and	  defences	  of	  
slavery	  were	  used,	  and	  transformed,	  in	  what	  Tim	  Alborn	  has	  called	  ‘joint-­‐stock	  politics’.	  
This	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  political	  entities	  that	  
need	  to	  maintain	  ‘a	  semblance	  of	  legitimacy	  to	  survive.’1	  In	  looking	  to	  attain	  this	  
legitimacy	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  in	  Brazil	  also	  had	  to	  legitimise	  their	  use	  of	  slave	  
labour.	  
The	  SJDR	  has	  already	  been	  the	  object	  of	  considerable	  study	  due	  to	  both	  its	  longevity	  
and	  the	  role	  it	  played	  in	  one	  of	  the	  key	  episodes	  of	  Brazilian	  abolition.	  Founded	  in	  1830	  
by	  the	  prominent	  London	  merchant	  John	  Diston	  Powles,	  the	  SJDR	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  mining	  concerns	  in	  Brazil.	  The	  company	  traded	  well	  into	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  when	  the	  business	  historian	  Marshall	  Eakin	  would	  chronicle	  its	  
history,	  including	  its	  reliance	  upon	  slave	  labour.2	  Eakin’s	  work	  is	  firmly	  positioned	  as	  a	  
traditional	  business	  history	  built	  around	  the	  labour	  practices,	  technological	  advances	  
and	  government	  lobbying	  of	  the	  company.	  Matt	  Childs	  has	  explored	  the	  management	  of	  
slaves	  at	  the	  company’s	  Morro	  Velho	  mine;	  he	  shows	  how	  ritual,	  discipline	  and	  reward	  
were	  used	  to	  control	  what	  was	  the	  largest	  unfree	  workforce	  in	  the	  region	  of	  Minas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  Alborn,	  Conceiving	  Companies,	  p.	  2.	  
2	  Eakin,	  British	  Enterprise	  in	  Brazil,	  pp.	  22-­‐23.	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Gerais.3	  Elsewhere	  Childs	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  SJDR’s	  status	  as	  a	  British	  
company	  provided	  an	  opening	  for	  Brazilian	  abolitionists	  during	  a	  controversy	  over	  the	  
illegal	  hiring	  of	  slaves	  in	  the	  late	  1870s.4	  	  These	  articles,	  alongside	  Eakin’s	  work,	  
valuably	  explain	  how	  a	  slave-­‐owning	  British	  company	  operated	  and	  how	  its	  
relationship	  to	  the	  slave	  workforce	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  were	  coloured	  by	  the	  
British	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  What	  they	  lack	  is	  an	  engagement	  with	  how	  slave-­‐
ownership	  was	  reconciled	  with	  the	  company’s	  shareholders	  in	  the	  metropole.	  This	  
chapter	  will	  address	  this	  gap	  by	  investigating	  how	  a	  slave	  enterprise	  such	  as	  SJDR	  was	  
represented,	  and	  rationalised,	  within	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  
Chris	  Evans	  has	  provided	  a	  more	  metropolitan	  perspective	  on	  mining	  companies	  and	  
slavery	  in	  an	  article	  on	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  1843	  Slave	  Trade	  
Suppression	  Act.5	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  this	  legislation,	  aimed	  at	  
stemming	  the	  flow	  of	  British	  capital	  into	  the	  slave	  trade,	  prohibited	  the	  purchase	  of	  
slaves	  by	  British	  subjects	  outside	  of	  the	  Empire.	  Evans	  provides	  an	  important	  snapshot	  
of	  British	  mining	  companies	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  crisis	  his	  main	  contention	  is	  that	  the	  
debates	  around	  Brougham’s	  bill	  demonstrated	  the	  limits	  of	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  
commitments.6	  My	  own	  reading	  of	  the	  final	  1843	  Act	  differs	  in	  viewing	  it	  as	  yet	  another	  
example	  of	  the	  ambivalence	  of	  British	  commerce	  rather	  than	  anti-­‐slavery’s	  weakness.	  
However,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  intend	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  companies’	  relationships	  with	  
their	  shareholders,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  government	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  campaigners.	  
Although	  Evans	  does	  advert	  to	  the	  protests	  against	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  IBMA	  
shareholders	  he	  does	  not	  fully	  explore	  the	  unique	  challenges	  presented	  by	  joint-­‐stock	  
ownership	  of	  slaves	  in	  anti-­‐slavery	  Britain.	  If,	  as	  Evans	  claims,	  Brazilian	  and	  Cuban	  
mines	  raised	  questions	  over	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  corporate	  responsibility	  [and]	  the	  possibility	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Childs,	  ‘Master-­‐Slave’,	  pp.	  43-­‐72.	  
4	  Childs,	  ‘British	  Slaveholder	  and	  Brazilian	  Abolition’,	  p.	  737.	  
5	  Evans,	  ‘Brazilian	  Gold’,	  pp.	  118-­‐134.	  
6	  Ibid.	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of	  ethical	  investment’	  then	  this	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  provide	  answers.7	  It	  will	  do	  so	  by	  
exploring	  how	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  addressed	  their	  controversial	  slave-­‐ownership	  and	  
justified	  it	  to	  their	  shareholders	  and,	  ultimately,	  the	  wider	  world.	  	  
Recent	  scholarship	  on	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  highly	  contested	  
nature	  of	  these	  economic	  entities	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  The	  traditional	  
narrative	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  proliferation	  as	  a	  rational	  response	  to	  an	  increasingly	  capital-­‐
hungry	  economy	  has	  been	  ‘reproblematiz[ed]’	  by	  historians	  such	  as	  James	  Taylor	  who,	  
by	  drawing	  on	  literary	  and	  journalistic	  sources,	  has	  noted	  the	  constant	  scepticism	  
directed	  toward	  joint-­‐stock	  ventures	  by	  the	  Victorian	  public.8	  Much	  of	  this	  scepticism	  
revolved	  around	  the	  uneven	  relationship	  between	  shareholders	  and	  company	  
directors.	  Representations	  of	  this	  relationship	  vacillated	  between	  fears	  of	  unwitting	  
investors	  duped	  by	  unscrupulous	  directors	  and	  harsh	  critiques	  of	  unthinking	  
speculators	  who	  were	  no	  better	  than	  gamblers.9	  These	  debates	  crystallised	  around	  the	  
issue	  of	  limited	  liability,	  whether	  investors	  should	  bear	  economic	  responsibility	  for	  the	  
debts	  of	  a	  company.	  However,	  there	  were	  wider	  concerns	  over	  directors	  misleading	  
shareholders	  through	  over-­‐promising,	  embellishment,	  and	  sometimes	  dishonesty.	  Like	  
all	  other	  joint-­‐stocks	  the	  SJDR	  and	  IBMA	  had	  to	  cultivate	  and	  maintain	  shareholder	  
confidence,	  what	  set	  these	  companies	  apart	  was	  that	  as	  well	  as	  legitimising	  high	  
expenditure	  they	  also	  had	  to	  legitimise,	  and	  therefore	  justify,	  their	  reliance	  on	  slave	  
labour.	  	  
Joint-­‐stock	  companies	  pursued	  legitimacy,	  and	  just	  as	  importantly	  continued	  
investment,	  through	  a	  number	  of	  different	  means	  which	  mostly	  took	  the	  form	  of	  
publications.	  Both	  the	  SJDR	  and	  IBMA	  produced	  reports	  generally	  following	  an	  annual	  
or	  half-­‐yearly	  meeting	  between	  directors	  and	  shareholders.	  As	  Alborn	  has	  noted	  
companies	  had	  a	  public	  of	  shareholders,	  customers	  and	  workers	  and	  the	  annual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Ibid,	  p.	  119.	  
8	  Taylor,	  Creating	  Capitalism,	  pp.	  1-­‐3.	  
9	  Alborn,	  Conceiving	  Companies,	  p.	  89,	  p.	  185	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reports	  were	  key	  to	  communicating	  with	  this	  public.10	  Mining	  companies	  looked	  to	  
stress	  their	  innovation	  and	  use	  of	  new	  technologies	  that	  justified	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  
capital	  joint-­‐stocks	  raised.11	  The	  reports	  produced	  by	  mining	  companies	  quickly	  fell	  
into	  a	  generic	  pattern	  of	  reporting	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  works,	  the	  amount	  of	  ore	  
extracted,	  and	  crucially	  the	  expected	  dividend.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  reports	  would	  
traditionally	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  main	  body	  statement,	  penned	  by	  the	  company	  secretary	  
or	  chairman,	  followed	  by	  an	  appendix	  of	  statistics	  and	  reports	  produced	  by	  the	  
superintendent,	  mining	  captains	  and	  surgeons.	  These	  reports,	  of	  course,	  sought	  to	  
represent	  the	  company	  in	  the	  most	  reassuring	  light	  possible.	  Therefore,	  what	  they	  did	  
and	  did	  not	  say	  about	  the	  companies’	  unfree	  workforces	  can	  reveal	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  
how	  slave-­‐owning	  was	  justified	  in	  early	  Victorian	  Britain.	  The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  
chapter	  will	  analyse	  how	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  both	  companies	  variously	  addressed,	  
elided	  and	  rationalised	  reliance	  on	  slave	  labour,	  and	  how	  these	  interventions	  related	  to	  
broader	  anti-­‐slavery	  ideology	  and	  economic	  culture.	  The	  annual	  reports	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  
companies	  are	  approached	  as	  texts	  that	  sought	  to	  establish	  the	  reputation	  of	  company	  
directors	  and	  win	  the	  trust	  of	  investors.	  I	  demonstrate	  how	  in	  constructing	  this	  
reputation	  annual	  reports	  had	  to	  take	  account	  of	  anti-­‐slavery,	  further	  demonstrating	  
the	  role	  played	  by	  moral	  concerns	  within	  the	  British	  economy.	  
Of	  course	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  SJDR	  and	  IBMA	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  rather	  
they	  existed	  in	  a	  constant	  dialogue	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  sources	  from	  which	  
shareholders	  and	  the	  wider	  public	  could	  garner	  information	  on	  the	  companies.	  The	  
nineteenth	  century	  for	  example	  saw	  the	  emergence	  and	  professionalization	  of	  financial	  
journalism.	  As	  Mary	  Poovey	  has	  noted	  from	  the	  1820s	  onwards	  increasing	  column	  
inches	  were	  devoted	  to	  sections	  with	  names	  such	  as	  ‘Money,	  Market,	  and	  City	  
intelligence’,	  which	  were	  ‘entertaining,	  generally	  provided	  reliable	  information,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Ibid,	  p.	  107.	  
11	  Taylor,	  Creating	  Capitalism,	  pp.	  34-­‐36.	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were	  sometimes	  sharply	  critical.’12	  As	  ventures	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  city	  investors	  
mining	  concerns	  could,	  and	  did,	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  these	  sharp	  critiques.	  Potential	  
investors	  scrutinised	  expenditure,	  profit	  and	  labour	  management.	  All	  of	  these	  could	  be	  
understood	  in	  terms	  of	  reliance	  on	  slave	  labour.	  Furthermore	  the	  mining	  industry	  had	  
its	  own	  specialised	  press,	  most	  notably	  the	  weekly	  Mining	  Journal.	  This	  journal	  has	  
been	  described	  as	  the	  publication	  of	  mining	  capital,	  rather	  than	  labour,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  
matched	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  city	  columnists.	  The	  Mining	  Journal’s	  specialisation	  
also	  meant	  it	  provided	  a	  forum	  for	  both	  directors	  and	  shareholders	  to	  have	  their	  say	  
through	  the	  regular	  publication	  of	  official	  reports	  and	  correspondence.13	  The	  financial	  
and	  mining	  press,	  alongside	  the	  annual	  reports,	  provided	  fodder	  for	  the	  BFASS.	  The	  
abolitionists	  mined	  any	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  publication	  for	  evidence	  of	  slavery’s	  cruelty.	  
The	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter	  periodically	  commented	  upon	  on,	  and	  condemned,	  the	  slave-­‐
owning	  of	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  up	  until	  Brazilian	  emancipation	  in	  1888.	  By	  examining	  
these	  various	  publications	  in	  concert	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  mining	  companies	  
sought	  to	  negate	  any	  critique	  of	  slavery.	  
The	  voices	  that	  remain	  frustratingly	  silent	  within	  this	  story	  are	  regrettably	  those	  of	  the	  
enslaved	  themselves.	  The	  one	  remarkable	  instance	  of	  a	  former	  SJDR	  slave	  directly	  
addressing	  a	  British	  audience	  came	  when	  a	  free	  man	  named	  Augustino	  appeared	  
before	  an	  1849	  select	  committee	  on	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Speaking	  through	  an	  interpreter,	  
Charles	  Herring	  Jr.	  (former	  superintendent	  of	  the	  SJDR),	  the	  ex-­‐miner	  recounted	  the	  
harrowing	  tale	  of	  his	  kidnap	  and	  transportation	  from	  West	  Africa.	  Alas,	  the	  committee	  
failed	  to	  ask	  anything	  about	  his	  time	  in	  Brazil	  itself.14	  The	  various	  sources	  mentioned	  
above	  stuck	  to	  discussing	  slaves	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  and	  whilst	  claims	  were	  frequently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  M.	  Poovey,	  Genres	  of	  the	  Credit	  Economy:	  Mediating	  Value	  in	  Eighteenth	  and	  Nineteenth-­‐
Century	  Britain	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  pp.	  32-­‐33.	  
13	  M.	  Taunton,	  ‘Mining	  Journal’,	  in	  L.	  Brake,	  M.	  Demoor	  (eds),	  The	  Dictionary	  of	  Nineteenth-­‐
Century	  Journalism	  (Gent:	  Academia	  Press,	  2009).	  
14	  Evidence	  given	  on	  24	  May	  1849	  in	  S.	  Wilberforce,	  Select	  Committee	  of	  House	  of	  Lords	  to	  
consider	  best	  Means	  for	  Final	  Extinction	  of	  African	  Slave	  Trade,	  Report,	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence,	  
Appendix,	  Index,	  PP,	  53	  (1850),	  pp.	  162-­‐163.	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made	  about	  their	  relative	  ‘contentedness’	  the	  enslaved	  perspective	  remains	  an	  elusive	  
counterweight	  to	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  directors,	  shareholders	  and	  metropolitan	  
abolitionists.	  Childs’s	  aforementioned	  article	  does	  explore	  the	  general	  experience	  of	  
SJDR	  slaves;	  their	  labour,	  leisure	  and	  resistance.	  Less	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  IBMA,	  
though	  the	  geological	  writings	  of	  Jory	  Henwood,	  a	  Cornish	  mining	  captain	  at	  the	  
company’s	  Gongo	  Soco	  mine,	  can	  be	  read	  to	  reveal	  the	  agency	  and	  resistance	  of	  these	  
enslaved	  people.15	  These	  accounts,	  although	  useful	  in	  contextualising	  and	  scrutinising	  
the	  claims	  of	  both	  companies,	  ultimately	  fall	  outside	  this	  chapter’s	  focus.	  Rather,	  my	  
intention	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  both	  companies	  represented	  slavery	  in	  their	  mines.	  As	  with	  
many	  depictions	  of	  non-­‐white	  society	  outside	  of	  Britain,	  these	  representations	  were	  
often	  divorced	  from	  reality.16	  
This	  chapter	  is	  broken	  into	  three	  distinct	  sections.	  Firstly,	  I	  will	  analyse	  the	  annual	  
reports	  of	  the	  SJDR	  and	  IBMA	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  degree	  of	  reluctance	  that	  
characterised	  discussion	  of	  slavery	  by	  the	  companies.	  For	  the	  most	  part	  they	  sought	  to	  
minimise,	  or	  even	  excise,	  reference	  to	  their	  slave	  workforce.	  However,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  
moments	  of	  crisis	  or	  controversy	  could	  drag	  the	  companies	  into	  more	  explicit	  
discussion,	  and	  defence	  of	  bonded	  labour.	  To	  demonstrate	  this	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  two	  
revealing	  episodes.	  Firstly,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  attempt	  by	  IBMA	  shareholders	  to	  bring	  
about	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  company’s	  slaves	  in	  1841.	  Secondly,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  a	  late	  
1849	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  SJDR	  slave	  workforce.	  The	  former	  
crisis	  related	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  any	  form	  of	  slave	  ownership,	  the	  latter	  related	  to	  how	  
the	  cruelties	  of	  slave	  ownership	  could	  be	  mitigated.	  Both	  cases	  show	  how	  debates	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  J.	  Henwood,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Cornwall	  Geological	  Society,	  8:1	  (1871);	  The	  main	  body	  
of	  this	  piece	  is	  a	  work	  on	  the	  geology	  of	  the	  IBMA’s	  Gongo	  Soco	  mine,	  however	  its	  footnotes	  
contain	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  slavery	  at	  the	  mine	  including	  a	  quantification	  of	  	  
‘misbehaviour’,	  which	  could	  be	  read	  as	  resistance.	  Henwood’s	  entry	  in	  the	  ODNB	  suggests	  this	  
discussion	  of	  slavery	  dated	  back	  to	  a	  private	  pamphlet	  produced	  upon	  his	  return	  from	  Brazil	  in	  
the	  1850s.	  D.	  Crook,	  ‘Henwood,	  (William)	  Jory	  (1805–1875)’,	  ODNB	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2004).	  [http://www.oxforddnb.com.liverpool.idm.oclc.org/view/article/12997,	  accessed	  12	  
Sep	  2017]	  
16	  Hall,	  Civilising	  Subjects,	  pp.	  20-­‐21.	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slavery	  became	  enmeshed	  with	  internal	  struggles	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  profitability	  
of	  the	  companies	  themselves.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  demonstrate	  the	  complexity	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  
belief	  and	  action	  in	  Britain	  post-­‐emancipation.	  For	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  
economy	  at	  least	  the	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  could	  pertain	  as	  much	  to	  money	  as	  it	  could	  
to	  morals.	  By	  addressing	  the	  role	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  within	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  this	  
chapter	  reveals	  that	  economic	  culture	  could	  shape	  the	  internal	  governance	  of	  
companies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market.	  
Reading	  Slavery	  in	  Company	  Annual	  Reports	  
The	  Directors	  in	  their	  preceding	  Reports	  have	  abstained	  from	  making	  
particular	  allusion	  to	  their	  Negro	  establishment,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  an	  object	  
of	  the	  greatest	  solicitude,	  from	  the	  moment	  they	  were	  apprised	  of	  their	  
being	  owners	  of	  negroes,	  to	  endeavour	  to	  ameliorate	  and	  soften	  their	  
condition.	  17	  
The	  above	  excerpt	  comes	  from	  an	  annual	  report	  published	  by	  the	  IBMA	  in	  1830	  and	  
represents	  the	  first	  time	  the	  company,	  somewhat	  sheepishly,	  addressed	  its	  ownership	  
of	  slaves.	  Previous	  reports	  had,	  as	  Evans	  notes,	  ‘coyly’	  elided	  reliance	  on	  slavery	  by	  
referring	  to	  the	  mine’s	  workforce	  through	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘labourers’.18	  This	  admission	  
on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  company	  contained	  many	  of	  the	  themes	  that	  would	  run	  throughout	  
the	  annual	  reports	  of	  both	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR.	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  
IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  must	  be	  first	  and	  foremost	  understood	  as	  attempts	  to	  cultivate	  
confidence	  and	  continued	  investment	  among	  shareholders.	  As	  such	  representations	  of	  
slavery	  within	  them	  were	  coloured	  not	  only	  by	  abolitionist	  campaigns,	  but	  also	  by	  
specific	  anxieties	  relating	  to	  their	  position	  as	  joint-­‐stock	  companies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  IBMA	  Annual	  Report,	  (hereafter	  AR)	  1830,	  (vol.	  1)	  p.	  14.	  Can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  British	  Library:	  
Shelfmark	  	  08247.g.14.	  	  
18	  Evans,	  ‘Brazilian	  Gold’,	  p.	  121,	  IBMA	  AR	  1829,	  p.	  8.	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In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  two	  mining	  companies	  
separately,	  drawing	  out	  similarities	  and	  divergences	  in	  their	  representation	  of	  their	  
enslaved	  workforce.	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  IBMA	  as	  this	  company	  was	  founded	  several	  
years	  before	  the	  SJDR	  and	  was	  in	  fact	  one	  of	  the	  pioneers	  of	  British	  mining	  in	  Brazil.	  As	  
Evans	  notes,	  the	  IBMA	  was	  formed	  in	  1824	  and	  sought	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  ‘[t]he	  new	  
Brazilian	  constitution	  …	  which	  allowed	  the	  crown	  to	  grant	  mineral	  concessions	  to	  
foreigners.’19	  Among	  the	  company’s	  directors	  were	  men	  such	  as	  Isaac	  Goldsmid,	  who	  
had	  experience	  dealing	  on	  gold	  bullion	  and	  also	  in	  financing	  loans	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  
government.20	  The	  IBMA	  then	  clearly	  formed	  part	  of	  wider	  shift	  towards	  Latin	  America	  
by	  British	  mining	  capital	  which	  was	  discussed	  briefly	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
The	  attraction	  of	  Brazil	  as	  a	  site	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  British	  capital	  and	  expertise	  lay	  
not	  only	  in	  its	  new	  openness	  to	  foreign	  investment,	  but	  also	  in	  a	  wider	  discourse	  of	  the	  
economic	  potential	  of	  Latin	  America.	  An	  increase	  in	  travel	  writing	  that	  stressed	  the	  
economic	  potential	  of	  South	  America	  accompanied	  the	  mining	  boom	  of	  the	  1820s.	  Mary	  
Louise	  Pratt	  has	  highlighted	  a	  common	  theme	  across	  such	  works	  on	  the	  Spanish	  
Americas	  that	  painted	  the	  local	  population	  as	  incapable	  of	  exploiting	  the	  continent’s	  
bountiful	  resources.21	  Striking	  similarities	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  
promoters	  of	  the	  IBMA.	  	  An	  advert	  aimed	  at	  drumming	  up	  shareholders	  in	  The	  Times	  
claimed	  ‘that	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  Brazil	  generally,	  are	  alike	  destitute	  of	  capital	  and	  
industry	  and	  ignorant	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  mineralogy;	  all	  which	  defects	  the	  conductors	  
of	  this	  Association	  will	  be	  able	  to	  supply.’22	  The	  IBMA	  promised	  innovation	  and	  profits	  
that	  would	  be	  garnered	  by	  applying	  new	  mining	  methods	  unknown	  to	  the	  
‘uninstructed	  natives’.23	  In	  pitching	  the	  vision	  of	  how	  Brazilian	  gold	  mining	  would	  be	  
transformed	  the	  advert	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  a	  slave	  workforce,	  nor	  did	  the	  official	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prospectus.24	  What	  is	  important	  is	  how	  the	  IBMA	  sought	  to	  sell	  itself	  as	  an	  exciting	  
potential	  investment	  that	  could	  bring	  success	  through	  the	  export	  of	  British	  capital	  and	  
ingenuity.	  This	  chimed	  with	  both	  literary	  representations	  of	  Latin	  American	  potential	  
and	  the	  promotion	  of	  other	  mining	  ventures	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Peru.25	  Yet,	  again	  imagined	  
geographies	  facilitated	  the	  deployment	  of	  British	  capital	  through	  a	  depiction	  of	  Brazil	  
as	  a	  safe	  and	  potentially	  awarding	  arena	  for	  investment.	  Slavery	  was	  not	  what	  
attracted	  the	  IBMA	  to	  Brazil,	  rather	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  it	  was	  a	  fact	  that	  had	  to	  be	  
reconciled	  once	  works	  began.	  
The	  somewhat	  sheepish	  admission	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  by	  the	  IBMA	  must	  be	  
understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  late	  1820s	  and	  early	  1830s	  as	  British	  slave	  owners	  in	  
the	  Caribbean	  had	  become	  increasingly	  assailed	  by	  abolitionist	  attacks.	  The	  IBMA	  
directors’	  admission	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  can	  be	  read	  alongside	  contemporary	  debates	  
around	  slavery,	  emancipation	  and	  amelioration	  in	  the	  West	  Indies.	  The	  passivity	  of	  the	  
directors’	  assertion	  that	  ‘they	  were	  apprised’	  of	  owning	  slaves	  signals	  a	  desire	  to	  
distance	  themselves	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  from	  the	  ownership,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  
importantly	  the	  purchase	  of	  slaves.	  Parallels	  can	  easily	  be	  drawn	  with	  the	  claims	  by	  the	  
tendency	  of	  West	  Indian	  slave-­‐owners	  to	  stress	  inheritance	  rather	  than	  purchase	  of	  
slaves	  when	  seeking	  compensation	  for	  emancipation.26	  In	  a	  Britain	  increasingly	  hostile	  
to	  slavery	  the	  active	  acquisition	  of	  slaves	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  defend,	  especially	  given	  
Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  suppression	  of	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Interestingly	  both	  the	  IBMA	  
and	  SJDR	  annual	  reports	  are	  careful	  in	  their	  refusal	  to	  discuss	  how	  slaves	  were	  
acquired.	  Though	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  the	  letterbooks	  of	  the	  SJDR	  
clearly	  indicate	  that	  agents	  were	  hired	  to	  purchase	  from	  the	  slave	  markets	  of	  Rio.27	  The	  
organisation	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  allowed	  the	  insulation	  of	  shareholders,	  and	  to	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  The	  Imperial	  Brazilian	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  Prospectus,	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  Dawson,	  Latin	  American	  Debt,	  pp.	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  Draper,	  Price	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  Emancipation,	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a	  certain	  extent	  the	  directors,	  from	  the	  realities	  of	  life	  at	  the	  mines.	  Again	  similarities	  
might	  be	  drawn	  with	  the	  trend	  that	  Nicholas	  Draper	  has	  identified	  of	  absentee	  
plantation	  owners	  using	  distance	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  from	  the	  negative	  
connotations	  of	  slavery.28	  This	  distance	  was	  even	  greater	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  IBMA	  and	  
SJDR	  whose	  slaves	  dwelled	  outside	  of	  the	  empire	  and	  could	  conceivably	  have	  been	  
purchased	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  shareholders.	  This	  distance	  was	  of	  course	  
physical	  as	  well	  as	  metaphorical	  and	  information	  about	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  mine	  was	  
limited	  even	  further	  by	  the	  relatively	  slow	  pace	  of	  transatlantic	  communication	  in	  the	  
1830s	  and	  1840s.	  
If	  the	  separation	  of	  management	  and	  ownership	  allowed	  company	  directors	  to	  insulate	  
themselves	  from	  slave-­‐ownership	  it	  also	  raised	  issues	  relating	  to	  accountability.	  
Although	  Victorian	  corporations	  have	  generally	  been	  viewed	  as	  depersonalised	  distant	  
entities	  Aeron	  Hunt	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  deeply	  personal	  nature	  of	  Victorian	  business	  
culture.29	  The	  annual	  reports	  of	  both	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  are	  prime	  examples	  of	  this,	  
because	  every	  statement	  within	  these	  texts	  is	  attributed	  to	  an	  individual	  director	  or	  
employee.	  Hunt	  has	  noted	  that	  Victorian	  business	  writing	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  
attachment	  of	  names	  to	  such	  texts	  was	  intended	  to	  ‘conjure	  the	  idea	  of	  personal	  
responsibility’.30	  The	  idea	  of	  who	  had	  the	  right	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  companies	  was	  a	  
key	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  both	  controversies	  discussed	  below	  and	  was	  part	  of	  the	  
struggle	  over	  directorial	  legitimacy.	  In	  establishing	  this	  personal	  responsibility	  annual	  
reports	  also	  purported	  to	  collapse	  the	  physical	  and	  metaphorical	  distance	  between	  
shareholders	  and	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  mine.	  
The	  directors	  of	  the	  IBMA	  were	  keen	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  acquisition	  of	  
slaves,	  but	  they	  were	  at	  times	  drawn	  into	  a	  more	  positive	  defence	  of	  their	  bonded	  
workforce.	  For	  example	  the	  assertion	  in	  the	  1830	  report	  that	  ‘[t]hey	  are	  well	  clothed	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  Draper,	  Price	  of	  Emancipation,	  pp.	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29	  Hunt,	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  Business,	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  5.	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  Ibid,	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  97-­‐98.	  
225	  
	  
and	  well	  fed’,	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  Directors	  had	  not	  abandoned	  their	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  
their	  human	  property,	  an	  accusation	  often	  levied	  at	  absentee	  plantation	  owners.31	  
However	  this	  statement	  was	  also	  clearly	  intended	  to	  reassure	  shareholders	  over	  the	  
security	  of	  their	  property	  as	  the	  directors	  lauded	  the	  ‘system	  of	  order,	  regularity,	  and	  
cleanliness	  has	  been	  established	  amongst	  them,	  which	  has	  conduced	  as	  much	  to	  their	  
health	  as	  to	  their	  tranquillity	  and	  happiness.’	  As	  important	  as	  the	  happiness	  of	  the	  
enslaved	  was	  their	  apparent	  ‘order,	  regularity,	  and	  …	  tranquillity.’	  By	  stressing	  these	  
facets	  of	  life	  at	  Gongo	  Soco	  the	  directors	  likely	  sought	  to	  assuage	  fears	  relating	  to	  the	  
perceived	  instability	  of	  slavery.	  This	  perception	  had	  been	  forged	  through	  a	  
combination	  of	  resistance	  amongst	  West	  Indian	  slaves	  and	  abolitionist	  publicity	  about	  
the	  revolts.	  Instances	  of	  slave	  resistance	  such	  as	  the	  Demerara	  revolt	  of	  1823	  had	  
confirmed	  to	  many	  Britons	  	  that	  slave	  societies	  were	  particularly	  susceptible	  to	  
outbreaks	  of	  violence.32	  Fears	  of	  unrest	  also	  related	  directly	  to	  debates	  over	  the	  
efficiency	  of	  slave	  labour	  versus	  free.	  Instability	  was	  of	  course	  anathema	  to	  investors,	  
as	  such	  the	  IBMA	  director’s	  comments	  on	  slavery	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  first	  and	  
foremost	  about	  maintaining	  the	  confidence	  and	  support	  of	  shareholders.	  
The	  picture	  of	  stability	  and	  order	  painted	  by	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  IBMA	  spoke	  not	  only	  
to	  concerns	  about	  slavery,	  but	  about	  the	  riskiness	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  ventures	  in	  general.	  As	  
discussed	  previously	  the	  IBMA	  was	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  boom	  of	  the	  mid	  1820s,	  
and	  when	  this	  boom	  turned	  to	  bust	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  were	  placed	  under	  
increasing	  scrutiny.	  Taylor	  notes	  that	  propagandists	  defending	  mining	  companies	  
sought	  to	  represent	  them	  as	  more	  stable	  investments,	  not	  susceptible	  to	  the	  periodic	  
crises	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  speculation.	  Annual	  reports	  should	  be	  considered	  alongside	  
works	  produced	  by	  propagandists	  hired	  by	  mining	  companies	  who	  wrote	  representing	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  p.	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Latin	  American	  mining	  as	  a	  stable,	  reliable	  investment.33	  Read	  in	  this	  way	  the	  IBMA’s	  
repeated	  stress	  on	  how	  well	  disciplined	  and	  behaved	  the	  company’s	  slave	  workforce	  
was	  can	  be	  understood	  less	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  slavery	  and	  more	  as	  a	  way	  to	  maintain	  
investor	  confidence.34	  The	  focus	  on	  order	  matched	  the	  role	  that	  the	  directors	  ascribed	  
to	  themselves	  in	  the	  company’s	  early	  reports	  in	  which	  they	  asserted	  their	  desire	  to	  
provide	  a	  ‘steady	  and	  persevering	  hand’	  to	  guide	  shareholders.35	  The	  potential	  for	  
unrest	  among	  slaves	  here	  was	  just	  another	  risk	  that	  had	  to	  be	  mitigated	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  
potential	  investors.	  
The	  desire	  to	  provide	  a	  steady	  hand	  also	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  
SJDR,	  a	  company	  whose	  early	  years	  were	  characterised	  by	  missteps	  and	  false	  starts.	  
The	  SJDR	  was	  founded	  in	  April	  of	  1830	  and	  was	  headed	  by	  a	  London	  merchant	  and	  
investor	  in	  a	  number	  of	  mining	  ventures,	  John	  Diston	  Powles.	  Charles	  Herring	  Jr.,	  future	  
superintendent	  of	  the	  mine	  at	  Morro	  Velho,	  also	  sat	  on	  the	  board	  having	  fulfilled	  a	  
similar	  role	  in	  Powles’s	  mining	  ventures	  of	  the	  mid-­‐1820s.36	  Like	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  
IBMA	  these	  men	  were	  not	  attracted	  to	  the	  Brazil	  because	  of	  slavery,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  
country’s	  perceived	  economic	  potential.	  The	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  SJDR	  had	  the	  same	  
goal	  of	  those	  of	  the	  IBMA	  in	  representing	  it	  as	  a	  serious	  venture	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  
abuses	  of	  most	  joint-­‐stocks.	  To	  this	  end	  the	  company’s	  second	  annual	  report	  contained	  
a	  promise	  to	  ‘have	  no	  inefficient	  or	  incompetent	  persons	  in	  their	  service,	  and	  to	  watch,	  
with	  the	  most	  scrupulous	  care,	  every	  part	  of	  the	  expenditure.’37	  Such	  statements	  
recognised	  the	  anxiety	  surrounding	  proprietor-­‐employee	  relationships,	  which	  suffused	  
Victorian	  economic	  culture.38	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  Taylor,	  Creating	  Capitalism,	  pp.	  112-­‐113	  
34	  IBMA,	  AR	  1837,	  pp.	  24-­‐25.	  
35	  IBMA,	  AR	  1826	  (vol.	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  p.105.	  
36	  Eakin,	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  Enterprise,	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  11.	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The	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  SJDR,	  like	  the	  IBMA,	  were	  first	  and	  foremost	  an	  exercise	  in	  
expectation	  management.	  This	  was	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  SJDR’s	  first	  few	  years	  
as	  their	  first	  mine	  in	  Sao	  Joao	  had	  to	  be	  abandoned	  and	  the	  move	  to	  Morro	  Velho	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  great	  expenditure.39	  In	  this	  context	  the	  company’s	  reports	  were	  
mostly	  focused	  on	  providing	  updates	  on	  the	  progress	  at	  the	  mines	  and	  explaining	  why	  
further	  expense	  was	  needed.	  This	  expectation	  management	  often	  related	  to	  the	  
company’s	  ability,	  or	  inability,	  to	  pay	  a	  dividend.	  In	  years	  were	  returns	  for	  
shareholders	  were	  not	  possible	  reports	  would	  be	  loaded	  with	  reassuring	  statements	  
that	  ‘the	  foundations	  had	  been	  laid	  therein	  for	  a	  more	  prosperous	  futurity.’40	  The	  slave	  
workforce	  of	  the	  company	  was,	  as	  with	  the	  IBMA,	  very	  much	  a	  secondary	  concern	  to	  
assuring	  shareholders	  that	  their	  investment	  would	  eventually	  be	  rewarded.	  	  
The	  SJDR	  overcame	  these	  initial	  stumbling	  blocks	  since	  the	  lode	  at	  the	  Morro	  Velho	  
mine	  proved	  to	  be	  incredibly	  rich	  in	  ore.	  Marshall	  Eakin	  has	  plotted	  how	  from	  the	  
1830s	  onwards	  the	  SJDR	  would	  expand	  its	  operation	  and	  swell	  its	  profits	  to	  the	  point	  
that	  it	  became	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  Minas	  Gerais.	  With	  this	  expansion	  came	  an	  
increased	  demand	  for	  slave	  labour	  and	  the	  number	  of	  slaves	  owned	  or	  hired	  by	  the	  
mine	  came	  to	  dwarf	  that	  of	  the	  IBMA.	  The	  slave	  workforce	  was	  recorded	  in	  a	  similar	  
way	  to	  the	  IBMA,	  divided	  into	  categories	  based	  upon	  gender	  and	  age.	  However,	  the	  
SJDR	  went	  even	  further	  by	  also	  calculating	  its	  ‘Effective	  Force’	  by	  subtracting	  the	  ‘Aged	  
and	  Infirm’	  slaves,	  as	  they	  were	  labelled,	  from	  its	  calculations.41	  This	  reflected	  the	  
directors’	  avowed	  focus	  on	  efficiency	  and	  should	  also	  colour	  claims	  about	  pastoral	  care	  
for	  the	  enslaved.	  The	  value	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  SJDR	  workforce	  ultimately	  rested	  on	  
its	  ability	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  productivity	  of	  the	  mine.	  Even	  this	  practice	  was	  
seemingly	  abandoned	  from	  1847.	  From	  this	  point	  onwards	  it	  was	  the	  reports	  of	  
medical	  officers	  contained	  within	  the	  appendix	  of	  the	  annual	  report	  that	  would	  give	  the	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  Eakin,	  British	  Enterprise,	  pp.	  23-­‐24.	  
40	  SJDR,	  AR	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  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  p.	  8.	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clearest	  idea	  of	  slave	  numbers	  by	  listing	  the	  number	  who	  had	  been	  treated	  for	  illness	  
or	  died	  over	  the	  past	  year.	  Again	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  link	  explicitly	  to	  expenditure	  and	  
efficiency	  concerns	  as	  deaths	  meant	  loss	  of	  capital	  and	  a	  need	  to	  purchase	  or	  hire	  more	  
labour.	  	  
Whilst	  the	  slave	  population	  of	  Gongo	  Soco	  and	  Morro	  Velho	  were	  not	  the	  primary	  focus	  
of	  the	  annual	  reports	  reference	  they	  did	  at	  times	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  picture	  companies	  
wanted	  to	  present	  to	  shareholders	  and	  the	  wider	  world.	  Mining	  companies	  sought	  to	  
represent	  themselves	  as	  technological	  innovators	  utilising	  British	  capital	  to	  transform	  
Latin	  America.	  Authors	  such	  as	  Disraeli	  contrasted	  this	  picture	  with	  domestic	  
companies	  making	  use	  of	  new	  technologies	  on	  a	  small	  scale	  as	  a	  way	  of	  justifying	  the	  
companies’	  large	  expenditure.42	  Annual	  reports	  from	  both	  companies	  were	  liable	  to	  
talk	  of	  the	  improvement	  and	  advancement	  of	  not	  only	  the	  mining	  property	  but	  also	  of	  
the	  slave	  workforce.	  Several	  IBMA	  reports	  commented	  on	  efforts	  to	  ‘improve’	  the	  
moral	  character	  and	  health	  of	  the	  slave	  workforce,	  specifically	  with	  relation	  to	  a	  system	  
of	  rewards	  and	  promotions	  instituted	  in	  1833	  by	  Superintendent	  Captain	  Thomas	  
Skerett.43	  Such	  representations	  not	  only	  chimed	  with	  the	  transformative	  role	  mining	  
companies	  claimed	  for	  themselves,	  but	  also	  related	  to	  debates	  surrounding	  
amelioration	  in	  the	  West	  Indies.	  Ameliorationist	  discourse	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  claims	  
made	  by	  slave	  owners	  intended	  to	  ‘demonstrate	  progress	  and	  material	  benefits	  of	  
slavery	  for	  the	  slaves’.44	  Discussions	  of	  how	  the	  conditions	  of	  slavery	  were	  ameliorated	  
by	  company	  practice	  could	  act	  as	  a	  buttress	  against	  anti-­‐slavery	  critiques,	  but	  they	  
ultimately	  reverted	  back	  to	  profitability.	  Skerret’s	  system	  at	  Gongo	  Soco	  was	  explicitly	  
intended	  to	  ‘get	  rid	  of	  a	  race	  of	  men	  the	  most	  profligate	  and	  unprofitable.’45	  In	  this	  way	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  Creating	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a	  performance	  of	  paternalism	  dovetailed	  perfectly	  with	  assuring	  investors	  of	  the	  
potential	  for	  profit.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  reports	  from	  both	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  referred	  to	  the	  slave	  population	  
in	  a	  minimal	  and	  abstract	  way.	  They	  were	  represented	  through	  tables	  and	  numbers,	  
always	  considered	  as	  a	  form	  of	  capital	  or	  as	  a	  form	  of	  labour.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  
slave	  workforce	  stood	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  company’s	  key	  concern,	  which	  was	  to	  
maintain	  investor	  confidence	  in	  the	  mines	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  bring	  a	  profit.	  
Discussions	  of	  slave	  life	  or	  labour	  conditions	  often	  related	  to	  this	  central	  goal.	  The	  
orderly	  behaviour	  of	  slaves	  mirrored	  the	  desire	  for	  joint-­‐stock	  mines	  to	  be	  stable	  and	  
reliable.	  The	  following	  two	  sections	  will	  explore	  how	  both	  companies	  would	  be	  drawn	  
into	  a	  more	  explicit	  discussion	  and	  defence	  of	  their	  reliance	  on	  slave	  labour.	  
The	  IBMA	  and	  Shareholder	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  
At	  a	  London	  meeting	  hall	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1841	  a	  bad	  tempered	  debate	  took	  place	  over	  
the	  question	  of	  slavery	  and	  emancipation.	  This	  meeting	  was	  remarkable	  because	  it	  
took	  place	  neither	  in	  parliament	  nor	  among	  the	  abolitionists	  of	  Exeter	  Hall,	  but	  
between	  shareholders	  and	  directors	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Brazilian	  Mining	  Association.	  
Seven	  shareholders	  had	  called	  an	  extraordinary	  general	  meeting	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  
bringing	  about	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  company’s	  500	  slaves.46	  The	  call	  for	  
emancipation	  was	  met	  with	  a	  forceful	  defence	  by	  the	  directors	  at	  odds	  with	  their	  usual	  
tight-­‐lipped	  stance	  on	  the	  company’s	  slave	  workforce.	  This	  clash	  between	  a	  group	  of	  
shareholders	  and	  company	  directors	  reveals	  the	  ambiguous	  position	  of	  the	  corporate	  
slave-­‐owner.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  explore	  how	  the	  call	  to	  emancipate	  slaves	  represented	  a	  
firm	  assertion	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  on	  the	  part	  of	  some	  shareholders,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  directors’	  claims	  about	  the	  benign	  and	  orderly	  nature	  of	  slavery	  
at	  Gongo	  Soco.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  IBMA	  shareholders	  gave	  expression	  to	  wider	  anxieties	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surrounding	  investor-­‐director	  relationships	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  companies.	  	  In	  response	  to	  
this	  shareholder	  scrutiny	  over	  slave	  labour	  the	  IBMA	  directors	  articulated	  a	  defence	  of	  
slavery	  that	  redeployed	  much	  of	  the	  pro-­‐slavery	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  pre-­‐emancipation	  
period.	  Ultimately,	  the	  company	  succeeded	  in	  defending	  their	  right	  to	  own	  human	  
property	  as	  only	  seven	  shareholders	  voted	  for	  emancipation.	  
The	  early	  1840s	  were	  turbulent	  years	  for	  both	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR.	  During	  this	  period	  
they	  were	  subject	  to	  similar	  scrutiny	  aimed	  at	  British	  merchants	  as	  the	  British	  
government	  sought	  to	  reconcile	  the	  countervailing	  commitments	  of	  commercial	  
expansion	  and	  anti-­‐slavery.	  Chris	  Evans	  argues	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  1843	  Act	  
demonstrated	  the	  limits	  of	  abolitionist	  influence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  ‘transnational	  mining	  
capital[‘s]	  brute	  power	  that	  was	  not	  to	  be	  tamed.’47	  By	  putting	  greater	  focus	  on	  the	  
joint-­‐stock	  ownership	  of	  mining	  companies	  I	  problematise	  Evans’s	  conclusion	  and	  
argue	  that	  joint-­‐stock	  ventures	  were	  uniquely	  susceptible	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  critique	  and	  
that	  they	  had	  to	  defend	  slave-­‐ownership	  to	  multiple	  audiences,	  including	  their	  own	  
shareholders.	  The	  IBMA	  Emancipation	  controversy	  of	  1841	  can	  in	  many	  ways	  be	  
understood	  as	  providing	  the	  both	  the	  impetus	  for	  Brougham’s	  Bill	  and	  an	  arena	  in	  
which	  slave-­‐owning	  companies	  were	  able	  to	  hone	  their	  defence	  of	  human	  property.	  
The	  attempt	  by	  seven	  IBMA	  shareholders	  to	  take	  decisive	  action	  against	  company	  
slave-­‐ownership	  was	  announced	  via	  advertisements	  in	  the	  press	  including	  The	  Times	  
and	  Morning	  Chronicle.48	  This	  call	  to	  their	  fellow	  investors	  to	  pressure	  the	  company	  to	  
emancipate	  its	  slaves	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  had	  ‘unknowingly	  in	  the	  
first	  instance	  become	  shareholders	  in	  a	  Mining	  Company	  which	  employs	  slave	  
labour.’49	  The	  image	  of	  the	  ‘unthinking-­‐shareholder’	  represented	  an	  explicit	  attempt	  to	  
distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  purchase	  of	  slaves.	  Draper’s	  work	  on	  the	  emancipation	  
process	  has	  revealed	  the	  variety	  of	  ways	  that	  metropolitan	  Britons	  became	  owners	  of	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West	  Indian	  plantations.	  These	  ‘paths	  to	  ownership’	  included	  inheritance	  or	  repayment	  
of	  debts	  and	  were	  often	  represented	  as	  a	  passive	  form	  of	  ownership	  where	  individuals	  
just	  happened	  to	  possess	  property	  in	  humans.50	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  section	  one	  of	  this	  
chapter,	  the	  IBMA	  directors	  attempted	  to	  use	  this	  defence	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  
the	  purchase	  of	  slaves.	  The	  seven	  shareholders	  sought	  to	  exploit	  this	  passivity	  in	  an	  
interesting	  way.	  By	  assuming	  that	  shareholders	  were	  unaware	  that	  mining	  companies	  
owned	  slaves	  abolitionists	  at	  once	  absolved	  them	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  thrust	  
another	  obligation	  upon	  them.51	  This	  was	  a	  clear	  attempt	  to	  exploit	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  
the	  position	  of	  the	  shareholder	  as	  someone	  interested	  in	  the	  ownership	  of	  a	  company,	  
but	  not	  involved	  in	  its	  management.	  To	  understand	  the	  implications	  for	  slave-­‐
ownership	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  a	  step	  back	  and	  consider	  wider	  debates	  over	  the	  role	  
and	  responsibilities	  of	  shareholders	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  companies.	  
Joint-­‐stock	  mining	  companies,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  consistently	  
represented	  themselves	  as	  trustworthy	  and	  attentive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  investors.	  
However,	  this	  relationship	  was	  far	  from	  a	  one-­‐way	  street	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
shareholder	  itself	  was	  openly	  scrutinised	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Many	  
commentators	  represented	  joint-­‐stock	  organisation	  as	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  economic	  
relationships	  built	  on	  mutual	  trust	  and	  good	  character,	  the	  latter	  being	  vital	  to	  credit	  
relations	  in	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century.52	  What	  could	  possibly	  undermine	  a	  person’s	  
character	  more	  than	  allowing	  their	  money	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  purchase	  of	  slaves?	  The	  
anti-­‐slavery	  convention	  of	  1840	  was	  littered	  with	  pejorative	  references	  to	  ‘sleeping-­‐
partners’	  who	  divested	  themselves	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  whilst	  reaping	  profits.53	  
Shareholding	  in	  slave-­‐owning	  companies	  might	  be	  conceived	  as	  the	  ultimate	  example	  
of	  speculating	  as	  a	  form	  of	  plunder	  at	  someone	  else’s	  expense,	  a	  criticism	  often	  levelled	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at	  investors.54	  For	  some	  capitalists	  the	  suggestion	  that	  they	  might	  be	  profiting	  from	  
slavery,	  and	  therefore	  corrupting	  themselves	  was	  one	  that	  had	  to	  be	  challenged	  
publicly.	  For	  example,	  Joseph	  Gurney	  wrote	  to	  The	  Times	  to	  assert	  that	  he	  owned	  no	  
shares	  in	  the	  IBMA,	  claiming	  ‘no	  one	  who	  knows	  me	  could	  possibly	  believe	  such	  a	  
calumny’.55	  Gurney’s	  business	  as	  a	  banker	  made	  him	  a	  prime	  candidate	  for	  investing	  in	  
joint-­‐stocks,	  but	  his	  Quaker	  faith,	  familial	  connections	  to	  abolitionists,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  
own	  active	  participation	  in	  anti-­‐slavery	  campaigns	  made	  the	  imputation	  of	  owning	  a	  
share	  in	  slaves	  particularly	  galling.56	  Those	  who	  did	  own	  shares	  in	  slave-­‐owning	  
companies	  however,	  stood	  open	  to	  the	  charge	  that	  they	  were	  the	  worst	  type	  of	  
speculators	  happily	  to	  idly	  profit	  as	  moral	  transgressions	  were	  committed	  in	  their	  
name.	  	  
Victorian	  entrepreneurs	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  interrelationship	  of	  business	  
interests	  and	  personal	  character.	  Therefore	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  seven	  signatories	  does	  
hint	  that	  this	  asserted	  ignorance	  could	  potentially	  have	  been	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  
public	  embarrassment	  about	  slave-­‐ownership.	  Listed	  among	  the	  signatories	  were	  
members	  of	  the	  Bristol-­‐based	  Fry	  family	  of	  chocolate	  manufacturing	  fame.	  Like	  Joseph	  
Gurney,	  the	  Frys	  were	  Quakers	  and	  the	  eldest	  son	  Richard	  was	  involved	  in	  organised	  
anti-­‐slavery.57	  Their	  plea	  of	  ignorance	  was	  quickly	  transformed	  into	  a	  striking	  assertion	  
of	  shareholder	  obligation	  as	  the	  circular	  stressed	  ‘the	  responsibility	  which	  devolves	  
upon	  us	  and	  upon	  all	  who	  have	  interest	  in	  companies	  similarly	  situated.’58	  Most	  
shareholders	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  possessed	  some	  form	  of	  supervisory	  power	  such	  
as	  the	  ability	  to	  call	  meetings	  and	  appoint	  directors.	  The	  general	  meeting	  served	  a	  
particularly	  important	  role	  and	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  ‘principal	  conduit	  of	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proprietorial	  power’.59	  Victorians	  held	  serious	  doubts	  over	  whether	  corporations	  could	  
act	  virtuously,	  potentially	  here	  lay	  the	  answer	  as	  individual	  shareholders	  might	  bend	  
the	  company	  to	  their	  moral	  will.60	  The	  Morning	  Chronicle	  certainly	  endorsed	  this	  
perspective	  as	  it	  applauded	  the	  circular	  and	  stressed	  the	  ‘solemn	  duty’	  of	  shareholders	  
to	  oppose	  slave	  labour.61	  For	  a	  brief	  moment	  it	  seemed	  that	  joint-­‐stock	  ownership	  
might	  allow	  anti-­‐slavery	  to	  reach	  where	  the	  government	  could	  not.	  
The	  intersection	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  joint-­‐stock	  politics	  in	  the	  IBMA	  case	  becomes	  
especially	  clear	  by	  examining	  how	  the	  controversy	  played	  out	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  
Mining	  Journal.	  Henry	  Tuckett,	  one	  of	  the	  seven	  requisitionists,	  utilised	  the	  journal’s	  
correspondence	  pages	  to	  call	  for	  emancipation	  and	  also	  to	  criticise	  the	  directors	  for	  
withholding	  the	  deed	  of	  settlement	  and	  a	  list	  of	  shareholders	  from	  him.62	  Tuckett’s	  
desire	  to	  see	  the	  deed	  of	  settlement	  spoke	  as	  much	  to	  the	  question	  of	  shareholder	  
rights	  as	  it	  did	  to	  the	  question	  of	  emancipation.	  Deeds	  of	  settlement	  can	  be	  understood	  
as	  the	  constitutions	  of	  unincorporated	  companies	  like	  the	  IBMA	  as	  they	  set	  out	  the	  
rights	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  shareholders.63	  There	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  ambiguity	  
surrounding	  the	  availability	  of	  information	  to	  shareholders	  but	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  
firmly	  sided	  with	  Tuckett,	  attacking	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  directors	  as	  ‘highly	  
discreditable’.64	  Tuckett’s	  use	  of	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  to	  criticise	  the	  IBMA’s	  evasiveness	  
demonstrates	  how	  calls	  for	  emancipation	  intersected	  with	  questions	  of	  directorial	  
accountability.	  The	  Mining	  Journal’s	  support	  was	  in	  line	  with	  a	  critical	  stance	  it	  had	  
previously	  taken	  on	  lack	  of	  attendance	  by	  shareholders	  at	  meetings.65	  The	  IBMA	  case	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represented	  shareholders	  actively	  engaging	  with	  corporate	  governance	  and	  their	  
recourse	  to	  the	  press	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  shareholder	  agency	  complimentary	  to	  
the	  attendance	  of	  general	  meetings.66	  Intriguingly,	  the	  Mining	  Journal’s	  intervention	  in	  
the	  emancipation	  debate	  did	  not	  stop	  at	  corporate	  governance	  and	  its	  comments	  on	  the	  
moral	  and	  economic	  implications	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  slave	  ownership	  deserve	  further	  
consideration.	  
From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  IBMA	  controversy	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  was	  firm	  in	  its	  support	  
for	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  company’s	  slaves.	  This	  anti-­‐slavery	  stance	  preceded	  the	  
original	  call	  for	  emancipation	  as	  the	  journal’s	  editors	  had	  previously	  commented	  on	  the	  
wider	  accusations	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  slave	  owning.	  For	  example	  an	  editorial	  on	  the	  anti-­‐
slavery	  convention	  of	  1840	  used	  the	  fact	  that	  £1.5	  million	  had	  been	  invested	  in	  Cuban	  
and	  Brazilian	  mining	  to	  estimate	  that	  ‘we	  should	  find	  that	  no	  less	  than	  3,000	  
Englishmen	  …	  are	  intimately	  connected	  with	  the	  abominable	  system.’67	  This	  statement	  
set	  the	  tone	  for	  the	  Journal’s	  coverage	  of	  the	  IBMA	  controversy,	  characterised	  as	  it	  was	  
by	  a	  moral	  condemnation	  of	  slavery	  inflected	  by	  the	  vagaries	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  venture.	  
Throughout	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1841	  the	  correspondence	  columns	  contained	  letters	  
both	  for	  and	  against	  emancipation,	  each	  with	  an	  appended	  comment	  from	  the	  Mining	  
Journal	  opposing	  slave-­‐ownership.	  This	  opposition	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  unremarkable	  
and	  was	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  morality	  or	  as	  a	  ‘question	  of	  national	  character’.68	  
Interestingly	  the	  Mining	  Journal’s	  coverage	  lacked	  any	  economic	  critique	  despite	  the	  
ongoing	  debate	  over	  the	  relative	  efficiency	  of	  slave	  labour	  versus	  free,	  which	  had	  been	  
part	  of	  the	  struggle	  over	  West	  Indian	  Emancipation.69	  In	  fact	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  
accepted	  many	  of	  the	  economic	  defences	  of	  slavery.	  One	  letter	  defending	  forced	  labour	  
on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  paucity	  of	  free	  labourers	  in	  Brazil	  was	  met	  with	  the	  admission	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Freeman,	  Pearson,	  Taylor,	  Shareholder	  Democracies,	  pp.	  211-­‐239.	  
67	  ‘Editorial’,	  Mining	  Journal,	  27	  June	  1840.	  
68	  ‘Editorial’,	  Mining	  Journal,	  17	  Apr	  1841.	  
69	  Drescher,	  Mighty	  Experiment,	  pp.	  121-­‐143.	  
235	  
	  
that	  this	  was	  an	  issue	  but	  that	  the	  question	  of	  emancipation	  was	  ‘not,	  in	  fact	  a	  
monetary	  question’.70	  Even	  more	  strikingly	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  admitted	  that	  the	  
Brazilian	  slave	  labourer	  might	  be	  better	  off	  than	  his	  European	  counterpart.71	  Morality	  
and	  national	  character	  then	  trumped	  economic	  or	  welfare	  concerns.	  	  
The	  Mining	  Journal’s	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  appeared	  to	  reflect	  broader	  anxieties	  over	  
Britain’s	  national	  character	  and	  moral	  example.	  However	  these	  were	  filtered	  through	  
an	  understanding	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company.	  The	  most	  strenuous	  objection	  to	  the	  
IBMA	  was	  that	  its	  slaves	  represented	  a	  form	  of	  stock.	  Slaves	  were	  an	  investment	  and	  
therefore	  ‘[t]he	  health	  of	  the	  slave	  is	  considered	  more	  with	  reference	  to	  his	  cost,	  and	  
the	  value	  set	  upon	  him	  in	  case	  of	  a	  sale	  being	  effected.’72	  Joint-­‐stock	  companies	  were	  
portrayed	  as	  having	  an	  interest	  in	  continuing	  the	  slave	  trade	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  maintain	  
their	  share	  price.	  This	  clearly	  jarred	  with	  the	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  ending	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  Worse	  still	  even	  if	  the	  IBMA	  and	  other	  companies	  treated	  their	  slaves	  
humanely	  the	  workforce’s	  character	  as	  an	  asset	  meant	  that	  any	  bankruptcy	  would	  lead	  
to	  slaves	  being	  sold.73	  Even	  if	  British	  slave-­‐ownership	  was	  ameliorated	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  put	  the	  slaves	  at	  risk	  of	  ending	  up	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
supposedly	  less-­‐civilized	  Brazilians.	  Here	  was	  a	  similar	  ambivalence	  over	  a	  British	  
commerce	  sullied	  by	  slavery	  as	  that	  which	  characterised	  the	  debates	  over	  West	  African	  
merchants	  explored	  in	  chapter	  three.	  If	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  was	  a	  uniquely	  
troubling	  form	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  it	  also	  it	  also	  provided	  a	  unique	  chance	  to	  set	  an	  
example.	  In	  an	  editorial	  the	  week	  before	  the	  IBMA	  meeting	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  
proclaimed	  that	  emancipation	  if	  secured	  would	  ‘have	  a	  more	  moral	  influence	  and	  effect	  
than	  half-­‐a-­‐dozen	  anti-­‐slavery	  meetings	  at	  Exeter	  Hall.’74	  The	  editor	  hoped	  that	  the	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joint-­‐stock	  company	  through	  its	  shareholders	  could	  reaffirm	  the	  moral	  superiority	  of	  
British	  commerce.	  Alas,	  these	  hopes	  were	  unfounded.	  
If	  the	  image	  of	  the	  ‘unthinking	  shareholder’	  provided	  a	  unique	  opening	  for	  anti-­‐slavery	  
critique	  it	  was	  not	  a	  position	  that	  went	  unchallenged.	  At	  the	  EGM	  the	  company	  
directors	  noted	  with	  some	  venom	  that	  ‘[the	  requisitionists]	  state	  the	  fact	  [of	  slave	  
ownership]	  as	  if	  it	  had	  only	  just	  now	  presented	  itself	  to	  their	  notice’.75	  The	  directors	  
pointed	  out	  that	  the	  number	  of	  slaves	  had	  been	  listed	  in	  nearly	  every	  report	  since	  1830	  
and	  this	  was	  certainly	  true.	  As	  Alborn	  has	  noted,	  joint-­‐stock	  banks	  fed	  information	  to	  
shareholders	  through	  annual	  reports	  so	  as	  to	  create	  a	  pool	  of	  individuals	  from	  which	  
future	  directors	  could	  be	  elected.76	  If	  the	  IBMA	  intended	  the	  same	  then	  the	  events	  of	  
1841	  surely	  disappointed	  them.	  Calls	  for	  emancipation	  seemed	  to	  undermine	  the	  
audience	  that	  was	  imagined	  for	  annual	  reports	  of	  a	  diligent	  shareholder	  reassured	  by	  
the	  directors	  soothing	  predictions.	  By	  pointing	  to	  the	  annual	  reports	  the	  directors	  
could	  at	  least	  curb	  any	  criticism	  that	  they	  had	  deliberately	  misled	  investors	  and	  there	  
had	  not	  been	  ‘any	  concealments.’77	  Other	  shareholders	  were	  also	  hostile	  to	  unthinking	  
shareholders.	  Richard	  Fry’s	  claim	  before	  the	  meeting	  that	  he	  had	  been	  totally	  ignorant	  
of	  all	  mining	  in	  Brazil	  when	  his	  father	  passed	  shares	  onto	  him	  at	  the	  age	  of	  21,	  was	  met	  
with	  an	  acidic	  response	  from	  one	  shareholder	  who	  quipped	  'I	  did	  suppose	  that	  the	  
Society	  of	  Friends,	  who	  were	  very	  anxious	  to	  acquire	  knowledge,	  must	  have	  read	  some	  
history	  of	  Brazil'.78	  The	  requisitionists	  were	  also	  mocked	  over	  their	  continued	  
shareholding.	  For	  example	  George	  Thomas’s	  admission	  that	  company	  dividends	  had	  
been	  paid	  to	  his	  bankers	  (then	  donated	  to	  BFASS)	  was	  met	  with	  laughs	  of	  derision.79	  
This	  back	  and	  forth	  over	  awareness	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  
articulation	  of	  the	  broader	  question	  of	  when	  shareholders	  had	  the	  right	  to	  challenge	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directors.	  By	  adopting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  unthinking	  shareholder	  Thomas	  and	  Fry	  arguably	  
undermined	  their	  claim	  to	  possess	  accurate	  knowledge	  about	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  mine	  
and	  slavery	  in	  Brazil.	  
The	  EGM	  of	  May	  1841	  bears	  further	  consideration	  as	  reports	  of	  it	  read	  like	  the	  struggle	  
over	  slavery	  and	  emancipation	  writ	  small.	  The	  usual	  attacks	  on	  slavery	  as	  inhumane,	  
cruel	  and	  wasteful	  were	  articulated	  through	  the	  language	  of	  directorial	  accountability.	  
This	  was	  mostly	  the	  doing	  of	  George	  Thomas,	  who	  led	  the	  way	  in	  pleading	  the	  case	  of	  
emancipation	  to	  board	  and	  shareholders.	  Thomas	  represented	  himself	  as	  a	  type	  of	  
‘unthinking	  shareholder’	  by	  noting	  that	  he	  had	  become	  aware	  of	  slave	  ownership	  in	  
1833	  and	  had	  since	  then	  pressured	  the	  company	  over	  issues	  of	  emancipation	  and	  
amelioration.80	  His	  sudden	  call	  for	  emancipation	  in	  1841	  was	  explicitly	  represented	  in	  
terms	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  company	  and	  specifically	  in	  their	  
abandonment	  of	  a	  policy	  of	  gradual	  emancipation	  upon	  the	  appointment	  of	  George	  
Duval	  as	  the	  mine’s	  superintendent.	  In	  Thomas’s	  telling	  the	  directors	  were	  guilty	  of	  
‘retrograde	  motion’	  in	  abandoning	  this	  policy.81	  The	  term	  ‘retrograde’	  not	  only	  
connoted	  moral	  backsliding	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  directors,	  but	  also	  undercut	  the	  narrative	  
of	  progressive	  improvement	  that	  was	  central	  to	  the	  IBMA’s	  annual	  reports.	  Thomas’s	  
critique	  then	  brought	  together	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  reassert	  the	  
accountability	  of	  company	  directors	  to	  their	  shareholders.	  
George	  Thomas’s	  critique	  openly	  drew	  upon,	  and	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of,	  
a	  rash	  of	  bad	  publicity	  the	  IBMA	  had	  attracted	  from	  late	  1840	  onwards.	  This	  began	  
with	  the	  publication	  of	  allegations	  of	  mistreatment	  of	  slaves	  by	  a	  former	  employee	  F.	  A.	  
Kentish.	  In	  a	  pamphlet	  entitled	  ‘An	  Introductory	  Letter	  Addressed	  to	  Sir	  T.	  F.	  Buxton’,	  
which	  was	  also	  sent	  to	  Colonial	  Secretary	  Lord	  John	  Russell,	  the	  former	  IBMA	  clerk	  
claimed	  to	  lay	  bare	  the	  ‘Frightful	  Horrors	  of	  Modern	  Slavery’	  at	  the	  company’s	  Gongo	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Soco	  mine.82	  The	  term	  ‘Modern	  Slavery’	  was	  keenly	  chosen	  to	  pierce	  the	  image	  of	  
modernity	  and	  technological	  progress	  asserted	  by	  mining	  companies.	  Rather,	  their	  
establishment	  in	  Brazil	  had	  led	  to	  a	  ‘system	  of	  atrocious	  cruelty	  far	  surpassing	  anything	  
ever	  known	  in	  the	  West	  Indies.’83	  In	  explaining	  this	  cruelty	  Kentish	  lingered	  particularly	  
on	  how	  when	  punishing	  their	  slaves	  the	  company	  allowed	  ‘female	  slaves	  to	  be	  
indiscriminately,	  and	  severely	  flogged’	  with	  a	  ‘cat-­‐o’-­‐nine	  tails.’84	  These	  gruesome	  
images	  drew	  freely	  from	  abolitionist	  attacks	  on	  the	  flogging	  of	  slave	  women	  in	  the	  
British	  West	  Indies.	  As	  Henrice	  Altink	  argues	  violence	  towards	  women	  was	  a	  particular	  
taboo	  and	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  morally	  degenerative	  effect	  on	  enslaved	  men	  and	  
children.85	  At	  the	  same	  time	  imagery	  of	  punishment	  and	  torture	  represented	  a	  
challenge	  to	  the	  picture	  of	  order	  and	  stability	  painted	  by	  the	  IBMA’s	  annual	  reports.	  
Following	  the	  publication	  of	  Kentish’s	  accusations	  the	  IBMA	  leapt	  into	  action	  in	  
attempting	  to	  refute	  his	  claims.	  This	  process	  began	  with	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  company	  
solicitors	  J.	  C.	  &	  Freshfields	  to	  the	  BFASS	  and	  a	  further	  correspondence	  published	  in	  the	  
Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter.86	  This	  action	  was	  indicative	  of	  two	  characteristics	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  
companies.	  Firstly,	  it	  showed	  the	  importance	  of	  solicitors	  in	  conducting	  the	  public	  
affairs	  of	  the	  company,	  a	  tendency	  Alborn	  has	  also	  identified	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  railways.87	  
Secondly,	  the	  decision	  to	  approach	  the	  BFASS	  showed	  a	  clear	  recognition	  that	  company	  
publications	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  Current	  shareholders	  and	  potential	  investors	  
might	  be	  swayed	  by	  allegations	  in	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  press;	  as	  such	  they	  had	  to	  be	  met	  
head	  on.	  The	  IBMA’s	  response	  was	  intent	  on	  removing	  Kentish’s	  credibility	  attributing	  
his	  ‘gross	  and	  scandalous	  libel’	  to	  the	  company’s	  refusal	  to	  grant	  him	  ‘a	  most	  exorbitant	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  Ibid.	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  original)	  
84	  Ibid.	  
85	  H.	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  Representations	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and	  unfounded	  pecuniary	  claim’	  upon	  his	  return	  to	  Brazil.88	  Evidencing	  this	  claim	  was	  
an	  appended	  letter	  from	  Kentish	  to	  the	  IBMA	  in	  which	  he	  threatened	  to	  expose	  their	  
slave	  labour	  practices	  if	  not	  paid.	  Such	  an	  approach	  served	  not	  only	  to	  discredit	  
Kentish,	  but	  also	  to	  flip	  around	  the	  charges	  of	  ‘avarice’	  the	  former	  clerk	  had	  levelled	  at	  
the	  association.89	  The	  problem	  for	  the	  IBMA	  was	  that	  Kentish’s	  accusations	  and	  the	  
responses	  to	  them	  drew	  attention	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  management	  of	  the	  company’s	  slave	  
workforce	  and	  the	  EGM	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  more	  direct	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  
directors.	  
The	  1841	  EGM	  brought	  together	  various	  critiques	  levelled	  at	  the	  IBMA	  in	  the	  Mining	  
Journal,	  Kentish’s	  pamphlet,	  and	  the	  abolitionist	  press	  and	  laid	  them	  before	  the	  
shareholders	  at	  large.	  George	  Thomas	  and	  Richard	  Fry’s	  speeches	  were	  not	  only	  in	  
favour	  of	  emancipation,	  but	  also	  of	  director	  accountability	  and	  shareholder	  activism.	  
Thomas	  went	  one	  further	  than	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  in	  holding	  up	  Antigua	  as	  an	  example	  
of	  how	  free	  labour	  could	  efficiently	  replace	  that	  of	  the	  slave.90	  Antigua	  was	  the	  one	  
British	  island	  to	  immediately	  abolish	  slavery	  in	  1833,	  foregoing	  the	  apprenticeship	  
period,	  and	  had	  recorded	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  sugar	  production.91	  Thomas	  exaggerated	  
Antigua’s	  triumph	  before	  the	  meeting	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  not	  only	  was	  emancipation	  
morally	  right	  it	  was	  also	  ‘sound	  policy’.92	  Fry	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  invoked	  the	  Golden	  
Rule	  arguing	  ‘it	  is	  always	  the	  best	  policy	  …	  to	  do	  to	  others	  as	  we	  would	  be	  done	  by,	  and	  
that	  will	  secure	  us	  prosperity.’93	  These	  anti-­‐slavery	  proclamations	  were	  expressed	  
through	  the	  profit	  driven	  language	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  venture.	  In	  this	  representation	  
slave	  ownership	  was	  not	  only	  morally	  dubious	  it	  was	  also	  economically	  irresponsible.	  
In	  addressing	  the	  call	  for	  emancipation	  then	  the	  IBMA	  directors	  also	  had	  to	  defend	  
their	  own	  competence	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  company.	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At	  the	  emergency	  general	  meeting	  the	  directors	  took	  the	  chance	  to	  defend	  their	  
ownership	  and	  treatment	  of	  slaves	  and	  won	  a	  resounding	  victory.	  Of	  those	  present	  at	  
the	  meeting	  only	  seven	  voted	  for	  the	  emancipation	  motion.94	  Whilst	  those	  who	  voted	  in	  
favour	  of	  maintaining	  the	  slave	  workforce	  were	  evidently	  motivated	  by	  economic	  self-­‐
interest,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  IBMA	  is	  worth	  examining	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  
company	  had	  to	  reconcile	  its	  slave-­‐owning	  with	  broader	  anti-­‐slavery	  vision	  in	  Britain.	  
Secondly,	  it	  had	  to	  convince	  shareholders	  that	  slavery	  was	  the	  most	  profitable	  labour	  
available	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  company	  was	  undergoing	  economic	  strife.	  1841	  had	  been	  
a	  year	  of	  ‘continued	  small	  produce,	  coupled	  with	  heavy	  expenditure’.95	  The	  IBMA’s	  
defence	  consisted	  of	  two	  parts,	  an	  address	  by	  Chairman	  Joshua	  Walker	  that	  was	  
reprinted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  annual	  report	  of	  1841,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  floor	  speeches	  at	  the	  
EGM.	  The	  defences	  offered	  for	  slave-­‐owning	  by	  the	  IBMA	  are	  perhaps	  most	  accurately	  
described	  as	  ‘anti-­‐abolitionist’	  or	  ‘ameilorationist’	  rather	  than	  ‘pro-­‐slavery’.	  Paula	  
Dumas’s	  recent	  survey	  of	  British	  defences	  of	  slavery	  distinguishes	  between	  these	  three	  
categories	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  authors	  were	  defending	  slavery	  as	  an	  institution,	  
critiquing	  abolitionist	  schemes,	  or	  arguing	  for	  the	  benefits	  brought	  to	  the	  enslaved	  by	  
their	  captivity.96	  To	  a	  point	  this	  rhetoric	  was	  present	  in	  the	  regular	  annual	  reports	  of	  
both	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR,	  but	  it	  was	  expressed	  most	  vigorously	  in	  times	  of	  crisis	  like	  
1841.	  	  
The	  IBMA	  director’s	  statement	  on	  slavery	  in	  May	  1841	  began	  with	  an	  echo	  of	  their	  first	  
statement	  on	  slavery	  in	  1830.	  Yet	  again	  they	  asserted	  a	  commitment	  to	  ‘ameliorate’	  the	  
condition	  of	  their	  slaves	  and	  linked	  this	  process	  to	  a	  vision	  of	  gradual	  emancipation.	  
The	  directors	  asserted	  that	  in	  1834	  they	  agreed	  to	  emancipate	  all	  children	  upon	  
reaching	  the	  age	  of	  21	  and	  that	  measures	  had	  been	  implemented	  for	  ‘securing	  the	  boon	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of	  emancipation	  to	  the	  rising	  generation.’97	  These	  lofty	  aims	  were	  tempered	  by	  the	  
directors	  admitting	  that	  attempts	  to	  emancipate	  adults	  had	  been	  unsuccessful;	  as	  such	  
it	  would	  be	  foolhardy	  to	  emancipate	  the	  slaves	  right	  now.98	  Dumas	  has	  identified	  
similar	  rhetoric	  amongst	  West	  Indian	  anti-­‐abolitionists	  who	  claimed	  to	  share	  the	  
ultimate	  goal	  of	  ending	  slavery	  but	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  brought	  a	  better	  life	  for	  slaves	  and	  
prosperity	  for	  planters.99	  These	  arguments	  required	  a	  certain	  representation	  of	  the	  
IBMA	  slaves	  as	  works	  in	  progress.	  They	  were	  in	  fact	  as	  ordered	  and	  disciplined	  as	  the	  
annual	  reports	  claimed,	  but	  if	  immediately	  freed	  they	  would	  die	  of	  ‘drunkenness’	  and	  
‘want’.100	  Emancipation	  was	  represented	  as	  a	  desirable	  end	  point,	  but	  one	  just	  out	  of	  
grasp.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  bring	  it	  about	  ahead	  of	  time	  would	  have	  disastrous	  consequences	  
for	  both	  the	  slaves	  and	  the	  company’s	  bottom	  line.	  These	  claims	  represent	  the	  flipside	  
of	  George	  Thomas’s	  calls	  for	  emancipation	  on	  economic	  and	  humanitarian	  grounds.	  	  
The	  central	  assertions	  of	  the	  IBMA’s	  defence	  of	  slave	  ownership	  was	  the	  necessity	  of	  
slavery	  to	  labour	  in	  Brazil	  and	  that	  they	  sought	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  moral	  transformation	  
in	  their	  slaves.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  one	  British	  mining	  companies	  stressed	  the	  
unique	  benefits	  their	  capital	  and	  expertise	  brought	  to	  Brazilian	  mining.	  This	  was	  no	  
different	  when	  it	  came	  to	  slavery	  and	  Brazilian	  slave	  ownership	  served	  as	  a	  useful	  
counterpoint	  for	  both	  companies	  in	  defending	  slave	  owning.	  Speaking	  before	  the	  EGM	  
company	  director	  Isaac	  Goldsmid	  claimed	  emancipation	  would	  ‘destroy	  the	  moral	  
effect	  which	  we	  anticipated	  the	  commencement	  of	  its	  establishment.’	  In	  this	  telling	  the	  
IBMA	  was	  founded	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  setting	  ‘a	  bright	  example’	  to	  Brazilians.101	  This	  was	  
the	  politics	  of	  moral	  suasion	  turned	  on	  its	  head.	  British	  slave	  owning	  could	  convince	  
the	  Brazilians	  to	  emancipate.	  The	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter	  was	  quick	  to	  pour	  scorn	  on	  this	  
claim	  mocking	  the	  notion	  that	  ‘[m]ining	  companies	  are	  formed	  for	  preaching	  …	  not	  for	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profit.’102	  Those	  at	  the	  meeting	  however	  appeared	  reassured	  by	  these	  claims,	  one	  
shareholder	  noted	  that	  those	  slaves	  who	  had	  been	  emancipated	  had	  ‘turned	  out	  
badly.’103	  Allied	  to	  this	  assertion	  that	  the	  IBMA	  acted	  as	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  
Brazilian	  slave	  owners	  was	  the	  oft-­‐repeated	  claim	  that	  emancipation	  would	  simply	  lead	  
to	  re-­‐enslavement	  by	  less	  humane	  masters.	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  bears	  striking	  
similarities	  to	  pre-­‐abolition	  arguments	  that	  British	  slave	  traders	  were	  a	  safer	  bet	  for	  
slaves	  than	  foreign	  rivals.104	  
The	  West	  Indies	  also	  stood	  as	  a	  point	  of	  comparison.	  In	  a	  letter	  appended	  to	  the	  1841	  
annual	  report	  an	  anonymous	  correspondent	  claimed	  that	  Brazilian	  slaves,	  having	  been	  
brutalised	  by	  the	  slave	  trade,	  were	  ‘barely	  weaned	  from	  the	  savage	  propensities	  and	  
habits	  of	  their	  childhood.’	  West	  Indian	  slaves	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  had	  been	  ‘accustomed	  
to	  British	  habits,	  wants,	  and	  feelings,	  …	  and	  able	  to	  exercise,	  the	  rights	  of	  man,	  without	  
detriment	  to	  themselves.’105	  Such	  arguments	  spoke	  to	  the	  diachronic	  understanding	  of	  
human	  variation	  espoused	  by	  many	  Victorians	  that	  explicitly	  tied	  moral	  and	  mental	  
development	  to	  social	  organization.106	  Ironically,	  this	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  ‘habits,	  wants,	  
and	  feelings’	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  West	  Indian	  defence	  of	  slavery	  identified	  by	  
Michael	  Taylor.107	  These	  claims	  directly	  undercut	  those	  of	  George	  Thomas	  and	  the	  
directors	  succeeded	  in	  convincing	  those	  present	  that	  they	  were	  reliable	  guardians	  of	  
the	  interest	  of	  both	  proprietors	  and	  slave	  labourers.	  
Perhaps	  the	  biggest	  success	  of	  the	  IBMA’s	  apology	  came	  in	  minimising	  any	  possible	  link	  
to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  illegal	  sale	  and	  purchase	  of	  slaves	  was	  entirely	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  
British	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  ending	  the	  slave	  trade	  and	  the	  directors	  made	  sure	  to	  
echo	  that	  sentiment.	  In	  their	  statement	  before	  the	  EGM	  they	  stressed	  ‘that	  traffic	  …	  is	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not	  less	  abhorrent	  to	  their	  feelings	  than	  it	  can	  be	  to	  those	  of	  its	  most	  zealous	  
opponents.’108	  Following	  this	  condemnation	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  quickly	  dismissed	  as	  a	  
topic	  as	  the	  directors	  focused	  on	  stressing	  the	  benefits	  that	  enslavement	  brought	  to	  the	  
workers	  at	  Gongo	  Soco.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  demography	  of	  Minas	  
Gerais	  in	  this	  period	  makes	  its	  likely	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  slaves	  purchased	  by	  the	  
IBMA	  would	  have	  been	  victims	  of	  the	  illegal	  slave	  trade.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  IBMA	  directors	  overwhelmingly	  succeeded	  in	  convincing	  shareholders	  
to	  accept	  their	  vision	  for	  the	  company	  and	  the	  continuation	  of	  slavery	  at	  Gongo	  Soco.	  
The	  Morning	  Chronicle	  reported	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  emancipation	  motion	  in	  a	  scathing	  
fashion	  attributing	  it	  to	  personal	  greed	  and	  the	  hope	  of	  shareholders	  that	  the	  
government	  ‘would	  grant	  them	  a	  liberal	  compensation’	  for	  their	  slaves.	  The	  paper	  did	  
however	  lavish	  praise	  on	  the	  ‘Seven	  Champions’	  and	  expressed	  hope	  that	  other	  mining	  
shareholders	  would	  follow	  their	  example.109	  This	  praise	  however	  should	  be	  qualified.	  
At	  least	  some	  of	  the	  requistionists	  remained	  actively	  involved	  with	  the	  company.	  Most	  
strikingly	  George	  Thomas,	  who	  had	  been	  most	  vocal	  in	  his	  support	  for	  emancipation,	  
went	  onto	  serve	  as	  the	  company’s	  secretary	  in	  the	  late	  1840s.110	  This	  somewhat	  
surprising	  development	  makes	  more	  sense	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  nature	  of	  Thomas’s	  
calls	  for	  emancipation.	  His	  fears	  that	  the	  company	  was	  moving	  in	  ‘retrograde	  motion’	  
and	  that	  slave	  labour	  was	  inefficient	  were	  as	  much	  about	  company	  management	  as	  the	  
welfare	  of	  the	  enslaved	  population.	  Both	  Evans	  and	  Temperley	  have	  found	  evidence	  of	  
shareholders	  selling	  shares	  or	  attempting	  to	  donate	  dividends	  to	  the	  BFASS,	  but	  
neither	  Henry	  Tuckett	  nor	  the	  Frys	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  among	  this	  number.111	  The	  
requisitionists	  then	  appear	  to	  have	  represented	  a	  group	  who	  could	  be	  reassured	  and	  
won	  over	  by	  the	  directors’	  defence	  of	  slavery.	  However,	  the	  public	  forum	  that	  joint-­‐
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stock	  companies	  provided	  for	  such	  discussions	  allowed	  them	  to	  garner	  wider	  anti-­‐
slavery	  attention	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  abolitionist	  movement.	  For	  a	  brief	  
moment	  it	  appeared	  that	  shareholder	  activism	  might	  offer	  a	  practical,	  and	  laissez-­‐faire,	  
solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  British	  slave-­‐ownership.	  
The	  IBMA	  emancipation	  controversy	  might	  at	  first	  glance	  appear	  to	  only	  have	  briefly	  
shaken	  up	  one	  firm	  but	  its	  aftershocks	  would	  reverberate	  across	  the	  broader	  anti-­‐
slavery	  landscape.	  The	  SJDR	  annual	  report	  of	  1841	  was	  much	  more	  forthcoming	  about	  
the	  company’s	  slaves	  than	  previous	  years	  stressing	  that	  ‘[e]very	  means	  is	  taken	  to	  
preserve	  them	  in	  habits	  of	  order,	  moral	  discipline	  and	  comfort.’112	  	  This	  statement	  
seems	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  prompted	  by	  the	  increased	  scrutiny	  of	  Brazilian	  mining	  
prompted	  by	  the	  IBMA	  case.	  Elsewhere,	  abolitionists	  having	  been	  thwarted	  in	  their	  
support	  of	  emancipation	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  turned	  to	  the	  government	  once	  again.	  
Following	  the	  IBMA’s	  EGM	  the	  BFASS	  mounted	  a	  series	  of	  petitions	  to	  the	  government	  
and	  anti-­‐slavery	  parliamentarians	  like	  Lord	  Brougham.113	  These	  petitions	  would	  form	  
the	  basis	  of	  Brougham’s	  aforementioned	  1843	  Act,	  which	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter	  both	  the	  SJDR	  and	  IBMA	  strenuously	  opposed.	  The	  EGM	  of	  1841	  appears	  to	  
have	  proved	  an	  effective	  training	  ground	  for	  honing	  defences	  of	  slave	  labour	  and	  the	  
companies’	  right	  to	  rely	  on	  slave	  labour	  was	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  heavily	  amended	  
version	  of	  Brougham’s	  bill	  that	  passed	  through	  the	  Commons.	  
The	  attempted	  emancipation	  of	  IBMA	  slaves	  speaks	  to	  the	  unique	  nature	  of	  slave-­‐
ownership	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  joint-­‐stock	  company.	  The	  separation	  of	  management	  and	  
ownership,	  particularly	  prevalent	  in	  a	  company	  whose	  daily	  operations	  took	  place	  
across	  the	  Atlantic,	  provided	  a	  distancing	  from	  the	  realities	  of	  slave	  ownership.	  
However,	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  joint-­‐company	  and	  the	  attention	  of	  a	  mining	  press	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provided	  as	  environment	  in	  which	  to	  push	  for	  emancipation.	  Many	  of	  the	  arguments	  
made	  for	  and	  against	  slave	  owning	  bore	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  earlier	  struggle	  over	  West	  
Indian	  slavery.	  However,	  this	  rhetoric	  was	  adapted	  to	  fit	  the	  context	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  
company.	  Profitability	  and	  order	  were	  central	  to	  both	  slavery’s	  advocates	  and	  
detractors.	  Furthermore,	  the	  question	  of	  emancipation	  was	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
reliability	  of	  the	  IBMA’s	  directors	  and	  their	  honesty	  to	  investors.	  These	  were	  concerns	  
common	  in	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  economy,	  but	  given	  an	  extra	  moral	  edge	  by	  slavery.	  It	  would	  
appear	  that	  dual	  anxieties	  about	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  and	  slavery	  made	  foreign	  
mining	  ventures	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  anti-­‐slavery	  critique.	  Ultimately,	  the	  IBMA	  
succeeded	  in	  legitimising	  its	  slave	  ownership	  by	  reassuring	  shareholders	  that	  the	  
company	  was	  making	  moral,	  as	  well	  as	  economic,	  progress.	  Elements	  of	  pre-­‐
emancipation,	  ameliorationist	  rhetoric	  were	  deployed	  and	  adapted	  specifically	  for	  a	  
joint-­‐stock	  context.	  Such	  a	  defence	  rested	  on	  maintaining	  confidence	  in	  the	  methods	  
employed	  to	  manage	  and	  maintain	  an	  orderly	  and	  healthy	  slave	  workforce.	  As	  the	  next	  
section	  will	  demonstrate	  such	  claims	  did	  not	  go	  uncontested,	  even	  when	  the	  right	  to	  
joint-­‐stock	  slave-­‐ownership	  had	  been	  guaranteed.	  
The	  SJDR	  Mortality	  Crisis	  
The	  nineteenth	  general	  meeting	  of	  the	  Saint	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company	  appeared	  
to	  be	  a	  celebratory	  occasion	  for	  those	  in	  attendance.	  The	  company	  directors	  laid	  out	  
the	  profits	  and	  losses	  of	  the	  last	  twelve	  months	  before	  the	  shareholders,	  concluding	  
that	  ‘the	  past	  year,	  has	  been	  one	  of	  continued	  success.’114	  This	  was	  surely	  a	  relief	  to	  the	  
proprietors	  of	  the	  company,	  which	  had	  already	  abandoned	  one	  mine	  in	  Brazil.	  
Productivity	  and	  profitability	  appeared	  to	  be	  on	  the	  up.	  However,	  there	  was	  one	  sour	  
note.	  The	  directors	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  address	  ‘very	  erroneous	  statements’	  in	  the	  press	  
about	  the	  treatment	  of	  their	  slave	  population.115	  These	  statements	  emanated	  from	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  SJDR,	  AR	  1849,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  p.	  7.	  
115	  Ibid,	  p.	  10.	  
246	  
	  
number	  of	  publications,	  notably	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  and	  Morning	  Post,	  which	  had	  
recently	  taken	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  SJDR	  and	  its	  management	  of	  slave	  labour.	  
This	  interest	  had	  prompted	  a	  more	  open	  defence	  of	  slavery	  than	  was	  common	  for	  the	  
company.	  Listing	  the	  supposed	  benefits	  that	  their	  unwanted	  reliance	  on	  slavery	  
brought	  to	  those	  who	  laboured	  in	  their	  mines	  the	  directors	  concluded	  that	  ‘in	  no	  part	  
of	  the	  world	  can	  a	  body	  of	  working	  people	  be	  found	  in	  a	  state	  of	  greater	  comfort	  and	  
contentedness.’116	  This	  bold	  defence,	  and	  the	  critiques	  that	  provoked	  it,	  were	  the	  result	  
of	  a	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  troubling	  number	  of	  deaths	  among	  slaves	  at	  Morro	  
Velho.	  The	  mortality	  crisis,	  as	  I	  shall	  refer	  to	  it,	  reveals	  how	  anti-­‐slavery	  could	  be	  used	  
to	  articulate	  broader	  concerns	  about	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  management	  among	  
shareholders.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  complicate	  the	  suggestion	  that	  abolitionists	  provoked	  
inquiry	  into	  mining	  companies.	  Rather,	  they	  appear	  to	  have	  played	  a	  supporting	  role	  in	  
a	  struggle	  over	  corporate	  governance.	  
The	  SJDR	  has	  received	  much	  greater	  scholarly	  attention	  than	  the	  IBMA,	  most	  notably	  in	  
the	  works	  of	  Eakin	  and	  Childs.	  The	  former’s	  company	  history	  does	  not	  directly	  engage	  
with	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  of	  1849	  in	  any	  great	  detail,	  however	  it	  does	  provide	  vital	  
information	  on	  labour	  practices	  and	  life	  at	  the	  mine.	  Childs	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  directly	  
addressed	  the	  events	  of	  1849,	  specifically	  press	  attacks	  on	  the	  SJDR	  and	  the	  company’s	  
response	  of	  an	  internal	  inquiry,	  in	  a	  ground-­‐breaking	  article	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  masters	  and	  slaves	  at	  Morro	  Velho.	  In	  this	  article	  Childs	  masterfully	  explores	  
the	  system	  of	  ‘rewards,	  and	  privileges	  [used]	  by	  slave-­‐owners	  to	  discipline	  and	  fashion	  
labour’	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  slaves	  could	  exploit	  and	  resist	  this	  system.117	  
Childs	  contends	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  master	  and	  slave	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  was	  
modified	  by	  public	  opinion.	  This	  assertion	  is	  in	  part	  grounded	  on	  the	  coverage	  that	  
mortality	  and	  accusations	  of	  overworking	  slaves	  received	  across	  the	  press	  in	  1849.	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Childs	  explains	  this	  press	  interest	  as	  a	  response	  to	  former	  SJDR	  superintendent	  Charles	  
Herring	  Jr.	  testifying	  before	  the	  1849	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  Slave	  Trade.118	  As	  I	  will	  
demonstrate	  this	  assumption	  is	  based	  on	  a	  faulty	  chronology,	  which	  falsely	  inflates	  the	  
importance	  of	  abolitionists	  in	  scrutinising	  the	  SJDR.	  In	  fact	  anti-­‐slavery	  is	  better	  
conceived	  as	  a	  weapon	  used	  in	  an	  internal	  struggle	  between	  the	  SJDR	  directors,	  
shareholders,	  and	  employees.	  Profitability	  and	  the	  company’s	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  
ultimately	  characterised	  this	  struggle	  much	  more	  than	  any	  concern	  for	  slaves.	  
Approaching	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  as	  a	  form	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  politics	  requires	  a	  critical	  
engagement	  with	  the	  texts	  through	  which	  this	  struggle	  was	  mediated.	  I	  have	  already	  
established	  that	  company	  directors	  used	  general	  meetings,	  and	  the	  reports	  they	  
generated,	  to	  maintain	  investor	  confidence	  and	  undermine	  criticism.	  These	  meetings	  
could	  also	  be	  sites	  for	  challenges	  of	  directorial	  policy	  and,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  IBMA	  in	  
1841;	  these	  challenges	  could	  have	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  character.	  This	  section	  shifts	  more	  
focus	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  financial	  press,	  specifically	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  and	  the	  city	  
column	  of	  the	  Morning	  Post.	  Specifically	  I	  focus	  on	  their	  role	  as	  ‘a	  key	  intermediary	  of	  
reputation	  in	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  market	  place.’119	  Whilst	  some	  scholars	  are	  
sceptical	  of	  the	  Victorian	  press’s	  ability	  to	  genuinely	  hold	  companies	  to	  account	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  interlocutors	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  mortality	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  made	  use	  of	  the	  
press	  to	  make	  moral	  claims	  for	  and	  against	  the	  company’s	  management.	  Columnists	  in	  
a	  number	  of	  publications	  were	  willing	  to	  moralise	  over	  the	  SJDR’s	  treatment	  of	  slaves	  
and	  what	  it	  meant	  for	  profits.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  conform	  to	  Poovey’s	  description	  of	  
attempting	  to	  use	  financial	  journalism	  as	  ‘an	  instrument	  that	  could	  actually	  make	  
business	  and	  investment	  as	  safe	  and	  ethical	  as	  [they]	  proclaimed	  it	  to	  be.’120	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The	  first	  hint	  of	  controversy	  comes	  with	  an	  April	  letter	  to	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  from	  an	  
individual	  resident	  in	  Minas	  Gerais	  about	  the	  status	  of	  mining	  companies	  in	  general.	  
The	  key	  remarks	  made	  are	  on	  the	  large	  number	  of	  slaves	  being	  hired	  cheaply	  by	  the	  
SJDR	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘the	  mortality	  among	  the	  black	  race	  is	  terrific’.	  Specifically,	  eight	  
slaves	  were	  said	  to	  have	  died	  over	  the	  previous	  fortnight.	  This	  shocking	  mortality	  rate	  
was	  not	  attributed	  to	  poor	  conditions	  at	  the	  mine,	  but	  rather	  ‘rumour	  gives	  out	  that	  
some	  of	  them	  are	  overworked.’	  This	  overworking	  amounted	  to	  a	  critical	  
mismanagement	  of	  labour	  and	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  feud	  between	  the	  mine’s	  
superintendent	  and	  the	  company	  surgeon.	  The	  SJDR’s	  slaves	  were	  paying	  the	  price	  and	  
‘dying	  like	  rotten	  sheep’.	  Perhaps	  most	  damning	  of	  all	  for	  a	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  like	  
the	  SJDR	  was	  not	  the	  accusation	  of	  mistreatment	  of	  its	  enslaved	  workforce,	  but	  the	  
anonymous	  author’s	  conclusion	  that	  ‘under	  more	  capable	  management,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  
safer	  investment	  than	  it	  is	  at	  present.’121	  This	  letter	  pre-­‐dated	  both	  the	  SJDR	  annual	  
meeting	  and	  Herring’s	  testimony	  before	  the	  select	  committee,	  both	  of	  which	  occurred	  
in	  May.122	  The	  letter	  not	  only	  disproves	  Childs’s	  chronology,	  but	  also	  complicates	  his	  
picture	  of	  the	  role	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  The	  Mining	  Journal’s	  correspondent	  was	  not	  an	  
abolitionist	  and	  in	  fact	  lavished	  praise	  on	  the	  IBMA’s	  brand	  of	  slave	  ownership	  because	  
the	  enslaved	  had	  ‘learnt	  to	  labour	  like	  Englishmen.’123	  Here	  was	  a	  more	  commercial	  
than	  moral	  critique	  that	  amounted	  to	  the	  following:	  the	  SJDR	  was	  working	  its	  slaves	  to	  
death	  and	  this	  made	  them	  a	  risky	  prospect	  for	  investors.	  
To	  understand	  the	  accusations	  of	  overwork	  that	  were	  levelled	  at	  the	  SJDR	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  take	  a	  step	  back	  and	  examine	  how	  the	  mine	  itself	  functioned.	  Slaves	  
laboured	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  roles	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  with	  one	  of	  the	  many	  divisions	  of	  
labour	  being	  between	  that	  done	  above	  and	  below	  ground.	  Work	  above	  ground	  included	  
transporting	  ore,	  building	  structures,	  and	  various	  other	  roles	  that	  supplemented	  the	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  ‘The	  Brazilian	  Mining	  Companies’,	  Mining	  Journal,	  14	  Apr	  1849.	  
122	  Report	  of	  the	  Select	  Committee,	  1850,	  p.	  164.	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  ‘The	  Brazilian	  Mining	  Companies’,	  Mining	  Journal,	  14	  Apr	  1849.	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process	  of	  mining	  for	  gold	  below	  the	  earth’s	  surface.	  Eakin	  estimates	  that	  around	  a	  
third	  of	  the	  company’s	  workforce	  laboured	  underground.124	  The	  mortality	  crisis	  and	  
accusations	  of	  overworking	  pertained	  specifically	  to	  the	  role	  of	  borer,	  a	  form	  of	  manual	  
labour	  key	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  mine.	  Borers	  were	  responsible	  for	  ‘the	  punishing	  
job	  of	  drilling	  and	  blasting	  holes’	  in	  the	  underground	  rock	  from	  where	  ore	  was	  
extracted.	  It	  was	  a	  two-­‐man	  job:	  
	  [O]ne	  man	  would	  hold	  an	  iron	  borer	  while	  the	  other	  drove	  it	  into	  the	  rock	  
with	  an	  eight-­‐pound	  sledgehammer.	  Between	  blows	  (up	  to	  thirty	  per	  
minute)	  the	  holder	  adeptly	  rotated	  the	  iron	  borer	  for	  greater	  
effectiveness.125	  
The	  SJDR	  would	  move	  towards	  mechanisation	  by	  the	  1870s,	  but	  in	  1849	  hand	  boring	  
performed	  by	  slaves	  was	  still	  central	  to	  the	  company’s	  success.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  tiring	  
shifts	  in	  dark,	  humid	  conditions	  ‘borers	  filled	  two	  or	  three	  holes	  with	  dynamite	  and	  
then	  blasted	  the	  rock.’	  This	  process	  produced	  smoke	  and	  nitric	  acid	  making	  the	  role	  of	  
borer	  both	  unpleasant	  and	  dangerous.	  126	  It	  was	  among	  these	  slave	  labourers	  that	  
mortality	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  highest.	  
The	  genesis	  of	  concerns	  over	  mortality	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  actually	  stretched	  back	  well	  
before	  1849.	  The	  board	  wrote	  to	  Superintendent	  Charles	  Herring	  Jr.,	  as	  early	  as	  1844,	  
to	  express	  their	  ‘extreme	  concern’	  at	  the	  ‘loss	  of	  17	  Negroes	  out	  of	  542	  in	  7	  months’.127	  
The	  board’s	  concern	  was	  so	  great	  that	  they	  had	  consulted	  with	  other	  mining	  
companies,	  including	  the	  IBMA,	  over	  the	  health	  of	  their	  slaves.	  These	  enquiries	  
revealed	  that	  slaves	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  worked	  longer	  hours,	  twelve	  compared	  to	  eight,	  
than	  slaves	  at	  any	  other	  mine.128	  These	  concerns	  over	  management	  of	  labour	  were	  
effectively	  concealed	  from	  shareholders	  and	  the	  public	  at	  the	  time	  but	  would	  continue	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  British	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  Ibid,	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  Ibid,	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  125.	  	  




to	  rumble	  on	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  itself.	  A	  disagreement	  between	  the	  company	  surgeon	  
Robert	  Monach	  and	  Herring	  over	  the	  health	  of	  the	  slave	  workforce	  had	  led	  to	  the	  
former’s	  replacement	  by	  the	  board	  in	  early	  1845.129	  The	  disagreement	  was	  so	  bitter	  
that	  after	  backing	  Herring	  the	  board	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  assure	  Monach	  that	  ‘the	  
superintendent	  has	  made	  no	  attack	  on	  you.’130	  Such	  measures	  demonstrated	  a	  keen	  
awareness	  that	  private	  disputes	  could	  blow	  up	  into	  public	  controversy.	  The	  IBMA’s	  
experience	  with	  disgruntled	  employees	  surely	  acted	  as	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  and	  though	  
they	  succeeded	  in	  silencing	  Monach	  immediately	  his	  dismissal	  would	  eventually	  come	  
back	  to	  bite	  them.	  This	  conflict,	  and	  the	  continuation	  of	  Herring’s	  approach	  to	  boring	  by	  
his	  successor	  George	  Keogh,	  sowed	  the	  seeds	  for	  the	  crisis	  of	  1849.	  However,	  the	  
annual	  reports	  of	  the	  mid	  1840s	  effectively	  silenced	  any	  internal	  critique.	  
The	  practice	  of	  twelve	  hour	  boring	  was	  maintained	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  from	  1847	  
onwards,	  but	  now	  was	  performed	  by	  slave	  labourers	  in	  exchange	  for	  overtime	  pay.	  
This	  arrangement	  amounted	  to	  eight	  hours	  of	  unpaid	  labour	  and	  four	  extra	  hours	  
worked	  through	  choice.	  Of	  course	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  coerced	  hours	  and	  
waged	  hours	  is	  a	  complicated	  one,	  ultimately	  the	  slaves	  at	  the	  SJDR	  were	  not	  free	  to	  
labour	  as	  they	  pleased.	  However,	  Childs	  is	  right	  to	  recognise	  the	  agency	  of	  slaves	  at	  
Morro	  Velho	  who	  worked	  overtime	  and	  amassed	  earnings,	  some	  of	  which	  could	  be	  
used	  to	  later	  purchase	  manumission.131	  The	  accounts	  produced	  in	  1849	  showed	  that	  
£1,	  467	  19s.	  2d.	  had	  been	  paid	  in	  overtime	  and	  rewards.132	  These	  rewards	  were	  not	  
given	  out	  of	  the	  good	  of	  the	  directors’	  hearts.	  More	  likely,	  the	  promise	  of	  overtime	  was	  
a	  way	  to	  meet	  the	  increased	  need	  for	  labour	  at	  a	  point	  when	  the	  purchase	  of	  more	  
slaves	  had	  prohibited	  by	  the	  1843	  Act.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  by	  1849	  borers	  at	  Morro	  
Velho	  were	  still	  working	  twelve	  hours	  shifts	  and	  mortality	  remained	  a	  concern.	  It	  was	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  J.	  D.	  Powles	  to	  C.	  Herring	  Jr.,	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  SJDR,	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  G.	  D.	  Keogh	  to	  R.	  Monach,	  14	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  Childs,	  ‘Master-­‐Servant’,	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  15.	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  SJDR,	  AR	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  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  p.	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at	  this	  point	  that	  these	  issues	  would	  be	  laid	  open	  to	  full	  public,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  
shareholder	  scrutiny.	  
Critics	  of	  the	  SJDR	  seized	  upon	  reports	  of	  overworking	  and	  slave	  mortality	  as	  evidence	  
of	  the	  particular	  cruelty	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  slavery.	  Writing	  in	  the	  Money	  Market	  and	  City	  
News	  column	  of	  the	  Morning	  Post	  a	  correspondent	  under	  the	  name	  ‘Philo-­‐Africanus’	  
explicitly	  pointed	  the	  finger	  at	  ‘London	  capitalists.’133	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  critique	  lay	  
the	  accusation	  that	  slaves	  were	  treated	  as	  entirely	  disposable	  and	  were	  worked	  to	  
death	  to	  meet	  the	  company’s	  labour	  needs.	  The	  profit-­‐motive	  was	  to	  blame	  here	  as	  the	  
company	  was	  guilty	  of	  ‘weighing	  the	  lives	  of	  blacks	  against	  gold,	  the	  balance	  in	  value	  
being	  the	  difference	  in	  dividends	  to	  the	  whites	  at	  home.’134	  The	  insertion	  of	  this	  letter	  
in	  a	  financial	  advice	  column,	  and	  its	  reprint	  in	  the	  Mining	  Journal,	  represented	  a	  clear	  
attempt	  to	  moralise	  investment	  and	  flag	  up	  damaging	  managerial	  practices.	  Philo-­‐
Africanus’s	  response	  was	  also	  remarkable	  in	  that	  it	  drew	  on	  the	  published	  reports	  of	  
the	  SJDR	  itself	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  company’s	  voracious	  labour	  hunger	  contributed	  
directly	  to	  the	  death	  of	  slaves.	  More	  remarkable	  still	  was	  the	  explicit	  links	  drawn	  
between	  the	  1843	  Act	  and	  slave	  mortality.	  The	  SJDR’s	  wanton	  destruction	  of	  life	  was	  
attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  purchase	  slaves	  and	  had	  to	  rent	  
labourers	  from	  neighbouring	  slave	  owners.	  Shorn	  of	  the	  self-­‐interested	  desire	  to	  care	  
for	  one’s	  own	  property	  the	  company	  management	  stood	  accused	  of	  callously	  working	  
hired	  slaves	  to	  death.	  This	  critique	  tapped	  into	  longstanding	  anxieties	  over	  the	  
separation	  of	  management	  and	  ownership	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  companies.	  Adam	  Smith	  had	  
theorised	  that	  managers	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  reckless	  than	  owners	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
personal	  investment	  in	  the	  property.135	  This	  principle	  could	  easily	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  
use	  of	  someone	  else’s	  property.	  Such	  beliefs	  motivated	  Philo-­‐Afircanus’s	  suggestion	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  The	  Morning	  Post,	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  Ibid.	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  Freeman,	  Pearson,	  Taylor,	  Shareholder	  Democracies,	  p.	  78.	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that	  the	  prohibition	  on	  slave	  purchasing	  should	  be	  lifted	  so	  as	  to	  produce	  a	  more	  
humane	  slave-­‐ownership.136	  	  
The	  SJDR’s	  own	  reports	  added	  weight	  to	  these	  attacks.	  A	  letter	  from	  ‘A	  Constant	  
Reader’	  to	  Lord	  Brougham,	  published	  by	  the	  Morning	  Post,	  referenced	  the	  reports	  of	  
the	  SJDR	  and	  cited	  page	  numbers	  as	  he	  constructed	  his	  critique.	  The	  letter’s	  author	  
cross-­‐referenced	  the	  number	  of	  slaves	  working	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  (1,100),	  with	  the	  
number	  of	  deaths	  (59)	  to	  calculate	  an	  ‘awful	  mortality’	  rate	  of	  ‘5½	  	  per	  cent.’	  Even	  
more	  glaring	  was	  the	  number	  of	  deaths	  among	  the	  ‘young,	  strong	  and	  able’	  borers,	  of	  
which	  8.2	  %	  had	  died.137	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  document	  produced	  by	  a	  mining	  company	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  reassuring	  shareholders	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  an	  instrument	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery	  critique	  raises	  interesting	  questions	  about	  the	  transmission	  of	  these	  texts.	  The	  
presence	  of	  IBMA	  annual	  reports	  among	  the	  papers	  of	  the	  Strutt	  family	  of	  Derbyshire	  
suggests	  that	  mining	  companies	  at	  the	  very	  least	  transmitted	  reports	  to	  shareholders	  
who	  lived	  outside	  of	  London	  to	  inform	  them	  of	  what	  was	  said	  at	  general	  meetings.138	  It	  
seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  SJDR	  took	  similar	  steps.	  Elsewhere	  brief	  
summaries	  of	  company	  reports	  made	  up	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  often	  under	  
the	  title	  ‘Foreign	  Mines’.	  City	  intelligence	  columns,	  such	  as	  that	  in	  the	  Morning	  Post,	  
might	  also	  contain	  summaries	  and	  direct	  quotes	  from	  these	  texts.	  However,	  the	  
detailed	  page	  references	  suggest	  ‘A	  Constant	  Reader’	  physically	  possessed	  the	  annual	  
report	  and	  had	  flicked	  through	  its	  pages	  plucking	  facts	  to	  sharpen	  their	  incisive	  
critique.	  Whether	  this	  author	  was	  a	  shareholder	  or	  had	  contact	  with	  a	  proprietor	  of	  the	  
SJDR	  cannot	  be	  known,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  texts	  produced	  by	  the	  company	  passed	  into	  
the	  hands	  of	  critics.	  Ironically,	  it	  was	  the	  SJDR’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  degree	  of	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  The	  Morning	  Post,	  21	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137	  The	  Morning	  Post,	  14	  May	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  SJDR,	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  1849,	  SJDR,	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transparency	  that	  provided	  ammunition	  for	  its	  critics,	  given	  many	  unincorporated	  
companies’	  were	  highly	  restrictive	  of	  the	  information	  given	  out	  to	  shareholders.	  139	  	  
The	  same	  annual	  report	  provided	  ammunition	  for	  ‘J.F.’,	  an	  anonymous	  correspondent	  
from	  Islington,	  who	  undertook	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  company’s	  accounts	  from	  1847	  and	  
1848.	  Key	  to	  this	  analysis	  was	  not	  only	  the	  mortality	  rates	  at	  the	  mine,	  but	  also	  the	  data	  
provided	  on	  productivity	  and	  hours	  worked.	  In	  ‘J.F.’s’	  reading	  the	  huge	  leap	  in	  ore	  
broken	  from	  40,	  859	  tons	  in	  1847	  to	  61,	  672	  could	  only	  be	  explained	  by	  coercing	  more	  
work	  from	  the	  slaves.	  The	  equation	  was	  simple.	  ‘This	  is	  an	  increase	  of	  labour,	  and	  
consequent	  increase	  of	  deaths	  among	  the	  miners,	  to	  which	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  freemen	  
would	  be	  liable.’140	  This	  attack	  was	  not	  simply	  humanitarian	  in	  nature.	  Rather	  it	  had	  as	  
its	  target	  the	  SJDR’s	  management,	  whose	  foolhardy	  pursuit	  of	  profit	  plunged	  the	  
company	  into	  a	  demographic	  death	  spiral.	  Whilst	  the	  annual	  reports	  had	  sought,	  as	  
always,	  to	  reassure	  investors	  of	  a	  brighter	  future	  for	  the	  company	  ‘J.F.’	  saw	  a	  gloomier	  
vision.	  Slave-­‐owners	  would	  surely	  refuse	  to	  hire	  out	  their	  property	  to	  a	  company	  
where	  they	  were	  so	  likely	  to	  die.	  Here	  the	  blame	  was	  apportioned	  directly	  to	  the	  ‘infirm	  
and	  nearly	  blind	  old	  man’	  in	  charge	  of	  Morro	  Velho	  who	  was	  led	  astray	  by	  his	  
subordinates.	  ‘J.F.’	  ended	  his	  letter	  with	  a	  particularly	  bleak	  warning:	  
I	  prophecy	  that	  he	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  his	  stamps	  supplied	  with	  stone,	  
that	  the	  ore	  will	  further	  fall	  off	  in	  value	  through	  working	  the	  lodes	  too	  
wide,	  that	  the	  expenditure	  will	  be	  augmented,	  and	  the	  returns,	  and	  
consequently	  the	  profits	  sensibly	  diminished.141	  
The	  gloomy	  prognosis	  offered	  by	  ‘J.F.’	  bears	  further	  consideration	  as	  it	  represented	  a	  
condemnation	  of	  slavery	  on	  economic	  rather	  than	  purely	  moral	  grounds.	  The	  
institution	  of	  slavery	  allowed	  men	  to	  be	  overworked	  in	  pursuit	  of	  profit.	  It	  fostered	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over-­‐ambition	  and	  not	  the	  frugality	  and	  temperance	  that	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  aspired	  
to.	  The	  message	  here	  was	  that	  slavery,	  whilst	  useful	  for	  reaping	  short-­‐term	  profit,	  
would	  founder	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Demographic	  arguments	  over	  the	  efficiency	  of	  slave	  
labour	  had	  been	  part	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  rhetoric	  from	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  and	  in	  
the	  nineteenth	  century	  population	  decline	  in	  the	  West	  Indies	  had	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  
indicator	  of	  slavery’s	  cruelty.142	  Belief	  in	  the	  superiority	  of	  free	  labour	  had	  taken	  
something	  of	  a	  battering	  following	  British	  emancipation	  and	  the	  consequent	  economic	  
collapse	  of	  West	  Indian	  sugar.143	  Mining	  however	  was	  a	  different	  industry	  with	  a	  finite	  
product	  and	  labour	  supply.	  In	  this	  context,	  rarely	  discussed	  by	  historians,	  slave	  
labour’s	  efficiency	  could	  clearly	  be	  challenged.	  This	  critique	  was	  mounted	  in	  economic	  
and	  demographic	  terms,	  but	  there	  may	  also	  have	  been	  a	  degree	  of	  moralising	  at	  work.	  
For	  example,	  James	  William	  Gilbart,	  founder	  of	  a	  joint-­‐stock	  bank,	  believed	  that	  
companies	  could	  act	  as	  moral	  agents	  and	  that	  financial	  failure	  was	  a	  just	  earthly	  
punishment.144	  Similar	  logic	  may	  have	  lay	  behind	  the	  doom	  mongering	  of	  the	  SJDR’s	  
critic,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  logic.	  
The	  ruthless	  exploitation	  facilitated	  by	  a	  captive	  workforce	  could	  ultimately	  prove	  
disastrous	  for	  the	  company’s	  bottom	  line.	  This	  was	  ‘J.F’s’	  grim	  warning	  and	  it	  certainly	  
caught	  the	  attention	  of	  some	  observers.	  Writing	  again	  in	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  ‘A	  
Shareholder’	  expressed	  fears	  that	  if	  ‘J.F’s’	  claims	  were	  true	  then	  the	  company	  was	  
guilty	  of	  presenting	  fraudulent	  accounts.	  Specifically	  the	  allegation	  that	  ‘the	  slaves	  are	  
dying	  20	  in	  three	  months’,	  if	  true	  the	  author	  contended	  then	  ‘the	  sum	  of	  700l	  should	  be	  
deducted	  from	  [the	  accounts].’145	  Another	  correspondent,	  Verax,	  wrote	  a	  number	  of	  
letters	  echoing	  concerns	  about	  over	  ambition	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  SJDR	  management.146	  
The	  veracity	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  accounts	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  highly	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  ‘St.	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  Del	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contentious.	  The	  SJDR,	  like	  many	  other	  companies,	  had	  its	  accounts	  audited	  by	  
shareholders	  who	  had	  to	  meet	  a	  qualification	  of	  owning	  at	  least	  twenty	  shares.147	  The	  
responses	  by	  supposed	  shareholders	  are	  somewhat	  chilling	  in	  their	  focus	  on	  the	  issue	  
of	  directorial	  responsibility	  and	  the	  future	  prospects	  of	  the	  company.	  The	  morality	  of	  
slavery	  was	  not	  really	  questioned	  by	  either	  author,	  profit	  and	  loss	  were	  the	  real	  issues	  
at	  stake	  here.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  IBMA,	  the	  question	  of	  slavery	  appeared	  to	  also	  
enable	  more	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  director-­‐proprietor	  relationship.	  
The	  broader	  questions	  over	  directorial	  accountability	  raised	  by	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  at	  
Morro	  Velho	  were	  addressed	  most	  explicitly	  in	  the	  city	  column	  of	  the	  Morning	  Post.	  The	  
column	  of	  July	  30th	  saw	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  letter	  signed	  ‘Anti-­‐Slavery’	  which	  levelled	  
accusations	  of	  outright	  deceit	  at	  the	  company	  directors.	  ‘[W]e	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  the	  
profits	  are	  real	  or	  unreal’	  complained	  the	  correspondent.	  ‘How	  long	  will	  shareholders	  
be	  duped?’	  This	  scepticism	  at	  directorial	  honesty	  was	  tied	  to	  a	  call	  to	  ‘be	  content	  with	  
smaller	  profits,	  and	  even,	  if	  necessary	  give	  up	  our	  works.’148	  This	  was	  a	  firm	  
condemnation	  that	  pandered	  to	  the	  worst	  representations	  of	  company	  directors.	  The	  
Morning	  Post’s	  editorial	  comment	  on	  the	  letter	  suggested	  that	  anxiety	  over	  the	  
reliability	  of	  accounts	  and	  information	  may	  have	  been	  particularly	  acute	  in	  the	  
overseas	  mining	  sector.	  ‘Management	  overseas	  is	  never	  to	  be	  trusted’	  was	  its	  rather	  
damning	  conclusion.	  Overseas	  mining	  remains	  an	  under	  researched	  aspect	  of	  the	  joint-­‐
stock	  economy	  so	  the	  representativeness	  of	  the	  Morning	  Post’s	  scepticism	  is	  hard	  to	  
judge.	  However	  the	  physical	  distance	  between	  investors	  and	  the	  mine	  appeared	  to	  
undermine	  the	  trust	  relationships	  necessary	  for	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  to	  function.	  
What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  they	  were	  unequivocal	  in	  their	  opposition	  of	  foreign	  mining	  
signing	  off	  with	  another	  bleak	  warning	  that:	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Treasure	  is	  raised	  only	  to	  be	  abstracted	  by	  unfaithful	  servants,	  and	  in	  vain	  
do	  shareholders	  in	  mining	  companies	  look	  for	  the	  golden	  results	  that	  were	  
present	  to	  their	  imaginations	  when	  they	  became	  so.149	  
The	  various	  articles	  and	  letters	  discussed	  above	  demonstrate	  how	  critiques	  of	  the	  
SJDR’s	  management	  could	  crystallise	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  slavery.	  Authors	  adopted	  
names	  like	  ‘Anti-­‐Slavery’	  or	  ‘Philo-­‐Africanus’	  and	  condemned	  bonded	  labour,	  but	  the	  
substance	  of	  their	  attacks	  was	  centred	  on	  the	  management	  of	  the	  company	  itself.	  These	  
ranged	  from	  an	  attack	  on	  directorial	  dishonesty	  to,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Morning	  Post,	  
scepticism	  of	  foreign	  mining	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  letters	  were	  placed	  
specifically	  in	  the	  financial	  press	  also	  suggests	  a	  determination	  to	  grab	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  
readership	  of	  investors	  and	  directors.	  Whilst	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  press	  did	  reprint	  and	  
comment	  on	  many	  of	  the	  articles	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  represented	  
joint-­‐stock	  politics	  expressed	  through	  a	  language	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
The	  SJDR	  directors	  were	  clearly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  critique	  aimed	  at	  them.	  
Responding	  in	  the	  Morning	  Post	  to	  ‘Anti-­‐Slavery’s’	  letter	  the	  company	  made	  the	  
following	  contentions;	  that	  the	  large	  loss	  of	  life	  was	  due	  to	  an	  epidemic	  and	  that	  the	  
slaves	  of	  the	  mine	  worked	  overtime	  out	  of	  choice.	  Allied	  to	  this	  was	  a	  reaffirmation	  of	  
the	  company’s	  paternalistic	  approach	  to	  slave-­‐ownership.	  Overtime	  was	  represented	  
as	  an	  ‘indulgence	  to	  them	  to	  give	  them	  the	  opportunity	  of	  acquiring	  something	  of	  their	  
own’.150	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  represented	  a	  striking	  assertion	  of	  enslaved	  agency.	  The	  
decision	  to	  work	  overtime	  was	  one	  taken	  freely	  and	  enthusiastically	  by	  the	  company’s	  
workforce.	  In	  fact	  such	  was	  their	  enthusiasm	  that	  the	  directors	  had	  put	  in	  place	  a	  
number	  of	  restraints	  and	  qualifications	  itemised	  in	  the	  Morning	  Post.	  Only	  ‘first-­‐class	  
blacks’	  were	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  work	  overtime	  and	  the	  surgeon	  had	  to	  approve	  those	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  Morning	  Post,	  11	  Aug	  1849.	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who	  overtime	  work.151	  By	  publishing	  this	  criteria	  the	  SJDR	  directors	  sought	  to	  dismiss	  
accusations	  of	  misleading	  shareholders	  whilst	  maintaining	  that	  their	  relationship	  to	  
the	  company’s	  slaves	  was	  more	  one	  of	  stewardship	  than	  ownership.	  The	  mine’s	  
managers	  allowed	  overtime	  to	  encourage	  improvement	  among	  its	  workforce.	  Bar	  the	  
unfortunate	  epidemic	  life	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  was	  happy,	  ordered,	  and	  productive.	  
The	  serene	  picture	  painted	  by	  the	  directors	  in	  the	  Morning	  Post	  elided	  a	  fractious	  
conflict	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  that	  had	  played	  a	  role	  in	  sparking	  press	  outrage.	  The	  company	  
presented	  a	  united	  front	  to	  the	  public	  that	  elided	  internal	  clashes	  over	  mortality	  at	  the	  
mines.	  The	  SJDR’s	  attempt	  to	  meet	  these	  criticisms	  and	  ensure	  investors	  of	  Directorial	  
competence	  took	  a	  body	  blow	  when	  internal	  ruptures	  broke	  through	  to	  the	  surface.	  A	  
circular	  was	  printed	  in	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  that	  reiterated	  the	  company’s	  commitment	  
to	  ‘seeking	  to	  improve	  the	  moral	  condition	  of	  the	  negroes’.152	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  circular	  
was	  an	  unremarkable	  reassertion	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  prudence,	  improvement	  and	  
reliability	  that	  characterised	  all	  SJDR	  publications,	  though	  it	  did	  notably	  attempt	  to	  
undermine	  the	  accusations	  of	  overworking	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  mortality	  figures	  had	  
been	  exaggerated.	  Like	  all	  company	  publications	  the	  circular	  bore	  the	  signature	  of	  
William	  Routh,	  company	  secretary	  whose	  name	  stood	  for	  the	  corporation	  as	  a	  whole.	  
This	  fiction	  of	  unanimity	  was	  exploded	  a	  month	  later	  when	  Routh,	  in	  a	  circular	  
addressed	  to	  shareholders,	  disputing	  the	  defences	  of	  the	  board	  and	  supporting	  
accusations	  of	  overworking.	  Specifically,	  Routh	  took	  aim	  at	  company	  chairman	  J.	  D.	  
Powles	  who	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  dictatorial	  figure	  who	  ‘kept	  [shareholders]	  in	  
ignorance	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  company’s	  affairs.’153	  Routh’s	  circular	  is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  
the	  mortality	  crisis	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  result	  of	  abolitionist	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  SJDR;	  rather	  
broader	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiments	  magnified	  and	  bought	  publicity	  to	  fissures	  within	  the	  
company	  itself.	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152	  ‘St.	  John	  Del	  Rey	  Mining	  Company’,	  Mining	  Journal,	  22	  Sep	  1849.	  
153	  ‘St.	  John	  Del	  Rey	  Mines	  –	  To	  The	  Shareholders’,	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  Journal,	  20	  Oct	  1849.	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William	  Routh’s	  circular	  prompted	  more	  airing	  of	  dirty	  laundry	  as	  Robert	  Monach	  took	  
to	  the	  press	  to	  further	  castigate	  the	  company	  directors.	  The	  former	  surgeon	  referred	  to	  
the	  twelve-­‐hour	  shifts	  of	  underground	  borers	  as	  a	  ‘murderous	  system’.	  Directorial	  
incompetence	  was	  not	  only	  leading	  to	  deaths	  but	  had	  also	  ‘burdened	  [the	  
establishment]	  with	  a	  number	  of	  living,	  but	  useless	  individuals.’154	  Yet	  again,	  the	  focus	  
was	  on	  efficiency	  and	  the	  company’s	  prospects	  rather	  than	  the	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  of	  
slavery.	  Monach’s	  letter	  and	  Routh’s	  circular	  did	  receive	  coverage	  in	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  
press.	  However,	  this	  only	  further	  demonstrates	  how	  anti-­‐slavery	  might	  be	  weaponised	  
as	  part	  of	  internal	  disputes.155	  The	  attractiveness	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  critique	  may	  well	  have	  
lain	  not	  only	  in	  the	  extra	  publicity	  garnered,	  but	  also	  the	  belief	  that	  extraordinary	  
measures	  might	  be	  taken	  to	  remedy	  problems.	  The	  evidence	  for	  this	  was	  of	  course	  
West	  Indian	  emancipation	  and	  legislation	  like	  the	  Suppression	  Act	  of	  1843.	  These	  
precedents	  of	  government	  intervening,	  or	  attempting	  to	  intervene,	  in	  issues	  of	  private	  
property	  may	  well	  have	  inspired	  the	  extraordinary	  ‘petition’	  produced	  by	  William	  
Routh.	  This	  petition	  was	  addressed	  to	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  printed	  in	  the	  Mining	  
Journal,	  Daily	  News	  and	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Reporter.	  The	  petition	  called	  for	  the	  government	  to	  
take	  the	  unusual	  step	  of	  intervening	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  SJDR.	  Her	  Majesty’s	  
minister	  at	  Rio	  should	  be	  empowered	  to	  impose	  limits	  both	  on	  the	  hiring	  of	  slaves	  and	  
hours	  worked	  at	  the	  mine.156	  This	  radical	  extension	  of	  government	  powers	  was	  
justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  enslaved	  workforce,	  yet	  there	  was	  no	  
suggestion	  of	  emancipation.	  Rather	  the	  government	  should	  enforce	  a	  system	  of	  
efficient	  and	  sustainable	  labour	  management.	  This	  fanciful	  petition	  was	  never	  likely	  to	  
prompt	  a	  serious	  governmental	  response	  and	  is	  perhaps	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  further	  
attempt	  to	  embarrass	  and	  undermine	  Routh’s	  rivals	  on	  the	  board.	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  Holding	  Mining	  Companies’,	  ASR,	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The	  SJDR	  directors	  then	  stood	  accused,	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  IBMA	  in	  1841,	  of	  
misleading	  shareholders.	  Whilst	  these	  accusations	  had	  attracted	  anti-­‐slavery	  
moralising	  from	  the	  press	  the	  central	  impulse	  came	  from	  concern	  over	  management	  of	  
the	  firm.	  Condemnations	  from	  the	  Anti-­‐slavery	  Reporter	  were	  likely	  much	  less	  
distressing	  than	  the	  exposure	  of	  internal	  strife	  to	  shareholders	  and	  potential	  investors.	  
The	  company	  responded	  to	  the	  accusations	  levelled	  at	  it	  through	  a	  performance	  of	  
openness	  and	  self-­‐reflection.	  This	  consisted	  of	  an	  internal	  inquiry	  by	  Thomas	  Walker,	  a	  
physician,	  hired	  to	  'to	  enter	  into	  a	  full	  investigation	  of	  all	  the	  circumstances	  attending	  
the	  condition	  of	  the	  Negroes'.157	  Walker’s	  authority	  came	  from	  his	  status	  as	  a	  
supposedly	  objective	  observer	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  witnessed	  life	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  
through	  ‘ocular	  demonstration’.158	  Walker	  was	  to	  be	  a	  surrogate	  for	  the	  shareholders	  
and	  bridge	  the	  oceanic	  gap	  between	  them	  and	  the	  mine.	  His	  visit	  resulted	  in	  a	  circular	  
addressed	  to	  the	  company’s	  proprietors	  that	  sought	  to	  not	  only	  refute	  accusations	  of	  
overworking,	  but	  also	  provide	  a	  positive	  defence	  of	  slave	  labour	  at	  Morro	  Velho.	  This	  
included	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  increased	  boring	  capability	  of	  the	  mine,	  which	  was	  
attributed	  to	  technological	  development;	  a	  claim	  that	  chimed	  with	  the	  company’s	  
broader	  message	  of	  advancement.	  The	  SJDR	  sounded	  a	  conciliatory	  note	  on	  this	  point	  
stating	  ‘everything	  in	  life	  is	  susceptible	  of	  improvement’	  and	  welcoming	  suggestions	  on	  
how	  to	  better	  deal	  with	  the	  enslaved	  workforce.159	  Such	  statements	  were	  clearly	  
intended	  to	  undercut	  the	  dictatorial	  picture	  of	  the	  board	  painted	  by	  Routh’s	  letters.	  The	  
circular’s	  intention	  was	  to	  present	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  company	  as	  open	  and	  willing	  to	  
accept	  scrutiny.	  
The	  SJDR’s	  commitment	  to	  improvement	  was	  of	  course	  also	  intended	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  
slaves	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  itself.	  Within	  Walker’s	  circular	  (also	  presented	  at	  the	  1851	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meeting)	  and	  the	  annual	  report	  of	  1850	  the	  SJDR	  directors	  firmly	  reasserted	  both	  their	  
opposition	  to	  slavery,	  and	  their	  right	  to	  slave	  labour.	  ‘It	  is	  no	  fault	  of	  the	  Company’s	  
that	  such	  is	  the	  social	  condition	  of	  Brazil’	  claimed	  the	  directors.	  The	  need	  to	  reassert	  
their	  personal	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  does	  show	  that	  the	  SJDR	  did	  feel	  that	  it	  still	  had	  to	  
answer	  abolitionist	  questions.	  However,	  most	  references	  to	  the	  company’s	  slaves	  
appear	  more	  calculated	  to	  qualm	  fears	  about	  management	  of	  the	  mine.	  The	  directors	  
were	  committed	  to:	  
[I]mprove	  the	  moral	  condition	  of	  the	  Negroes;	  they	  provide	  them	  with	  
good	  food,	  good	  clothing,	  and	  other	  comforts;	  they	  encourage	  a	  spirit	  of	  
industry	  amongst	  them,	  by	  dividing	  them	  into	  classes,	  and	  encouraging	  the	  
most	  deserving;	  they	  endeavour	  to	  teach	  them	  the	  difference	  between	  right	  
and	  wrong,	  by	  means	  of	  religion	  and	  instruction	  in	  worship;	  they	  cause	  
their	  children	  to	  be	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  mechanical	  arts.160	  
These	  claims	  were	  in	  many	  ways	  unremarkable	  in	  that	  they	  were	  simple	  reassertions	  
of	  the	  ameliorationist	  representations	  discussed	  in	  sections	  one	  and	  two.	  What	  is	  
notable	  is	  that	  many	  of	  the	  privileges	  extended	  to	  the	  slave	  population,	  such	  as	  gardens	  
and	  livestock,	  were	  motivated	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  for	  more	  efficient	  work.	  When	  proposing	  
such	  measures	  the	  board	  directly	  referenced	  how	  they	  hoped	  to	  follow	  the	  example	  of	  
‘the	  best	  managed	  estates	  in	  the	  West	  Indies’.161	  	  References	  to	  such	  inspirations	  were	  
of	  course	  absent	  from	  company	  publications,	  though	  the	  West	  Indies	  did	  provide	  one	  
useful	  comparison	  point	  for	  the	  SJDR	  as	  the	  gradual	  emancipation	  was	  held	  up	  as	  a	  
positive	  example	  to	  follow.162	  The	  claims	  the	  SJDR	  made	  about	  its	  slave	  workforce	  
should	  be	  read	  in	  light	  of	  their	  need	  to	  maintain	  confidence	  in	  the	  company’s	  long-­‐term	  
profitability.	  Even	  this	  caution	  against	  immediate	  emancipation	  can	  be	  read	  as	  assuring	  
shareholders	  that	  the	  company	  labour	  force	  would	  remain	  intact.	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  Ibid,	  p.	  52.	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  G.	  D.	  Keogh	  to	  C.	  Herring	  Jr.,	  6	  Nov	  1844,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  LB4.	  
162	  ‘SJDR	  Circular’,	  1850,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  Box	  134/F1,	  p.	  53.	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Thomas	  Walker’s	  inquiry	  and	  the	  general	  meetings	  are	  most	  usefully	  understood	  as	  
attempts	  by	  the	  board	  to	  limit	  criticism.	  Company	  publications	  were	  obviously	  
intended	  to	  reassure	  shareholders,	  but	  the	  problem	  of	  negative	  press	  coverage	  
remained.	  One	  potential	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  was	  recourse	  to	  law.	  After	  William	  
Routh’s	  aired	  his	  public	  spat	  with	  the	  board	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  began	  to	  garner	  wider	  
publicity	  including	  articles	  in	  the	  Liverpool	  Mercury	  and	  The	  Observer.	  The	  latter	  called	  
for	  ‘the	  powers	  of	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  machinery	  of	  the	  law’	  to	  take	  action	  against	  
the	  company	  and	  accused	  the	  directors	  of	  ‘base	  hypocrisy’.163	  The	  directors	  appeared	  
to	  have	  bristled	  at	  these	  accusations	  and	  following	  an	  unfruitful	  correspondence	  with	  
the	  paper’s	  editor	  they	  moved	  towards	  legal	  action.	  The	  SJDR	  counsel	  recommended	  
bringing	  a	  libel	  suit	  against	  The	  Observer	  to	  tackle	  the	  ‘calumnious	  assertions’	  made	  
against	  the	  company.164	  Nineteenth-­‐century	  libel	  laws	  were	  famously	  draconian.	  Taylor	  
notes	  those	  found	  guilty	  of	  libel	  could	  face	  up	  to	  two	  years	  imprisonment.165	  The	  SJDR’s	  
response	  to	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  then	  combined	  a	  performance	  of	  openness	  for	  
shareholders	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  silence	  external	  critics.	  
The	  mortality	  crisis	  was	  a	  challenge	  that	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  SJDR	  effectively	  met.	  
Although	  abolitionist	  critiques	  continued	  throughout	  1850	  coverage	  in	  the	  financial	  
press	  fizzled	  out.	  William	  Routh	  appears	  to	  have	  left	  the	  company	  following	  his	  clash	  
with	  the	  board,	  silencing	  the	  company’s	  major	  internal	  critic.	  Thomas	  Walker	  having	  
provided	  the	  valuable	  service	  of	  reassuring	  shareholders,	  would	  return	  to	  Morro	  Velho	  
and	  be	  appointed	  superintendent	  in	  1855.166	  In	  the	  decades	  that	  followed	  a	  decreasing	  
amount	  of	  attention	  was	  paid	  within	  the	  company’s	  annual	  reports	  to	  the	  company’s	  
slave	  population.	  From	  the	  1850s	  onwards	  discussion	  was	  increasingly	  relegated	  to	  
appendices	  and	  medical	  statistics.	  This	  was	  consistent	  with	  a	  shift	  to	  greater	  secrecy	  at	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  The	  Observer,	  21	  Oct	  1849.	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  ‘Minute	  Book	  No.	  2’,	  9	  Nov	  1849,	  SJDR,	  BLUT.	  
165	  Taylor,	  ‘Privacy,	  Publicity,	  and	  Reputation’,	  p.	  693.	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  SJDR,	  AR	  1855,	  SJDR,	  BLUT:	  p.	  55.	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general	  meetings	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  companies.167	  For	  many	  companies	  this	  was	  a	  result	  of	  
not	  wanting	  to	  risk	  losing	  competitive	  advantage	  and	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  the	  
company’s	  slaves	  from	  the	  1850s	  onwards	  perhaps	  indicated	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  
damage	  the	  issue	  could	  cause	  the	  company.	  
Life	  and	  work	  at	  Morro	  Velho	  were	  a	  key	  point	  of	  contention	  throughout	  the	  mortality	  
crisis.	  Childs	  has	  used	  the	  texts	  generated	  in	  the	  controversy,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  
accounts,	  to	  paint	  a	  compelling	  picture	  of	  the	  slave	  experience	  at	  the	  mine.	  Here	  I	  have	  
contextualised	  this	  picture	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  company	  accounts	  of	  life	  at	  the	  mine	  
were	  prompted	  not	  by	  abolitionists,	  but	  by	  shareholders	  and	  potential	  investors.	  As	  
such	  they	  should	  be	  read	  as	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  and	  inspire	  economic	  confidence	  in	  
the	  company’s	  directors.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  I	  have	  explored	  how	  the	  mortality	  crisis	  
revealed	  an	  intriguing	  brand	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  critique	  where	  investors	  focused	  on	  
slavery	  as	  a	  means	  of	  giving	  their	  anxieties	  over	  company	  management	  a	  moral	  edge.	  
Conclusion	  
The	  above	  case	  studies	  in	  sections	  two	  and	  three,	  could	  not	  have	  occurred	  without	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  Britain	  culturally	  and	  politically	  committed	  to	  anti-­‐slavery.	  However,	  none	  
of	  these	  cases	  saw	  the	  impetus	  come	  solely	  from	  abolitionists.	  Instead	  anti-­‐slavery	  
language	  and	  ideas	  could	  be	  utilised	  by	  other	  actors	  to	  complement	  non-­‐humanitarian	  
priorities.	  This	  chapter	  in	  particular	  has	  focused	  on	  how	  the	  various	  participants	  in	  the	  
joint-­‐stock	  economy,	  whether	  they	  be	  shareholders,	  directors	  or	  the	  press	  utilised	  
slavery.	  Debates	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  slave-­‐ownership	  or	  the	  treatment	  of	  slaves	  
often	  cloaked	  anxieties	  over	  company	  management	  and	  future	  profitability.	  The	  
blending	  of	  economic	  and	  moral	  concerns	  within	  debates	  over	  corporate	  slave-­‐
ownership	  provides	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  historically	  contingent	  nature	  of	  economic	  
decisions.	  Company	  directors	  had	  to	  establish	  their	  reputation	  as	  reliable	  managers	  of	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  Freeman,	  Pearson,	  Taylor,	  Shareholder	  Democracies,	  p.	  239.	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other	  people’s	  investments	  and	  this	  required	  constant	  demonstration	  that	  they	  were	  
knowledgeable	  about	  what	  was	  happening	  at	  the	  mines.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  critiques	  could	  
and	  did	  translate	  into	  questions	  about	  the	  economic	  competency	  of	  those	  in	  charge.	  
These	  concerns	  were	  often	  expressed	  in	  spatialised	  terms	  as	  both	  shareholders	  and	  the	  
financial	  press	  identified	  the	  difficulty	  of	  acquiring	  accurate	  information	  about	  mining	  
overseas.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  SJDR	  and	  IBMA	  the	  ability	  to	  answer	  questions	  over	  slavery	  was	  part	  
and	  parcel	  of	  the	  broader	  process	  of	  legitimising	  the	  companies.	  This	  may	  also	  go	  some	  
way	  to	  explaining	  the	  seemingly	  uneven	  nature	  of	  abolitionist	  attention.	  This	  can	  be	  
best	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  brief	  consideration	  of	  Cuban	  copper	  mines.	  The	  presence	  of	  
British-­‐owned	  mines	  in	  Cuba	  was	  well	  known	  to	  abolitionists	  and	  had	  been	  addressed	  
within	  David	  Turnbull’s	  Travels	  in	  the	  West,	  which	  recounted	  a	  visit	  to	  a	  copper	  mine	  
operated	  by	  British	  vice-­‐consul	  John	  Hardy	  Jr.168	  This	  mine	  located	  at	  El	  Cobre	  
belonged	  to	  the	  Company	  of	  Proprietors	  of	  the	  Royal	  Copper	  Mines	  of	  Cobre,	  which	  had	  
been	  founded	  by	  Hardy	  in	  1830	  and	  floated	  on	  the	  London	  stock	  exchange	  in	  1835.	  As	  
Chris	  Evans	  notes	  the	  Cobre	  Company	  offered	  12,000	  shares	  on	  the	  stock	  exchange	  
more	  than	  half	  of	  which	  were	  owned	  by	  Charles	  Pascoe	  Grenfell.	  169	  In	  1836	  another	  
copper	  company,	  the	  Royal	  Santiago	  Mining	  Company,	  was	  formed	  with	  Isaac	  Goldsmid	  
of	  the	  IBMA	  listed	  among	  the	  company	  directors.	  Both	  companies	  relied	  upon	  large	  
unfree	  workforces	  to	  function.	  There	  were	  nearly	  500	  enslaved	  workers	  at	  El	  Cobre	  
and	  an	  1841	  census	  counted	  249	  slaves	  at	  the	  Royal	  Santiago	  mine.170	  As	  such	  both	  
mines	  were	  comparable	  in	  size	  to	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR.	  	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  companies	  were	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  gold	  
mining	  ventures	  they	  failed	  to	  attract	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  scrutiny.	  Sadly,	  
only	  a	  single	  annual	  report	  is	  extant	  for	  the	  Cobre	  Company	  and	  the	  Royal	  Santiago	  has	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  Travels	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  C.	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  ‘El	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  114-­‐116.	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left	  even	  less	  evidence	  behind.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  gauge	  how	  either	  company	  
discussed	  their	  unfree	  workforce	  with	  shareholders.171	  However,	  reports	  of	  company	  
meetings	  within	  the	  Mining	  Journal	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  indicate	  that	  slavery	  was	  a	  regular	  
discussion.	  The	  greatest	  scrutiny	  of	  these	  mining	  ventures	  appears	  to	  have	  come	  from	  
the	  Foreign	  Office	  and	  John	  Hardy	  jr.	  was	  forced	  to	  explain	  his	  use	  of	  slave	  labour	  to	  
Palmerston	  in	  1836.	  His	  justification,	  like	  many	  other	  slave-­‐owners,	  rested	  upon	  the	  
paucity	  of	  free	  labour	  within	  the	  region	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  slaves	  acquired	  through	  debt	  
repayments	  rather	  than	  the	  slave	  trade.172	  Unlike	  the	  IBMA	  or	  SJDR	  Cuban	  companies	  
appeared	  to	  lack	  shareholders	  willing	  to	  utilise	  a	  language	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  pursuit	  of	  
company	  reform.	  As	  Evans	  pointed	  out	  the	  Cobre	  Company	  rather	  than	  protesting	  the	  
1843	  Act	  registered	  the	  slaves	  under	  the	  name	  of	  a	  Cuban	  employee	  before	  “renting”	  
them	  back,	  as	  such	  they	  were	  not	  required	  to	  publicly	  legitimise	  slave-­‐ownership	  to	  the	  
same	  degree.173	  
The	  Cuban	  mines,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Brazilian	  ventures,	  appear	  to	  have	  lacked	  
shareholders,	  or	  other	  parties,	  willing	  to	  use	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  a	  means	  to	  air	  their	  
discontent.	  The	  emancipation	  and	  mortality	  crises	  faced	  by	  these	  companies	  then	  
demonstrate	  how	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  reconfigured	  by	  joint-­‐stock	  politics.	  Slave	  labour	  
became	  more	  a	  question	  of	  profit	  and	  directorial	  accountability	  than	  of	  morality.	  
Defences	  of	  slavery	  shifted	  as	  well.	  The	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  justified	  their	  reliance	  on	  slave	  
labour	  through	  a	  rhetoric	  that	  echoed	  ameliorationist	  writings	  of	  the	  pre-­‐emancipation	  
period.	  Both	  critiques	  and	  defences	  of	  slave	  labour	  in	  this	  context	  ultimately	  revolved	  
around	  issues	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  economy	  such	  as	  efficiency,	  accountability,	  and	  
publicity.	  By	  viewing	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  the	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  through	  the	  
lens	  of	  joint-­‐stock	  politics	  I	  have	  complicated	  the	  traditional	  view	  of	  these	  companies’	  
relationship	  to	  the	  metropole.	  The	  IBMA	  and	  SJDR	  were	  less	  forced	  to	  recognise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Royal	  Copper	  Mines	  of	  Cobre	  Association,	  Annual	  Reports,	  British	  Library,	  1890.e.1.105.	  
172	  John	  Hardy	  Jr.	  to	  Palmerston,	  27	  Dec	  1836,	  TNA:	  FO	  84-­‐201;	  Evans,	  ‘El	  Cobre’,	  p.	  122.	  
173	  Evans,	  ‘El	  Cobre’,	  p.	  124.	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abolitionist	  pressure	  than	  held	  to	  account	  by	  stakeholders	  who	  expressed	  economic	  
concerns	  through	  a	  language	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  As	  long	  as	  these	  concerns	  could	  be	  met	  
then	  reliance	  on	  bonded	  labour,	  and	  therefore	  British	  slave-­‐ownership,	  could	  be	  





British	  involvement	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  definitively	  
ceasing	  with,	  as	  Thomas	  Clarkson	  had	  called	  for	  at	  the	  1840	  Convention,	  ‘extirpation	  of	  
slavery	  from	  the	  whole	  [or	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Atlantic]	  world.’1	  Chattel	  slavery	  in	  the	  
Americas	  ended	  with	  the	  Brazilian	  emancipation	  of	  1888,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  most	  
prominent	  British	  slave-­‐owner	  in	  that	  country,	  the	  St.	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company,	  
successfully	  transitioned	  to	  use	  of	  a	  free	  labour	  workforce.2	  That	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  survived	  this	  long,	  far	  outlasting	  the	  initial	  outrage	  over	  British	  complicity	  
in	  the	  1840s,	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  success	  of	  capitalists	  in	  reconciling	  profits	  from	  the	  
transatlantic	  slave	  system	  and	  anti-­‐slavery	  ideology.	  In	  1840	  abolitionists	  appeared	  
unanimous	  in	  their	  belief	  that	  publicity	  and	  moral	  suasion	  would	  provide	  a	  solution	  to	  
the	  problem	  of	  British	  involvement	  in	  slavery.	  As	  this	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  this	  
proved	  to	  be	  far	  from	  the	  case.	  In	  this	  conclusion,	  I	  comprehensively	  analyse	  how	  
British	  capitalists	  consistently	  rebuffed	  critiques	  and	  defended	  their	  right	  to	  deal	  with	  
slave	  traders	  or	  own	  other	  human	  beings.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  stress	  the	  continuities	  in	  both	  
rhetoric	  and	  ideas	  from	  the	  earlier	  struggle	  over	  slavery	  in	  the	  British	  Caribbean.	  
Finally,	  I	  briefly	  discuss	  an	  early	  twentieth	  century	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  British	  
firm	  Cadbury	  Brothers	  and	  cocoa	  production	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  colony	  of	  São	  Tomé	  and	  
Principe.	  I	  highlight	  further	  continuities	  in	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  British	  capital	  
and	  unfree	  labour	  was	  understood,	  but	  also	  demonstrate	  a	  key	  shift	  in	  the	  geographic	  
understanding	  of	  slavery.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  thesis,	  then,	  complicates	  our	  understanding	  
of	  Victorian	  Britain	  as	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  nation.	  	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  saw	  the	  slave	  systems	  of	  the	  new	  world	  
dismantled.	  A	  discussion	  of	  the	  how	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  and	  various	  internal	  
slaveries	  of	  the	  Americas	  ended	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  recap	  of	  how	  the	  various	  iterations	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  BFASS,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  General	  Anti-­‐Slavery	  Convention,	  p.	  3.	  [Italics	  in	  original]	  
2	  Marshall	  Eakin	  has	  argued	  a	  working-­‐class	  community	  emerged	  at	  the	  mine	  in	  the	  decades	  
after	  slavery.	  Eakin,	  British	  Enterprise,	  pp.	  212-­‐218.	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the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  were	  resolved.	  For	  example	  my	  first	  chapter	  surveyed	  the	  
historiography	  surrounding	  British	  consumption	  of	  slave	  produce	  specifically	  sugar,	  
copper,	  and	  cotton.	  That	  chapter	  demonstrated	  the	  essentially	  heterogeneous	  
character	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  rhetoric	  and	  action	  in	  Britain,	  including	  that	  the	  purchase	  and	  
consumption	  of	  slave	  products	  could	  be	  reconciled	  with	  a	  professed	  opposition	  to	  
slavery.	  Much	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  these	  commodities	  revolved	  around	  whether	  the	  
British	  state,	  consumers,	  or	  capitalists	  should	  be	  held	  to	  moral	  account.	  The	  adoption	  
of	  free	  trade	  and	  continued	  commitment	  to	  naval	  suppression	  equated	  to	  a	  consensus	  
that	  the	  British	  state	  should	  police	  the	  slave	  trade,	  but	  not	  the	  internal	  slaveries	  of	  
other	  societies.	  Consumers	  were	  viewed	  as	  exercising	  personal	  choice	  that	  had	  little	  
effect	  on	  the	  national	  character.	  Capitalists	  might	  be	  conceived	  as	  bound	  to	  slave	  
produce	  until	  the	  emergence	  of	  viable	  “free”	  labour	  alternatives.	  This	  process	  often	  
corresponded	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  slave	  labour	  in	  the	  producer	  society,	  for	  example	  the	  
disruption	  to	  Southern	  cotton	  production	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  American	  Civil	  War..	  
The	  role	  of	  British	  capitalists	  in	  supplying	  slave	  traders	  came	  under	  greater	  scrutiny	  
than	  their	  purchase	  of	  slave	  produced	  goods.	  This	  was,	  as	  argued	  in	  my	  second	  chapter,	  
due	  to	  both	  government	  officials	  and	  abolitionists	  conceptualising	  economic	  ties	  to	  
slave	  traders	  as	  practically	  undermining	  the	  British	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  ending	  the	  
slave	  trade.	  The	  converging	  movements	  of	  British	  merchants,	  foreign	  slave	  traders,	  and	  
the	  Royal	  Navy	  provided	  the	  material	  basis	  for	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  Britain’s	  
West	  African	  commerce.	  Whilst	  critics	  of	  merchants	  attempted	  to	  demarcate	  certain	  
sections	  of	  the	  West	  African	  littoral	  as	  off	  limits	  men	  like	  Matthew	  Forster	  maintained	  
that	  their	  commercial	  activity	  was	  the	  best	  weapon	  against	  the	  slave	  trade.	  The	  
problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  in	  this	  context	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  British	  
manufactures	  to	  both	  the	  slave	  and	  palm	  oil	  trades,	  which	  relied	  on	  the	  same	  African	  
brokers.	  In	  the	  short	  term	  West	  Africa	  merchants	  defended	  their	  commercial	  activity	  
despite	  Colonial	  Office	  scepticism.	  In	  the	  long	  term	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  solved	  as	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technological	  advances,	  specifically	  steam	  power,	  saw	  older	  firms	  supplanted	  by	  new	  
companies	  less	  tainted	  by	  links	  to	  the	  era	  of	  the	  legal	  slave	  trade.	  3	  
Debates	  over	  British	  manufactures	  were	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  struggle	  to	  define	  legitimate	  
commerce	  in	  the	  post-­‐abolition	  era.	  As	  discussed	  in	  my	  third	  chapter,	  the	  idea	  of	  
legitimacy	  and	  legality	  of	  British	  commercial	  activity	  in	  Cuba,	  Brazil,	  and	  West	  Africa	  
was	  far	  from	  a	  given.	  The	  role	  of	  British	  capital	  was	  in	  fact	  highly	  ambivalent.	  It	  could	  
be	  cast	  as	  consistent	  with,	  or	  contrary	  to,	  the	  campaign	  against	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Various	  
merchants	  operating	  across	  these	  societies	  succeeded	  in	  limiting	  their	  personal	  
responsibility	  for	  links	  to	  slave	  traders,	  often	  by	  playing	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  these	  
links	  were	  inevitable.	  Secondly,	  they	  maintained	  that	  interference	  with	  their	  economic	  
activity	  was	  irrational.	  This	  argument	  rested	  upon	  the	  equation	  of	  individual	  
merchants’	  prosperity	  with	  the	  success	  of	  Britain	  as	  a	  whole.	  Merchants	  were	  able	  to	  
construct	  a	  favourable	  interpretation	  of	  what	  counted	  as	  legitimate	  commerce.	  From	  
this	  perspective	  British	  capital’s	  role	  in	  the	  slave	  trade	  became	  unproblematic,	  
particularly	  as	  the	  British	  state’s	  focus	  switched	  to	  gaining	  compliance	  in	  abolition	  
from	  the	  Cuban	  and	  Brazilian	  governments.	  	  
The	  Brazilian	  trade	  ended	  following	  a	  British	  naval	  blockade	  of	  Rio,	  this	  approach	  to	  
suppression	  saw	  the	  government	  substitute	  moralising	  for	  militancy	  and	  concerns	  over	  
British	  complicity	  somewhat	  swept	  aside.	  In	  Cuba	  the	  slave	  trade	  would	  continue	  well	  
into	  the	  1860s	  and	  the	  final	  decade	  saw	  huge	  increases	  in	  the	  number	  of	  enslaved	  
Africans	  brought	  to	  the	  country.	  British	  capital	  certainly	  played	  a	  role	  in	  this	  process.	  It	  
seems	  very	  likely	  that	  British	  merchants	  continued	  to	  supply	  credit	  and	  manufactures,	  
but	  British	  capital	  also	  lay	  behind	  technological	  advances	  such	  as	  steamships	  that	  
allowed	  Cuban	  vessels	  to	  outstrip	  the	  suppression	  squadron.4	  At	  least	  some	  Britons	  
were	  profiting	  from	  the	  Cuban	  traffic	  until	  a	  combination	  of	  increased	  naval	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Lynn,	  Commerce	  and	  Economic	  Change,	  p.	  115,	  pp.	  128-­‐150.	  
4	  Murray,	  Odious	  Commerce,	  p.	  298.	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suppression,	  a	  diplomatic	  climate	  created	  by	  the	  American	  Civil	  war,	  and	  political	  
instability	  within	  the	  island	  saw	  the	  illicit	  trade	  die	  down	  by	  1867.	  	  	  
For	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  involvement	  with	  slavery	  ended	  through	  financial	  failure	  or	  
emancipation.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four	  British	  capital	  played	  a	  role	  in	  several	  of	  the	  
New	  World	  emancipations.	  Unsurprisingly,	  most	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  favoured	  a	  
compensated	  emancipation	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  apprenticeship,	  as	  had	  been	  the	  
case	  in	  the	  British	  West	  Indies.	  Slave-­‐owners	  based	  both	  in	  Britain	  and	  overseas	  played	  
a	  role	  in	  securing	  this	  form	  of	  emancipation	  in	  the	  Dutch	  context	  when	  a	  compensation	  
settlement	  was	  finally	  agreed	  in	  1863.5	  Similarly,	  Britons	  were	  among	  those	  slave-­‐
owners	  who	  violently	  re-­‐imposed	  bondage,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  apprenticeship,	  on	  the	  
former	  St.	  Croix	  slaves	  who	  had	  seized	  their	  freedom	  in	  1848.	  This	  recognition	  of	  
property	  rights	  in	  man	  combined	  with	  an	  attempt	  to	  bind	  black	  labourers	  to	  their	  
former	  masters	  can	  be	  partially	  understood	  as	  a	  legacy	  of	  British	  Emancipation.	  These	  
arguments	  for	  compensation	  can	  be	  read	  alongside	  a	  wider	  effort	  from	  different	  types	  
of	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  to	  try	  and	  legitimise	  their	  slave	  property	  in	  response	  to	  
Brougham’s	  1843	  Act.	  Key	  to	  this	  process	  was	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  reposition	  slave-­‐
ownership	  as	  ownership	  of	  land,	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  property	  which	  unfortunately	  
happened	  to	  have	  enslaved	  people	  attached	  to	  them.	  Various	  British	  slave-­‐owners	  
were	  able	  to	  win	  a	  begrudging	  acceptance	  of	  their	  extant	  slave	  property,	  whilst	  
dismissing	  any	  suggestion	  of	  links	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  
British	  banks	  who	  mortgaged	  slave	  property	  did	  not	  win	  as	  clear	  a	  recognition	  of	  their	  
property	  rights	  as	  other	  slave-­‐owners.	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  key	  role	  played	  by	  Barings	  
Bank	  in	  organising	  parliamentary	  opposition	  to	  Brougham’s	  Bill.	  Their	  response	  to	  
doubts	  over	  the	  legality	  of	  slave	  mortgages	  was	  to	  avoid	  publicity	  of	  their	  slave-­‐
ownership.	  Whilst	  Barings	  did	  sell	  off	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  plantations	  they	  mortgaged	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  Dutch	  emancipation	  see	  C.	  Goslinga,	  The	  Dutch,	  pp.	  387-­‐313.	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is	  not	  inconceivable	  that	  they	  and	  other	  Britons	  involved	  in	  Cuban	  slavery	  maintained	  
their	  property	  until	  the	  emancipation	  legislation	  of	  1884.	  	  The	  ‘gradual,	  tortuous	  
process’	  of	  ending	  slavery	  in	  Cuba	  demonstrates	  both	  the	  economic	  vitality	  and	  
ideological	  power	  of	  slave-­‐owning	  interests	  well	  into	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.6	  	  
Cuban	  slavery	  finally	  ended	  amidst	  republican	  resistance	  to	  Spanish	  rule	  and	  political	  
upheaval	  with	  the	  final	  emancipation	  legislation	  passed	  in	  1884.7	  
My	  final	  chapter	  explored	  British	  investment	  in	  the	  last	  New	  World	  slave	  economy.	  My	  
analysis	  of	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  the	  St.	  John	  d’El	  Rey	  Mining	  Company	  and	  Imperial	  
Brazilian	  Mining	  Association	  demonstrated	  that	  debates	  over	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐
slavery	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  British	  state,	  but	  might	  also	  take	  place	  within	  
companies	  themselves.	  Shareholders	  and	  the	  financial	  press	  gave	  expression	  to	  a	  form	  
of	  anti-­‐slavery	  that	  mingled	  with	  the	  anxieties	  of	  the	  nascent	  joint-­‐stock	  economy.	  This	  
further	  attests	  to	  the	  heterogeneous	  nature	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  sentiment.	  Whilst	  
both	  companies	  succeeded	  in	  legitimising	  their	  reliance	  on	  slave	  labour	  to	  an	  audience	  
of	  metropolitan	  investors	  it	  was	  a	  Brazilian	  audience	  who	  proved	  most	  troubling	  to	  the	  
SJDR.	  In	  1879	  Joquim	  Nabuco	  made	  explicit	  use	  of	  the	  company’s	  British	  ownership	  as	  
a	  means	  of	  launching	  a	  serious	  political	  abolitionism	  within	  Brazil.	  The	  company’s	  
foreign	  ownership,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  involvement	  in	  mining	  rather	  than	  the	  coffee	  
production,	  allowed	  for	  an	  abolitionist	  critique	  that	  would	  not	  be	  opposed	  by	  other	  
Brazilian	  slave-­‐owners.	  Nabuco’s	  attack	  on	  the	  SJDR	  was	  the	  first	  step	  in	  securing	  the	  
wider	  political	  isolation	  of	  Brazilian	  slave-­‐owners	  that	  would	  conclude	  with	  the	  Golden	  
Law	  of	  1888.8	  From	  this	  point	  forward	  anti-­‐slavery	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  problem	  that	  
British	  capitalists	  in	  the	  Americas	  would	  have	  to	  contend	  with.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  C.	  Nowara-­‐Schmidt,	  Freedom	  and	  Abolition	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Atlantic	  World	  
(Albuquerque:	  University	  of	  New	  Mexico	  Press,	  2011).	  
7	  Knight,	  Slave	  Society	  in	  Cuba,	  pp.	  154-­‐178.	  
8	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Brazilian	  abolition	  see	  R.	  E.	  Conrad,	  The	  Destruction	  of	  Brazilian	  Slavery,	  
1850-­‐1888	  (Malabar:	  Krieger,	  1993).	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British	  involvement	  with	  transatlantic	  slavery	  was	  both	  diverse	  and	  resilient.	  Despite	  
the	  variety	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  British	  capital	  and	  slavery	  were	  entangled	  I	  believe	  that	  
three	  interconnected	  themes	  emerge	  from	  the	  attempts	  to	  legitimise	  these	  economic	  
connections.	  Firstly,	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  economic	  activity	  or	  negate	  property	  rights	  
relating	  to	  slavery	  were	  represented	  as	  economically	  irrational.	  Secondly,	  British	  
capitalists	  rejected	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  slavery	  whilst	  representing	  themselves	  as	  
morally	  superior	  to	  both	  enslaved	  people	  and	  foreign	  slave-­‐owners.	  Finally,	  these	  
arguments	  can	  be	  understood	  within	  a	  longer	  tradition	  of	  rationalising	  profiting	  from	  
coerced	  labour	  and	  associated	  practices.	  Specifically,	  expressions	  of	  British	  anti-­‐slavery	  
ideology	  after	  1833	  echoed	  many	  of	  the	  assumptions	  of	  slavery	  apologists	  in	  the	  earlier	  
period.	  I	  will	  now	  expand	  upon	  these	  three	  themes	  and	  what	  they	  reveal	  about	  the	  
relationship	  between	  capitalism	  and	  anti-­‐slavery.	  
The	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery,	  as	  proposed	  in	  my	  introduction,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  
having	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  economic	  connections	  to	  slave	  societies	  in	  light	  of	  an	  
ideological	  opposition	  to	  human	  bondage.	  The	  majority	  of	  capitalists	  discussed	  in	  this	  
thesis	  argued	  that	  reliance	  on	  slave	  labour	  or	  dealing	  with	  slave	  traders	  was	  inevitable.	  
This	  defence	  of	  necessity	  was	  not	  meant	  to	  win	  over	  hard-­‐line	  abolitionists	  like	  Richard	  
Madden	  or	  David	  Turnbull.	  Instead	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  convince	  the	  Victorian	  state,	  
which	  through	  guaranteeing	  property	  was	  ‘was	  imbricated	  through	  all	  economic	  
relationships.’9	  In	  doing	  so	  West	  African	  merchants,	  Brazilian	  mining	  company	  
directors,	  and	  Caribbean	  plantation	  owners	  appeared	  to	  maintain	  that	  their	  
involvement	  with	  transatlantic	  slavery	  was	  the	  result	  of	  amoral	  market	  relations.	  
However,	  these	  claims,	  which	  depicted	  critics	  as	  economically	  irrational	  also	  attempted	  
to	  align	  sectional	  interests	  with	  that	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  was	  the	  logic	  that	  lay	  
behind	  Pedro	  Zulueta’s	  claims	  that	  his	  arrest	  threatened	  all	  British	  commerce,	  or	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  P.	  Johnson,	  Making	  the	  Market:	  Victorian	  Origins	  of	  Corporate	  Capitalism	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  17.	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similar	  claims	  made	  by	  partners	  in	  Barings.	  Whilst	  these	  arguments	  where	  pitched	  in	  
terms	  of	  property	  rights	  or	  economic	  rationality	  they	  clearly	  rested	  upon	  cultural	  
assumptions	  related	  to	  Britain’s	  anti-­‐slavery	  self-­‐image.	  
When	  merchants,	  bankers,	  and,	  company	  directors	  asserted	  their	  economic	  behaviour	  
was	  rational,	  or	  even	  inevitable,	  they	  also	  made	  both	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  moral	  claims.	  
As	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  throughout	  these	  moral-­‐political	  claims	  often	  related	  to	  how	  
the	  economic	  activity	  of	  British	  subjects	  across	  a	  number	  of	  different	  sites	  advanced	  
the	  cause	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  civilization.	  Such	  a	  perspective	  required	  British	  capitalists	  
to	  define	  themselves	  against	  a	  series	  of	  foreign	  others.	  One	  might	  compare	  this	  process	  
to	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre’s	  comment	  that	  European	  colonialism	  rested	  upon	  “creating	  slaves	  
and	  monsters.”10	  	  British	  capitalists	  projected	  an	  image	  of	  various	  foreign	  slave	  traders,	  
slave-­‐owners,	  and	  slaves	  who	  were	  to	  different	  degrees	  deficient	  in	  civilization.	  Of	  
course	  many	  Brazilian	  slave-­‐owners	  or	  Cuban	  slave	  traders	  were	  indeed	  monstrous.	  
Yet,	  whether	  they	  were	  any	  more	  monstrous	  than	  their	  British	  counterparts	  is	  
debatable.	  This	  imagined	  geography	  allowed	  British	  subjects	  to	  represent	  capitalism’s	  
relationship	  with	  slavery	  as	  at	  once	  inevitable,	  but	  also	  working	  towards	  a	  positive	  end.	  
These	  assumptions	  underpinned	  discussion	  of	  property	  rights	  or	  economic	  rationality.	  
Both	  themes	  discussed	  above	  should	  be	  considered	  within	  the	  longer	  tradition	  of	  
British	  debates	  around	  slavery.	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  indicated	  continuities	  in	  
rhetoric	  and	  practices	  that	  had	  been	  arraigned	  against	  both	  British	  abolition	  and	  
emancipation.	  As	  Swaminathan	  has	  argued,	  debates	  over	  the	  slave	  trade	  had	  also	  been	  
a	  contest	  over	  British	  identity,	  and	  this	  process	  continued.	  Prior	  to	  1807,	  Britons	  
involved	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  had	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  ‘commercially	  savvy,	  
“white”	  Briton	  poised	  to	  outstrip	  other	  European	  powers	  in	  trade.’11	  This	  
representation	  was	  maintained	  alongside	  a	  belief	  that	  British	  capitalists,	  particularly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Quoted	  in	  Hall,	  Civilising	  Subjects,	  p.	  14,	  fn.	  32.	  	  
11	  Swaminathan,	  Debating	  the	  Slave	  Trade,	  p.	  129.	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those	  in	  West	  Africa,	  acted	  as	  agents	  of	  civilization.	  Many	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  had	  
previously	  been	  aired	  in	  defence	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery	  were	  redeployed	  as	  forms	  of	  
anti-­‐slavery.	  That	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  IBMA	  could	  position	  themselves	  as	  opponents	  of	  
slavery	  with	  any	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  speaks	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  as	  an	  
ideology.	  Whilst	  the	  BFASS	  or	  government	  officials	  contested	  these	  claims	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  not	  a	  normative	  concept.	  Instead	  measures	  taken	  to	  oppose	  
slavery	  or	  the	  slave	  trade	  often	  boiled	  down	  to	  a	  compromise	  between	  the	  divergent	  
perspectives	  of	  abolitionists,	  capitalists,	  and	  government.	  
The	  legacy	  of	  the	  West	  Indian	  Emancipation	  settlement	  loomed	  large	  over	  many	  of	  the	  
case	  studies	  discussed	  within	  this	  thesis.	  Its	  simultaneous	  moral	  condemnation	  of	  
slavery	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  property	  rights	  re-­‐occurred	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  
contexts.	  Most	  prominently	  the	  Dutch	  and	  Danish	  West	  Indies	  were	  British	  slave-­‐
owners	  actively	  campaigned	  for	  a	  gradualist	  compensated	  emancipation.	  Eric	  
Hobsbawm	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘progress’	  was	  the	  central	  idea	  of	  the	  age	  of	  capital	  
describing	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  upheavals	  of	  the	  period	  as	  the	  ‘drama	  of	  progress’.12	  
However,	  many	  Victorians	  hoped	  that	  progress	  would	  not	  be	  so	  dramatic.	  West	  Indian	  
emancipation	  had	  a	  broader	  legacy	  as	  it	  conformed	  to	  a	  widespread	  belief	  within	  
Britain	  in	  a	  stadial	  model	  of	  historical	  development.13	  Such	  a	  perspective	  allowed	  the	  
end	  of	  slavery	  or	  the	  slave	  trade	  to	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  point	  in	  the	  future,	  desirable	  
but	  not	  yet	  achievable.	  British	  commerce	  would	  eventually	  put	  down	  the	  slave	  trade.	  A	  
British	  slave-­‐owner	  would	  bestow	  freedom	  upon	  the	  rising	  generation.	  This	  view	  of	  
historical	  development	  was	  seen	  by	  many	  as	  consistent	  with	  opposition	  to	  slavery.	  As	  
we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  SJDR	  this	  future	  remained	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  many	  slaves	  
until	  the	  question	  of	  freedom	  was	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  company’s	  hands.	  As	  David	  Brion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Hobsbawm,	  Age	  of	  Capital,	  p.	  4.	  
13	  Qureshi,	  Peoples	  on	  Parade,	  p.	  189;	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  pp.	  85-­‐88.	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Davis	  has	  noted,	  certain	  forms	  of	  “progress”	  could,	  and	  did,	  prove	  an	  obstacle	  to	  
emancipation.14	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  what	  happened	  once	  the	  various	  New	  World	  abolitions	  
and	  emancipations	  provided	  a	  definitive	  solution	  for	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery.	  After	  
1888,	  no	  British	  capital	  could	  find	  its	  way	  into	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  system,	  but	  new	  
entanglements	  emerged.	  Abolitionists	  within	  Britain	  had	  become	  increasingly	  focused	  
on	  East	  Africa	  from	  the	  late	  1860s.	  Much	  of	  this	  attention	  was	  garnered	  through	  the	  
missionary	  work	  and	  publicity	  efforts	  of	  David	  Livingstone,	  who	  argued	  that	  the	  slave	  
trade	  between	  Zanzibar	  and	  Arab	  states	  needed	  to	  be	  tackled	  just	  as	  the	  European	  
slave	  trade	  had	  been.15	  Following	  Livingstone’s	  death	  his	  supporters	  pressured	  a	  
reluctant	  Liberal	  government	  into	  taking	  naval	  action	  against	  the	  Zanzibar	  slave	  
trade.16	  Suppression	  in	  Zanzibar	  proved	  a	  precursor	  to	  an	  increasing	  entanglement	  
between	  anti-­‐slavery	  and	  imperial	  expansion	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  
century.	  The	  commercial	  motivation	  for	  much	  imperial	  expansion	  into	  Central	  and	  East	  
Africa	  was	  grounded	  in	  a	  belief	  that	  ending	  slavery	  would	  ultimately	  result	  in	  material	  
and	  moral	  benefits.	  Richard	  Madden	  and	  Matthew	  Forster	  had	  shared	  this	  same	  
assumption	  of	  the	  ends	  of	  opposing	  slavery,	  even	  if	  they	  disagreed	  over	  the	  means.	  The	  
1880s	  at	  least	  witnessed	  relatively	  broad	  support	  for	  a	  more	  militaristic	  and	  explicitly	  
imperial	  anti-­‐slavery,	  with	  even	  the	  previously	  pacifistic	  BFASS	  seeing	  force	  as	  a	  viable	  
option.17	  Within	  this	  framework	  British	  businesses	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  
promoting	  anti-­‐slavery,	  even	  as	  they	  facilitated	  violence	  against	  various	  African	  
populations.	  
These	  imperial	  developments	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  a	  renewed	  anti-­‐slavery	  debate	  over	  the	  
role	  of	  British	  capital.	  The	  early	  twentieth	  century	  would	  see	  anti-­‐slavery	  attention	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Davis,	  Slavery	  and	  Human	  Progress,	  p.	  154.	  
15	  Temperley,	  British	  Antislavery,	  pp.	  261-­‐264.	  	  
16	  Huzzey,	  Freedom	  Burning,	  pp.	  148-­‐154.	  
17	  Temperley,	  British	  Antislavery,	  p.	  265.	  
275	  
	  
turn	  towards	  what	  Kevin	  Grant	  has	  called	  the	  ‘new	  slaveries	  of	  European	  imperialism	  
in	  Africa’.18	  During	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  European	  powers	  operating	  in	  
Africa	  had	  followed	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  the	  British	  government	  in	  technically	  
outlawing	  slavery	  in	  colonial	  possessions	  but	  de	  facto	  maintaining	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  
bonded	  labour	  within	  those	  societies.19	  The	  maintenance	  of	  older	  forms	  of	  slavery	  and	  
coerced	  labour,	  under	  euphemistic	  terms,	  had	  during	  the	  era	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery	  
allowed	  these	  practices	  to	  escape	  sustained	  critique	  from	  abolitionists	  or	  even	  stand	  in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  particular	  evils	  of	  new-­‐world	  bondage.	  The	  slaveries	  within	  Britain’s	  
African	  protectorates	  were	  dynamic	  institutions	  and	  African	  slave-­‐owners	  often	  
protested	  when	  they	  feared	  colonial	  interference.20	  At	  the	  same	  time	  British	  officials	  
and	  capitalist	  “men	  on	  the	  spot”	  in	  Egypt,	  Sudan,	  and	  Uganda	  did	  face	  abolitionist	  
critique	  for	  use	  of	  slaves	  or	  coerced	  labour	  in	  the	  1870s	  and	  early	  1880s.	  Their	  
response	  was	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  a	  reliance	  on	  slavery	  was	  a	  temporary	  measure	  in	  
line	  with	  advancing	  civilization.21	  These	  arguments	  almost	  certainly	  benefited	  from	  the	  
understanding	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery	  as	  a	  peculiarly	  immoral	  form	  of	  labour	  
exploitation.	  
The	  carving	  up	  of	  African	  territories	  by	  European	  powers	  at	  the	  Berlin	  (1884-­‐85)	  and	  
Brussels	  (1889-­‐90)	  conferences	  had	  been	  predicated	  in	  part	  on	  a	  commitment	  to	  end	  
slavery	  and	  bring	  so-­‐called	  civilization	  to	  Africa.	  The	  1890s	  saw	  missionary	  societies	  
feed	  news	  of	  labour	  abuses	  to	  the	  BFASS	  and	  the	  Aborigines	  Protection	  Society,	  
especially	  with	  regard	  to	  rubber	  production	  in	  the	  Congo	  Free	  State.	  The	  turn	  of	  the	  
century	  saw	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  nationwide	  movement,	  the	  Congo	  Reform	  Association,	  
attacking	  Belgian	  labour	  abuses	  as	  akin	  to	  those	  committed	  during	  the	  era	  of	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  A	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  (London:	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transatlantic	  slavery.22	  This	  campaign	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  late	  Victorian	  
humanitarianism,	  that	  like	  anti-­‐slavery,	  that	  was	  heterogeneous	  in	  nature.	  Grant	  has	  
argued	  that	  this	  humanitarianism	  was	  characterised	  by	  different	  ideological	  strands,	  
specifically	  an	  older	  tradition	  of	  evangelicalism,	  represented	  by	  missionaries,	  and	  a	  
newer	  human	  rights	  based	  discourse	  grounded	  in	  ideas	  of	  property	  and	  cultural	  
relativism.23	  This	  particular	  strand	  of	  humanitarianism	  bears	  a	  striking	  resemblance	  to	  
the	  claims	  made	  by	  Matthew	  Forster	  in	  defence	  of	  his	  West	  African	  commerce.	  
Within	  this	  context,	  British	  capital’s	  global	  reach	  continued	  to	  raise	  moral	  quandaries.	  
From	  around	  1902	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  a	  controversy	  unfolded	  that	  
echoed	  many	  of	  those	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  Once	  again,	  a	  number	  of	  British	  
firms	  who	  placed	  great	  stock	  in	  their	  metropolitan	  respectability	  stood	  accused	  of	  
profiting	  from	  the	  exploitation	  of	  black	  bodies	  overseas.	  Three	  chocolate	  companies,	  
Cadburys,	  Rowntree,	  and	  Fry,	  appeared	  to	  be	  both	  reliant	  on	  unfree	  labour	  and	  
complicit	  in	  the	  transportation	  of	  Africans.24	  Despite	  these	  echoes	  of	  previous	  
controversies	  there	  were	  two	  key	  differences.	  Firstly,	  location	  as	  the	  labourers	  
involved	  found	  themselves	  transported	  within	  Africa,	  from	  the	  Portuguese	  colony	  of	  
Angola	  to	  the	  cocoa	  plantations	  of	  the	  islands	  of	  São	  Tomé	  and	  Principe.	  Secondly,	  the	  
labourers	  involved	  were	  technically	  not	  slaves,	  rather	  they	  were	  serviçaes;	  a	  term	  that	  
roughly	  translated	  as	  contract	  labourer.25	  Yet,	  as	  one	  British	  observer	  noted,	  “if	  this	  is	  
not	  slavery,	  I	  know	  of	  no	  word	  in	  the	  English	  language	  which	  currently	  characterizes	  
it.”26	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  Clarence-­‐Smith,	  Slaves,	  Peasants	  and	  Capitalists	  
in	  Southern	  Angola,	  1840-­‐1926	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1979).	  
26	  Joseph	  Burt	  quoted	  in	  Satre,	  Chocolate	  on	  Trial,	  p.	  73.	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The	  ability	  of	  Britons	  to	  move	  past	  a	  strict	  binary	  of	  slave/free	  labour	  spoke	  to	  shifts	  in	  
political	  and	  imagined	  geographies.	  After	  1888	  the	  British	  Empire	  could	  not	  be	  
perceived	  as	  the	  only	  area	  definitively	  free	  of	  chattel	  slavery.	  However,	  the	  controversy	  
echoed	  many	  of	  those	  of	  the	  earlier	  period.	  Debate	  raged	  both	  privately	  and	  in	  the	  
press	  over	  the	  correct	  response	  to	  the	  revelations	  of	  São	  Tomé	  slavery.	  The	  Aborigines	  
Protection	  Society	  argued	  for	  boycott	  and	  a	  moral	  example.	  Others	  pressured	  a	  
reluctant	  Foreign	  Office	  to	  intervene.	  William	  Cadbury,	  purchasing	  agent	  for	  his	  family	  
firm,	  argued	  for	  a	  diplomatic	  approach	  whilst	  continuing	  to	  purchase	  cocoa.	  As	  ever	  
British	  opinion	  was	  heterogeneous	  and	  there	  was	  much	  dispute	  over	  how	  bad	  labour	  
conditions	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  islands	  actually	  were.	  	  The	  final	  resolution,	  which	  saw	  
Cadburys	  switch	  production	  to	  the	  British	  colony	  of	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  and	  win	  a	  libel	  suit	  
against	  press	  critics,	  echoes	  the	  case	  studies	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Often	  what	  was	  most	  
important	  was	  protecting	  the	  reputation	  of	  British	  firms	  or	  the	  British	  state,	  securing	  
material	  benefits	  for	  enslaved	  Africans	  fell	  by	  the	  way	  side.27	  All	  sides	  in	  this	  debate	  
explicitly	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  acting	  within	  Britain’s	  tradition	  of	  anti-­‐slavery,	  but	  
as	  I	  have	  shown	  this	  tradition	  contained	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  slavery	  apologism.	  
At	  first	  glance	  the	  involvement	  of	  British	  subjects	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  seems	  both	  
obvious	  and	  inevitable.	  Such	  a	  conclusion	  in	  many	  ways	  echoes	  the	  claims	  of	  those	  
British	  subjects	  who	  successfully	  defended	  their	  right	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  enslavement	  of	  
other	  human	  beings.	  This	  thesis	  has	  begun	  to	  reassemble	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Britons	  
profited	  from	  slavery,	  and	  more	  importantly	  how	  they	  justified	  it.	  A	  diverse	  collection	  
of	  British	  capitalists	  succeeded	  in	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  the	  slave	  trade	  or	  
reimagining	  their	  slave-­‐ownership	  as	  a	  means	  of	  spreading	  so-­‐called	  civilization.	  By	  
revealing	  the	  practices,	  rhetoric,	  and	  people	  involved	  in	  this	  process	  I	  have	  hopefully	  
laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  future	  research	  that	  will	  deepen	  our	  understanding	  of	  Victorian	  
Britain’s	  economic	  and	  ideological	  relationship	  to	  slavery.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Satre,	  Chocolate	  on	  Trial,	  pp.	  73-­‐98;	  pp.	  104-­‐178.	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A	  central	  contention	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  Victorian	  economy	  was	  not	  merely	  an	  
impersonal	  market	  place,	  but	  also	  a	  site	  of	  cultural	  and	  moral	  debate.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  
provides	  a	  particularly	  fruitful	  entry	  point	  into	  these	  debates	  as	  it	  allowed	  many	  of	  the	  
assumptions	  that	  underpinned	  the	  British	  economy	  to	  be	  questioned.	  Victorians	  were	  
aware	  that	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  had	  previously	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  British	  state	  
negating	  property	  rights	  and	  prohibiting	  the	  slave	  trade.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  they	  were	  
aware	  that	  success	  within	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  economy	  rested	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  
forge	  trust	  relationships,	  maintain	  a	  good	  reputations,	  and	  that	  most	  important	  of	  
source	  of	  social	  capital	  “character.”	  Within	  this	  context	  both	  the	  economic	  actions	  of	  
individuals	  and	  whole	  categories	  of	  economic	  activity,	  for	  example	  investing	  in	  joint-­‐
stock	  companies,	  were	  open	  to	  being	  moralised.	  It	  was	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  abolitionists	  
believed	  that	  simply	  revealing	  involvement	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  would	  expose	  
capitalists	  to	  moral	  condemnation	  and	  even	  prosecution.	  Across	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  
demonstrated	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  was	  due	  neither	  to	  a	  weakness	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  
nor	  the	  inexorable	  logic	  of	  the	  market.	  Rather,	  those	  invested	  in	  slavery	  successfully	  
constructed	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  economy	  to	  that	  proposed	  by	  
abolitionists	  or	  government	  critics.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  revealed	  how	  the	  entanglement	  of	  physical	  and	  imagined	  geographies	  
provided	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  for	  British	  capitalists.	  Debates	  over	  
the	  role	  of	  British	  capital	  in	  transatlantic	  slavery	  were	  physically	  removed	  from	  actual	  
sites	  were	  Britons	  owned	  slaves	  or	  dealt	  with	  slave	  traders.	  As	  such	  material	  
geographies	  aided	  British	  capitalists	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  limit	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  
back	  to	  the	  metropole.	  This	  included	  obscuring	  the	  trust	  relationships	  through	  which	  
commerce	  functioned	  or	  the	  elision	  of	  slaves	  into	  landed	  property.	  When	  abolitionists	  
did	  succeed	  in	  identifying	  British	  complicity	  merchants,	  bankers,	  and	  company	  
directors	  sought	  to	  establish	  their	  legitimacy	  through	  correspondence,	  company	  
reports,	  and	  the	  press.	  In	  positioning	  themselves	  as	  possessing	  authentic	  knowledge	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about	  the	  different	  slave	  societies	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  world	  these	  capitalists	  relied	  upon	  an	  
imagined	  geography	  that	  conceptualised	  various	  slave	  societies	  as	  occupying	  different	  
positions	  in	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  civilization.	  This	  imagined	  geography	  then	  justified	  the	  
material	  geography	  of	  Atlantic	  world	  capitalism	  by	  securing	  government	  sanction	  or	  
the	  support	  of	  investors	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  capital	  within	  slave	  societies.	  
Moral	  and	  cultural	  ideas	  cannot	  be	  easily	  separated	  from	  economic	  reasoning.	  British	  
capitalists	  constantly	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  economic	  rationalists	  in	  opposition	  to	  
critics	  who	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  economy.	  This	  was	  true	  of	  
both	  British	  merchants	  hoping	  to	  avoid	  regulation	  in	  West	  Africa	  and	  joint-­‐stock	  
directors	  arguing	  that	  they	  were	  taking	  appropriate	  care	  of	  their	  enslaved	  workforce.	  
Always	  implicit	  in	  these	  arguments	  was	  the	  assumption	  that	  British	  commerce	  or	  
mining	  ventures	  would	  eventually	  benefit	  both	  Britons	  and	  the	  societies	  where	  capital	  
was	  being	  deployed.	  By	  adopting	  a	  non-­‐normative	  definition	  of	  both	  morality	  and	  anti-­‐
slavery	  this	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  economic	  activities	  that	  could	  
be	  defended	  as	  both	  moral	  and	  working	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  transatlantic	  slavery.	  It	  has	  
also	  stressed	  that	  the	  knowledge	  upon	  which	  appeals	  to	  economic	  rationality	  was	  
based	  depended	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  historical	  actors	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  trustworthy	  
informants.	  Company	  directors,	  plantation	  owners,	  and	  merchants	  generally	  had	  
enough	  social	  capital	  to	  win	  the	  war	  of	  representation	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  
economy.	  They	  imagined	  a	  world	  in	  which	  certain	  moral	  expectations	  must	  be	  
suspended	  to	  allow	  the	  movement	  of	  British	  goods,	  capital,	  and	  people.	  
The	  problem	  of	  anti-­‐slavery	  was	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  operate	  
morally	  in	  an	  Atlantic	  economy	  built	  upon	  chattel	  slavery.	  For	  some,	  particularly	  the	  
abolitionists	  of	  BFASS,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  was	  to	  cut	  off	  connections	  to	  slavery.	  
But	  few	  Victorians	  dealt	  in	  such	  moral	  absolutes.	  As	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  throughout	  
this	  thesis	  capitalists	  argued	  time	  and	  again	  that	  their	  economic	  activity	  was	  both	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moral	  and	  economically	  rational.	  This	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  overseas	  British	  slave-­‐
ownership	  or	  complicity	  in	  the	  supplying	  of	  the	  slave	  trade	  were	  inevitable,	  but	  that	  
they	  could	  be	  reconciled	  with	  an	  opposition	  to	  slavery.	  They	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  in	  part	  
because	  the	  British	  Empire,	  as	  a	  political	  and	  geographic	  unit,	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  
free	  of	  slavery.	  Whilst	  connections	  to	  slave	  economies	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  disrupt	  this	  
image	  British	  capitalists	  succeeded	  in	  positioning	  themselves	  as	  opponents	  to	  slavery	  
and	  champions	  of	  civilization.	  As	  such	  the	  idea	  of	  Victorian	  Britain	  as	  an	  anti-­‐slavery	  
nation	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed;	  instead	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  how	  those	  involved	  in	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